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
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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND
PHILOSOPHY



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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

JAMES DRUMMOND.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

WHEN, on June 13th last, James Drummond passed from our midst the HIBBERT JOURNAL lost one of its most loyal and steadfast supporters. From the very beginning he had been intimately associated with our work, aiding and furthering it at every stage by his warm sympathy and his wise counsel. Our first number contained a striking and valuable article from his pen, and from that time until his death he was a frequent, and always a welcomed, contributor. An original member of the Editorial Board, he was never once absent from its meetings. And in the movement which led to the institution of this JOURNAL in 1902 he took a leading and prominent part, ever ready to give time and trouble and thought to the attainment of the object in view. It is fitting, therefore, that in these pages there should be some tribute, inadequate though it needs must be, to his memory, some recognition of what the religious life and theological thought of England have owed to him during the last half-century.

And yet in actually attempting to explain to oneself, much less to express in words the subtle influence of his personality, how impossible a task it seems! Dr Drummond had none of the vulgar marks that frequently characterise a successful leader either of thought or action. He founded no school, and in the ordinary sense of the term he gathered round him no disciples; and to those who believe that no religious teacher can stamp his impress upon his generation unless he be either a partisan or a dogmatist, the unique power which he

exerted will remain a perplexing and baffling enigma. But to those whose privilege it was to know him and to be able to converse with him on the highest and deepest subjects the secret of his power was no enigma, though it was of the character he was wont to ascribe to all things spiritual and eluded the grasp of the merely discursive reason. We cannot hope to meet again in this world the counterpart of that mind, so scrupulously careful and exact where care and exactness were essential for sound judgment and yet so firm and unhesitating when assured of a truth, however opposed that truth might be to the views of those with whom he would fain have been in accord. Still less can we hope to meet again a nature such as his; the union of a trained scientific and scholarly intellect with the simplicity and modesty of the humblest craftsman; an understanding keen, alert, and untiring, but entirely divorced from the remotest tinge of self-assertion and wholly absorbed in the interests to which his life was devoted. Upon his unfailing and delicate kindness we could always count; his perfect courtesy, his tranquil serenity, his unaffected piety, his placid trust in the goodness of the power that ruled the universe made us feel as though in his presence we were breathing an atmosphere rarer and purer than that which encircles the earth. These are the traits, or some of them, that endeared him to his friends, and which now by "the idealising touch of death" they are enabled to realise more clearly. Yet how utterly insufficient the enumeration will be to reveal to others the manner of man he was! In short, we have in himself a confirmation of the principle he was never weary of inculcating—the significance, namely, of personality in all the higher realms of being.

James Drummond was but twenty-four years of age when, after a brilliant career as a student, first at Trinity College Dublin, and later at Manchester New College (then in London, with John James Tayler as its Principal and James Martineau in its chair of Philosophy), he was called in 1859 to be the colleague of William Gaskell ("a beloved and sweet-souled man," as he described him) at Cross Street Chapel, Manchester. Mrs Gaskell was then at the height of her literary fame; *Mary Barton*, that pathetic story of Green Heys and Ancoats, *Ruth, Cranford*, and the *Life of Charlotte Brontë* had all been published; and in the troublous days of the Cotton Famine she and her husband were mainly occupied in organising methods of relief—the one topic, as she writes in one of her letters, "which was literally haunting us in our sleep, as well as being the first thoughts in wakening and the last at night."

The problems of the time were such as to draw forth the latent energy of the young Irish preacher; and often have I heard from the lips of Manchester citizens of the wondrous force and penetration and rich eloquence of James Drummond's early sermons. "He spoke," so one of them has recently said, "as one rapt into the very presence of divine things and able from that vantage-ground to see into the depths and lay bare the secrets of all the souls before him." Some of the fruits of that ministry are happily preserved in the volume entitled *Spiritual Religion*—assuredly one of the most beautiful series of devotional utterances in our own or in any language. The book is addressed to "that increasing class of men, who, while profoundly conscious of a spiritual power in Christianity, are yet unable to accept any of the current representations of it"; and, as contrasted with appeals to an external authority or to a miraculous revelation, presents a noble plea for the reality of religious experience as an actual fact in human consciousness, bearing its own guarantee no less convincingly than the experience of visible objects bears to their presence and reality.

After ten years in the ministry, and on the death of his former teacher, John James Tayler, in 1869, James Drummond was appointed to the chair of theology in his old college, and from that time onwards devoted himself, with unwearying perseverance, to the vocation of the scholar, without, however, in the least degree losing his inspiration as a preacher. For sixteen sessions he worked, "in pure and unbroken harmony," with Dr Martineau, who succeeded Mr Tayler as Principal; and then, in 1885, on Dr Martineau's retirement, was himself called upon to assume the Principalship, a position which he continued to fill for twenty-one years, resigning the office in 1906. The early years of his Principalship were eventful years in the history of the college. Its removal in 1889 to Oxford threw upon him a heavy load of responsibility. The students of those days, and I may venture to speak as one of them, look back with unqualified admiration to the way in which their Principal rose to the demands of the situation. Naturally of a reserved and unobtrusive disposition, with an inveterate shrinking from anything approaching to self-advertisement or display, it is surprising how on every public occasion he invariably contrived to say the right thing, and how, under his direction, the unsectarian position for which the college stood speedily came to be recognised in Oxford. In his Address at the simple opening ceremony in October 1889 he vindicated the claims of theology to be pursued, as every other science is pursued, by the patient

accumulation of evidence and the application of sound methods of criticism. "A pledge, which binds teacher or learner to any foregone conclusion, even if that conclusion should be true, may yet," he urged, "bias the intellect and strain the conscience, and so impair the spiritual faculty by which truth is apprehended. It is not by chains and servitude that men are withheld from error; and truth needs not, as a weak pretender, the shelter of a gilded prison, but moving in imperial freedom among the free, commands with native authority those who have sworn allegiance to her alone." And in his sermons from the college pulpit the fundamental principles of Christianity were unfolded with the simple persuasiveness of irresistible conviction, which seemed to pierce to one's most inward needs and to envelop life with a sacredness it was sacrilege to violate.

Dr Drummond believed in the capacity of the mind to attain to truth, but he did not believe that the road to truth was a smooth and easy road. He felt that the search for truth exacted alike from teacher and from pupil not only strenuous labour of the intellect but patient wrestling with irksome details. No teaching could have been more thorough than his, certainly none has earned more grateful recognition from all who were able and willing to pursue the intellectual ideal he set before them. After his exhaustive treatment, for example, of the Epistle to the Romans, containing at every turn the fresh results of his own research and reflection, the student who had followed him was in possession of a new conception of Pauline theology—a conception in the light of which the Apostle Paul stood forth as an interpreter of the religious consciousness incomparably greater than he is ordinarily represented as being. And in his comprehensive and masterly lectures on the Synoptic Gospels, Dr Drummond made one realise what genuine and fearless criticism involved and how it should be conducted. Nor was his erudition less conspicuous when he was dealing with the more speculative problems of theology, and discussing, say, the trends of thought in the systems of an Irenæus or an Origen. Throughout, and in everything he handled, his method was the same—the method of resolute and many-sided inquiry, of undeviating loyalty to fact, and of vigilant care in drawing conclusions. For the theological student it was a priceless discipline, engendering those habits of intellectual honesty and of independent judgment which are so essentially requisite in men who are to stimulate the thought and touch the souls of their fellows.

Of the many volumes that we owe to Dr Drummond's pen it must suffice to mention only a few. His first book on the Messianic Idea among the Jews, which appeared in 1877, has been the forerunner of a number of subsequent investigations, all of which are more or less indebted to his pioneer survey of the whole field. His great treatise on Philo and the Jewish-Alexandrian Philosophy, which was given to the world in 1888, is still, and is likely long to remain, the standard work upon an intricate and difficult subject. By an elaborate and minute examination of the available evidence, the result is reached that the Logos was not, as had generally been supposed, regarded by Philo as a personal being, but as the thought of God, dwelling subjectively in the divine mind, while at the same time planted out and made objective in the universe, so as to be capable of being conceived apart from God. Probably Dr Drummond had been led into these paths of research by his desire to approach the problems raised by the Fourth Gospel fully equipped for the task. It was not, I believe, until 1891 that he commenced to lecture on the Fourth Gospel; and, although he had previously published three or four considerable monographs on special Johannine questions, it was not until 1903 that his now well-known work saw the light. That it belongs to the front rank of critical contributions towards the solution of the problems with which it deals is universally admitted. To not a few its contents must have occasioned feelings of surprise. Written by one who had consistently rejected the orthodox Christology, it pronounced definitely in favour of St John, the son of Zebedee, as the author of the Gospel; and, in opposition to a large consensus of opinion, argued that the Gospel was used, not only by Justin, but by both the Gnostic leaders, Basilides and Valentinus, and that traces of it are to be found in the Apostolic Fathers—Ignatius, Barnabas, and Hermas. On the other hand, however, it was maintained that the book is rather an interpretation of the inward and essential meaning of Christ's life, than an exact delineation of its outward incidents; and that, therefore, a lower historical value is to be attributed to it than to the Synoptics.

In the weighty work on Christian doctrine, published in 1908, as also in the Hibbert Lectures of 1894 and in other smaller writings, Dr Drummond laid out in detail his conception of the root-ideas of Christianity and of the place of Christ in human history. Looking at the life of man as a whole, we can, he maintained, discern in the development of religion a

peculiar form and quality of the religious spirit which is marked off from other forms and qualities of it. A certain combination of graciousness and purity of soul, of tender regard for others, of loving self-forgetfulness, of trustful acceptance of the divine will, together with an assurance of intimate communion with God and a felt relationship with Christ, constitute what may be called the "Christian consciousness." And if we try to specify what it is that gives uniqueness to this type of consciousness, we shall find it to be that which is denoted by the phrase "a sense of sonship," a sense of oneness of nature between the Infinite Mind and minds that are finite and limited. In other words, we are led to see that within the realm of mind the difference between infinitude and finitude involves not difference of nature; the "Over-Soul" is still a soul and lives in unity with other souls. And just as there is spiritual union between God and man, so is there spiritual union between man and man. But although the bond of union is in essence the same in both cases, yet the sense of sonship is not identical with the sense of brotherhood. And to share in the sense of sonship with another is again a different experience from sharing directly in the life of God. Now, if the sense of sonship first became a reality for the world in the soul of Christ, if through his consciousness of his own sonship the fatherhood of God, in all its significance, first dawned upon the human mind, that in itself suffices to explain how it comes about that in the experience of sonship Christians feel themselves to be in touch with the personality of him who was the first-born of many brothers. Mysterious though the influence which one soul exerts upon another may be, yet such influence is an indisputable fact of daily occurrence; and what a departed father or mother, friend or comrade, may be to the individual, that Christ may be to the community of Christendom and to each member of it. If, on the other hand, the term "son of God" when applied to Christ be used in a totally different sense from that in which the term is applied to other men, the whole Christian argument is rendered incoherent and becomes lost in obscurity. Not to reveal himself but to reveal the Father was surely the purpose of Christ's mission; and just because the consciousness of the divine had reached in him an unexampled clearness, the thought and speech by which he thrilled the multitudes amazed and awed even himself, the love he felt for the sinful and the sad seemed to flood his being from a source beyond him, he seemed to himself to be an instrument in God's hands. Hence it is not strange he should have told his disciples that he could do nothing of himself, and

that in so far as they beheld what was deepest and most inspiring in him they beheld, not the transient frailty of a mortal, but the eternal life of the Father who sent him.

The theme was one upon which Dr Drummond loved to dwell, and the earnest desire to penetrate into the consciousness of Christ was the animating motive of his patient labours as a theologian. He looked upon the advent of Christianity as the most tremendous fact of the human centuries; and, even though the records which have come down to us be less perfect than has usually been supposed, and elements in them of Jewish misconception and of Hellenistic theory have to be admitted, yet from all this he found the gracious figure of its author disengaging itself in greatness more signal and beautiful, and entitled still to the grateful veneration of mankind as the perfect realisation of a soul in harmony with the divine. Nay, more. It was only a superficial and mechanical view of human nature that could throw obstacles in the way of a faith in the continual presence of Christ with our humanity, not only as the exemplar of an incarnation of God in man which is perpetually happening, but as a living "quickenings spirit" that may be the light of our seeing and impart to us the strength and peace of filial devotion. Such, indeed, was the essence of the Christian religion as Dr Drummond conceived it. And by his own life—a life permeated with the Christian sense of sonship—he has shown how the love of God in Christ can lift all the actions and events of an individual's existence into a higher plane, and shed a new dignity around its least and lowliest details. Of him one might venture to say, in a very real sense of the words, that his life was in its inner being, as it was lived from day to day, a life that was "hid with Christ in God."

"His was a soul from visionary hill
Watching and hearkening for ethereal news,
Looking beyond life's storms and death's cold dews
To habitations of the eternal will."

G. DAWES HICKS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

IN WHAT SENSE IS SURVIVAL DESIRABLE ?

C. D. BROAD, M.A.

§ 1. THE question that I propose to discuss in this paper concerns a purely hypothetical state of affairs. I do not intend to consider whether there be any reason to believe that all or some human beings survive the death of their bodies. I simply wish to analyse the notion of survival; to see how far we should be justified in taking a more cheerful view of the world if it be true; and, in particular, to inquire which parts of this complex notion are relevant to the question of optimism or pessimism, and which are not. But, before opening the main discussion, I must say something about the connection between the desirability and the probability of survival. In my opinion there is none. If it could be conclusively proved that the world would be very bad without survival and very good with it, this would not have the slightest bearing on the question whether survival is a fact. All arguments of this sort have been refuted in principle by Dr M'Taggart in his *Dogmas of Religion*; there is nothing to add to his criticisms, they have merely to be adapted to meet particular forms of this fallacious argument as they arise.

Survival, if believed in at all, must be believed in either for no reason, or on authority, or on general philosophical grounds not involving ethical considerations, or on empirical evidence such as that discussed by the S.P.R. Neglecting the first form of belief, which is irrelevant to anyone who does not happen to have it, and the second, which would take us too far afield, I will make a few remarks about the third. Here again M'Taggart is one of the very few modern philosophers who have seen clearly the points involved. He sees that there are two questions—one empirical and one *a priori*. The *a priori* part is the attempt to prove that certain

factors in the universe must be permanent. The empirical part is the attempt to identify human beings with some of these. It seems to me that M'Taggart's actual argument in his *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology* fails on both counts; but this does not prove that all such arguments must do so. Nevertheless, I feel little doubt that they will. It seems pretty clear that things about which propositions can be proved *a priori* have not that kind or degree of complexity which characterises a human mind, and that propositions which can be proved *a priori* do not make assertions about existence or permanence. This may seem a dogmatic statement; but familiarity with propositions which are certainly *a priori*, such as those of mathematics and logic, does, I think, lead one to feel that a proposition asserting that minds do (or do not) last for ever, and claiming to be *a priori*, is as incongruous as a purple quadratic equation or a virtuous gamma function.

I conclude, then, that any evidence for survival must come from psychical research, and therefore must be empirical, not merely in the sense in which there would be an empirical element even in M'Taggart's argument, but in the sense in which the evidence for the wave-theory of light or the formula of benzene is empirical. By this I mean that survival must be a hypothesis to explain certain special and peculiar facts, and that the only *a priori* element in the argument is the laws of logic and probability used in the hypothetical method and therefore common to all the sciences of nature.

§ 2. Now, this conclusion, if true, is important. It means that, if we ever have any evidence for survival at all, it will not merely be evidence for survival in the abstract, but for some particular kind of survival. Any facts which lead us to believe that a certain person has survived bodily death must enable us to form some view, though it may be a very inadequate and precarious one, as to whether he has gone up or down in the scale intellectually or morally. There are, in fact, some general principles which could be applied to such cases. If the communications be above the normal intellectual level of the person whom we assume to be sending them, it is *as safe* to suppose that he has risen in the intellectual scale as that he is communicating at all. If they be below his normal intellectual level, it is not *as safe* to assume that he has fallen intellectually as that he is really communicating, for it is reasonable to take account of the shock of bodily death, the imperfections of the instrument, and the possible lack of skill of the supposed communicator.

The importance of this consideration is that we shall never

in practice have to discuss the value of survival wholly in the abstract, since any evidence for supposing it to be true at all will also be evidence for supposing it to be of such and such a kind. Applying these considerations to the mass of facts accumulated by the S.P.R., I think it is reasonable to say that, *if* they point to survival at all, they point on the whole in no way to intellectual improvement in the departed (though they leave this possible), but that they do not point so strongly to general intellectual degeneration as the uncritical sometimes suppose. Moreover, the one set of facts—the “Myers” cross-correspondences—which most strongly suggests survival also strongly suggests ingenuity and initiative of a fairly high order. I think, therefore, that we are free to discuss the desirability of survival on the assumption that, if it takes place at all, there is no strong reason to think that the survivor is intellectually much better or much worse a few years after his death than he was a few years before. As to the moral characteristics that are to be assumed in survivors, I think we have no means of judging. Some communications contain elevated (but, to my mind, rather “twaddling”) rhetoric, others contain obscenity. But, as it would be impossible to form any very valuable opinion of the character of an ordinary man from the mere fact that he habitually talked in an elevated style (as did Mr Jabez Balfour), or that he habitually told bleak stories (as did Sir Robert Walpole), I think that such communications leave us completely in the dark as to whether, if people survive, they improve or degenerate morally. We may therefore take as a reasonable hypothesis the view that, if people survive bodily death at all, they are neither much better nor much worse morally shortly after that event than they were shortly before. I can certainly see nothing in the communications to warrant the Catholic view that they are all due to evil spirits; if it be true, the practice of pulling the legs of psychical researchers must surely be among their more innocent amusements and not their more serious business—unless my Lord Chesterfield’s remark to the Garter King-of-Arms applies very forcibly to the fallen angels.

§ 3. These matters being settled, let us reflect why we regard death as an evil, and how far survival of the kind mentioned would remove the sting of death. We may regard the fact that all men are mortal from three altitudes. (1) We may consider the objection which each of us has to his own death. (2) We may consider our objection to the deaths of our friends. And (3) we may consider our objection to the death of the human race. Let us discuss these points in order.

§ 4. I suppose that, in some sense, we all dread our own death. But this dread is of a very different intensity in different people who have the same powers of reflection and imagination. Moreover, it can coexist in an acute form (as it did in Dr Johnson) with a lively belief in human survival. These facts suggest that probably there is a good deal of confusion in men's dread of their own death, and that the phrase probably covers a number of fears directed towards wholly different objects. Our first task will be to analyse the dread of death and distinguish the various fears which it may include.

First we must distinguish between the fear of dying and the fear of being dead. It is perfectly reasonable for anyone to fear dying, for the process of dying is often very painful, and it is always accompanied by weakness and the control of oneself by external things or by other people. And there are some ways of dying which are specially hateful from their inherent lack of dignity. Any death by slow suffocation seems to me peculiarly horrible for this reason. The impulse to try to breathe as long as possible is too primitive to be overcome by the will. Hence death by suffocation involves a hopeless struggle between an uncontrollable impulse and external nature, which will go on to the bitter end in spite of our desire to submit ourselves with dignity to the inevitable. Such a struggle is degrading in itself and hideous in its external manifestations, and we are quite right to regard it with loathing. Now, whether we survive death or not, we shall all die, and many of us will die from suffocation. Hence, the fear of dying (as distinct from that of being dead) is a reasonable one, and is independent of a belief in survival.

§ 5. On the other hand, the fear of being dead must depend for its rationality very largely on whether we do or do not expect to survive, and on what we expect our future state to be if we survive. Let us suppose, first, that we definitely disbelieve in survival. We cannot then rationally *fear* being dead, though we can rationally regret the cessation of our life if it promised at the time of dying to contain in the future a balance of good. If we die in old age, when our best work is done and our chances of future health and happiness are small, there is nothing to fear in being dead and little to regret in dying, on the present view. But many people who do not expect to survive fall into a confusion about their own death. They tend to think of themselves in the future as being at once really dead and yet able to contemplate their own loss and deadness. This, however, is a mere confusion,

it is tantamount to assuming a definite and exceptionally depressing view about survival. The great consolation about a firm belief in one's own extinction is that one knows the worst, and that the worst—so far as concerns oneself—is not particularly bad.

§ 6. Let us next assume a doubt about the certainty of extinction, together with no positive view as to the nature of survival if we survive at all. Such a view really does add two terrors to death. (1) There is the terror of strangeness which must, in practice, attach to death on any view of survival. If we survive at all, we are bound to pass through very unfamiliar circumstances after having adapted ourselves so long to life in the body. It is reasonable to shrink from what is strange and unfamiliar; and part of our shrinking from death, if we think survival probable or even possible, is the shrinking which a boy feels on going for the first time to a public school. This source of fear attaches to all views of survival, however detailed and cheerful they may be. If I were certain that, as soon as I died, I was to be triumphantly carried by legions of angels into the company of just men made perfect, I should still feel extremely nervous as to the correct way of treating the angels and the exact code of etiquette which prevails among just men after they have been perfected. (2) The other terror of course is that, if we are to survive, and if we know none of the details, then our future life may be much worse than the one which we are leaving. For the individual there is nothing specially cheerful in the doctrine of survival in the abstract. On the theory of non-survival we know the worst; on the theory of survival, combined with no sort of knowledge as to its details, the most horrible possibilities remain open to us; whilst, on some theories about the nature of the next life, these possibilities are extremely probable. Dr Johnson was afraid of death mainly because (quite reasonably, on his own theological view) he was afraid of hell. And I must insist that the fact that hell would be extremely unpleasant furnishes no ground for holding that it cannot be real. I must add that the doctrine of survival, accompanied by no theory as to its details or by a belief in hell, may add to other evils of life besides the fear of death. This is because of its connection with suicide. If I am persuaded that there is no survival I know that, when things in this life become too bad, I can leave them and cease to exist. But, on the theory of survival, I cannot kill myself, and I may only make my state worse if I kill my body. Now this frankly seems to me an appalling reflection; one may

never have the faintest desire to cease to exist, but the thought that one *could* not do so however hard one tried is suffocating, and makes the world into a prison, even when it is—as it is not for most people at most times—a palace too.

§ 7. Now, we will take what I have tried to show to be the most reasonable view, viz. that, if we survive at all, we are probably not much better or worse soon after death than soon before it. If this be true, the strangeness and our fear of it will remain; but it will no longer be the fear of a boy going to a public school of which he knows nothing, or of a man going under an operation of doubtful issue, but rather that of a nervous man going to take up his work in new surroundings when he has no reason to doubt that he will be tolerably happy and successful when the novelty has worn off. The possibility of ultimate downfall of course will remain too, and the possibility, though not the certainty, that the self is indestructible by its own acts, however badly things may turn out. On the other hand, anyone who agrees with the present writer in thinking that the three things in life really worth having are personal friendship, clear knowledge, and the contemplation of beautiful objects, will die, on this view, with a reasonable hope that he may be able to renew his friendships, increase and clarify his knowledge, and continue to contemplate beautiful objects. So far then it seems as if the only kind of survival in favour of which we can produce the least evidence would, for most of us personally, be likely to be better than extinction.

§ 8. But a serious qualification remains to be mentioned. If a life something like our present one is to go on indefinitely, will it not become at length an intolerable bore? If, on the other hand, it eventually ceases, is the consolation of surviving the first death worth anything to the individual? Again, to repeat a very pertinent question of Mr Bradley's, does not death sometimes bury difficulties about personal relations which might be disastrously exhumed by resurrection? Let us take the first two questions together. To a person possessed of intellectual curiosity and reasonable powers of exercising it, it does not seem to me that this life becomes burdensome except through ill health (including pain and exhaustion), loss of friends, or loss of a certain minimum of the means of physical comfort and decency. So long as there is anything in the world to master intellectually and understand more clearly, and a reasonable prospect of making progress in these directions, I can hardly imagine myself being permanently bored. Still less can I imagine this happening if there were old friends to

meet and new people whose thoughts and tastes I could discover by an adventurous process of drawing them out. When I contemplate a continuance of the present life and find the prospect boring, it seems to me that it is really old age with its loneliness, its ill health, its failing powers, and its headstrong dogmatism and onesidedness that I am dreading. If the main effect of death be to shake off these accumulated clogs from my mind, but otherwise to leave me neither much better nor much worse than it finds me, I do not think the danger of being bored a serious one; for there is not the slightest fear that I shall ever understand all there is to know, and yet there would be a reasonable prospect that I should continually understand more things and see more clearly their mutual relations. Still, I can see that it is *only* love and knowledge which "in heaven shall shine more bright," and I can imagine that those whose main interests are elsewhere might be bored with their immortality.

It is, of course, quite possible that, if we survive the first death and be not greatly changed, we may do this only to meet later with a second and final death. If this were true, it need not make the first survival worthless. We have seen that there is nothing very terrible in being dead if we do not survive, and that, apart from a natural fear of the circumstance of dying, the main ground for regret on this view is to die with our work unaccomplished. Now, if we survive one death, there is at least a hope that we shall have done all that is in us by the time we reach the second and final death. And there is no such hope if earthly death be the end of all of us. Finally, I do not see why, if we survive at all and are not greatly changed by our earthly death, death should not be a recurrent incident in our total life as sleep is in our present life. This would at least remove all fear of boredom; for each death would be a great adventure, and, as our knowledge increased, the fear of dying, which is so painful in this life, might not sadden our future lives. In them death might seem as normal and beneficent as sleep.

§ 9. Mr Bradley's question can best be discussed in the next section. We may sum up the results thus far as follows. For the individual the fear of dying is a reasonable one, and is independent of any theory about survival. Being dead is not to be feared if we are sure that we shall not survive; and dying is only to be regretted, on this view, if we still have reasonable prospects of happiness, knowledge, and friendship when we die.

On any view of survival, death is to be dreaded from its

strangeness, whilst a bare belief in survival and certain positive beliefs about the future life open up horrible possibilities or probabilities which a belief in extinction eliminates. Those who believe in extinction have the great consolation of having real suicide open to them; to the believer in survival, suicide may be an abstract possibility, but he does not know how to accomplish it, or whether it can be accomplished at all. A belief in survival, combined with the view that we are not greatly changed for the better or worse by death, offers a reasonable prospect of friendship and growing understanding to men; it need not be worthless to them if they be ultimately mortal, nor boring if they be ultimately immortal.

§ 10. We now pass to the second point of view from which death is to be considered, viz. our sorrow at the death of our friends. We have to analyse this sentiment, and to see how far a belief in survival is likely to have a consolatory influence on those who hold it. My sorrow at the death of anyone else is a complicated state of mind, like my fear of my own death; it consists of several emotions directed at different objects. There are at least three different sentiments involved in sorrow at the death of a friend. Suppose, *e.g.*, the friend is a promising youth who has been cut off in the war at the best time of his life. Then I feel sorry (*a*) for him, (*b*) for myself in losing him, (*c*) in a more abstract and general way for the loss to humanity of a person with his gifts and graces. These three states of mind are clearly distinguishable: I can feel (*a*) and (*c*) about a man whom I have never met, though I cannot feel (*b*); a religious man who had a lively faith that his friend was better off in the next world than he could ever be in this might feel (*b*) and (*c*) without (*a*); whilst, in the perfectly possible case of losing a friend without being under any illusion that he had great powers or virtues, I could feel (*a*) and (*b*) though not (*c*). Let us, then, consider these sentiments in turn and ask how they should be affected by a belief in survival.

§ 11. (*a*) In what sense can I reasonably be sorry for my dead friend if I believe that he has totally ceased to exist? He cannot be regretting that his life was cut short before his work was done or his pleasure enjoyed, for he neither knows nor regrets anything. My regret can only rationally take the impersonal form (*c*) on this hypothesis. The only more personal form that it can take is sympathy with *his* feeling of regret at leaving this life, on the assumption that he was conscious near the end and had this feeling. My sorrow in this case will be, not for him as dead, but for him as dying and dying unwillingly. Hence the belief in extinction renders

sorrow for the dead as individuals irrational, and, in doing this, it must be regarded as consolatory so far as it goes.

If, on the other hand, we believe in survival, sorrow for the dead will be reasonable or unreasonable entirely as we think their future state likely to be good or bad. If we think that they are in hell or in purgatory, it is reasonable to be sorry for them. If we think that their state after death is not conspicuously different from their state some time before, it is not rational to be particularly sorry for them, since, on this hypothesis, it will probably be better than their state during their last illness. It will, indeed, be reasonable to sympathise with them on two counts, so far as we can judge. We may sympathise with them on the strangeness and unfamiliarity of their new condition, and on their initial loneliness; for, if it is painful for us to have lost communication with them, it is presumably painful to them to have lost communication with us.

The conclusion seems to be that, on no theory except one which makes it probable that our friends are in hell or purgatory, is it reasonable to feel very sorry for them in being dead. If they have not survived, they do not exist to be objects of our sorrow; and, if they have survived, they are probably not permanently worse off than when they were with us. Sympathy with them, rather than violent sorrow for them, seems to be our appropriate attitude towards our dead friends immediately after their death, on the present theory. We shall feel this sympathy most strongly when their death has been violent and sudden, because it seems reasonable to suppose that, under these circumstances, their initial sense of strangeness and loss will be greatest.

§ 12. (b) My sorrow at my own loss seems to me to be in fact, and quite reasonably, much the most important factor in my total sorrow at my friend's death. Friendship being the most important good in life (with the possible exception of abstract knowledge), the loss of a friend is the worst evil that can happen to us. Now, of course, if we believe that death really is the end, we have nothing to mitigate our sorrow. On the other hand, have we very much to mitigate it if we believe in survival? I think we can only say that survival makes it *possible* that we may renew our friendships; but, without a great deal more detailed knowledge as to the next life than we can reasonably expect to have, I doubt if it be probable. Consider how easily friends who are contemporaries may be totally separated on this earth by the circumstances of business or family ties; remember that, of a pair of friends,

one may die fifty years before the other; and I think that we must admit that, even on the hypothesis of survival, the renewal of friendship is a faint hope rather than a reasonable probability. The question really depends largely on two metaphysical ones to which I am not prepared to give answers: (i) What is the real significance of space and time in the universe? and (ii) Has human love any importance *sub specie æternitatis* compared with what it has *sub specie temporis*? I can only say that, whilst I am pretty sure that *order* in time and space is a fundamental characteristic, I am much less sure that the particular positions and distances in time and space which are so important in this life are of universal significance. About human love I can say even less; the love of persons of opposite sex seems to me to have probably only a local and temporary significance, its *main* function in nature is obvious enough, and this may be its *whole* function. Friendship, on the other hand, cannot be dealt with or explained in this short and easy way (which is possibly inadequate even for the love of opposite sexes), and it may be that it really is of some importance from the point of view of the universe. But I think we should be unwise to build any great hopes on these two possibilities; and, therefore, I must conclude that a belief in survival can only be regarded as a faint mitigation of our grief at the loss of a friend. It leaves a loophole for hope, and that is about all we can say.

§ 13. This seems the place to deal with Mr Bradley's question mentioned in a previous section and there deferred. Human love is singularly imperfect; it is capricious, impermanent, and at the mercy of misunderstandings due to the absurdly complex way in which human minds have to communicate with each other. If a friend dies at a time when one's relations with him are perfect, there is, I think, a very real sense in which one may say that his death was the crowning point of the friendship; that if he had lived it could not have been permanently maintained at that level; and that by his death the friendship has gained the finished perfection of a work of art which a *post mortem* renewal might destroy, as a bad sequel injures a good novel. There are many similar difficulties, some of which Mr Bradley considers in detail. I think we must admit that they show that, so far as we can see, survival would not be an unmitigated advantage even as regards our personal relations with our friends; like most other things in the world, its effects would be partly good and partly bad. We may, in fact, sum up by saying that, if survival does not renew our personal relations, it is no consolation to

our sorrow at the death of a friend, but it is not likely to cause the difficulties mentioned by Mr Bradley ; if it does renew our personal relations, it is a consolation to our sorrow, but it may lead to other difficulties of which we shall be free if we die with our bodies or survive without meeting our old friends and enemies.

(c) The impersonal sorrow that we feel at the loss to humanity caused by the death of a man in the prime of life belongs clearly to the next section, where we have to deal with death from the point of view of the human race as a whole.

§ 14. It has been noticeable so far that the doctrine of extinction has few genuine terrors for the individual so long as he regards the interests simply of himself and of his personal friends. It has, indeed, as we have seen, some consolation to offer on both counts. And the doctrine of survival, though in certain forms it has been seen to be mildly consolatory to the individual in viewing his own fate and that of his friends, cannot be said to have proved very encouraging in the only form in which it seems in the least probable ; whilst, in some other forms, it suggests detestable possibilities and probabilities. But, when we consider the fate of the human race as a whole, and take a less personal point of view, the scene, in my opinion, changes altogether.

It seems about as certain as anything not *à priori* can be that, apart from a miracle, the earth will in time become uninhabitable by men, and, at a later time, by any organised life. It is a matter of indifference whether this time be long or short for anyone who takes at all a wide outlook. If, then, men die when their bodies die, it is practically certain that, within a long but finite time, there will be no human spirits in the universe. Now, everything that we know as having the slightest value, either is a human spirit, or is the state of such a spirit, or contains as an essential element such a state. Hence, if ever there be no human spirits there will, as far as we know, be no objects of the slightest value in the universe. There will, of course, remain objects which *would* be elements in valuable things *if* they stood in cognitive and other relations to human spirits (*e.g.* the properties of the elliptic integrals will remain, and the cognition of these *would* be valuable *if* there were anyone to cognise them). But they *will* not be valuable by themselves, merely because they *would* be elements in valuable wholes if the other elements, which as a matter of fact will be missing, were present. If, then, no human being survives the death of his body, it is certain that all valuable objects which depend in any way for their value on relation

to a human mind will some day cease to exist. And, as we do not know that there are any other valuable objects in the universe, we must say that, so far as we know, there is a date after which the universe will contain nothing of the slightest value.

There may, of course, be other spirits in the universe which are not human, *e.g.* other finite spirits or God. If so, of course the universe may always contain valuable objects, and only a certain class of valuable objects will be lost by the extinction of the human race. And, of course, the values that depend on human beings might be trivial as compared with those which depend on other spirits. But all this is pure conjecture.

§ 15. Supposing it were a true conjecture, could it be said that our efforts are of any permanent importance? The value of ourselves and of our personal relations could be of no permanent importance in this view. But the beautiful objects which we produce and the truths which we discover might be contemplated by other spirits when we have ceased to exist, and might help them to the production of still more beautiful objects and to the discovery of still more complex truths. Our contemplation and our knowledge will die with us and its value will die with it, but it might be succeeded by their contemplation and knowledge of the objects which we had produced or discovered. We may say then that, if all human beings die with their bodies, their efforts are only of permanent value on the following supposition: (*a*) that there exist other spirits; (*b*) that these spirits are so related to us that what we produce and discover can be contemplated by them and can help them to further artistic production and intellectual achievement; and (*c*) that either they are immortal or are related to other spirits in the same way as we can be to them, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Even on this fairly complex hypothesis (for which, so far as I know, we have not the faintest evidence), all values which reside in human characters, which are stored up in human institutions, or which are constituted by the personal relations of human beings, will vanish with the human race. Nevertheless, I should consider the universe tolerably satisfactory if I thought that there was no survival, but that the hypothesis mentioned above was true. On such a theory it could not fairly be said that men were mere means to the welfare of other spirits, any more than you could say that Newton was a mere means to Laplace because the discoveries of the former were the starting-point of the latter's work. I do not think the human race could reasonably complain if it knew that it

and its efforts stood in the same relation to another race of spirits and their efforts as Newton and his work stand to Laplace and his. We should make our discoveries and have the pleasure of contemplating their beauty, with the knowledge that, when we and our contemplation had ceased, others could contemplate the same objects and profit by our labour. Such a situation is neither degrading nor depressing.

The upshot of the discussion seems to be that, if there be no survival, a great part of all that we know to be valuable *must* be lost on any hypothesis. On a certain rather complicated hypothesis about other spirits and our relations to them, for which we have no evidence whatever, something would be saved from the wreck, and it would be enough to enable us to pronounce the universe a tolerably decent institution. Of the three great goods, human love goes altogether; human knowledge and human æsthetic contemplation go, as such, but the efforts of the thinker and the artist are not lost. The hypothesis of human survival would save all those without the need of any very complex subsidiary hypotheses. But we shall do well not to expect too much of the universe:—

“Therefore, since the world has still
Much good, but much less good than ill,
And while the sun and moon endure
Luck’s a chance, but trouble’s sure,
I’d face it as a wise man would,
And train for ill and not for good.”

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ARMS AND MEN : A STUDY IN HABIT.¹

L. P. JACKS.

IF the past experience of the race may be taken as decisive, it would appear that arms, like clothes, are a normal part of the human equipment. And so they will remain until the habits of nations are radically changed. That all of us wear clothes and only some carry arms must not be suffered to obscure the essential truth. For the individual in modern times has escaped the necessity of wearing arms by arming the State on his behalf. Hence the distinction between the civilian and the soldier is not as deep as it looks. In the deeds of the soldier the civilian is accessory both before and after the fact : before, in supplying him with his armed equipment, and in supporting him in general ; after, in sharing the fruits of what has been accomplished by the arms which he has placed in the soldier's hand.

So long as man needs protecting against his neighbour, or against himself, it is not easy to see how he can live his life without aid from the weapons of death, either by deputy or in person. Under present conditions we arm the State for both purposes : for protection against others, when we contemplate foreign war ; for protection against ourselves, when we contemplate civil strife and recognise that we too require to be kept in order. All this is apt to be forgotten when we cry for disarmament ; but is conceded immediately afterwards when we demand the establishment of an International Police. The term "police" is perhaps a little unfortunate in this connection ; it is too suggestive of those excellent men in blue who so often save us from ourselves by a smart tap on the shoulder and a little pacific advice.

¹ The present article may be considered as the sequel to one, by the same writer, which appeared a year ago in the HIBBERT JOURNAL, under the title "The War-made Empires and the Martial Races of the Western World."

But an International Police would have to be extensively and effectively armed and armoured, with warlike commanders at its head. Its war harness would have to stand ready to be donned at a moment's notice.

To strip mankind of its arms, and to pass an edict of universal prohibition on their use, and to do this suddenly, would be the most complete return to the simple life that could be imagined, for it would carry us back beyond primitive man to a prehuman stage of history. Though less startling to the sensibilities, it would be at least as drastic in principle as if mankind were suddenly stripped of its clothes and compelled to resume the garb of its original progenitors. Arms, indeed, may be considered a kind of clothes, as Carlyle, in *Sartor*, reminds us more than once.¹ The distinction between arms and armour is not easy to draw; the one tends to pass into the other, and the transition takes place both ways under a somewhat bewildering law. As the individual soldier tends to wear less armour—though this tendency appears at the moment to be reversed—the State tends to wear more. When the State is in question we speak of armaments rather than of arms, and these may be justly regarded as the iron clothes of nations. A nation, or a league of nations, which had no armament would be, in a very real sense, naked.

Arms, like "clothes" in general, have played a notable part in moulding history, changing human character, and creating habits of thought. In the last respect especially their influence has been most remarkable. Philosophy itself is largely conducted in language borrowed from their use. Metaphors of this kind are so numerous and so closely entwined with the philosophical vernacular as to be almost categories of thought. "The sword of the Spirit" has become an inevitable expression. We seldom realise how deeply the very form of our minds in their "highest" as well as in their "lowest" activities has been influenced from this source. Were we to strip them of all they owe to it, what remained would hardly be a recognisable thing.

It is remarkable that the first word of the national epic of Rome is "arma" and the second "virum." The form of the words reminds us that between arms and men there is a close

¹ "Nay, rightly considered, what is your whole Military and Police Establishment, charged at uncalculated millions, but a huge scarlet-coloured, iron-fastened Apron, wherein Society works (uneasily enough); guarding itself from some soil and stithy-sparks in this Devil's-smithy of a world?"—*Sartor*, chap. iv.

psychological intimacy, and almost suggests that arms lead the way and the man follows. Most assuredly they do so at times, as Shakespeare profoundly hints in the passage when he makes the dagger of Macbeth "*marshal* him the way that he was going." At all events the relation between arms and men, or rather between nations and armaments, is never merely mechanical. As the dog has acquired some human characteristics by long association with his master, so arms have come, in a manner, to share the personality of the race, whose ends they have served through so many ages. They have been the companions of man in his great adventures; have shared his vigils, his perils, his trials, his achievements; have followed him through all the tortuous paths of his history, have contributed to his triumphs, have helped him again and again to save the things he values most. To be sure, they have been as often, perhaps oftener, his partners in crime; but how difficult it is to think of a single good cause now established which owes nothing directly or indirectly to their service! What form of the Christian religion, for example, is without debt to the sword, were it only for the liberty to express itself? And the influence has been reciprocal. A cause once defended by the sword borrows something from the sword which has defended it—the iron enters into its soul; and the sword borrows something from the cause for which it has been drawn—the soul enters into its iron. And the same holds true of man and his weapons. The man on his side owes features of character to the arms that he has carried—the quality of his martial courage, for example, was changed by the invention of gunpowder, and is being changed to-day by the invention of long-range artillery, submarines, and fighting aeroplanes. And the arms on their side have borrowed from human nature, and may even be said to possess a kind of inarticulate speech, well understood by nations or men accustomed to their use. In particular, they have acquired that power of *suggestion* that resides in all familiar tools, but in them to a higher degree than in any of the others; and it is a power that makes them, in certain circumstances, exceedingly dangerous. It was no mere freak of a poet's fancy that endowed Excalibur with a life of its own, or gave a song to the sword of Sigurd.

In modern times the intimacy of arms and men has become collective, and is better understood by thinking of nations and armaments than of individual men and individual weapons. To most of us Britons, for example, perhaps to all, the British Fleet is more than a collection of inanimate monsters, steam dragons with their bellies full of combustibles and with open

mouths for spitting fire and death. It belongs to the very selfhood of the nation. As we see it gathered in a Grand Review, it is as though our own hearts were beating beneath the iron ribs of the Leviathan. The impulse that moves it is the will of a people; it utters the ancient voice of the sea which is also the voice of the nation, revives a thousand memories, and suggests the possibility of great deeds to come. Our past, our present, our future are there. Who that has listened, even in time of peace, to the firing of its guns at sea, has not imaged the ships as great watch-dogs barking round the coast and felt a fondness for the trusty brutes? For my part, I cannot think of the British nation without finding that I have included the British Fleet, and its great traditions, and all the seafarings and the reverence for the sea of which it is the symbol, as elements in the concept. As well try to think of a judge without a court, of a doctor without medicine, of a dean without a cathedral, of an old shepherd without his dog. If the Fleet were put up for auction, one feels that the nation would be for sale; if it were blown up as useless, we should attend the function in mourning as though it were the funeral of an old friend. And here, too, the influence has been reciprocal. In the sum total of the causes which have made us what we are as a people the Fleet has played no inconsiderable part. There is something in us all, more perhaps than we are aware, which reflects the nature of this ancient weapon; something that we carry with us even when we go to church or attend a pacifist meeting. Through long ages the nation and the Fleet have grown together and interchanged their characteristics, so that the relation between them has become akin to that between thought and language, or between the mind and the body. It would cost us a pang to give it up.

Of all the difficulties besetting the path of a League of Peace, perhaps the greatest resides in this psychological partnership, or intimacy, between arms and men. I doubt if we, who desire a League of Peace, have yet realised how deeply we are involved in it. It is always somebody else who must break with the past and change his nature or his ways. We demand of the fighting man that he shall give up his trade, as though he and his trade were things apart from the genius of the nation. We forget the secret affinities which bind us all, soldiers and civilians alike, to our national weapons of war. We forget that we are a martial people richly endowed with martial aptitudes, especially for the business of the sea. We forget that we are and always have been an armed people,

highly trained in the use of our national weapons, and by no means proof against their powers of suggestion. We forget that we are all potential warriors, or their fathers, their mothers, their kindred. Confusing thus between militarist and martial, we fail to give our doctrines their final application, which consists in turning round upon ourselves and saying, "Thou art the man." And it is the same all over the world.

Surely it avails but little to "throw down" our arms, so long as the instinct or tradition persists which prompts us to pick them up again—and so long as arms retain that power of suggestion which bids us pick them up. Some perceiving this have proposed to sweep them from off the face of the earth: the nations are to enter into a solemn pact and destroy their armaments for good and all. But, alas! the life that is in these lethal things includes the power of rising from the dead. While the earth contains the raw materials of which they are made it is difficult to see how any nation that was so inclined could be prevented from assembling "iron and sulphur," secretly if not openly, into the forbidden form and in the forbidden quantities. Others, more moderate, have proposed an International Police, itself armed, to regulate the use of arms, to enforce the limitation of armaments, and to coerce any nation which should manufacture them in certain forms or beyond the limits assigned. But here again it is certain that if a nation were inclined to defy the world-agreement at all, it would begin by defying it precisely at this point. Its "recalcitrancy" would start by making the arms it was forbidden to use. If such designs were allowed to develop, how difficult would be the task of an International Police unless itself were furnished with an extensive armament, complete with the latest devilries, and with men trained to their use! And how could the designs be prevented from developing, if any State with a grievance wanted to develop them? We must remember that a Police, just because it deals with offenders, has always to contend not only against open violence but with a far more formidable adversary, human cunning working underground. I have little doubt that if the matter were referred to Scotland Yard we should be told at once that an essential part of the work of a Police is detective work. And it so happens that the vast industrial communities of modern times offer an exceptionally promising field to the cunning law-breaker bent on the secret manufacture of arms, and at the same time an exceptionally difficult field to the detective. A group of long-headed plotters with a Bernsdorff to direct them, money

at their disposal, and the wide world to work in would find it, I imagine, a most fascinating and profitable undertaking. As the Irish Police know to their cost, arms include among their peculiar properties a power of suddenly appearing from nowhere. To guard against this, a Secret Service with immense ramifications and a ceaseless watch is the least that would be required: its brains a match for all that cunning could invent; its eyes everywhere; its forces ready to strike without a moment's delay in unsuspected places and against innocent-looking occupations. Even so, it is far from improbable that the first intimation we should receive of the law having been broken would be the appearance, say, of the forbidden submarine, built heaven knows where, among the traffic on the high seas. Our whole treatment of disarmament has been far too superficial, for we have ignored the psychology of arms. They are more subtle than heresy; and as heresy eluded the Inquisition, we may rest assured that arms would elude the International Police, even the most inquisitorial. And who would tolerate an Inquisition of this kind?¹

The truth is that every war, especially if the purpose be moral, forges another link in the partnership of men and arms, endows armaments with new potencies, and makes war more difficult to suppress. To the student of the psychology of habit so much will be obvious, but it has been strangely forgotten by those who assure us that "this war is to end war." For that reason I shall venture still further to enforce it.

1. At the end of the war we shall find ourselves in a world stocked with arms as the world has never been stocked before. Ships of war, from the super-dreadnought to the submarine, cannon of all calibres, machine guns, rifles, tanks, fighting aeroplanes, transport, shells, flame-throwers, poison gases, every conceivable variety of lethal instrument, military equipment, offensive and defensive armament, together with the factories, armouries, and apparatus for producing more of the same kind—all these will be as the sand by the sea-shore for multitude. One thing is certain: anyone who wants to fight will find weapons ready to his hand. The

¹ It is remarkable and perhaps a little amusing that in many discussions of this question the quiet assumption is made that while the International Police would have to keep a sharp eye on other countries, the British Empire would always be above suspicion. That may be true, but is not exactly what foreigners think about the matter. I imagine we should find ourselves closely watched, and I doubt if we should like it.

world will have a pretty problem on its hands in keeping these dangerously suggestive things out of the way of those who might be tempted to use them, whether States, factions, groups, or individuals. For there is no denying the truth that the mere existence of highly perfected armaments, representing an immense cost in effort and treasure, is of and by itself a strong incentive to their use. We all know how powerfully this cause operated in determining the line of German policy which led to the war. After the war the same danger will exist, or rather a much greater danger of the same kind, in all the belligerent nations. "How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds makes ill deeds done!"

The problem of disarmament is not what it was in 1914. It has now become the problem of disarming nations every one of which is armed to the teeth, and, what is more, highly skilled in the use of its weapons—an infinitely more difficult affair. "To enforce peace" under these conditions will not be easy. A condition more provocative of war could hardly be imagined. We talk too lightly of turning our swords into ploughshares, as though it were something that could be accomplished by pressing a button, or by the mere magic of the word "Peace," or by the production of a few ethical flowers. But when we remember that the sword in question consists of such things as the British Fleet, and Krupp's factory, and of all that corresponds to them in the armouries of a dozen great States; and when we reflect further on all that these represent in the way of national effort, of highly developed science, and of vast expenditure, it should become evident to the least discerning that more will be needed than the repetition of pacific phrases before the nations can be persuaded to lay them aside. What to do with all the arms that are now in the world is, in truth, a serious problem. It would be serious enough were there nothing to be considered but the economic question of converting war industry into peace industry—which also cannot be accomplished by pressing a button, though some speak as if it could. But there is something else to be taken account of. National armaments have in them the malign quality that Macbeth found in his dagger. There is nothing about a sword that tempts us to turn it into a ploughshare. But there is something about it which tempts us to use it for the purpose for which it was created. Apply this to the immense armaments, in every variety, of which all the belligerent nations, even the least military, will find themselves possessed at the end of the war, and we stand in the presence of what I can only describe as a

world-wide temptation of enormous power. It will be hard to resist.

2. But we have to consider not only the arms but the men who have been trained to use them—that is to say, the whole able-bodied male population of all the great States. I have heard it said that no man who has passed through this war as a common soldier will ever want to take up arms again. This, though a little too sweeping, is perhaps true on the whole. But, however true it may be of the common soldier, it may be otherwise with those who pull the strings of foreign policy, and with those who are likely to pull them hereafter. These, if occasion should arise, will have at their command immense potential armies. For the first ten years after the war—and it is then that the danger will be greatest—the male population of the great States will consist for the most part of men who can be transformed at short notice into efficient soldiers. During that period, and perhaps for longer, a vast supply of men and officers ready trained will be immediately available; to that extent it will be easy to make war, easier indeed than it has ever been before. And behind the men will lie the experience, the lessons of generalship, strategy, military science and organisation, learnt during the present war, and learnt at a terrible cost—things not easily dismissed from a nation's life as for ever useless, but far more likely to be kept in readiness for future use.

If, then, Europe was a powder magazine before the war, it will be a larger and more dangerous powder magazine afterwards. And there will be plenty of sparks flying about. For though it is to be hoped that the peace will put an end to "war-lords," there will still remain the domestic factions which see in the use of arms the only way of attaining their ends. Little is to be gained by an arrangement which shuts the door on foreign war but leaves it open to the civil variety. In this I am thinking less of my own country than of others, where not only are class hatreds more bitter than with us, but where numerous racial animosities have to be reckoned with. The example of Russia is not encouraging. Most of the peasants have rifles and many have machine guns concealed in their houses.

3. The next point, unlike the one last mentioned, concerns my own country in particular, though doubtless it has its application elsewhere. There is some confusion in our common way of describing the general attitude of the British people towards war. We are wont to speak of ourselves as a peace-loving people, and this usually carries the implication that we

are a war-hating people also. Both epithets may be justly applied, but neither singly nor together do they convey the whole truth, which is complicated and many-sided. We hate war for reasons of which we are conscious and which are easy to state. But our emotions are not composed exclusively of hatred: they include also its contrary. We hate war when we are in the presence of its horrors, but not when we recall it as a glorious memory of our race. What the difference is can be easily understood if we compare our emotions on reading the descriptions of Trafalgar in Mr Hardy's *Dynasts* with our emotions on passing the Nelson Column. We hate war and love it at the same time: like many other things to which we are deeply attached.

We British ought not to disguise from ourselves that as a race we have been addicted to war for many centuries. Taking a long view of our history, I doubt if any existing nation has waged so many wars as we. We are a war-hardened people. We have been tested by innumerable victories, and still more severely tested by innumerable defeats. We are old hands at bearing reverses. The memory of war in all its aspects is deeply woven in with the warp of our national ethos and of our personal characters. If we imagine the British character to be suddenly deprived of all it owes to this training, or to these memories, it may well be doubted if we Britons could recognise one another. Even the pacifists would suffer a change.

Taking our victories and our defeats together, the net result has been a record of conquest which has hardly a parallel in the history of the world. We are the children of conquerors and the instincts of conquest are not dead. This may be admitted with shame, or it may be proclaimed with pride, according to the point of view; but it ought not to be denied; and whenever we deny it, or seek to explain it away (as, alas! we sometimes do), our national reputation for honesty is imperilled and ill-sounding words are not unjustly hurled at our heads.

As I contemplate this record of conquest, what impresses me most is not so much its extent, when measured by the present boundaries of the British Empire, as its continuity through long ages. Our conquests have not taken the form of an occasional debauch of imperialism. They represent rather the steady pressure of the national spirit, and seem to indicate a *habit* of our race. Hence it is that the Briton, even when most enlightened, has the greatest difficulty in speaking of international affairs without betraying in some part of his

language the manner and spirit of the conqueror; and it would be amusing, if the matter were not so serious, to collect the traces of this spirit in recent utterances that were meant to be pacific. They show themselves, for example, whenever we take the stand of a great nation assuming the right to protect lesser ones, and still more when we dictate the terms on which any one of them, say Turkey, is to be suffered to exist. Have we not conquered for ourselves the very position which enables us to behave in this benevolent manner? The truth is that we do not know, or at least we have not known till lately, what a martial people we are. The truth has been disguised from us by the garb of industrialism, which recent circumstances have compelled us to throw off. Nor shall we fully realise it until the moment comes, if ever it does, when we are called upon to lay aside our martial aptitudes for ever, and to put out of commission those elements of the national character which repose on the war-memories of our race.

Viewing this matter not as a politician but as a student of our national psychology, I, for one, would not answer for the consequences if the British people were suddenly compelled to accommodate themselves to the conditions of perpetual peace. Certain I am that our character would have to be greatly changed—even in the pacifically minded—before we should take kindly to the new order of things. The breach with the past would be exceptionally violent, perhaps the most violent that could be conceived, and would be followed, at first, by an immense restlessness that might easily vent itself in dangerous forms. It is a hard thing, as most of us know, for an individual to break with a lifelong habit. It is a vastly harder thing for a great people to break with an agelong habit—how hard will not be known until we make the attempt. And surely it is not a wise proceeding to impose the decree of “never again” on the form in which a long-established racial characteristic has found expression, unless we otherwise provide for its activity. An outlet of some kind it must have. No doubt the problem would be solved if we could be assured, as ethical idealists sometimes assume, that our martial aptitudes would suddenly transform themselves into a passion for conquering nature or for conquering social evils. But this would not take place spontaneously. Meanwhile other possibilities remain open, and some of them suggest that the last state of that man might be worse than the first. The suppression of foreign war will avail us nothing if the class war is still left in being or in prospect.

Here, again, much importance has been attached to the

influence of our returning armies. Many believe that these men will bring back with them, in their millions, an overwhelming hatred of war, and that this will become a decisive factor in determining the policy of the future. The late Professor Kettle—who fell on the field of battle—has recorded this belief. “When the time comes,” he says, “to write down in every country a plain record of [the war], with its wounds, and weariness, and flesh-stabbing, and bone-pulverising, and lunacies, and rats and lice and maggots, and all the crawling festermment of battlefields, two landmarks in human progress will be reached. The world will understand the nobility, beyond all phrase, of soldiers, and it will understand also the foulness, beyond all phrase, of those who compel them into war. In those days, God help the militarists! There will be no need to organise a peace movement; it will organise itself in all democratic countries, spontaneous and irresistible as a prime force of nature.”¹ These are the words of a pacifist-warrior, and all that I have heard from returning soldiers confirms them. But we must not be hasty in drawing conclusions. I imagine that hatred of war has always been brought back from the battle-fields, at least since the world became civilised, and the tale has never lacked a sympathetic audience. The nations have long been familiar with the lesson these things convey. You have it in the *Ballad of Blenheim*; you have it in Carlyle’s immortal description of war in *Sartor Resartus*. And yet, must we not confess that all that returning soldiers have had to tell through the ages of the horrors of war, all the “never agains” ejaculated by men who have seen the thing with their own eyes, have amounted to very little as a peace-making force? True, there were never so many of them to tell the tale as there are now, and the tale was never so horrible. But there is much to be set down on the other side, and one little phrase in Professor Kettle’s statement indicates what it is—the *nobility of the soldier*. Who can doubt that this war is destined to become a sacred memory of our race? I do not say its horrors will be forgotten, I am very sure that its crimes—such as the murder of Nurse Cavell and the sinking of the *Lusitania*—will never be; but the noble things it has revealed will be remembered most vividly of all. In particular the *men* will be remembered, and it will be the desire of succeeding ages to emulate “the nobility of the soldier.” Their names will be passed on from generation to generation, badges of honour in millions of families. The dead will be commemorated in every church and public place; the survivors will be

¹ *The Ways of War*, T. M. Kettle, p. 231.

marked men, and when they pass away their graves will be decorated and pilgrimages will be made to them. Every home will have its own "Nelson Column." Fifty years hence old men will be pointed at in the street by boys who will whisper to one another, "He was one of them." By then our tears will have dried, or the eyes that wept them will be closed; the racked nerves, the agonised conscience, will be at rest; the public horror will have subsided; the hand of time will have painted into the picture many colours that are not there now, and softened those that are. Hence I greatly doubt if, in the long run, the presence in our midst of the men who come back will have much effect in deepening our hatred of war. Their personalities will influence us more than their words. They will remind us of something above and beyond our hatred of war and not altogether consistent with it. The stream of our war memories will not be checked or impoverished, but enriched by the inflow of a tributary; it will not be condemned but sanctified anew. It has always been so. I think it will be so again.

These reasons forbid us to assume, as we are often tempted to do, that the war-making habit and the tradition of conquest are obsolete or obsolescent, or likely to become either when the present war reaches its end. We shall be better advised to consider both as in a high state of activity and to conduct our reasonings on that assumption. Whatever plans we may form for the future government of the world, the habit of war and the tradition of conquest will have first and foremost to be reckoned with. No doubt, if the feelings of individuals at the moment were all that has to be considered and a vote were to be taken to-morrow on that basis, the great majority of men and women would poll as opponents of war. But when the psychology of nations is in question these phases are not decisive. The past will assert itself, and in the future great revulsions of feeling will upset calculations based on the mood of the moment. If the reader hesitates to reason thus about his own country, let him think of the enemy: the lesson in either case is the same. When the ruined gambler contemplates in the morning what the night's play has cost him, doubtless he will write himself down as a hater of gambling: but a week afterwards he is at his old trade again. So too the confirmed drunkard suffering from the effects of an exceptional debauch will declare himself willing to take the pledge; but he will be in another mind when his depression has passed, his thirst returned, and the bottle again stands within easy reach. That

long views of this kind are needed when dealing with the habit of an individual no one will deny: they are still more needed when dealing with the habit of a nation or of a race. Many factors must be reckoned with that are not represented in the mind of the moment; and of these the recurrent force of habit, the insistent appeal of memory and tradition, are the chief.

History reminds us of this. As I have said, all the reasons we now have for hating war, or most of them, have existed for ages; but they have not prevailed. However deeply the lessons learnt from the horrors and ruin of war have entered in the passing lives of particular generations, they have made little impression on the continuous life of great States. Unquestionably there are differences among the States in this respect: the analogy of the confirmed drunkard does not apply to them all. But which of them can address the others as though it were a lifelong and total abstainer from war? The strongest position that any of them can claim in pressing its will on the rest is that of the moderate drinker. All have the same habit, some more, some less; and so far there is not one that can claim to have conquered it. For honesty's sake, therefore, if for no other reason, it should be frankly recognised that in this matter each State needs protecting against itself almost as much as against its neighbours. We cannot divide the States of the world into two groups, one addicted to war and the other addicted to peace, and, identifying ourselves with the second, proceed to impose Prohibition on the first as though we on our side were total abstainers by nature. If we do that, our past will immediately rise up against us in judgment. Long views are needed, and the long view must embrace the past. There are many pacifist individuals; but, strictly speaking, there are no pacifist States. The truth of this, which ought to be obvious even now, would assert itself immediately if the States of the world were ever to sit down in a general Areopagus to negotiate the foundations of perpetual peace, and might lead to mutual recrimination not conducive to the end in view. In particular, the lesser States would have something to say to the greater. "By what right," they would ask, "do *you*, who have conquered so much, forbid *us* to conquer anything more?"

Yet another point remains to be considered, especially by those who think that the habit of war will have exhausted itself, or grown disgusted with itself, through recent experience. We must now lay our account with the likelihood that the present war will end by the victory of one side and the defeat of the other. The time when peace without victory was

possible has now long passed, for good or ill—as I think, for good. It began to pass in the spring of 1916: it ended definitely in the spring of 1917 when America entered the war. There will be a victory at the end of it all, and when it comes, and to whichever side it comes, it will be such a victory as the world has never seen; and there will be a defeat of a corresponding magnitude on the other side. What will be the effect of this on the psychology of the nations? Will it be such as to break the habit of war and to discredit the tradition of conquest?

The effect will no doubt vary as between the victors and the vanquished. But taking history as the guide, I cannot persuade myself that it will be such as to break the habit of war on either side, or to discredit the tradition of conquest on the side of the conquerors.

The effect on the vanquished is the more complex and the more difficult to foresee. Much, of course, depends on the terms of peace, and still more, perhaps, on the manners of those who dictate them. Looking to history, however, and leaving out of account the examples in which defeat has amounted to total annihilation—as when the Aztec empire was annihilated by the Spaniards under Cortes,—it would be hard to find a single instance of a great State finally cured of its war habit by the experience of military disaster. On the other hand, many examples might be cited where the effect has been the contrary: where, that is, the defeated nation has set to work with a grim determination to put its house in order with a view to doing better next time. Our own defeats—which have been more numerous and more serious than our school histories suggest—have acted in that manner. France after 1870 is another remarkable instance. On the whole, we may say that great nations, unless they are completely pulverised, do not tend to take their defeats lying down. The war habit is reinforced and instructed by the temporary check.

But what will be the effect on the victor? Having regard to the magnitude of the victory, and to what its achievement has cost in blood, treasure, and especially in moral effort, it will be immensely hard to persuade him to forgo what are known as the legitimate fruits of conquest—the will to recoup himself, as far as he can, for the sacrifices which his victory has involved. This may be seen by carefully studying the utterances of the statesmen of all the belligerent countries, even those intended to be most pacific, which either hesitate when they come to this point or else reveal in significant asides that Victory has not changed her well-known terms.

But waiving all that, which belongs to the fringe of the matter, let us come to the central question of the psychology of national habit. Can we suppose that the effect on the national mind of swallowing this great draught of victory will be to create a disinclination to indulge thereafter in that kind of beverage? And if that be the effect on the generation which drinks it, will it continue through the generations that are to come? If the draught be bitter when tasted by the present, will it never become sweet when remembered by the future? I am afraid that these questions cannot be answered in a sense favourable to the lovers of peace, but they can be answered in a sense highly favourable to sowers of the dragon's teeth. It is true that a habit may sometimes be cured by inflicting on the victim a horrible surfeit of the poison to which he is addicted. But the habit in question is not of the kind that succumbs to this method of treatment; nor is it clear that victory, to whichever side it comes, will have the character of a horrible surfeit. Reasoning from well-known analogies, it is more probable that the tradition of conquest will arise from the present war like a giant refreshed with wine. And it is the tradition of conquest that feeds the habit of war.

Perhaps we can test the matter by putting to ourselves a plain question. When, after the war, we Britons look upon the British Fleet and remember how in a time of unparalleled danger it stood as a bulwark between us and ruin, as it has done so many times before, how it saved the nation from famine and the noblest of causes from overthrow, shall we feel that the weapons of war are discredited as means for attaining a moral end? Shall we want to dissolve the partnership? Shall we take kindly to the proposal that the Fleet be dismantled, scrapped and sold for old iron? Will not our feelings rather resemble those of the shepherd who, when his dog has just saved the sheep from the wolf, is commanded by some hater of dogs to shoot the faithful animal?

Whether, therefore, we consider this question as lovers of peace, or as impartial psychologists, there can be no mistake as to the nature of the problem that confronts us. We are in the presence of a peculiarly obstinate form of national habit which has carried the world for ages on a wide, well-defined, and hard-trodden road, and which will continue to carry it along the same road hereafter, unless its force can be either broken or diverted here and now. To break it suddenly, to break it for good and all by an international *coup d'état*, I regard—for reasons already given—as an impossible and even dangerous undertaking. No doubt we can conceive the

nations binding themselves by some pledge to dissolve the agelong partnership of men and arms. But would the pledge be honoured for long? Would it effectively bind the next generation, and the next after that? And were it to be broken, would not the world have good reason to regret that it had ever been given?

There remains, however, the possibility of diversion.

If by an effort of imagination we picture the civilised world as suddenly united at the conclusion of the war in one austere determination to right all wrongs, to atone for the crimes or follies of the past, to undo by self-renunciation what has been done through the ages by self-assertion and the greed for power, and so lay the foundations of nobler human polity; and if we picture this determination as made in intellectual harmony and universal goodwill—then, no doubt, there would be in existence an expulsive force of sufficient magnitude to break the war-habit of mankind. Unfortunately, the war-habit is itself the very force which will prevent such a dream from being immediately realised. Moreover, though the dream is infinitely attractive, it lacks the *punctum saliens* at which the practical will can begin operations. And just because of this it runs a grave risk of coming to naught. With so vast and unmanageable a programme before us, what we have most to fear is that the League of Nations will become the topic of an immense and confusing debate, all definite action suspended in the wrangle of a thousand discordant voices, each claiming precedence, each tending to neutralise the others, each with its own proposal of how the thing is to be done. Meanwhile the old habit, which the war has not broken but reinforced, will decide the question behind the backs of the disputants. It will trip the nations up unawares, even as at this hour it trips up so many who think themselves pacific.

But there is a hope that opportunity may arise in another quarter for effecting a great diversion of foreign policy, and therewith of the habit and tradition of which foreign policy has so far been the expression.

There is good reason to believe that the end of the war will find the economy of industrial civilisation in a highly perilous condition. This may seem at first sight to be only adding one more to the immeasurable evils the war has brought in its train, and such undoubtedly it may become if wisdom fails in her task. But it may be interpreted in a contrary sense. It may provide us with an opportunity for effecting a great diversion, for giving a new direction to inter-

national affairs, for gradually turning it from the path of strife to the path of co-operation. At all events, it will furnish all the nations with a new matter to think about, and that a matter of life and death, the same for all of them. When its true nature is discovered—and the discovery may come with great suddenness—it will give the nations a *shock* of which the public, in none of them, seems at the present moment to have prevision. It will be as though the gamblers at Monte Carlo suddenly perceived on rising from their play that the Casino was in flames; or as though the combatants on the deck of a ship, having settled their account, became aware that the battered vessel was in danger of sinking. Rivalries, hatreds, and quarrels will change their colour in presence of another problem. These are the conditions which psychology, whether of individuals or of nations, demands for dealing with the power of habit. There will be the needed shock to begin with, the shock that brings the mind to its senses; and upon that will supervene the new task, the absorbing interest, the great diversion, the matter of life and death, by concentration on which release is found from the tyranny of use and wont.

This narrows the ground on which a beginning is to be sought for that new era of co-operation among peoples which our moral idealists seek to establish. But even so the ground is not narrow enough to furnish the *punctum saliens* of practical effort, and we are still left asking where and how to begin. Some definite type of action must be named which will challenge the nations to co-operative effort, and at the same time teach them the ABC of that art of co-operation in which they have shown themselves hitherto so woefully inexpert. The thin end of the wedge must be driven in first. That done, it will be easy to drive the rest. *C'est le premier pas qui coûte.*

I believe that the principle of Mutual Insurance applied to international affairs provides, if not the very thing, at least the *type of thing* of which we are in search. The time is coming, and at the end of the war we shall all know that it has come, when the industrial nations, faced by new and tremendous risks, will have to turn their attention to the question of pooling their burdens and their means to bear them—the question, namely, of insurance; and this, as it so happens, is the very question to convince them of their need of one another's help—the starting-point of all co-operation. I am under no illusion as to the immense difficulties here involved, though they are far less, in my opinion, than those of some other proposals now before the public. They

will tax the resources of the statesmen and the knowledge of the expert to the uttermost. That, however, may well be considered a point to the good, for it is certain that nothing short of an immensely difficult task, requiring the full concentration of business and other talent, will provide a diversion of sufficient power to accomplish what we have in view.

The political mind, the legal mind, the historical mind, the religious mind—each of these will have its own contribution to the solution of the problem before us, that of diverting the life of nations from the path of strife to the path of co-operation. But in addition to them we shall need another and perhaps greater contribution from the trained *business mind* of the community. We must use ideal principles, but we must be sure of their businesslike application. Business, which is organised industry, is the life of these great States. To industry will fall the task of restoring prosperity to a well-nigh ruined world; may we not say, therefore, that it holds the key to the problem? It represents the greatest motive power now extant in civilisation, and I believe that it can supply not only the force but the method our situation demands. For it is in industry, or if you will in business, that the most fruitful methods of co-operation have been developed, of which Mutual Insurance ranks among the chief. May it not be that we have here a principle whose further extension will give to international relations the same kind of *security* it has already given to the communities which use it?

The editors of four daily newspapers,¹ one in London and three in the provinces, have already permitted me to bring the question of International Insurance before the public. As presented in the newspapers the matter was necessarily sketched in the barest outline. In the next issue of this Journal I hope to deal with it more fully, and with the advantage of the expert criticism which the first presentation has called forth.

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¹ The London *Star*, the *Liverpool Courier*, the *Birmingham Gazette*, the *Sheffield Independent* of August 12, 13, 14; 19, 20, 21.

PRAYER AND EXPERIENCE.

PRINCIPAL S. H. MELLONE.

THROUGH the age-long story of human religions, we seem to hear the spirit of man slowly learning to ask a question and build life on the answer: "What is all this universe to me? What has it to do with my Life? Is there anything in me which has relation to earth and air, sun and star, the depths of space and time, the mysterious Whole itself? Is there anything in that Whole which has relation to me?" Each individual has proceeded from the immeasurable universe; there is in him something of all that exists. Feeling thus the possibility of a secret communion between himself and the universe, man becomes conscious of himself as personal, as a living soul. Hence religion, in all but its lowest forms, has meant not only some kind of belief in a Power outside ourselves; it has meant belief in a Power which is akin to ourselves, and exerts an influence on our lives to which gratitude and reverence are our natural and fitting response.

We have proceeded from this universe. We feel within ourselves our relationship to the vast order around us. The spiritual treasures whose beginnings are in us, like the substance and strength of our bodily frame, are in us because their fountain-head is in the Whole from which our personality arises. And in the end we learn to say: Thy face, O Source of all my life, will I seek! O Reason, who hast formed this mind in me, it shall aspire to thee and in thy great light shall expand! O Love, who hast made this heart, it shall seek Thy fulness, and in Thy strength be strong!

Prayer is thus interpreted as the movement of the soul putting itself into personal relation with the mysterious Power "whose presence it feels even before it is able to give it a name." There is no need to dwell on the historical and religious significance of this interpretation. William James indicates its central importance when he defines prayer as

“every kind of inward communion or converse with the Power recognised as divine.” James calls this “prayer in the wider sense”; and he carefully distinguishes it from prayer as petition, while claiming for both acts a real and fruitful place in experience.¹ We must take a further step, and insist on the significance of the twofold fact, that these acts are distinct and yet inseparable. The essence of prayer is communion *in and through* petition. All the difficulties and perplexities of prayer, and all its possibilities of spiritual strength and power, spring from this union of the two acts: the union of a human or subjective and a divine or objective aspect.

I

Prayer is not merely the feeling of various wishes or wants. It does not begin until the man not only feels the “wish” or “want” but consciously makes it a personal desire of his own, and thinks of a personal good to be attained or evil to be avoided in the filling of the want. Prayer therefore depends on a man’s conception of some personal satisfaction to be attained in the fulfilment of a desire: not necessarily a selfish satisfaction, for it may arise only through his interest in others, and may be sought in spite of any amount of personal suffering on his part incidental to its attainment. But if it is to be made the subject of prayer, he must voluntarily identify himself with the desire for it: it must be, in the full meaning of the words, his “soul’s sincere desire.” None the less, desire in itself is only the beginning of prayer; it is the human side of it, with its divine implications and possibilities left out.

Prayer is the offering of desire to a Divine Being who is recognised as personal and as able to respond. On such a Power men feel themselves to be dependent. It is therefore almost a psychological necessity that prayer should take the petitionary form,—the natural form in which the sense of dependence finds expression: for even in the inner life of the spirit we are perpetually reminded how great our needs are, and how small is the inner provision we have made to meet the dangers, temptations, and perplexities that surround us. Petition is not the whole of prayer; but it is a legitimate and necessary part of it, flowing from the imperfection and incompleteness of human life. It is, again, almost a psychological necessity that petition should take the verbal form. It is true that no human quality can fully utter itself in speech.

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 463 ff., 467 ff.

Readers of Browning will be familiar with this thought, and with the passionate denial that

this coil
Of statement, comment, query, and response,
Tatters all too contaminate for use,

can come between the human heart and the Divine. But we cannot throw away our instruments because they are imperfect. The feeling from which a desire springs always seeks to complete itself by finding some expression, however imperfect, in words.

Prayer does not involve the exclusion of petition, or the annihilation of desire, or the resolution of all desires into the one aspiration of Quietism, "Thy will be done." Even contemplation of the character of God, even communion with Him, if it ends in mere resignation of ourselves to His will, is scarcely to be distinguished from the theistic fatalism of Islam, with its submission to the inexorable Will which it calls God.

On the other hand, prayer is not the holding of a desire as though it were the greatest good or the supremely perfect blessing. No human desire can be that. At its best it is the expression of a man's aspiration,—a man, with human imperfections, weaknesses, limitations. The highest good that we can desire is only a broken fragment of that Perfect Good which eye saw not, ear heard not, and which entered not into the heart of man. If our broken fragment of desire is really good, it is because it contains within it a gleam from the perfect Light or is suffused with a glow from the central Fire.

We must think of prayer not as the annihilation of desire or its deification, but as the offering of desire to God, in order that the personal petition, without losing its distinctive meaning, may be blended and fused into one whole with conscious acquiescence and rest in the Divine Will. "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from me: nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt. . . . O my Father, if this cannot pass away, except I drink it, Thy will be done.' . . . And there appeared unto him an angel from heaven, strengthening him: and being in an agony, he prayed more earnestly."

II

We urge, then, that "prayer" is not merely another name for communion with God. It stands for a specific form which that communion may take. It is the *discipline of desire* in the light of the best consciousness of God that we can attain unto, and the endeavour, through that desire, to educate ourselves

into communion with Him. Petitionary prayer becomes a specific method of communion between man and God; and the basis of belief in prayer must always lie in spiritual experience, whether our own or that of some person whom we accept as spiritual authority or guide.

The next question to be faced is this: Under what conditions is the actual petition itself fulfilled, and what are the limits within which petitionary prayer is legitimate?

A "law of nature," as a scientific conception, involves no assumption that anything is fatally determined *a tergo*; it involves the assumption that *if* certain conditions are realised *then* a certain result will follow. It is a "law with an *if*"; it does not provide the occasions of its own operation. This definition of "law" would be widely accepted at the present time, and it is evidently involved in all experimental science. Unfortunately it is often accepted under a limitation which destroys a great part of its significance. The "antecedents"—the conditions required for the operation of the law and implied in the "*if*"—are assumed to be limited to previous events in space and time, being therefore material conditions capable of reduction to mechanical terms. It may be practically convenient for science, or some department of science, to adopt this assumption as a working hypothesis; but if presented as the final truth, it appears to be a wholly arbitrary dogma. It carries with it the equally groundless dogma that the material order is a closed sphere in whose necessary sequences spirit cannot intervene; from which it follows that any material movement—whether of molecule or of a brain or orbit of a planet—can only be produced by other antecedent or concurrent material movements. It is remarkable that such men as Martineau and F. W. Robertson were prepared to accept this *so far* as to exclude prayer from any efficacy in the physical order, while earnestly contending for its place and efficacy in the spiritual realm, and that the Rev. W. Knight—afterwards Professor in the University of St Andrews—published an able and elaborate argument to the same effect during the controversy aroused in the seventies by the late Professor Tyndall.¹ The reign of law holds equally in the worlds of matter and of mind. If a Divine response to prayer for some material benefit is to be described as an "intervention in the sequence of material phenomena," and denied, as a "violation of law," then a Divine response to prayer for a spiritual benefit is equally an intervention in the order of spiritual phenomena and equally a violation of law.

¹ *The Contemporary Review*, January 1873.

In reality there is no "violation of law" in either case. There is the emergence of a *new condition* modifying, perhaps transforming, the conditions which are actually at work and tending to produce a certain result.

But if the goodness of God is unlimited and unconditioned, how can imperfect and ignorant creatures, such as we are, expect God's response ever to take the form of a change in the action of His Will? Can we imagine the Almighty saying: "I can avert this blow and the affliction that it will cause, but I will not avert it unless I am asked to?" The confusion of thought involved in this natural and apparently most relevant objection was stated with remarkable lucidity by St Thomas Aquinas.

The providential order of the world is so far from excluding secondary causes that it is actually realised by their means. These causes fall into various grades of importance and worth. They are not limited to material or physical agencies. Among other causes, human action holds a very important place. We act, not because anyone supposes that by doing so we can change the Divine ordinance, but because we must act in order to attain certain ends. In so far as these ends are harmonious with the Divine plan, they are *good* in the full meaning of the word.

In this respect, petitionary prayer is on the same level with human actions in general. We do not pray in order to change God's ordinance but to achieve those things which in God's ordinance are possible to be achieved by petitionary prayer. "Therefore, to say that we should not pray to receive anything from God, because the order of His Providence is unchangeable, is like saying that we should not walk to get to a place, nor eat to support life." St Thomas, therefore, concludes that "if the immutability of the Divine plan does not withdraw the effects of other causes, neither does it take away the efficacy of prayer."¹

Hence we have from the outset insisted that genuine prayer is much more than "asking." It is the expression of a spiritual activity,—a man's identification of himself with a desire and his offering of the desire to God in the consciousness (necessarily a partial and imperfect consciousness) of what God is. It is the actual expression of an inner force proceeding in the life; it gains in strength and value by shaping before the mind just what it aims at, defining an ideal, and setting it free from everything unworthy to be offered to God.

In all things our motto must therefore be, not *laborare est*

¹ *Contra Gentiles*, Rickaby's abridged translation, pp. 257-9.

orare, but *ora et labora*. "We made our prayer unto our God and set a watch against them day and night." Let the question be put in a concrete form, as the modern mind would put it: "A man finds himself in a post of trust in which he is constantly tempted to fraud, and has every opportunity of doing so with impunity. Shall he pray for God's help to overcome the temptation? Will it do him any good?" Goodness cannot be had for the earnest asking, any more than knowledge can; if prayer were only asking, it could not make the foolish mind wise, any more than it could make the barren soil fertile. To be efficacious, it must embrace an actual endeavour to identify self with the higher law written in the mind—thus rousing the dormant faculty of resistance and intensifying the desire for personal righteousness.

Experience shows that such prayers are not vain, even though the response may not include literal fulfilment of the petition. They are not vain, any more than all human action is vain because disappointment and failure are facts of experience. A statesman prays that his country may be delivered from the tragedy of war. He offers to God his labour, long, persistent, faithful, that this great deliverance may be secured. He fails to control the tidal waves of international discord, which at length burst through with devastating force. Let him now labour as earnestly and pray as sincerely for insight into historic causes, and for courage and faithfulness to principle, as he laboured and prayed for change in historic events: and the heaven that fled from the earth will return to the heart. He rests upon a greater strength that flows into him and lifts him above himself; he becomes possessed of a power which is more than the power of his single self.

The parents, in agony, pray for the life of their child. The supplication is a cry to God which summons to the point of need the resources of knowledge, skill, and tenderness; but it is unavailing. Through some deficiency of knowledge or skill the conditions are not met. The child is taken from their arms. As the suppliants wrestle with destiny, as they press closer and closer to the necessity driving ruthlessly across their deepest and cherished happiness, the cry for a life becomes a cry that the loss of life may not be wholly crushing, a cry for patience, courage, trust. A voice is heard across the storm, stronger than the tumult of grief, saying: "It is I, be not afraid." The agony of Gethsemane found its solution in the strength that said: "Thy will be done"; and the denial of the petition set free a stream of spiritual energy containing within it the promise and potency of the world's redemption.

From the principle implied in *ora et labora* it follows that prayer has no place in reference to events—such as those constituting the general order of cosmic phenomena—where all intervention of human agency is excluded. We may, indeed, admit that the range of events into whose causation human agency does actually enter is larger than it appears to be. Sir G. G. Stokes pointed out¹ the immense variety and complexity of conditions affecting changes in the weather, and suggested that even the action of a child might bring about such a change. But we must ask, Can any practical use be made of such a possibility in determining the limits of prayer? A prayer for rain is offered precisely at the time when human agency fails and because it fails. The event practically belongs to the order of nature which is determined by the Divine Will alone—assuming that super-human intermediate agencies are excluded. Presented as a petition, it does not differ in principle from prayer that an eclipse of the moon, announced on astronomical grounds for a certain date, shall take place on some other date.

The great possibilities of human endeavour and achievement, in the material and in the moral world, may be counted one of the discoveries of our age; but their actualities are limited by the concrete conditions of existence. The limit of what we can attain in the day-to-day details of life is reached far sooner than the limit of what we need, and the limit of what we need is reached far sooner than the limit of our legitimate desire. We know what this means in the hour when we are *at the end of our resources*: when we are faced by a situation where we have done all that we can do—perhaps all that a human being can do: when we can only wait for the inevitable calamity or tragedy which we now see must come. It is said that when the hunted hare perceives that in spite of all its efforts the hounds are gaining on it, and it can do no more for itself, it screams aloud. And when, in human experience, all that before seemed real is shaken and falls as solid walls in the shock of an earthquake, then the outcry of the soul's elemental instinct is heard, sometimes only as the cry of the terrified beast, yet ever and again rising to meet the tragedies of life, not in petition that what must be, shall not be, but in prayer which passes beyond all petition and loses itself in the deep sense of need of the Living God, the Soul of Goodness in things evil.

¹ *Gifford Lectures*, pp. 217 ff., quoted in *Cambridge Theological Essays*, pp. 291-2, where apologetic use is made of the passage.

III

We may now examine the application of our principle to some special aspects of prayer which are of great practical importance: prayer as healing, prayer as intercession, and prayer as the common act of a group.

The universe is so constituted that if we learn and obey its laws, we receive its treasures. Our natural and scientific knowledge suggests of itself that there are resources around us, which, if we could lay hold on them, would enable us to achieve what is as yet beyond our dreams. Science assumes that the latent resources are no more than forms of physical energy. Our interpretation implies that they are not only physical, but also mental, moral, and spiritual. If Nature says to the discoverer and the inventor, "Obey me, learn of me, have perfect confidence in me," much more are the unrealised treasures of the mental, the moral, the spiritual world offered to us on like terms. There are resources available to build up the character, the moral health, the spiritual happiness of all who seek their co-operation by fulfilling the conditions through which alone their virtue is obtained.

Prayer for spiritual good for ourselves, if it is genuine, must mean the identification of self with an ideal desire. This is an indispensable condition for the attainment of the end desired; for it becomes an act of will. It is impossible to deny that such petitions have a spiritual effect. The utmost that can be said on the negative side is that these effects are only the mind's reaction on itself: prayer as a mental condition is followed by a certain mental result and so "answers itself." This is now called "self-suggestion." It must be distinctly understood that this name, though valuable for its implications, explains nothing. It names a fact; and room must be left for the religious interpretation of the fact,—which is, that God invariably answers such prayers in a certain way. If the process were believed to be wholly subjective it would cease to be prayer. The reference to the Divine object would disappear. And the process would become one of directing our thoughts so as to secure a subjective result which we desire to attain. This opens up the wide and most practical question of "mind-cure" or mental healing in all its forms. The persistent direction of thought and attention is known to produce, under certain conditions, results which may extend beyond the mental life as ordinarily understood, and may affect the vital functions of the bodily frame. But no such mental endeavour is prayer unless it takes the form of a desire offered to God

in the consciousness of what God is ; and this means the reinforcement of the desire by the strongest force that can enter into human experience.¹

The truth seems to be that instead of reducing prayer to a process of self-suggestion affecting our own spirits merely, we must see in prayer a deepening and development of the unexplained power of self-suggestion which we witness every day. Even the act of self-suggestion which makes no conscious appeal to a super-personal power and believes that it is only calling up latent personal resources, must derive its ultimate efficacy from an increased inflow from the Infinite Life which the mind's "effort of attention" (the psychologically "reduced" definition of *faith*) does in some way induce. Our lives must be continuously dependent on the Divine Life of the universe ; but its inflow varies in abundance and power in correspondence to variations in the attitude of our own minds.

If God is the Soul of souls, aspiration to God is to a centre where the issues of all lives meet. Founded on this faith, prayer as *intercession* is the endeavour, by means of our communion with God, to benefit another.

It is a plain fact of experience that individuals are dependent on one another and influenced by one another in countless ways both above and below the range of conscious deliberate intention. And it is now known that there is an increasing body of evidence for the influence of mind on mind in ways transcending the ordinary channels of sense. The forms taken by this interpersonal influence, whether "normal" or "super-normal," are related to genuine prayer as "self-suggestion" is. An act of ideal "self-suggestion," deepened and strengthened by the consciousness of God, becomes a prayer. So may any endeavour to help another become prayer. When we are in personal contact or intercourse with a fellow-creature, the offering to God of our desire for his welfare may, and indeed must, deepen and strengthen our power to inspire or save him.

Are there, then, some good things that God will not give to my friend unless I pray that he may have them ? This is a question which met us before in another form ; but the answer is fundamentally the same. Prayer is a vital factor in my relation to my fellow-man, because in prayer I realise that this relation is divinely constituted. God deals with my fellow-man in ways beyond the capacity of my thought to conceive ; but so far as God acts on my fellow-man through my desire and will, so far may the offering of my desire

¹ See this illustrated by James, *Gifford Lectures*, p. 466.

for a fellow-creature's good be a condition for the fulfilment of God's purpose for that man. We may accept this as more than a mere possibility if we bear in mind the need of active endeavour, the significance of failure, and the inevitable limitations of human desire. And when the question of Divine answers to specific intercessory petitions is raised, we may reply with Canon Streeter: "Whether it is because when we pray for others we are less blind to their real and highest needs than we are when we pray for ourselves, or whether it is because such prayers, being more disinterested, are more truly prayers 'in His name,' it is the experience of many with whom I have spoken on this subject that such prayers are answered too often and in too striking a way to make the hypothesis of coincidence at all a possible explanation."¹

Intercession is the culmination of prayer. It begins by deepening our objective interests and developing in us a wider sympathy. The feeling of self is merged in the feeling of a larger human life. And we rise to the consciousness of a communion with God which is possible only because we no longer think of our self alone.²

The psychological justification of *Common prayer in public worship* is—to use current terminology—"the suggestibility of the individual through the social group." From this point of view Canon Streeter has stated the essential condition involved: "It is only in so far as the congregation, or at any rate the majority of those present, are at the same moment concentrating themselves on the same act of devotion that the object of 'assembling together' is fully attained." Personal interests give place to the elemental things, the abiding needs and aspirations of humanity; and the satisfaction of these appears as the primary and fundamental interest of the common will. Whatever "order" or method be adopted, the problem is at once psychological and religious: to arouse and guide the attention and thought of the assembly so that each one may become responsive to the Divine influence. And the dangerous, pervasive effects of custom, convention, routine, do not alter the essential fact of the ideal purpose of common prayer.

¹ Streeter, *Restatement and Reunion*, p. 27. "Experimental" tests for the efficacy of intercession, such as the hospital-ward test proposed by Tyndall in 1872, must be dismissed as irrelevant; see, for instance, the excellent observations of Everett, *Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 463. If the thoughts and desires of a number of persons were collectively concentrated in prayer and directed to a group of sufferers, a change in the condition of the latter might result, without involving anything more than the effects of human intervention.

² Compare John xvii. 21-23.

Must we hold that common prayer ought to be limited to these elemental things? May it not extend to the concrete conditions of the national life; above all, in times of public distress and danger?

The case of the war will more than suffice for illustration. Other national conflicts and difficulties, external and internal, might be adduced; but this ultimate tragedy will test the worth of our principle best. It has been maintained that any community entering on a war which it believes to be righteous, ought to be able to make prayer the test of its conviction: "Can we, with a clear conscience, pray for victory?" We fully admit that there is a sense in which this is true. We admit that, given the sincere conviction of the righteousness and justice of our cause, we ought to pray for victory. We ought not to fear to offer our desire and will for victory to God, in the consciousness of what God is. But this means that we have cast away every vestige of the notion of a tribal God who makes it His business to guard the temporal prosperity and success of any race or nation. This belief, which was literally burnt out of the soul of ancient Israel as by a consuming fire, dies hard in the modern world.

Even then, it is said, what possible meaning can we give to the issues of prayer when two opposed human wills are both praying for victory? The only possible reply is to point to the actual source of the conflicting petitions. Its source is in the opposition and conflict of human wills. If this is inconsistent with prayer, then it is equally inconsistent with the assumption of any unifying and universal purpose in human life and with the unfolding of any Divine plan on the field of time. That the limitations and imperfections of human nature involve the possibility of such conflicts is evident. And the relation of human prayer to the providence of God is at bottom one with that of human deeds. It is also evident that human deeds, whatever be their quality of wisdom or unwisdom, good or evil, are wrought on the field of time into issues beyond the intention and will of the agents and even beyond their power of conception.

"And Joshua went to him and said unto him, Art thou for us or for our adversaries? And he said, Nay; but as Captain of the Host of the Lord I am come." Even so we look into the dim unknown where lie the issues of the world's present life; and with the same intensity of meaning the question rises to our lips. To us, as to him, the same mysterious answer is given—mysterious, yet boundless in its significance. To us, it is borne down through the voice of

the age-long experience of man, ever varying, yet ever the same, whose sound is as the sound of many waters, deeper and more penetrating than the storms which rage in this or any time. In all the quests and conquests of this life we are but doing our part in a Host as innumerable as the ages of time. We are workers in a Great Plan whose issues are vaster than our clearest vision can discern. And to him the Voice said, as it says to us to-day if we have ears to hear: "Not as Captain of thy host only, or of theirs, do I come; not as guarantor that all for which thou goest forth to contend with them shall be won, or lost; but as Messenger of that Host whose movement means that in this struggle thou and thy foes are serving greater ends, ministering in deeper ways to the meaning of human life, kindling a flame whose brightness shall show the terror and the glory of the Eternal Law of Justice and Righteousness on earth."

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GHOSTS AS PHYSICAL FACTS.

W. G. BRAITHWAITE.

A VERY remarkable book appeared in Germany a few months before the war. It is called *Materialisation Phenomena: a Contribution to the Investigation of Mediumistic Teleplastic Manifestations*, published at Munich by Reinhardt. Its author, Dr Von Schrenck-Notzing, has devoted twenty-five years to a specialised study of this branch, as it has now become, of learning. This book represents four years' culminating work with a medium carried out under test conditions, which are the result of previous research, and which bring the subject as near as is at present possible to the stage of laboratory experiment. Owing to the interruption of communication with Germany, probably very few copies of the book at all have found their way to England, and it appears as if it has escaped not only general attention in this country, but also the attention of those who specialise in psychical research, if we are to judge by the very scanty references made to it, and when we remember the vastly increased interest aroused by the war in all psychical matters. The object of this paper is to summarise the results of the book and to show what light it throws upon current discussions. Those to whom, from personal experience, materialisation phenomena are "stale news" must pardon some of the elementary explanations which it will be necessary to give.

It is impossible to aim at more than a summary of the book. It contains 523 large pages of mixed type, none of which is large, thirty full-page illustrations from photographs, at least half of which ought to be reproduced if the book is to be judged fairly, and 150 inset illustrations from photographs and a cinematograph film, the publication of which by themselves would give the best summary history of the research. (A selection of these are indeed advertised for sale separately.) The scheme of the book is to present

(1) a historical and general introduction relating to materialisation phenomena, the existing stage of theory, and the conditions under which research must be carried on; (2) an account of the sittings in detail; and (3) a review of the results.

1. The whole inquiry is carried out in the spirit of the positive sciences upon the assumption that since phenomena are impossible without a medium, the phenomena are dependent on the medium, and their explanation is to be sought first in her organism. Schrenck-Notzing, however, does not, with twenty-five years' experience, adopt the view of popular science that there is nothing to inquire about. Even from the standpoint of the conjurer, he says, the results of mediumistic experiment are so remarkable that they would be worth years of research, since they would add so much to our knowledge of the possibility of deception, and since they so far exceed anything which is now known to be possible in conjuring. Not only the precautions taken but the nature of the phenomena themselves and the method of their production preclude so simple an explanation. We are left with the fact that phenomena are produced, and the problem of investigating their nature and the conditions under which they appear. It will be time to seek for an explanation when the facts and the conditions are established. It is wrong to assume at the present stage the spiritistic explanation, for (1) all new sciences have been tempted to their bane by wrong assumptions, and psychology must discard spiritism as astronomy discarded astrology and chemistry alchemy; and (2) it is a false method which posits an unknown cause of new phenomena, and does not first try to relate them to known facts and causes. In the author's words: "As can be seen from this summary, nearly all inquirers who have busied themselves in recent times with physical mediumship—and physical mediumship is after all in some way connected with psychical phenomena, since the facts originate in mind—incline to reject the spiritistic theory and prefer to accept a psychodynamic explanation and an attitude of simply observing facts. The representatives of this school are Morselli, Botazzi, Foa, Richet, Ochorowitz, Kotik, Ostwald, Flournoy, de Vesme, de Rochas, Maxwell, and others. This is also the standpoint of the author of these studies."

There is of course also a long list of investigators who accept the spiritistic view, and the alternative between a spiritistic and anti-spiritistic view is not an absolute one, though convenient practically for discussion. It may be, as

many philosophers and poets have dreamed, that the true solution is that the whole of consciousness is one sea upon which our poor personalities are passing and more or less impermanent waves. The review of previous literature and experiments which prefaces the book and of which the above is a very short account introduces the record of the sittings.

2. The form of the record of the sittings is remarkable in two respects. First, for what it leaves out. No account is given of words spoken at a sitting except where it is necessary to explain events. They are treated as "patter" to be omitted. The record consists solely of things seen or done. Secondly, it is remarkable for the minute pains taken to make clear exactly the conditions—the steps taken to prevent fraud, the order of events, the exact account of events, the criticism and examination of every detail. Nothing is left to chance or imagination. Everything is made a matter of record. No precaution, which is suggested by previous experience or in the course of the experiments, is left untried.

The medium with whom the experiments were conducted is "Eva C."—a girl under the protection of a French lady, Madame Bisson, widow of a French sculptor, who has herself also published a record of the experiments. No sittings were held in the dark, red light being used from the commencement and increased up to a six-branched burner of 100-candle power. The most stringent precautions against anything being brought into the "sitting room" were continued throughout. The medium's cabinet, which consisted of a curtained space in the corner, was under Schrenck-Notzing's continual inspection and control. Specially devised garments were generally worn by the medium, but at some of the best sittings the medium was completely naked; and thorough search of the medium's person was always made before and after materialisation. I must leave the future readers of the book to satisfy themselves whether any further precautions were humanly possible. Detectives were tried and failed. If further precautions can be suggested, I have no doubt they will be adopted.¹ Under these conditions the following results were obtained, and photographs were taken of them towards the end of the sittings by many cameras at once from different angles, showing both the medium and the materialisations:—

¹ I cannot avoid giving an illustration. It was suggested that the medium swallowed things before the sittings, and brought them up again in the hysteria of the trance state. To test this she was surreptitiously given with her food a drug which would colour bright red anything which came from the stomach. Materialisation followed, but no sign of red!

(1) A grey filmy substance was seen coming out of the medium—perhaps most generally from her mouth, but indiscriminately at different sittings from different parts of her body. This substance moves and grows and disappears most rapidly again. It is clammy to the touch like a snake, and has a certain amount of weight. Drops of it were obtained and analysed, and showed on analysis cell residues. A cinema film of the process was obtained. This substance appears to be the original matter from which further materialisations are obtained.

(2) The next group of phenomena consists of white paper-like objects, which look in the photographs like flat bits of paper cut out into the shapes of fingers, etc. These are perhaps the most remarkable, because the most apparently pointless, of all the phenomena. With and after them may be grouped more fully developed fingers, hands or toes, and such things as a slipper—these latter already solid and not flat. The fingers and hands had the character of living objects, being able to grasp objects held up to them—and most certainly were not the medium's hands.

It must not be thought that the two stages above described are distinctly marked as separate—they pass in and out of each other. In both kinds of phenomena we find mixed up threads and strings, or what look like “threads” and “strings,” connecting them with the medium. The discussion of the part played by these “threads” is not the least interesting part of this book, and throws a flood of light on the allegations of fraud which are commonly made in the case of these phenomena. They will no doubt be in due course fully investigated and “explained.” Meantime they must be regarded as the means by which the phenomena get the “life” or share of life which they possess. I will give the author's own summary of these two stages before passing on to the last group, which will arouse the greatest interest.

“The stuff produced by Eva C. appears to move in a peculiar way. As long as it is connected with the body by ‘strings’ or ‘threads’ we may ascribe its movements to movements of the muscles. After it is severed it is still capable of showing movements of its own, which are proved by a change of position or of form. In a manner which is open to no objection the movement of this reptile-like substance could be clearly seen by several observers upon the bare skin of the body. The movements are slowly undulating and follow zigzag and wavy lines, when they take place on the body, like the creeping of a snake. When the substance is coming out of the organism, for instance from the region of

the navel, it is like a column of thick fatty matter pressed out of a tube or some gelatinous matter gradually spreading out on a flat substance.

"The substance goes back into the organism often with a sudden springing motion towards the body of the medium, which visibly takes the substance to itself again or reabsorbs it. The process could never be more closely observed on account of its extraordinary and most surprising quickness. On some occasions, however, the substance could be observed going back into the mouth with chewing and swallowing motions, or into other parts of the body." (A cinematograph film of the process of swallowing is printed in the book.)

"The substance may also simply suddenly disappear—not merely be withdrawn into a dark corner of the cabinet, but actually vanish and not be found though immediate search be made. This happens especially if the medium is startled, for instance by the flare of the magnesium or an unexpected noise. And just as suddenly as it disappears, so it can reappear again, and this although the body of the medium remains quite still.

"Just as mysterious as the movements of the substance is the stage of teleplastic morphogenesis or metamorphosis. We are concerned here with the building up of dissimilar parts out of the homogeneous plasmatic substance—that is, not with a mere increase in volume and mass of the same substance. Before our eyes the white, thick, flowing matter throws out ends and growths of the queerest elementary forms, like leaves or flowers (*e.g.* orchids or the lower forms of life), like freaks of nature which remind us of the most primitive organisms. . . . Near these growths we find better-outlined forms which look like fingers and hands. At this stage of development the material of the ribbon-like structure is homogeneous with the original substance.

"Finally, we find a whole series of hand forms which stand out clearly in the photographs, white and flat as if cut out of paper. The examination of enlargements of the photographs of these highly suspicious appearances shows that they have not the characteristic structure of paper but are made of some coagulated substance. Some of the negatives seem to show that the substance is fluid or yielding." Attempts to get the same photographic results with gloves failed.

(3) The third group consists of "portraits," fragments of heads, faces, and "ghosts,"—yes, complete ghosts!—photographed in every kind of position and at all sorts of stages of developments. The portraits are in some ways the queerest, for they seem so obviously real portraits brought

in surreptitiously and displayed at the sittings. Readers of the book will not, however, be able to accept this "simple" explanation, for it does not explain how the same portrait can alter during the same sitting and does not relate these appearances to the rest of the phenomena.

These objects disappear and reappear again in the fraction of a second, as when an object is visible or invisible with the turning on or off of an electric lamp.

"On every occasion, so far as can be judged, at the same sitting, the same face is represented. Mostly the later expositions are better developed than the earlier. Whenever the same appearance was photographed twice consecutively, the second photograph showed substantial alterations when compared with the first. The development of the appearances of heads follows three stages:—

"(a) The appearance of the elementary matter in the form of white conglomerates, strips, and shreds.

"(b) The development of flat picture-like portraits either upon a soft or upon a panel-like material.

"(c) The building up in relief of different parts of the face, and the coming forth of parts with hair on them upon a flat background, till the face is completely modelled.

"When the form appears and reappears it is difficult to decide whether in some way the material of the appearance remains, or only the form-character of a particular portrait. If the latter, then we have to deal, when the form is again seen, with a new work which differs from the first in the same way as a second picture of the same object by the same artist will differ from the first."

Sometimes, when the medium was getting tired, the late appearances were not so clear as the earlier. The final disappearance takes place either quite suddenly or gradually, following the stages by which it developed. For illustration, I transcribe here some events at one of the sittings.

"The appearance was on the left of the medium. Upon our suggestion, Eva, who wanted a good photograph, made it take up its position on the right side of her head, so that it could be taken at the same time by the several cameras (probably she did this herself with her hands).

"I now asked her to choose her own moment for the taking of the photographs by opening wide the curtains.

"She did so. I pressed the button, but the magnesium did not go off. I was unscrewing the button-holder to see what was wrong, when Eva called out, 'C'est le contact' . . . and this turned out to be the case.

“After this intermezzo Eva again opened the curtains and the flash went off. After a short pause the sitting continued. And now the head could be seen by Madame Bisson and me coming nearer the opening and apparently moving free. It was about the size of a child’s head, clad like a nun with a white veil. Whilst this was going on Madame Bisson, as if moved by an unconscious impulse, seized Eva’s left hand. At the same instant I saw the head, which was on the medium’s left side, sink as quick as a flash to the ground and vanish. The face had seemed to me sketchy and unfinished.

“When the head appeared again, Eva spoke and expressed the wish that Madame Bisson should cut a hair off it. I handed Madame Bisson my pocket scissors, which she took with her right hand as the head approached again. Her left hand was guided by Eva’s right hand to the head, which was now on the edge of the curtain. Madame Bisson now, under my directions, since I could see the whole thing from where I was, quite near, seized a lock of hair and cut off a length of about ten centimetres from it. She at once gave me half, which I took. The materialisation disappeared like a flash in the direction of Eva, and she cried out. It was as if its substance was dissolved and reabsorbed by the medium.

“Search was made, and nothing found except that the knitted garment worn by the medium was found wet through for about the breadth of a man’s hand in the middle of the left inner side of the lower part of the thigh. The spot did not smell, and suggested a bandage soaked through by the watery (serous) fluid from an open place.”

Then follow detailed examinations of the photographs, three of which are printed, and the result of a microscopic and other tests of the hair, tending to show that it was human hair, but not the medium’s.

3. It has been worth while to give the author’s own description of the last group of materialisations, which culminates in complete “ghostly forms.” I cannot, in passing on now to the concluding discussion, expect “sceptics” to be convinced by my brief narrative, and must leave them to wrestle with the facts when they read the book. The great merit of the whole research is that it is divorced from all spiritistic assumptions and clings closely to the bottom fact that these appearances are all in some way connected with the organism of the medium. True that the phenomena are unexplained, and in themselves most weird. True that a medium is not an inert piece of matter which can really be made the subject of laboratory experiment—in the sense that

the experimenter can dictate the appearance which is to be produced. Here, as elsewhere, the experimenter must observe the conditions, which may be stated shortly as follows :—

First, the medium must be in a fit state of health ; results are not obtained except at the price of a certain amount of physical exhaustion on her part. Next, due regard must be had to her sensitiveness, which is acute. A sudden interruption may have serious results, for instance, an effort to grab the phenomena : and moreover grabbing won't do any good. Even the elementary substance, when grabbed, slips out of the hand, like a snake, or suddenly disappears out of the hand that holds it. And such irruptions impede experiments by alarming the medium's sensitiveness. Again, the "circle" must be friendly. The medium's consciousness will be affected by a hostile atmosphere, and experiments will fail. The author, during the years of these experiments, gradually dispensed, he tells us, with many of the usual accessories of mediumistic séances, and got away from the spiritistic accompaniment. But even he had to bow the knee in the temple of Rimmon to some extent, for in a trance condition the medium feels as if she was operated on by some intelligence outside her own, even if that intelligence be really (as the author provisionally assumes) only her own sub-consciousness or that of other people in the room. And, lastly, the experiments cannot be conducted in white light. The flash used for taking the photographs nearly always destroys the materialisation. The author advises red light for the sittings ; and, as he points out, it is not so very remarkable that these phenomena avoid strong light, for all organic growths at their conception or in the first state of development best flourish in the dark, and red light he considers the most favourable light to use to avoid dark sittings.

Very much has been passed over in the above summary of this book, not least the most remarkable chapter in which Schrenck-Notzing discusses the "hypothesis of fraud." The possibility of deception or self-deception is frankly faced. "Considered objectively, a whole series of the photographs favours the hypothesis of fraud." And yet a closer examination shows that fraud is not the explanation. It is true that the medium will help herself with her hands, if she is allowed a chance, for she is anxious for the results, and a materialisation (which is only produced with great effort and with pangs like the pangs of childbirth) is difficult to manage and wants "arranging" to be displayed to the sitters. True that the materialisations are full of foldings, ragged ends (some most

curious, as in the case of a half-finished nose in one photograph), threads, and strings, or what looks like them—and that these suggest trickery. Yet a closer consideration of the circumstances, helped by the photographs, shows important differences from manufactured articles, and experiment proves that under the conditions of the sittings a sufficiency of material could not possibly have been brought in without detection. And how can fraud be the explanation on those occasions when the whole manifestation took place in full view of the sitter—the first appearance, the development, the completion, and the disappearance? or at a naked sitting? or at a sitting where the medium's hands, head, and body is wholly sewn up? Further, the whole result of the four years' work is confirmed by a series of supplementary sittings with another medium, where the phenomena go through the same stages of development. I must leave this part of the book with the greatest reluctance, for it throws a most extraordinary light on all previous accounts of similar phenomena which have been vouched for by credible witnesses and discredited by sceptics. It will be enough to say that to re-read Podmore's two volumes after reading Schrenck-Notzing will be found most illuminating. Podmore's ingenuity will be as attractive as ever. But the alleged facts which he seeks to discredit will give most furiously to think—for they fall into line with this most recent and thorough examination; they are no longer incredible; we appear at last to be standing firmly at the beginning of a new science of the powers of the human organism, to be emerging into (it is true) a new and strange country from a region of mere fairy- and wonder-land, in which everything reported was so strange and incredible, or reported so badly, that nothing sometimes seemed left which could be accepted as fact.

Enough has perhaps now been given to arouse curiosity and interest in the research carried out by Schrenck-Notzing. Not the least valuable part of his work is that he avoids all conclusions and is content to observe and record facts. But it is worth while here to make some comparison of this work with the work of other investigators and to try to discover the line of future progress. Ordinary English readers of psychical literature, if I may judge from my own experience, have been brought up too exclusively upon a diet of trance phenomena depending mainly upon trance speech or automatic writing. From the many years old work of Crookes with D. D. Home hardly any serious effort to investigate "physical phenomena" physically can be found in English till the recent

short work of Dr Crawford. The English investigations of the case of Eusapia Palladino are most incomplete and unsatisfactory. Upon the Continent it has been different. Much work both in French and German has been devoted to "materialisations," which have been regarded, in contrast to the view prevalent in this country, as affording the most hopeful line of research. As a result the relation of the two sets of phenomena to each other and to the hypothesis of spiritism is not as commonly recognised as seems desirable. A few words may therefore not be out of place upon this subject.

First of all, ghosts have become "real." Ghosts have a living substance. It is true that this substance is borrowed. Where there *is* a ghost, there there is a medium. But the traditional ghost has been rightly described. It is white and "filmy," and moves with a gliding motion, and disappears at cock-crow, with daylight, and is frightened away by noise, for instance the firing of a pistol. And the old stories of its diaphanous nature, its power to appear and disappear, and walk through doors, are all true. Loving hands have indeed in vain attempted to embrace its unsubstantial form. The poet's vision is true:—

(The) unsubstantial form eludes (our) grasp ;
 As often as that eager grasp is made,
 The Phantom parts, but parts to reunite
 And reassume his place before (our) sight.

But the ghost's reality opens new problems. How is it generated? This is the first problem to investigate, and the one towards which Schrenck-Notzing directs himself, though no solution is yet visible. What intelligence gives it its birth and its form? This is the second and still greater problem, and this problem will not be solved by the methods of Schrenck-Notzing alone, apart from the methods of the English school. For the purpose of his inquiry Schrenck-Notzing rightly discards the spiritistic hypothesis. He is dealing with material things. He is establishing objective facts, which have to fit somehow into the world as we know it, and to be tacked on to the mystery of the living organism. The facts are indeed curious ones, much more curious than the ordinary trance phenomena, such as automatic writing, to which we have become accustomed, or the ordinary control of body by mind in waking life, which we take for granted, though we cannot explain. But what is this mind which can do these things? Are they, in common with all other "occult" phenomena, to be explained by sub-consciousness, suggestion,

and telepathy? Are all "miracles" but instances of the unknown power of the intelligence embodied in the organism?

It is worth while summarising the present position of the spiritistic hypothesis in the light of the new possibilities opened out by the investigation of materialisation.

First, it is not possible not to relate the Gospel story with the new knowledge. Nearly all the physical appearances of the risen Christ, so far as the "conditions" are related, took place under "suitable" conditions from the point of view of their being materialisations. They occur in the early morning, "whilst it was still dark," or in the evening on the road to Emmaus, or in the room with a "circle" of disciples. We may expect, when Schrenck-Notzing and many other people's researches are fully confirmed and recognised, to find that the Higher Criticism will no longer trouble to deny the reality of the appearances. The "Touch Me not" to Mary and "Reach hither thy hand" to Thomas will find parallels, have already found parallels, in the séance room, but the reality (which will be accepted) of the appearance will no longer be a proof in itself of the reality of the survival. The test of the same body will no longer be sufficient. Bodies of this kind are created by the intelligence of the sub-consciousness. The test must be a test devoted to discover what intelligence or sub-consciousness or consciousness is at work to give form to the ghostly body. Materialisations do not differ from other experiments in psychical research by affording a miraculous proof, even if its own nature permitted the mind to be "convinced" by miracle. We shall still, so far as we trust to reason, be left to argument; so far as we trust to faith, to deeper springs of our nature which we cannot explain.

Argument to prove survival in the future, as in the past, so far as it rests on facts and not on general or prior considerations, will still be based on three groups of phenomena.

(a) The returning spirit may make an emotional appeal which is recognised by friends and relations. It behaves "just like him." The literature of psychical research is full of instances which were convincing to those who experienced them. But these facts are not facts for others who do not share the emotion (and to whom they are often, even ridiculous), and are to the sceptic sufficiently explained by "suggestion." This will be the explanation, this is the explanation offered of the behaviour of the most life-like ghost on the pages of any Schrenck-Notzing. Schrenck-Notzing indeed quotes a case of a materialisation of a portrait by Rubens which seems clearly due to sub-consciousness and not an

outside mind, just as sub-consciousness is the explanation offered of the ordinary trance phenomena.

(b) The returning spirit may act or speak "in character." This, to the ordinary man, is the strongest proof, and since character is a fixed thing, it is perhaps the strongest proof to the scientific mind. Two instances of my meaning may be given. Christ's appearance on the shore of the lake is "in character" more than any other of the appearances. We feel that His reiterated "Feed My sheep" cannot have been invented by the sub-consciousness or suggested *ab extra* by the minds of the disciples. It springs, we feel, from His very own personality, just as much as if one of the parables, which can be no one's but His, had been spoken on the occasion. The story is real; the characters are real; if we accept the view that the Ghost is real, we have to ask ourselves if it is inspired by anything else than the consciousness of Jesus. It is when the dramatic play of personalities (which is common at mediumistic séances) becomes thus "creative" that we have the strongest proof that a so-called dead mind still survives.¹

A second illustration will make this clearer. It shall be taken from a quite modern source and not from a materialisation. At the end of the recently published *Ear of Dionysus*, the communicating intelligences, purporting to be Professor Butcher and Dr Verrall, comment upon their own work. "Isn't it S.H.ish (they say) and A.W.ish?"—meaning, isn't it like the two communicators. And this is just what it is. The puzzle which is set and unravelled is just the sort of puzzle that the two men would have contrived. It is because of this, not because the puzzle is set and later answered, that the incident is such a strong one for the purpose of proof. Cross-correspondences by themselves, of the most elaborate kind, prove nothing except one intelligence working in two mediums. They still leave the question open, whose is that intelligence?

(c) The third group of phenomena consists of the ordinary incidents which are relied upon in proof of personality, recollections of all kinds of trivial facts known only to the communicant, or shared by him with only one or two persons. Striking as are the incidents recorded in this group, they cannot from their nature be convincing. They would not even be convincing if they contained records of the Myers' test which had proved successful—I mean the delivery by the communi-

¹ It is worth noting that the story occurs in the chapter of St John's Gospel which has generally been regarded by the critics as clearly an addendum. It is not stated what time of day it was.

cator of a message written down before death and known only to himself. They can always be ascribed to telepathy, if necessary from the communicator when alive, or to the subconsciousness of living persons. Materialisations may be expected to add to the number of such incidents, but they will not make them more convincing. The fact that the "ghost" and the living man both have a finger missing or a wart on the nose can be ascribed just as well to the subconsciousness of the medium, if that inspires the form, as to the mind of the dead person, if that inspires it. Proof does not lie along the lines of an ordinary "recognition" scene from the stage. No cheap and easy "lusion" of man's tragi-comedy will be found along the road by which the unskilful dramatist winds up his play happily in the last lines of the last act. We must expect, if there is to be scientific proof, that it will only be hardly won as the result of much toil and many long and patient investigations (in which all these elements will play a part); and it is right that the preliminary work should continue to be carried on in the spirit of Schrenck-Notzing and in that of much of the work of the Society of Psychical Research if a firm bridge based on facts and reason is to be built across the gulf to the unknown and (may be) unknowable other shore.

And we have to remember that when all is said and proved about survival, the fundamental questions will still remain. Survival is at best a "temporary" affair. It is difficult to think of it as worth possessing, unless it will answer for us the questions to which we in this life fail to find the answer, the questions, of which the very nature of time forbids an answer, the questions of "eternal life."

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THE BASIS OF REUNION.

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THE question of reunion is essential to the future well-being, if not even to the future existence, of Christianity. No comment has more frequently been made during the war than the criticism—sometimes friendly, more often hostile—that the Church has failed conspicuously to rise to the opportunity which the war has presented to her. Like most generalisations, the criticism is misleading and inaccurate. There are respects in which the Church of England and the Free Churches have risen magnificently to their opportunity; and there are other respects in which they have all alike failed. But in so far as the comment has a measure of truth in it, it is merely pointing to the very obvious truism that a divided Church can never speak with authority to a divided world; or in plain English, that those who live in glass houses should not throw stones. And when the present world-conflict in the field is at an end, the Church, if she continues divided, will be unable to speak with authority to a world which will be divided in other and subtler ways. Her only chance of recovering her true position as a spiritual mother of men is to recover first of all her own unity, which was an essential element in her original foundation and inferentially, if not explicitly, a condition of her security.

The question of reunion is, further, ecumenical. It affects all communions in Christendom alike. Half-measures, parochially conceived measures, measures of Church Pacifists, who think in terms of two or three branches of the divided Church instead of thinking in terms of them all, are not merely of questionable utility, but they are a positive danger and embarrassment. It is obvious that there must be many individual movements before there is the slightest chance of a

great all-embracing corporate reunion. But there are Bolos even in affairs of the Church: and they work and scheme to bring about a premature, inconclusive, thoughtless peace between separate communions, regardless of the interests of the whole. The watch-cry of the religious Bolos is inter-communion. "Why do we continue to fight, more especially on the mission field? Do our differences really matter? Why not lay them all aside and reunite at once, as good Christians should, around the table of our Divine Lord?" It is a plausible cry; it is generally well meant; it is believed to be a step in the direction of mending the seamless garment of the Church. That position is now familiar to all of us under the name of Kikuyu. A recent writer, Mr Leslie Shane, in his illuminating book *The End of a Chapter*, looking at that question from a Roman Catholic standpoint, says:—

"The world crisis found Anglicanism cloven between the rival claims of the Bishops of Uganda and Zanzibar, who had collided in the African Mission Field on the question as to whether their amazed converts were Catholics or Protestants. The Kikuyu question, as it was called, was referred to the worthy Archbishop of Canterbury, who decided *ex cathedra* that they could be both or either, provided they did no violence to Church principles. Whereat one archangel retired behind a cloud and two cherubs at least were admonished for laughing."

It was quite right to admonish the cherubs for laughing: it was most improper—they should have been weeping!

There are some ardent souls who are very keenly interested in the steps which are being taken to effect an amalgamation of the sundry Presbyterian bodies; but who would regard with horror any conception of reunion which would include the Scarlet Woman of their hereditary prejudices. In the Church of England there are some who view with favour, if with some mistrust, a growing understanding between what they are pleased to call the Low Church and the High Church; but who never realise what a small fraction of Christendom the Church of England is. There are yet others who have a genuine zeal and concern to see the barriers removed which separate the Church of England from the Nonconformist bodies, and to see unity restored once again to all those who are included under the general head of Protestant, *i.e.* those who do not acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope. Now these are all excellent aims in themselves—excellent so far as they go; but they are wretched panaceas for the wounds of a divided Church, if those who hold them are going to regard them—as, alas! they often are regarded—as ends in themselves and not merely means towards an end. It is difficult to

conceive anything more disastrous than the success of a propaganda which might unite all the so-called Protestant bodies into one Federal Union, leaving out altogether the Roman communion and the Orthodox communions. Such a result, if achieved, would be the worst possible travesty of the true unity of the Church as conceived by her Divine Founder and, moreover, it would be in a position of unstable equilibrium, for it would be based upon no sound principle, but merely on devices of human ingenuity and resourcefulness. Reunion can mean one thing only—the restoration of complete communion between all branches of the Christian Church throughout the world—Roman, Orthodox, and Protestant—which confess our Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour, and the formation of all such communions into a visible unity. That is the one kind of reunion worth working for or praying for. Has such a great visible unity of the Church ever existed? Most certainly, it existed in the early centuries to a greater or less degree, and was not completely shattered until A.D. 1054, the date of the schism between West and East. Such a unity is not inconsistent with the springing up of sects and heresies, first individual and then corporate. While human nature remains human, individuals will go astray and draw others after them. The existence of freak sects may continue as parasites on the body of the Church. “The unity of the Church,” as Mr Lacey in his Paddock Lectures rightly observes, “is not intended to embrace every vagary of thought and practice which claims to be Christian.” It is not impossible that such a unity may be restored by patient, prayerful, self-sacrificing work on the part of the leaders in the Christian Churches, who are content to sow what they themselves will almost certainly never live to see fructify. It is probable that in the decades and centuries to come, the grateful appreciation of Christendom will go out to the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America for having with unexampled boldness of vision, and yet humility of purpose, set on foot in 1910 the present movement for the World’s Conference on Faith and Order. Their original resolution called upon all Christian communions throughout the world which confess our Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour to unite with them in arranging for a conference for the consideration of questions touching faith and order.

It is neither necessary nor possible to describe in any detail here what has taken place since that historic Church Session in Cincinnati in 1910. It can, however, be rapidly surveyed.

A Commission of three American bishops and one priest was sent over to confer with the Archbishops of Canterbury and York on the whole matter. Their Graces, impressed with the reality and importance of the proposal, appointed a representative committee of bishops, priests, and laymen, charged not with any plenipotentiary authority, but merely with the sufficiently responsible duty of holding a watching brief for the archbishops and reporting progress from time to time, but also of advancing the whole undertaking by conferences first among themselves and then with leaders of the Free Churches. The committee was in itself a highly representative body. The bishops were represented by leaders such as the Bishops of Bath and Wells (Chairman), Oxford, Winchester, and Ely; lay opinion varied from that represented by Mr Athelstan Riley to that represented by Dr Eugene Stock. The American Episcopal Church soon got into communication with the principal non-Episcopal Churches of North America; those bodies responded willingly, and appointed their own Commissions, and in their turn they communicated with the parent organisations of their respective bodies in the United Kingdom. As a result, the Free Churches in this country appointed each its own Commission, and each Commission one representative, thus forming a committee representative of all the chief Free Churches. This Free Church Committee naturally contains some of the most eminent and respected names of Nonconformity; but, like the Church of England Committee, it is in no sense plenipotentiary, and must refer back for instructions to the separate communions and ultimately to the separate Free Churches which lie behind it.

From what has already been said it will be seen that the American Episcopal Church has acted in no narrow or parochial spirit. But her activity has by no means ended in what has been already mentioned. It is safe to assert that during the seven years that have elapsed since the Church Session of 1910, progress then unexpected has been made. By January 1916, fifty-five separate Commissions had been appointed, each representing a branch of the Christian Church, each with the same object of paving the way towards a future Conference on Faith and Order, which will be in the true sense of the term ecumenical. Among these Commissions are those representative of all the various communions of the Church of England, *i.e.* those in the British Dominions, Colonies and Dependencies, and in certain foreign lands.

One of the most interesting aspects of this whole question

is the possibility of the ultimate participation of the Roman Catholic Church and of the several branches of the Greek Orthodox Church. On this topic one must speak with reserve and with caution, because any attempt to overestimate the significance of what has already taken place would be liable to set back the desired result and lead to a fatal estrangement.

The movement includes among its friends and sympathisers many individual Roman Catholic and Orthodox prelates, priests, and lay-people. That is encouraging, but it is not enough. One of the earliest steps taken by the Protestant Episcopal Church in America was to arrange an interview with Cardinal Gibbons. "His Eminence expressed friendly interest in the subject, a desire to be kept informed of the progress of the movement, and a conviction both that clear statements of positions would show them to be nearer together than had been supposed, and that only good could come of the effort to promote the spirit in which such a conference should be undertaken. Similar sentiments have been expressed orally by Cardinal Farley, and by letter by a number of other cardinals, archbishops, bishops and priests of the Roman Catholic Church in various parts of the world."¹ From the Vatican, Cardinal Gasparri has written to express the interest of the Holy Father in this "project of examining, in a sincere spirit and without prejudice, the essential form of the Church." An influential Episcopal deputation is already appointed in America and is ready to proceed, when the time is ripe, to Rome, and that visit, fraught as it is with incalculable possibilities for the future peace of the Church, may not be very long deferred.

With the Greek Orthodox Church the situation has shown more definite progress than can be expected in the case of the Roman Catholic Church. Between the so-called Protestant bodies and the Orthodox communions there are not, and never have been, the thorny questions of recognition, which still exist in the case of the relations with the Roman Catholics. An indication of this may be found in the comparative readiness and ease with which an international movement, such as the World's Student Christian Federation, found it possible to multiply points of contact and form links with university students in Orthodox countries, frequently with the open approval and encouragement of the responsible religious leaders. In the movement for reunion, the chief link with the Orthodox world has been Archbishop Platon of the Holy Orthodox Church of Russia in New York, who has expressed

¹ *Report of Joint Commission to General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church*, 1913, p. 11.

hearty approval of the undertaking. The present situation in Russia makes it impossible to forecast the religious outlook with any more certainty than the political. It will be remembered that last year, 1917, the United States Government sent to Russia a special diplomatic Mission, which included intentionally two leading American religious leaders—Dr John R. Mott and Mr Charles R. Crane, whose special function it was to investigate the religious situation in Russia and, as far as they were allowed, to offer to Russia a mission of help on the religious side on analogous lines to those on which the rest of the Mission offered political help and support. The confidential unofficial reports of Dr Mott upon this aspect of the work of the Mission are of extraordinary interest and significance. They showed that an entirely new spirit was moving in the Russian Church; that that Church was susceptible as never before to friendly advances from the West; that the prospects of an understanding with the West—at any rate, with the non-Roman West—were never before so hopeful. Dr Mott received on leaving the personal assurances in writing of the head of the reconstituted Holy Synod that, as far as his personal efforts were concerned, the Russian Church would be officially represented at the future World Conference on Faith and Order. Since then, much that is intensely disappointing has happened in Russia; but it is difficult to suppose that, when peace is restored, the situation of the Orthodox Church will be one less open to friendly advances than it was before the outbreak of war, and there is good reason for hoping that it may be much more open.

Such, then, is the general position of the movement which aims at promoting the reunion of Christendom. It may be described as the first serious attempt made, not by mere individuals but by corporate bodies, to achieve a result which all would agree in regarding as desirable, but which many regard as idealistic, quixotic, impossible. At any rate, no previous attempt has ever gone so far in the direction of producing a favourable atmosphere for the proper consideration of the great underlying problems, an atmosphere which can be best described by a term used in one of the manifestos issued in America by the Commission of the Protestant Episcopal Church, a truce of God.

It appears likely that in a good many of the Free Churches the progress in the matter of readiness to consider proposals for reunion is greater than in the Church of England. Most of the Free Churches are more homogeneous, more closely knit, more easily handled as a whole by their accredited leaders

than is the Church of England. It takes a longer time and a greater effort to make an impression of any kind upon the Church of England than upon any other non-Roman communion.

It is not to be expected that the World Conference on Faith and Order will be held in the near future, still less in the immediate future. If one considers what has taken place in the eight years since 1910, one realises that slow and steady advance is the most which can be looked for. It may be decades before the conference itself is held. It is anticipated that the conference when held will be in North America, not in Europe. A good many advantages, into which it is not practicable to enter here, would attach to holding the conference in American surroundings. The conference will not be charged with working out any particular scheme of unity; least of all a scheme of unity based upon mere outward uniformity. Above all, it is important to realise that the eventual conference, as conceived by its promoters, will not be plenipotentiary; it will have no power to pledge or commit those bodies participating in it; its functions will be to confer: it will be, it is hoped, an ecumenical conference, but not an ecumenical council.

Reference has already been made to the formation of the Archbishops' Committee on Faith and Order, and to the creation of a central committee representing the several corresponding Free Church Commissions. One of the most interesting, and in some respects most promising results of the whole movement, has been the meeting in common session in the historic Jerusalem chamber of the Church of England Committee and the representatives of the English Free Churches Commissions. It would be improper for anyone privileged to take part in those conferences to reveal more of the proceedings than has by common consent been published; but it is not improper to emphasise the fact that if the atmosphere in which those conferences were held were the atmosphere of the Churches represented at them, the problem of reunion, as between the Church of England and the Free Churches, would have made already a notable advance towards solution. There has been throughout the proceedings courtesy, absence of embittered controversy, readiness to understand the position of those from whom one differs—and, notwithstanding all this, an absence of any desire to compromise.

As a result of several meetings in common session and of joint committee work, the first interim Report, entitled

“Towards Christian Unity,” was published in February 1916. The full document appeared at the time in the Church papers and elsewhere, and consisted of three parts: a statement of agreement on matters of faith; a statement of agreement on matters relating to order; and a statement of differences in relation to matters of order which require further study and discussion.

The first somewhat surprising result which emerges even from these headings, and still more from the matter under each heading, is that the matters on which differences are found to exist are matters of order, not of faith. The statement of agreement on matters of faith—briefly summarised—begins with an assertion of the progressive revelation of God, reaching its culmination in the person of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God; it shows this revelation, accepted as the Word of God, to be the basis of the life of the Christian Church and to constitute the permanent spiritual value of the Bible; and as involving a positive doctrine of God, from which follow the doctrines concerning human nature and destiny, sin, redemption through the incarnation and the atoning death and resurrection of Christ. The statement ends with the acceptance of the Apostles’ and Nicene Creeds as affirming essential elements of the Christian faith, and an affirmation that there is no contradiction between the acceptance of the miracles recited in the creeds and that of the principle of order in nature.

Turning to matters relating to order, agreement is found to exist upon the existence of the Church as being in the purpose of our Lord one visible society; upon the sacraments and the Lord’s Supper as not only declaratory symbols, but also effective channels of grace; and upon the existence in the Church of a ministry of manifold gifts and functions.

It is a matter for profound thankfulness to find a willing and unanimous recognition of aspects of the Church and the sacraments which are vital to members of the Church of England. With a candour and desire to recognise facts as they are, the document ends with a frank statement of matters of order concerning which differences exist, including the nature of the visible society, the Church, the conditions upon which the validity of the sacraments depends, and the method or channel by or through which the ministry derives its authority.

This important Report would undoubtedly have received far more attention than it has done, had it not been for the preoccupations consequent upon the war. It was a foregone conclusion that it would be warmly received by the Evangelical

Church Press and by the Free Church Press. But it received a more favourable reception from the *Church Times* than could have been expected of that journal. The *Church Times* regarded it as an important step forward, and gave it a favourable editorial notice. The two years which have elapsed since its publication have not been idle years. A second Report, with the same title, has recently been published. It marks a great advance on the first Report. It states that "the visible unity of the body of Christ is not adequately expressed in the co-operation of the Christian Churches for moral influence and social service, . . . but could only be fully realised through community of worship, faith, and order, including common participation in the Lord's Supper." Then follows the most significant statement with respect to the historical Episcopate, viz.: "The first fact which we agree to acknowledge, that the position of Episcopacy, in the greater part of Christendom, as the recognised organ of the unity and continuity of the Church is such that the members of the Episcopal Churches ought not to be expected to abandon it in assenting to any basis of reunion." That agreement, if it receives the support of the separate Churches, removes one of the chief stumbling-blocks in the way of reunion. It is of cardinal importance, because any partial reunion which did not contain that basis *inter alia* would bar the door to the ultimate reunion of all Christendom, which is the only true reunion and the only one worth seeking.

The second Report formulates certain positions for consideration by all the parts of a divided Christendom as the necessary conditions of any possibility of reunion. They may be summarised under the following heads: (1) the effective preservation of the historic Episcopate, (2) the re-assumption by the Episcopate of a constitutional form, both as regards method of election and method of government, and (3) the acceptance of the fact of Episcopacy and not any theory as to its character.

The atmosphere or spirit of the Report is in some ways more important even than the positions agreed upon, and this atmosphere is shown most clearly by the closing paragraph, which states that it must be felt by all good-hearted Christians an intolerable burden to find themselves permanently separated from those in whose characters and lives they recognise the surest evidences of the indwelling Spirit.

There are many criticisms which might be pressed against the work already done by the Archbishops' Committee, in concert with their Free Church colleagues; there are many

difficulties which might be raised. "The end of the exploration," said Livingstone, "is the beginning of the enterprise." At present, greater progress has apparently been made in this country than in other countries. But the Reports which have been issued do not represent more than the exploratory stage. The enterprise is only begun, and it will need any amount of wisdom, tact, inspiration, and patience if it is to eventuate in a World Conference on Faith and Order, and if that conference is to eventuate in reunion.

Thus far the Archbishops' Committee has been concerned only with the relations of the Church of England to the Free Churches, though in the minds of some, if not of all, members of the committee the thought of the relations to the Roman and Orthodox Churches has remained constantly in the background as an underlying concern. On that all-important topic what can be said? Not the most optimistic amongst the friends of reunion can regard the position in relation to Rome as exactly hopeful. It is true that, as in the case of the relations with the Free Churches, investigation will show that the differences which are found to exist are differences principally of order and not of faith. It is not matters of faith primarily which separate the Churchmen of this country from the great Roman communion; though undoubtedly there are tenets of modern Romanism which, if insisted upon too rigorously as *de fide*, may block the path of reunion—tenets such as the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, of the Corporal Assumption of our Lady, and of the Transubstantiation theory of the Real Presence. But far more menacing to the success of any proposals for reunion are the questions of order connected with the claim of the Pope, as occupant of the "Cathedra Petri," to be the centre and origin of unity in the whole Church, and to wield a monarchical jurisdiction over the Church in virtue of the *potentior principalitas* inherent in his see, and to be the vicegerent of Christ on earth, notwithstanding the fact that he occupies his position without the elective voice of the episcopate of the whole Church, with indeed the support of only a fraction of that episcopate. The present dominance of ultramontanism in the policy of the Curia is not an encouraging feature; even less encouraging is the notorious and incontrovertible association of the Holy See with Germanophile influences during the present war, which cannot fail to create prejudices in the minds of ardent friends of reunion in the Allied countries—prejudices which it may take many years to remove. There is also in the way the persistent refusal to recognise

the validity of Anglican orders, coupled, it must be admitted, with the refusal to condemn them. Such are a few of the outstanding problems on that side of the question of reunion concerned with Roman relations, as considered in the most general terms. The situation, taken as a whole, has a good many elements of cheer and encouragement. But it would be a false and dangerous policy to look on one side only of the picture. For Churchmen, the religious horizon is heavy with clouds. There is the Kikuyu cloud hanging over the next Lambeth conference, which may set back the cause of reunion for decades and stir up embittered feelings. There is the cloud of Undenominationalism, which is spreading over the religious life of the nation. No one has a higher regard than the present writer for the marvellous work done by agencies such as the Y.M.C.A. during the war, and that organisation has earned the sincere gratitude of the nation; but the ministering to the physical needs of men, while a necessary handmaid of religion, is not the whole of religion. There is, it seems to me, the danger of Modernism, rightly recognised by the late Pope Pius, in his encyclical *Pascendi*, as one of the serious obstacles confronting the Christian Church as a whole.

This is a dark side of the horizon. Blacker clouds have, however, before now appeared in Church history and have been dispersed. For those who have the true welfare of the Church at heart, the constructive work of labouring towards the restoration of its essential and primitive unity is one which will occupy their time, interest, and imagination, and which will go on bearing fruits of fellowship and not of discord during the years when the difficulties which now threaten have been dispersed.

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THE LIBERAL POSITION IN REGARD TO THE CREEDS AND THE HEREFORD APPOINTMENT.

I.

THE REV. WILLIAM SANDAY, D.D.

PROFESSOR KIRSOPP LAKE has raised a very pertinent question, toward the answer to which I would ask leave to offer a brief contribution. His article or note amounts to asking, What ought to be the Liberal position in regard to the Creeds? He criticises one view, and rightly claims to offer another. I should be glad if I might be allowed to add yet a third, which has indeed much in common with both the others, and might be said to lie rather between them.

Perhaps we should begin by delimiting our subject, which has the advantage of having a clear delimitation. In the first place, it is a question within the Liberal camp. Other schools will have other views; but with these we are not concerned. In the second place, it is a general question, and not (except accidentally) either personal or historical. I do not think that there is so far any generally accepted Liberal doctrine in regard to the Creeds. It might be a good thing if we could agree on one. But in any case, it will be well to aim at clear thinking on the subject; and we shall do that best by discussing possible alternatives.

As between Professor Lake and Dr Henson, I think I should agree more with the former. At least I should regard the phrase "accepting the Creeds *ex animo*" as a rather loose mode of expression. I believe it is one that is frequently used; but in the mouth of those who use it, I suspect that it often does not mean quite what it says. For instance, in the case of Dr Henson, I submit that it would be nearer the

mark if he had said that he honestly (*= ex animo*) believed his views to be entirely compatible or in accordance with the Creeds.

There are two objections to the phrase "accepting the Creeds":—

(1) It is inconsistent with the psychology of belief. To "accept" means in this connection to "accept on authority," to receive as propounded from without. But the Liberal does not do that. For him, beliefs that are to deserve the name of beliefs cannot be dictated. The man himself must assent to them as a free agent. The Liberal as such may assent to the Creeds, but his assent will be deliberate and reasoned; it will not be of that wholesale kind which is often implied when we speak of "accepting" the Creeds. That, I feel sure, is the way in which Dr Henson will have wished his words to be taken.

(2) There is another reason why I conceive that he must have done this. No one—not even the Archbishop—would have had any right to demand of him the wholesale acceptance of the Creeds. No such demand is contained in any of the formularies of the Church of England.

The Sixth Article lays down that

"Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation."

It is true that the Eighth Article goes on to say that the Three Creeds (Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian) "ought thoroughly to be received and believed: for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." But at this point the Liberal puts in something of a demurrer. He urges that the conception of scriptural proof is different now from what it was both at the time when the Creeds were drawn up and also at the Reformation. On this ground he claims to have the right of revising—indeed he is compelled to revise—what he accepts as proved and what he does not.

And, apart from that, three later Articles qualify considerably the nature of the authority on which the Creeds are supposed to rest.

Article XIX speaks thus of the fallibility of the Church:

"As the Churches of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch have erred; so also the Church of Rome hath erred, not only in their living and manner of Ceremonies, but also in matters of Faith."

Article XX lays down that :

“It is not lawful for the Church to ordain any thing that is contrary to God’s Word written, neither may it so expound one place of Scripture, that it be repugnant to another. Wherefore, although the Church be a witness and a keeper of holy Writ, yet, as it ought not to decree any thing against the same, so besides the same ought it not to enforce any thing to be believed for necessity of Salvation.”

And Article XXI goes on to restrict considerably the authority even of those General Councils from which the Creeds are conceived to derive their validity :

“When they be gathered together, (forasmuch as they be an assembly of men, whereof all be not governed with the Spirit and Word of God,) they may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto God. Wherefore things ordained by them as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of holy Scripture.”

It will be seen from the above how well the Liberal is safeguarded on the side of the Creeds. They cannot be held at his head in quite such peremptory fashion as some of our friends on the other side would like to hold them.

So far, then, as Dr Henson is concerned, I think we only have to emend his language in the way suggested above so as to make it mean what I believe he really did mean. The Liberal does not take even the Creeds simply on authority and without further criticism. He feels himself constrained to “prove all things” before he can speak of “believing” or “accepting.” But that does not mean that the Creeds have no influence upon him or that his opinions are wholly independent of them. He is consciously aiming at the same object as the Creeds. He deliberately desires to keep in living touch with them. The agreement with them at which he aims is not literal and formal, but free, spontaneous, spiritual. While he is working, the Creeds are in the background of his mind as a parallel but older attempt to embody the same ideal; an attempt made on a great scale and with a great expenditure of mental power. He looks on them with veneration. And when he has reached conclusions of his own by methods suited to his own day, he is quite willing to compare these conclusions with the Creeds and to test their essential meaning by that of the Creeds.

How far this testing is to be carried is a question that will come before us presently. But in the meantime it may be well to examine a little further the alternative view of the Liberal position put forward by Professor Kirsopp Lake.

His description of this view is full and explicit, and there can be no doubt about his meaning:

“The true position is that we do *not* accept the Creed *ex animo*, because it represents not our mind but that of a generation which, however great it may have been, was nevertheless mistaken in its view of the interpretation and authority of the Scriptures on which the Creed is based. As a matter of Church discipline and custom we recite the Creed in our liturgical services, but we desire either to see it dropped or preserved merely as a monument of the history of the Church. It is in this last sense that we accept it. It was intended as a bulwark against forms of wrong thinking which, though now dead, were once dangerous; as historians, we understand and value this monument of ancient battles. We are not gnostics, and are on the side of orthodoxy against gnosticism. But the Churchmen of those days were not infallible; nor can the summary of their arguments control by authority the controversies of the present. We refuse either to make the words of the Creed mean what historically they cannot mean, or to accept the position that old answers are sufficient for new questions. Science and criticism have introduced new problems. We deny that the Church, on any subject, or in any direction, is unable to modify, or even to reverse, its view when new evidence is brought forward. . . . We claim complete liberty to discuss facts in the light of evidence and literature in the light of criticism. We believe that we have a right to remain in the Church of our fathers, and try to make its opinions correspond with truth, so far as it is given us to see the truth.”

Let me try to take my bearings more exactly on the many points that are raised by this statement.

1. Speaking broadly, I do not think that I am prepared to go quite so far. I have no wish to agitate against the public recitation of the Creeds. I can see that they perform a very useful function. They stand for the continuity and identity of Christian belief in a way that nothing else can. The Nicene Creed is a rallying-point for Christians all the world over, a reminder of the identity of the faith in which they join. It knits together the present with the past, and the scattered members of the Body of Christ. It unites the Anglican with the Roman, and the Orthodox with both; and most even of our own Nonconformists are willing to join in it. That is no light matter.

It is true that the use of the Creed covers a somewhat different degree of identity in some of these cases and in others. Within our communion, it carries with it a more literal and complete identity for the High Churchman than for the Broad Churchman; and in the Church of Rome it marks off the Modernisers, or would-be Modernisers, from the main body. But it is a great thing that it should carry with it so much of unity and identity as it does. I am not sure that Professor Lake allows enough for the value of the Creed or Creeds under this head.

2. On the other hand, he expresses very well the funda-

mental reason why the Creeds cannot be taken simply *en bloc*. It is impossible that one age should wholly speak for or bind another. Where methods of investigation and proof are not the same, conclusions cannot be exactly the same. The later conclusions may resemble the earlier, but they cannot be identical. *Si duo dicunt idem, non est idem*. And, greatly as we may be impressed to this day by the total mass of intellectual power which went to the making of the Creeds, yet we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that the whole method of applying scriptural proof has changed, and that we can no longer have the assurance that if we were to go over the old arguments we should arrive at the same results. It is in the field of history that this is felt most. Our way of envisaging and reconstructing history is not what it was, and we are compelled to take the consequences. We only have to remember that the age which produced our Anglican Articles was an age which still believed in the Greeks of Cricklade and in Brute the Trojan to see how matters stand.

3. Again, I do not doubt that Professor Lake does well to emphasise the independence of science and criticism. They must not be drawn aside from their course by any foregone conclusions. The old Platonic maxim still holds good: ὅπη ἀν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρη, ταύτη ἰτέον (*Rep.* 394 *E*). That is the incorruptibility of scholarship. Wherever it is necessary we must be prepared to say, *amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, magis amica veritas*.

The danger under this head would seem to be that it might lead to a mistaken view of life. Life is not made up merely of a succession of isolated problems, each marking a new beginning and each to be labelled with Aye or No. Life is rather a broad movement, to be conceived and described as such. The problems are subordinate to the reconstruction of this.

I have rather the feeling that if Professor Lake were taken strictly at his word, and if his own scheme of opinions were worked out in accordance with the principles laid down in his article, it would be found to be wanting in coherence. There would be a want of cohesion between his view of the present and his estimate of the past; and there might be—I do not say that there would be—a want of cohesion between the parts of his scheme and the whole.

4. I think I can understand in the main the objection which Professor Lake and his friends take to what they call the “figurative” interpretation of the Creeds, though I certainly cannot endorse the sweeping criticism that by this method

“anything can be made to mean anything.” The conditions under which the method is applied are strictly limited. It is not a question of beliefs in general, but of particular clauses in particular Creeds. And in each of these instances a definite—or more or less definite—modern counterpart is offered for the ancient original. Those who make use of this method for the most part regard the modern counterpart as something more than this—as a real and full spiritual equivalent, adapted to the present day as the older expression was adapted to a day that is past.

Here once more the real source of mischief is the supposed acceptance of the Creeds on the ground of authority. It would, as Professor Lake evidently thinks, be an objectionable proceeding if the Creeds were proposed for acceptance in one sense and accepted in another. And the ghost of authority so continues to haunt the whole of this region that language appropriate to it is apt to survive even when the basis on which it rested has gone. It is a different thing when the Creeds are regarded rather as outstanding moments in a continuous movement of Christian thought that has been going on from the first days until now.

I am conscious of shifting my own ground a little in this respect. Under the influence of the lingering idea of authority, and in order to link up the past with the present, I have been in the habit of appealing to the providential order as supplying the bond of connection between them. I have urged that it was not reasonable to suppose that Divine Providence would as it were contradict itself—that it would at one time pronounce to be false what it had at another time pronounced to be true. Of course I still most thoroughly believe in the providential order and in any consequences that may follow from it. If what was true at one time becomes false at another, we may be sure that it is not in its essence but only in its accidents. At the same time, I do not like appealing to presumptions, and I do not think that it is necessary to appeal to them. Is it not enough that the process is all one, and that the unity which binds together its different parts is an organic unity? I suspect that here again the authoritarian view of the Creeds has tended to throw Christian thought off the track. We have been too apt to think of formulations as if they were commands. Is it not better to think of them as steps or stages in a living process? What is the whole history of doctrine but an effort after the expression of divine things in language that we can understand? There have been times when greater progress has been made than at others.

Those have been the periods of definition, when the effort of thought has come to a head and been brought into relative harmony with its surroundings. Still, there is always the relative and temporary element, which cannot be avoided and yet must not be allowed to pass itself off as if it were absolute and final.

In such a state of things, if we want to bring out the difference between what is permanent and what is temporary in an idea I doubt if "figurative" is the best word that we can use. Professor Lake seems to use it, still with the associations of authority in his mind, as though it meant putting a modern gloss upon an ancient idea for the purpose of bringing a new meaning under an old formula. But if we give up the idea of coercive authority and look at the Creeds rather as "landmarks" and guides to direction, then I would submit that "symbolical" would be the better term. A "symbol" always implies that something that is known is taken to stand for more that is not known. And that, it seems to me, is just what we want. In this use we can make allowance for the difference of times. We can read our own meaning into the unknown element without putting a strain upon it.

5. After all, it is not really on *a priori* grounds alone that I would plead for the principle of symbolical interpretation. I plead for it on two grounds which cannot be called *a priori*.

In the first place, I plead for it because (if we discard the notion of authority) it is really natural and not imposed. By all means let us give the Creeds their strictly historical sense. But if we do that, we are also entitled to claim for our own beliefs that they too should be historically conditioned; in other words, that they shall be adjusted to the rest of their intellectual context in our own minds, just as they originally were in the minds of those by whom they were framed.

And then I would also advance the argument that this method of symbolical interpretation is found practically to work. I can at least speak for myself. So far as I personally am concerned, I find that this method gives me all the latitude I want. I can recite the Creeds without hesitation because I feel that they have for me to-day the same essential meaning that they had for those who made them. I should admit that there is in this an element of what I should call *mutatis mutandis*; but that I believe to be inevitable.

I do not know how far this experience of mine may be regarded as typical. I should be glad to compare notes with Professor Lake or with anyone else. I would heartily adopt the Pauline principle that each man's conscience must judge

for itself. What may be liberty enough for me may not be for my neighbour. To his own master he standeth or falleth.

Professor Lake is good at inventing picturesque phrases, and when he speaks of the Creeds "as milestones marking the still unfinished progress of the Church" he is not far from my own position. I would only wish to lay stress on the word "progress" and reserve for the Creeds an active share in shaping this progress. They are something more than "historical monuments," products of the "dead hand," if the movement of to-day is a continuation of the same movement that produced them.

I have some hope that the Professor may even see his way to fall in with these suggestions. I am thoroughly at one with him in resisting ecclesiastical dictation. But it is not submitting to dictation to observe a certain piety towards the past, to aim at keeping up a real continuity of teaching, and to remember that we ourselves are involved in the same never-ending process.

W. SANDAY.

OXFORD.

II.

THE REV. ALFRED FAWKES, M.A.,

Honorary Chaplain to the Bishop of Hereford.

THE higher a man's reputation stands on his own ground, the greater the risk he runs when he leaves it for another. On a question of criticism, one would differ from Professor Kirsopp Lake with misgiving: he would probably be right, and his opponent wrong. But in ecclesiastical politics this presumption ceases to hold. Here temperament goes for much; some very able men are temperamentally unable to go in harness: and a knowledge of the *milieu* is essential. This is particularly the case with English ecclesiastical politics, where the currents are many and shifting: to judge of them a man must be on the spot, and know the circumstances at first hand. I do not think that Professor Lake's criticism of the Bishop of Hereford will seem either reasonable or just to Liberal Churchmen in this country. It has certainly not suggested itself to the Bishop's opponents, who "lie at the catch," and are not over-scrupulous. Shortly after his consecration, 162 "Priests of the Diocese of London" addressed a formal protest to their Bishop:

"We desire to place on record our entire dissent from the idea that the correspondence between the Archbishop and Dr Henson, published in the *Times*, January 18, contains a retraction by Dr Henson, justifying his consecration: on the contrary, we affirm that the answer given to the two questions asked by the Archbishop does not contain any statement at all by Dr Henson of his sincere and positive belief in the doctrines named (*i.e.* the Miracle of the Virgin Birth of our Lord and the Miracle of His Bodily Resurrection on the third day), as taught by the Catholic Church from the first."

The Bishop of London, in acknowledging the receipt of this document, "with its many weighty signatures," gave instructions that it should be "preserved in the archives of the diocese," where it no doubt remains, to the satisfaction of those concerned.

Professor Lake's criticism would have carried greater weight had it been based not on "the scanty information which has reached America," but on a more exact knowledge of the facts.

He appears to have been misled by the U-boat campaign which has been, and is still being, carried on against the Bishop into the belief that the question of Creed-assent was the ground of the original opposition to the appointment. This was not so. It was an after-thought; nothing was heard of it till the original offensive had failed. The *Church Times* (Dec. 14, 1917) admitted that "it might be difficult to frame articles of heresy against him from his writings. . . . It is the personality and the record in general of Dr Henson that seems to constitute his unsuitability for a see." A famous passage in the *Provinciales* will occur to the reader: "Ce ne sont pas les sentiments de M. Arnauld qui sont hérétiques; ce n'est pas que sa personne. C'est une hérésie personnelle." The opposition was based not on speculative but on political theology. "Diotrephes loveth to have the pre-eminence." The "Church Party," which, though a negligible quantity in the nation, has controlled the ecclesiastical machine since Archbishop Tait's death (1882), felt that Dr Henson's elevation to the episcopate would seriously endanger its supremacy. Hence these "railing accusations"; the ascendancy of those who made them was at stake.

Early in January the *Times* published a letter from Dr Darwell Stone, of the Pusey House, which the first of living English theologians—Professor Sanday—described as raising "grave and difficult and delicate questions," and as "treading on dangerous ground." His warning fell on deaf ears:

coorta est
Seditio, sævitque animis ignobile vulgus:

the Church found herself on the verge of a doctrinal crisis of the first importance; a crisis of the same character as, and of greater gravity than, that occasioned in 1860 by *Essays and Reviews*. It was greatly, very greatly, to be regretted. "Novelty," says Cardinal Newman, "is often error to those who are unprepared for it, from the refraction with which it enters into their conceptions."¹ And "it was not an open enemy that hath done me this dishonour; for then I could have borne it." The worst blows inflicted upon religion are those dealt from within. It is difficult not to think that a false issue was raised, and raised deliberately, by persons bent at all costs on the removal of an opponent of whom they could not, they found, rid themselves by legitimate means. They have been described as "earnest men." It is possible that they were so. But piety can be unscrupulous. When Royes-Collard was taxed with having spoken of Guizot as *un intrigant austère*, his answer was a barbed one: *Est-ce que j'ai dit austère?*

Except, however, among the clergy, the agitation, even in this revised version, fell flat. The attempt made to revive the Pusey-Shaftesbury alliance of 1860 by securing the co-operation of the Evangelicals miscarried. Their good sense discerned the danger: they "snuffed the approach of tyranny in the tainted breeze." And general opinion was unruffled; "Hippokleidos didn't care." But eleven bishops had been induced to countenance it; and it was thought necessary to "save the face" of these venerable persons by providing them with a way of escape from the *impasse* in which they had been imprudent enough to land themselves. The substance of Professor Lake's complaint against the Bishop of Hereford seems to be that he did not see his way to refusing to take part in what those responsible for it might have described as "this charitable work of ours." I cannot profess any overwhelming sympathy with the eleven bishops; and I shall not deny that, from the point of view of what Professor Lake calls "the ordinary man," a certain element of make-believe may seem to attach to the "charitable work." But, from the larger standpoint of public affairs, I cannot doubt either that the Archbishop was well advised in building a bridge for such of the opposition as were desirous of withdrawing from an impossible position; or that Dr Henson could not with propriety have refused "favourably to allow it," and even to co-operate in its construction. The interests not of the eleven "earnest" persons immediately concerned, but of the community, were involved.

¹ Preface to *The Via Media*, ed. 1877.

The question was one of the ethics not so much of subscription, as of association. If men are to act in combination, either in civil or religious life, a certain give and take is indispensable. "Be soople, Davie, in things immaterial," is the advice given to the hero of *Kidnapped*: to be "stiff in opinions," is to be "always in the wrong."

"When the public man omits to put himself in a situation of doing his duty with effect, it is an omission that frustrates the purposes of his trust almost as much as if he had betrayed it. . . . Let us be persuaded that all virtue which is impracticable is spurious; and rather run the risk of falling into faults in a course that leads us to act with effect and energy than to loiter out our days without blame and without use." ¹

The Archbishop found himself in a difficult situation. It was, indeed, none of his making; but it was one with which, by his office, his training, and his temperament, he was peculiarly qualified to deal. The *amour propre* of individuals was secondary: what was incumbent upon him was to avoid a controversy which, if it left public opinion indifferent and even contemptuous, menaced the peace, perhaps the existence, of the Church. He succeeded, where a man of less tact might have failed. Not without a touch of irony he reminded the Bishop of Oxford, who had been the backbone of the opposition, that in the controversies connected with *Lux Mundi* his own orthodoxy had been questioned: and, when the Bishop called attention to a somewhat equivocal Resolution on the subject of Creed-assent accepted by the Upper House of Convocation in 1914, he replied: I am, of course, quoting, not commenting upon, His Grace's pronouncement:

"I do not myself find in that Resolution, interpreted either literally as it stands, or in the light of the ample and weighty debate which introduced it, anything which leads me, as one of those who voted for it, to feel that I should be acting inconsistently in proceeding in due course to the consecration of Dr Henson."

To the Bishop-elect of Hereford he wrote:

"I am receiving communications from many earnest men of different schools who are disquieted by what they have been led to suppose to be your disbelief in the Apostles' Creed, and especially in the clauses relating to our Lord's Birth and Resurrection. I reply to them that they are misinformed, and that I am persuaded that when you repeat the words of the Creed you do so *ex animo* and without any desire to change them."

To which Dr Henson's reply was:

"It is strange that it should be thought by anyone to be necessary that I should give such an assurance as you mention; but of course what you say is absolutely true. I am indeed astonished that any candid reader of my

¹ *Thoughts on the Cause of the present Discontents.*

published books, or anyone acquainted with my public ministry of thirty years, could entertain a suggestion so dishonourable to me as a man and as a clergyman."

On this the Bishop of Oxford withdrew his protest against the consecration. He was the one man of distinction who had associated himself with the opposition; and it collapsed with his defection. If this defection was prompted by prudential motives, it is intelligible.

"Devise not evil against thy neighbour,
Seeing he dwelleth securely by thee."¹

But, as a matter of principle, the position of the 162 "Priests of the Diocese of London" is easier to understand.

It will be noticed that the Archbishop did not ask Dr Henson whether he believed in what the 162 "Priests of the Diocese of London" speak of as "the Miracle of the Virgin Birth of our Lord, and the Miracle of His Bodily Resurrection." He carefully refrained from doing so; and it can scarcely be thought that Dr Henson should have answered a question which he was markedly not asked. Had he done so, he would seriously have embarrassed the Archbishop, and precipitated the crisis which, in His Grace's judgment, it was imperative to avoid. It seems to me that Professor Lake entirely mistakes the meaning of the phrase *ex animo*. It is not the equivalent of *e mente auctoris*; and the loose impression said to be left on "the ordinary man" must be ruled out of court in the discussion of technical subject-matter. Every science has its terminology: neither Dr Henson, nor the Archbishop, nor (I venture to say) anyone competent to form a judgment, understood the words in this sense. Professor Headlam paraphrases the Bishop-elect's letter: "That is to say, he appealed to his writings to show the exact way in which he had repeated the Creed. That was a straightforward way to meet the position."² The opposite of *ex animo* is feigned, or fictitious. Cranmer's recantations, *e.g.*, were not *ex animo*; there is reason to believe that many of those who subscribed the Anti-Modernist oath of Pius X. did not subscribe it *ex animo*; it is difficult to see how persons who sign the Articles in the sense of Tract XC. can be said to do so *ex animo*—though we may be content in such cases to leave the responsibility with themselves. On the other hand, a formula may be subscribed *ex animo* by different people in different senses. I can profess,

¹ Prov. iii. 29.

² *Church Quarterly*, April 1918.

e.g., *ex animo* that I “unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament”; but I do not understand the word “believe” in the sense in which it is, presumably, understood by the readers of the *Record*: I believe *ex animo* that “the Body and Blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord’s Supper”; but I do not take the words “verily and indeed” in the sense in which they are, presumably, taken by the readers of the *Church Times*. An *ex animo* acceptance of a historical formula is necessarily consistent with a certain liberty of interpretation: in this connection the Clerical Subscription Act of 1865, and the Declaratory Act passed in 1879 by the Free, now the United Free, Church of Scotland, will be remembered. Bishop Thirlwall described the former as “one of the most remarkable and the most auspicious events of our day.”¹

The position of the Bishop of Hereford is not open to misconception. He lays stress on the distinction between “Disbelief” and what may be called the “Not Proven” attitude with regard to the so-called dogmatic facts of the Creed which the advance of Biblical studies has made unavoidable in an informed and considering believer. He asserts the compatibility of an *ex animo*, *i.e.* an unfeigned, acceptance of the Creeds with such liberty of interpretation as is necessitated by the advance of knowledge; and he has left no doubt that in his judgment this liberty of interpretation extends to those clauses which express in the language and conceptions of their age—how, indeed, could they do so in those of a later generation?—the Church’s belief in the Birth and the Resurrection of Christ. For, here as elsewhere, the fact and the manner of the fact are two different things. The Birth and the Resurrection of Christ are facts of faith. But their manner, like that of His Presence in the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, is a question of speculative theology. “It skilleth not,” says Hooker, speaking of the last; “men’s opinions do vary.”² May we not “teach our tongue to say, ‘I do not know’”? Personally many of us are not prepared to give a purely symbolical answer to such questions; there are questions which should not be asked, and cannot be answered. But we do not feel inclined to acquiesce in the ruling of “the ordinary man” any more than in that of the demagogues of orthodoxy. Both stand for ignorance. Both must acquire the *rudimenta grammaticæ* before they can be heard. Till then they have no

¹ *Charge*, 1866.

² *Ecclesiastical Polity*, v. 67.

locus standi. "Thou hast neither part nor lot in this matter"; and—for intellectual is in the last resort one with moral virtue—"thy heart is not right before God."

The excellent M. Olier, the founder of Saint Sulpice, carried his devotion to the Gospels so far as to place them in the Tabernacle alongside of the Pyx. Some modern Anglicans are inclined to treat the Creeds in the same way. We may admire their zeal; we must regret their indiscretion. For Creeds are neither stereotyped—there have been many Creeds—nor sacrosanct; they possess the authority of their imponent, neither less nor more.

For the Church of England the authority of the three Creeds which have been retained rests on Article VIII., which bases them on Scripture; and, as the *scientia Scripturarum* is progressive, room for growth is secured. Paley's account of the Ethics of Subscription cannot be improved upon. The imponent of the Articles, under which the Creeds, as they affect the English clergy, fall, is "the Legislature of 13 Elizabeth (1571)." And the intention, he tells us, was "to exclude from offices in the Church—

"1. All abettors of Popery.

"2. Anabaptists, who were at that time a powerful party on the Continent.

"3. Puritans, who were hostile to an Episcopal constitution; and in general the members of such leading sects on foreign establishments as threatened to overthrow our own."¹

To attempt to bring later controversies under the Articles is "to apply a rule of law to a purpose for which it was not intended"—a proceeding repugnant to right-minded men.

The Bishop of Hereford rightly repudiates the assumption that a bishop-designate may be called upon before his consecration to supplement "the legally required declarations of belief [Creeds and Articles] by such other assurances of orthodoxy as may be demanded by suspicious individuals." He has successfully vindicated for himself and for others the liberty which he claims. It is to be hoped that Professor Kirsopp Lake will not give us reason to include under the head of these "suspicious individuals" the uneducated, loosely thinking, and emotionally unbalanced person whom he speaks of as "the ordinary man."

The view which Professor Kirsopp Lake attributes to "the ordinary man" will not, as it stands, bear examination. If it is thought out, it resolves itself into an argument against sub-

¹ *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, ed. 1825, p. 144.

scription as such. I shall not deny the force of this position ; opinions differ, and will continue to differ, as to the propriety of subscribing and of demanding subscription to Articles of Religion and Confessions of Faith. But this is not the present issue. No one proposes to abolish subscription, as such, in the Church of England. What the wisest and best friends of this Church are contending is that the subscription required by law from the clergy is reasonable, historical, and spiritual. The phrase *ex animo* was not chosen by the Bishop of Hereford, and both his letter and its context make the sense in which he accepted it clear. As applied to subscription, it is tautological : *i.e.* if we are to have subscription at all, it must be *ex animo* ; for a subscription which was not *ex animo* would be fictitious ; that is to say, it would be no subscription at all.

It should be added that there is a general feeling, by no means confined to what are called "Liberal" Churchmen, that the particular method of meeting the susceptibilities of "earnest men" adopted *pro hac vice* in the case of the Bishop of Hereford must not be taken as establishing a precedent. It is, indeed, open to serious abuse. The Archbishop's tact avoided, not for the first time, what might have been a crisis ; and a crisis which, if possible, it was the part of prudence to avoid. That tact, though it may avoid or postpone controversies, will not solve them. Faith is a fixed quantity. A bishop should, indeed, have more knowledge than a simple priest or a layman, but Faith is the same for us all. And that a super-tax in the matter of conformity to paperless religious conceptions should be imposed upon prominent clergymen against whom certain persons, possibly "earnest," but certainly unscrupulous, desire for party purposes to create a prejudice among the ignorant would be an intolerable state of things.

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FROM SCIENCE TO RELIGION.¹

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THE religious problem of the present time is determined very largely by the fact that the modern mind, in its attempt to understand life, starts from the platform of Natural Science. Even where there is little scientific knowledge, there will be some practical familiarity with the technical applications of Science, or, in default of that, the subtle influences of a vast industrial network, organised on scientific lines and supplied with the latest scientific machinery. Thus precept and practice alike serve to inculcate the scientific temper and point of view, and to make the scientific outlook increasingly familiar.

It would be hard to overrate the value for humanity of this long training in scientific method and its technical applications. It has encouraged sincerity, veracity, perseverance, and a wide toleration of opinion. It has brought into being a great thinking fraternity whose bond of loyalty is respect for the Truth.

Our debt to Science is indeed very great; and as not the least of her good services to humanity—and the most relevant at any rate to our present theme—let us remember the championship of the cause of reason. So fundamental for the scientific spirit is this respect for rationality that, starting from Science in our search for Religion, we shall inevitably look for a religion that accepts the reason for its ally.

Let us consider for a moment how devotion to scientific aims and methods, and a constant familiarity with scientific ways of thinking, is likely to affect the intellectual outlook. It is a truism to remark that the mind's outlook is fundamentally determined by the work into which it puts its

¹ Delivered originally as an address at the Annual Meeting of the Melbourne College of Divinity, May 1918.

interest. We grow to the likeness of that which we love. Hence the more we are bound up with the problems of Science, the problems of matter in motion, the more inevitably do we come to accept the scientific standards and ways of explanation as alone reasonable and fruitful. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, by the very force of familiarity with methods and canons that satisfy the scientific mind, we settle to the conclusion that knowledge reaches as far as strict Science can take us and no further. As for God and the Soul, immortality and freedom, if Science has nothing to say about these things it is, we think, because nothing can reasonably be said.

I speak with much sympathy of this general attitude, as for a short span of years it chanced to be my own. For some few years my systematic thinking was mathematically disciplined and bore a mathematical appearance; till at length, by force of habit and familiarity, I came to identify systematic thought with thinking in terms of energy and mass, on quantitative lines. It was not that I had any particular passion for these subjects. On the contrary. I had, I believe, at this time, a warmer preference for literature. But it never struck me that the deeper love might hold the secret of the deeper reason. Above all, it never struck me that religion might be more profoundly reasonable than Science itself.

These were the days when I was innocent of philosophy, or, to speak more accurately, of all philosophies save one, that of Herbert Spencer, as presented in the works of his disciple, John Fiske. Since philosophy was there presented as a sort of generalised science and the whole conception of truth and of method set out in these volumes was scientific, it seemed to me eminently reasonable, and I could not imagine how anyone could be so foolish as to dispute its conclusions.

The illumination came at last. It came in the first instance when, on reading a chapter on "Methods of defining Religion," by Edward Caird, I suddenly realised what *development* meant, and discovered to my astonishment and delight that there really was a sense in which the oak explained the acorn, and, more generally, a sense in which the later stages of a developing process explained the meaning of the earlier stages, the latter being but imperfect manifestations of a principle more completely manifested in the former. A developing process, a process of life or soul, might then be explained by reference to its end. It was not necessary, indeed it was inappropriate, to attempt to explain the later stages as a complex built up out of the simpler elements into which the earlier stages could be reduced. That was the

scientific way, and I had now realised that the scientific way was not the only rational way of interpreting the universe.

And then came the liberating reflection that scientific explanation did not rest, after all, on any axioms or necessities of the mind: it rested on hypotheses and postulates, on a substratum of assumptions. Science and its necessities were, I saw, suspended from an "If." There *might* then be a more categorical and a more intimate form of explanation in terms of freedom. I saw now not only that Science had its limits, but that philosophy might do positive work beyond those limits in opening up the territory of an inner world.

But the most crucial turn in my philosophical conversion came with the realisation that this inner personal world could be studied and understood in terms of purpose and end, and in a genuinely personal way only when a wholly new viewpoint was taken up. Inlook must be substituted for outlook, and the point of view of the experiencer for that of the external spectator. Suffice it to say that, approaching the soul psychologically from the experiencer's point of view, I seemed to touch through feeling or intuition an order of fact other than the sensory. In self-consciousness and in all that involved the presence or participation of the Self I seemed to have the consciousness of a supersensual fact, a fact I could directly grasp without the guiding help of sensory symbols.

Now, when we are asked questions concerning the Self's reality our first instinct is to bring to their solution modes of perception which are more or less habitual to us. If asked about the Self, we have a vague idea that it must be located somewhere in the brain, and that we can grasp it by some sort of inner sense. But we preserve our old habit of looking for an object that will be distinct from other objects, something that we can separate off as an object of inner sense from all objects of outer sense, like trees or stones. And there is just one thing we are apt to forget, and that is that the Self is not an object at all but a subject *for* which objects exist. How often do we look for our spectacles with our spectacles on! Clearly we *are*, in this case, the very thing for which we look: indeed, we could not look for this self of ours unless we had already found it, for there would then be no one to do the seeking. There must then be some very direct way in which we become aware of ourselves as subjects. As opposed to the way of sensation, we call it the way of intuition, or self-feeling.

So far we have been moving from Science to philosophy, from nature to experience, from the external and sensory

outlook to the inward point of view of self-intuition. We have yet to pass from philosophy to religion, from recognition of the fact of self to recognition of the fact of God.

We start here from the recognition of the Self as real, and real primarily because it is free,—free to initiate, free to control the body, free in some degree at least to realise itself. To the free agent the *real* world is the world in which the Self can realise itself and stamp its impress: it is the world to which a personal character and drift can be given, for evil or for good. If we would grasp the Self as a fact, let us first grasp it as a free power capable, within due limits, of transforming the universe into its own image. But this freedom or capacity for self-realisation and world-reformation is, as it stands, too abstract. Freedom for what? we ask. To answer this question we must let our thought sink deeper into the abysses of the personal world, and recover the larger fact of which this freedom is but a fragment. This larger fact is *Morality* in the broad sense in which that term covers the whole element of *Obligation*. It is, I think, easy to see that obligation has no meaning apart from freedom, and freedom no value apart from obligation. The freedom to do as I like is, no doubt, a perfectly genuine aspect of freedom, but if this *carte blanche* were all that freedom meant, it would be a gift fit only to plague the possessor and disintegrate his life. It is only when the “I can” and the “Thou shouldst” form a single whole together that freedom first has a value. For not till then are we free to realise ourselves through service. On the other hand, obligation has no meaning apart from freedom. “I must,” taken strictly, is a confession of impotence. It is meaningless to add to it the words “and therefore I will.” On the other hand, “I should” calls for “I will” to complete it. I am not doomed to do a certain deed because I should do it and know that I should do it.

The central fact of morality, the fact of duty, is thus closely bound up with our self-recognition as free agents. “I should, I can, I will,” duty, freedom, and personal decision, are integrally united elements in every act of moral resolution.

Now, if there is a deeper fact than *duty*, it is the *Ideal* which inspires it. Let us put aside the old prejudice that Ideals are mere abstractions. It is no doubt true that in thinking of them we may isolate them from each other, from their bearing on the actual, and from all reference to the central light of which they are but the radiations. But such abstraction is at our convenience and at our peril. It does not mirror the truth. If ideas are forces—and who doubts it?—

the ideals which inspire and control ideas must be greater powers than the ideas through which they find a partial, imperfect, and transitory expression. Ideals, then, are powers, powers immanent in the actual and yet transcending it, being in the actual and yet not of it: and if we could but grasp our personal life as a whole, in which intellect, feeling, and will—interpenetrating though mutually distinct—were but one pulse of being, then the three rays of the Ideal would retract into a common centre, and in lieu of their refracted colours we should see only the white and unrefracted light of what Plato would call the Good, and others might call God.

Let us look at this point more closely, for we are getting near to the central fact of the personal world. *Beauty*, beauty as it meets us in face and form and landscape and art, is this anything fictitious or illusory? When the mystic refers to it as God's wooing of the soul, is he altogether wrong? And when Wordsworth, telling of Nature's adopted child, writes in the familiar words that "she shall lean her ear in many a secret place where rivulets dance their wayward round, and beauty born of murmuring sound shall pass into her face," how vivid is the reality that makes that face so beautiful! It has no hands or feet, it takes no room in space though it pervades it, it alters nothing and yet it transfigures everything. Is that beauty, we ask, a real power, and a power of another and deeper order than the sense which it idealises, or is it a mere abstraction? Is it a supreme fact or is it an illusion? Surely it is a real power and a supreme fact. And *Truth*? Is not truth also a power within the soul? A power immanent in it and yet transcending the thought it inspires and guides? How it holds us when we are trying to express ourselves, compelling us to erase this and underline that, to tear up a morning's work like so much chaff; and when we think the work is finished, it will kindle our thought afresh and with revealing flame light up some uncriticised assumption, something slurred over with rhetoric, or perhaps a pretentious reason that does no more than repeat the statement it professes to support. And finally *Right*, the concrete rightness which sways what we call our moral conscience, and brings duty home to us, what of that? Is that not also something very real? Our life may be torn with perplexity, with the conflict of rival claims. The pressure of that familiar tragedy when one good strikes another may be urging us to a one-sided solution. But down in the depths of our conviction we know that there is but one ultimate solution possible: that the Ideal Right is real, real as God is, that it cannot favour a one-sided

good ; that we must work on, fight on, love on, till the form of the Good to which we yield our wills in faith stands revealed to us in its harmony and unity. If this power be taken from our life, the fixed loyalty to a single call goes with it, the lodestar falls from our sky, our resolution falters, we snatch at various partial goods, our life disintegrates, the great joys of love and work turn to poison in the cup. Only the confessed reality of Right can save us from all this. We are saved if we but grasp the supreme, divine reality of Ideals that are never fully realised in our conduct but are yet the life and deathless spring of all our upward endeavour. Such Ideals are not abstractions, but powers ; and there is surely no greater power, no one more real, more personal, more fundamentally satisfying than the Right.

It may be objected to all this that if Beauty, Truth, and Right are powers, so also are Ugliness, Error, and Evil. I am far from denying it, but however disturbing and terrible they may be, they are, on my view, powers of a different and intrinsically subordinate order : their vocation, as Hegel would put it, is to be consumed. For their function is to distort and disintegrate and turn cosmos into chaos. They have no constructive efficacy, and can subsist only as parasites and dependents. Take away all ugliness, error, and evil : the beauty, the truth, and the right—in one word, the Good—remains. Withdraw all beauty, truth, and right, take all good from the universe, nothing at all is left ; for, apart from the binding force of good, nothing, not even a gang of murderers, can hold itself together.

We come back then to the unrefracted white light, the burning star of which these ideal powers are the partial irradiations. It has been called The One, The All, The Good, The Spiritual Life : it has also been called more simply God or Love. Is God, we ask, a Fact ; and if so, how are we to see Him ? And is the vision rational or is it beyond all reason ?

It is, indeed, a feature of the soul's upward movement from self to God that the Ultimate Fact in the personal world seems at first view to be illimitably remote. And but for one supreme consideration we might despair of ever reaching beyond the dome of many-coloured glass to the white radiance which it stains. The great consideration is this, that all the colours of the *spiritual* rainbow are saturated with the whiteness of the unbroken light. There is no need to shatter life's prison to fragments in order to realise the abiding unity which is refracted through it. If God is anywhere, He is everywhere, and wherever He is, He is God. The fact of God is not

hidden away in some unfathomable eternity, but here, now, in this and through that, the unsullied virtue is transcendently active, ready to transfigure the situation, and flood the soul with the joy of its presence. There is virtue in the outermost hem of the garment of God. And so it comes to pass that artless and unlettered lives may, through some faithful use of a single talent, live daily in the practice and the joy of God's presence. If the soul has the freedom of the body, God surely has the freedom of His world, and the fact of God may blossom into life at any point of it.

As we then pass upwards in our quest for God through art, philosophy, and morality, the Ideals that inspire us are in very sooth God's presence in the soul, and there is no doubt a sense in which our recognition of such a presence is religious from the outset. But if such recognition is to be wholeheartedly religious, something more, it seems to me, is needed. The truly religious moment would seem to come when our groping intuition feels a responsive flash of revelation and the quest is continued on holy ground. An experience is religious, I take it, when at its active centre and point of growth we trace not our own initiative but the love and leading of God. I do not wish to suggest that this sense of divine initiative must set the limit to self-realisation. On the contrary. It marks a new era in the story of the soul's realisation of itself—the religious era. Here intuition, instead of groping from the self-centre, is caught up into a larger life of revelation, into the vision of religion.

Why is it, we may ask, that the deeper religious insight of all the ages has made *ὑβρις*, self-righteousness, self-centredness, selfishness, the fundamental sin; and humility, repentance, reverence the basic virtues? Surely because the former, by exalting one's relative weakness and deficiency, prevent that recognition of God's initiative which is so essential to religion. Why is it that the philosopher is held to be further from the fact of God than is the little child, and reason further from its apprehension than faith? Is it not because philosophy has been identified with an instinct of self-sufficiency, and reason conceived as the great organ of man's assertive independence; whereas religion and faith have been connected with the sense of self-insufficiency, with the need for God?

The point I wish to express here is just this, that the powers of the Ideal, the powers of Beauty, Truth, and Right, cannot adequately reveal the fact of God to self-centred insight, however penetrating its intuition may be, unless

there come, in and through that intuition, the sense of revelation, the conviction that it is not the light from below that is to shed its glimmer over the world above, but that it is the light from above that is to flood with its radiance the world below. When Jesus is asked for the chief *commandment*, he replies in the familiar words of the old prophetic law: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and mind and strength, and thy neighbour as thyself." And unquestionably this is the keynote of all religious Ethic; but it is not, I take it, the central religious truth. Religion, as I conceive it, emphasises the initiative of God. "God is Love" does this with unparalleled directness and simplicity. If then our progress takes us from *our* love for God to God's own love for us, from Ethics and man's initiative to Religion and the initiative of God, we may take it that it is the latter truth which is the more inclusive, the more vital, and the more explanatory. "We love," so runs that religiously fundamental text, "because He first loved us."

I stated at the outset that, starting from Science in our search for religion, we should inevitably look for a religion that accepted the reason for its ally. Let me conclude with some further words on this special point. Let me attempt to show that though religion is not scientific it may still be fundamentally rational.

It may be this simply as a life and as a faith. Nothing can be more fundamentally rational than an active relation towards life which solves its problems practically and sees and assimilates all its visions and delights. We do not therefore commit ourselves to irrationalism when we make an active faith rather than an intellectual belief the ultimate touchstone and criterion of religious soundness. We simply commit ourselves to a new view of rationalism and of reason. We commit ourselves to the recognition that the saintly life, the life of love, is intrinsically rational, rational in the profoundest religious sense; also that the monuments of artistic genius—cathedrals, dramas, sonatas and the rest—are intrinsically rational in their own inimitable way; and we also commit ourselves to the recognition of the intrinsic limitations of all strictly intellectual work. Reasoning cannot do the whole work of Reason. No philosophy can take the place either of art or of conduct, still less of religion; nor can it solace itself with the reflection that, being the sole guardian of the reason, art and conduct apart from it must be intrinsically irrational. For philosophy, emphatically, is *not* the sole guardian of the reason.

Our primary contention then is that religion, as synonymous with practical faith and apart from any specific intellectual factor contains, none the less, a fundamentally rational element.

Now this rational element may become intellectually explicit: we then call it religious *belief*. And there is in all religion a tendency to seek expression in intellectual terms, and frame its convictions into beliefs. Our faith, our sense of spiritual reality is not content to define itself imaginatively in the literary forms of legend and parable, but will seek sooner or later a more definitely philosophical expression. A religion of love feels the need of reflectively realising the significance and import of its fundamental principle and of systematising its insight not only in terms of the imagination but also in terms of thought. And it is only when religion blossoms into religious belief that it is rational in the richer and riper sense of the term. Religion can rise to its full stature only through the help of thought. But the thought must be its own: it must be rooted in religious insight, and its function must be to define and to clarify religious experience and aspiration. Beliefs, in a word, must be the defining feelers of faith. Severed from the faith they seek to clarify, they may still have a certain fossil value, but religiously they are, and remain, sapless and dead.

Our final conclusion would be this:—In moving from Science to Religion we are moving not in the direction of unreason but towards the most fundamental rationality which our human nature knows: the rationality, primarily, of faith, with its intuitive grasp of spiritual reality; but further of that vitally organised venture of knowledge also, in and through which faith seeks out its own direct intellectual expression. Briefly, I have sought to follow the clue of rationality, and to exhibit religious faith, and the beliefs through which it defines itself as radically reasonable. The clue of rationality may break, but if it does philosophy will vanish with it, and not philosophy only but, as I firmly believe, religion and faith as well.

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THE PRIMITIVE MEDICINE-MAN.

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A HISTORICAL question of some interest is how far the modern doctor is to be considered the social counterpart and spiritual heir of the so-called doctor of the primitive world, with his impressive but, as we hold, highly unscientific methods of bewitching and bedevilling his patients back into health. I had better say at once that I am quite incapable of propounding any wholesale solution of this formidable problem. At most, I may hope to adduce some desultory thoughts of a general nature, such as may be worth taking into account whenever this missing first chapter of the history of medical science comes to be worked out with due regard for its many-sided interest, and for the sheer bulk of the relevant facts.

Huxley has defined science as "organised common sense";¹ and accordingly, I suppose, medical science would be nothing else than organised common sense in regard to the particular matter of health. Now does man of the primitive type display any common sense whatever? An anthropologist of the study might almost be pardoned if he were to deny it to him altogether upon a survey of his reported customs, so utterly fantastic from our point of view do they appear to be. Yet, on closer acquaintance, such as perhaps is to be obtained only in the field, the savage turns out to be anything but a fool, more especially in everything that relates at all directly to the daily struggle for existence. Hunt with him, for instance, and you soon learn that, allowance made for the conditions under which he works, he is a marvel of skill and resource. Or, again, who among our most tried explorers would claim to outvie the Eskimo in ice-craft, or the Bedouin in desert-travel? Clearly, then, common sense is no monopoly of civilisation.

¹ T. H. Huxley, *Collected Essays*, iii. 45.

Indeed, a cynic might declare that the wonder is rather how under civilisation there should still be so much of it left.

Likewise as regards the conduct of health, then, we may expect to find plenty of common sense, and even of organised common sense, in evidence in the primitive world. Consider, for example, the manner of dealing with child-birth. As a rule it is wholly the concern of the women's department. There are traditional modes of assisting delivery, usually very effective,—and of course the savage mother makes an excellent patient—which are put into operation by the female relations and friends of the sufferer without any recourse being had to professional assistance. It is part of every woman's education to know how such affairs are managed, and thus something like an organised system of practical precepts is handed on from generation to generation. We may even say, I think, that common-sense measures predominate in this sphere of medical activity; or, at any rate, that we can here discover a considerable mass of sound practices built up gradually by experience, that is, by the slow but certain method of "trial and error." Of course there are many superstitious observances—about which, indeed, our observers are wont to discourse at disproportionate length, because they make such good "copy"—that accompany, and to some extent embarrass, the common-sense part of the treatment. For instance, custom may decree that the husband go to bed as well as the wife, and this not merely for the reasonable motive of getting him out of the way. Again, ordinary experience is never adequate to tackle portents; so that a monstrous birth, let us say, or even the appearance of twins, may well involve the interposition of an expert who specialises in mysteries. But it is enough for my present purpose to insist that the typical "wise woman" who helps a savage infant into the world is wise in a prevaillingly common-sense way; so that she might possibly put many a civilised Mrs Gamp to shame. Her lore constitutes a kind of folk-lore, no doubt. But it is not folk-lore in the sense that merely connotes superstition, magic, and the like. Rather, it forms part of the precious vital tradition of the race; and it is out of such bed-rock stuff, I suggest, that advanced medical science is in no small part developed.

I cannot attempt here to deal at all exhaustively with the common-sense element in primitive medicine; but, lest I seem to mete out unequal justice to the sexes, I had better illustrate the application of common-sense principles to the healing art from the side of the mere male. Masculine activity of the violent order, as put forth in war or in the chase, leads to

manifold wounds and fractures that call for first-aid treatment on the part of comrades, to be followed up, no doubt, by nursing, in which presumably the wife plays a leading part. Thus the use of ligatures, splints, poultices, and so forth, is understood by every handy man; and even though he bolster up unexceptional practice with grotesque theory—if the ligatures work because of the binding power of knots, the splints because they come from a sacred tree, the poultices because they are afterwards deposited in a grave, and one and all because they are reinforced by tremendous spells—even so, there is distinguishable herein a living kernel of well-tested, workaday experience that will one day burst through the husk of superstition and become a lusty growth in the garden of knowledge. Doubtless, there are further refinements of primitive surgery that demand the skill of the trained hand; some of which, however, as, for instance, the agelong practice of trephining, may have been greatly assisted in their development by superstitious notions. But within certain limits a rough but effective surgery—and the same holds good of a knowledge of the curative properties of simples—forms part of the practical equipment of the ordinary tribesman. Humanity owes much to the expert, but it owes not a little also to the unsophisticated multitude. Genius tends to be erratic, pursuing every will-of-the-wisp, though fresh paths are at times discovered in the process. But the multitude cleaves to the beaten track, partly led and partly driven from behind by common sense, that is, by nature, who, as the poet sings, is ever “careful of the type.”

Having, I trust, made clear my first point, that there exists everywhere at the level of the lower culture a leechcraft of the plain man, which is to be reckoned as one main source of modern medical science, I pass on to consider that other source to which all the credit is usually given by writers on scientific origins, namely, the professional activity of the so-called medicine-man.¹ Let me say at once that this term is apt to be used very loosely, and stands in need of such definition as anthropological inquiry admits when it sets up a type

¹ See, for instance, Sir J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*³, i. 246, 421. Compare, also, H. Hubert and M. Mauss, “Théorie générale de la magie,” in *L'Année sociologique*, vii. (1904), 1 f., and esp. *ad fin.*: “Dans les basses couches de la civilisation, les magiciens sont les savants et les savants sont des magiciens.” (I ought, perhaps, to add that, as regards the account here given of the underlying principles of primitive magic, I am in full agreement with the distinguished authors.) Or compare Professor G. Elliot Smith’s statement in J. Wilfred Jackson, *Shells as Evidence of the Migrations of Early Culture* (1917), Introd. xviii, that religion and science were identical in early times.

to the exclusion of sundry related but aberrant forms. Who, then, is the typical medicine-man? He is by no means to be identified with anyone who is reputed a cunning healer. Thus, among plain men practising the traditional folk-medicine, one will be more successful than another, and will naturally be called in more frequently, while prestige and material benefits will correspondingly tend to come his way. Nevertheless, he may be ruled out as a layman. Similarly, the man who happens to have some special remedy as his private secret—one perhaps that he has inherited from his forebears—need be no thorough-going professional, even if he be unwilling to impart his secret except for a consideration. Again, a member of the snake totem, let us say, is expected to know the cure for snake-bite; it is part of his spiritual birthright. Yet it is in no sense the chief business of his life to effect such cures; it is purely by the way that he passes on some of his innate virtue to others. He, too, then may be eliminated. A more doubtful case is that of the member of a medicine society in North America. The fact would seem to be that, whereas some of these societies are professional guilds, others simply consist of ordinary people who are somehow in mystic touch with healing influences—they may, for instance, have recovered from a severe disease—and are consequently able to perform ceremonies that make for the public weal in some fortifying but quite indefinite fashion.¹

The typical medicine-man, on the other hand, is always, in a literal sense, consecrated to his vocation. Alike by native disposition and by social convention, he is destined to live a life apart. Thus he figures in the eyes of the crowd as the man of mystery, the denizen of an unearthly world. Of course he does not dwell wholly alone in this separate world of his. He always belongs in some sense to a fraternity. We hear of bedside consultations, for instance.² In any case, the true medicine-man invariably undergoes some sort of initiation, whereby the traditional secrets of his craft are formally made over to him. Such secrets may appear at first sight to consist mainly in mere conjuring tricks, involving sleight of hand, ventriloquism, and so forth. But on a more searching and scientific view these things, so trivial to us, have a serious meaning and function in respect to the kind of medicine practised by the doctor. One and all, they are means of producing and applying supernormal power. The belief in

¹ Cf. Dr A. Hrdlicka in *Bur. American Ethnol.*, Bull. 30 (1907), i. 838.

² Cf. B. Spencer and F. Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia* (1899), 530.

the reality of such power and in the possibility of its exercise is common alike to the medicine-man and to his patients. The mystery-monger is likewise a mystery to himself. Assuredly, in the typical case, he is no humbug. Of course charlatans are to be found here and there. Indeed, the primitive doctor rivals the modern one in his desire to show up the disreputable person who trades in shams. But, normally, the savage faith-healer has perfect faith in himself and in his methods. A sufficient proof is that, if he feel the power to have deserted him, he will instantly retire from practice.¹ To acquire this power he has undergone grievous tests and privations, and to retain it he continues to suffer the lot of a tabooed man, the life of an ascetic, starved, solitary and brooding. Truly, then, if he has his reward, he has first paid the price; and this reward consists essentially, not in his fee, if he take one, but in the sense of communion with a power that is above the power of ordinary men.

Now it will be clear even from this slight sketch of the doctor's conception of his calling that he belongs to a wider class, that likewise includes the priest. Indeed, the two functions are frequently combined. For the rest, there may exist side by side in the same community a plurality of types—the faith-healer, the rain-maker, the spirit-medium, the diviner, the bard, and so on—that all alike fall under the same category of wonder-worker vested with supernormal power.² No wonder, then, if these various characters are to some extent interchangeable. Indeed, their historical tendency, I suggest, is to find their natural meeting-point and consummation in the priest.

But what, it will be said, of that standing antithesis of the priest—the magician? Is it not he, rather, who was the primitive representative of science as distinguished from religion, and initiated the development of a scientific medicine? I reply by distinguishing. The words “magic” and “magician” are notoriously of ambiguous import; and, whereas in one sense the magician is the antithesis of the priest, in another and, I think, a better sense, he is much the same thing, namely, either identical with the priest, as in Babylonia, or a priest in the making, as in more primitive Australia. Strictly antithetic to the minister of religion is the votary of the black art, the accursed sorcerer who poisons honest folk to gain his private ends.³ Now if the magician is to be identified with

¹ Cf. H. Hubert and M. Mauss, *Mélanges d'histoire des religions* (1909), 183.

² Cf. A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of S.E. Australia* (1904), 355, 389, 397.

³ See my book, *The Threshold of Religion*² (1914), 85 f.

this purely nefarious type of person, it is to be hoped that we must look elsewhere for the prototype of the modern doctor. Medical science can hardly be a branch of crime that has somehow evolved into respectability. Moreover, it is worth noting that the much dreaded sorcerer is very largely, though not altogether, a bogey. He usually inhabits the next village. When anything goes wrong in one's own village, it is convenient to put the blame on the wizard over the way. He provides a butt, so to speak, against which a vigorous counter-magic may be discharged. If, however, one of these gentry be suspected of dwelling near at hand, the primitive group is ordinarily not so craven-spirited as to refrain from "smelling" him out. It would seem, indeed, that Australian natives not infrequently "point the bone" at one another on the sly. They even boast openly, at any rate to white men, of such scandalous achievements. But, as society advances in organisation, the sorcerer is at the mercy of the strong arm of the law. To quiet the public nerves by means of a little witch-burning is, in fact, a stock expedient with African rulers. Altogether, then, we have good reason to rule out the magician in the anti-social sense of the word as the forerunner of any possible kind of scientific man. Suspect though science be to the crowd on account of its esotericism, it must be so far tolerated by the community as a whole that a continuous tradition can be handed on. But the sorcerer is an outlaw. Short of a witches' sabbath, he has no social opportunity of consulting a preceptor or training a disciple. Consequently, a developing art or science can never be his. He must be purely parasitic on existing systems, seeking vainly to outrival them by a parody of their forms as applied to a chaotic content of popular superstition.¹

In quite another sense, however, there is a magic which is either a kind of religion, or, if we prefer to say so, is part of the stuff out of which religion has developed. Such a magic involves the use of supernormal power to secure such ends as are socially approved. But religion does precisely the same. Hence, if we seek to differentiate magic of this kind from religion at all, it must be on the ground that in the magical rite the power appears to act automatically, whereas in the religious rite it appears to act through the interposition of a god. Such a distinction, however, is not one that is likely to appeal with much force to the savage theurgist; for his interest is practical, and the elements in the practical problem are two

¹ Cf. my art. "Magic," in *Hastings' Encycl. of Relig. and Ethics*, vii. (1915), 250.

only, namely, first, a supernormal power to be moved, and, secondly, a traditional rite that promises to move it. In no case is it certain beforehand that the rite will work. To this extent there is always something arbitrary in the manifestation of the power. The Australian doctor, for instance, knows that it will work for him only so long as he maintains his taboos. Thus he is not the master of the power, but its vehicle merely. On the other hand, in the higher religions there is ever present a tendency to impute efficacy to ritual as such. If, then, we ignore this tendency as an aberration unworthy of the true spirit of religion, so, too, we must give the Australian doctor the benefit of the doubt if he sometimes seem to claim the power that works through him as his own. Thus the postulate of magic, in this sense, and of religion would seem to be the same; namely, that there is a power conferred by holiness of life which, through the mediation of holy men, can be made to abound for the common good.

Meanwhile, the exterior history of religion largely turns on the evolution of ritual from the manual or dramatic type to the oral. The religious spirit, it is true, is to a certain extent independent of the mode of its expression. To rub the solar plexus with a stone bull-roarer may make the heart "strong" and "glad" and "good," as the Australian worshipper testifies in so many words.¹ On the other hand, what sounds a prayer may, even in the higher religions, serve the purpose of a mere spell.² Nevertheless, the special character of the human action is bound to colour the notion of the divine reaction. Operate on the supernormal power, and it seems to work back. Speak to it, and it seems to answer. There is, therefore, likely to prevail at the lower levels of cult a hylomorphic conception of supernatural power in both its good and its evil forms—of God and the devil, as we may say—that bears a certain superficial resemblance to our modern naturalistic theories of health and disease. I call the resemblance superficial, however, because there is almost literally a world of difference for the savage between the normal and the supernormal—between the comfortable routine of everyday life and the discomposing play of occult influences. The wonder-worker, whether his methods be manual or oral, is always seeking adjustment with the freakish forces of a wonder-world. Nature, as modern science understands it, namely, the sphere of uniform happenings, lies clean outside his department. A power that for good or evil is essentially arbitrary in its manifestations has somehow to be

¹ Cf. *The Threshold of Religion* ², 165, 191.

² See, for instance, W. Heitmüller, *Im Namen Jesu*, Göttingen, 1903.

brought into harmony with human endeavour. Hylomorphically conceived, such an arbitrary power appears as a contingent matter, a luck in things. Anthropomorphically conceived, it appears as a personal will. In neither the one nor the other aspect is it comparable with nature, as science conceives it. Nature obeys known or knowable laws. But the ways of the wonder-world are unknowable—past human understanding, if not past human hope, and faith, and faith-inspired effort.

In view, then, of this fundamental disparity between the working principles of the primitive and of the civilised doctor, it may be doubted whether a certain parallelism that appears in their methods is not in the main accidental.¹ An Australian medicine-man, for instance, goes through an elaborate pretence of extracting from his patient the evil magic, the bad luck, which is thereupon exhibited to the sufferer and his friends in the form of a piece of crystal. Such a manual rite mimics a surgical operation throughout, down to the hylomorphic representation of the supernormal trouble as a foreign body that has been visibly removed. But a genuine surgical operation it is not, such as that whereby plain folk in their common-sense way manage to extract a tooth. If it were to be judged from the empirical standpoint, which is, however, quite irrelevant in such a context, it would be a mere conjuring trick, and one of which the perpetrator must be fully aware. Given the true point of view, however, which is not empirical at all but transcendental, we can see that the procedure is perfectly sincere and in its way rational. An invisible force is dealt with visibly by means that are meant and understood to be symbolic. Unawares and unaccountably the patient is taken ill. Therefore an evil magician must have projected a crystal into him “like the wind,” that is, invisibly. Such is the diagnosis; and it accounts admirably for the furtive nature of the attack. But it now becomes necessary to provide a therapeusis in the form of a manual rite. Conformably, therefore, with such a piece of visible manipulation, the evil magic takes on a visible form. But this is mere make-believe, and felt to be such. The real influence at work transcends its appearances. It is occult and devilish in its action, and strikes from “behind the veil.”

At this point in the argument it may be well to recapitulate. Two types of primitive healing have been broadly distinguished with the object of determining their several shares in the development of medical science. One type is the common-sense treatment of the plain man. With certain

¹ Cf. L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (1910), 315.

qualifications, which will be more fully stated presently, it may be said to follow experience. The other type is the professional ministrations of the medicine-man. It is the attempt on the part of a man in holy orders to combat supernatural power of an evil kind by means of supernatural power of a good kind. Whether this power be dealt with by gesture or speech—by manual or oral rites—and, consequently, be itself represented in hylomorphic or anthropomorphic shape does not affect the essentially occult character of the causes assumed to be at work. In a word, the first type of primitive medicine is on the whole empirical in spirit and method, the second is metempirical or transcendental throughout.

The contrast between the types in question may be further illustrated in two ways. Thus, on the one hand, the general practice of uncivilised folk would seem to be to try common-sense remedies first, and, only when these fail, to call in the professional doctor. In other words, his special function is to grapple with the abnormal; and, as is well known, this ever tends to constitute for the savage a distinct dispensation, a world of its own, in which common-sense principles no longer hold. On the other hand, the primitive theory of how disease is caused completely bears out this dual system of coping with it. Ordinary ills of the flesh are set down to old age, accidents, and so on. But extraordinary visitations claim an explanation of another order. They are due to sorcery, to the violation of a taboo, to the wrath of an offended ghost—in short, to some supernatural agency. I once had the pleasure of interviewing Bokane, an African pygmy from the Ituri Forest, and he told me how his people were wont to cut up a dead man in order to find out what had killed him.¹ If in the course of this veritable post-mortem they lighted upon an arrow-head or a thorn, well, that had done it. If, however, nothing was found, then it must have been done by *oudah*, “the mysterious.” There are authors who assure us that the distinction between the natural and the supernatural is utterly beyond the grasp of savage minds. But here, as it seems to me, we have it drawn very clearly; and, besides, in a context that is on the face of it purely theoretical, though I suspect that such an inquest is attended by practical consequence of a retributive nature, concerning which my informant preferred to leave me in the dark.

Given, then, this fundamental opposition between the incipient naturalism of the lay healer and the well-developed

¹ *The Threshold of Religion*² (1914), 87.

supernaturalism of the professional, it remains for us to try in a rough-and-ready way to assign to the rival influences their respective parts in the making of medicine. It has already been shown how, in the treatment of child-birth, or again in that of wounds and other accidents, recourse is had to processes and specifics such as are likewise approved by a more developed surgery and medicine. Not to attempt any exhaustive enumeration of these, we may take note of bandaging, poulticing, lancing, bone-setting, and the rarer practice of amputation, in the case of bodily injuries; massage, as notably in relation to child-birth; cupping and bleeding; blistering and cauterising; fomentation, and the excellent prescription of the vapour-bath; the use of purges and emetics; and, finally, the employment for various other remedial purposes of all sorts of drugs and simples, some of them quite unprofitable, it is true, but in large part of real and well-tried efficacy. Now all these methods of cure, it is contended, are matters of more or less common knowledge. Everyone tries them, and experience on so wide a scale, even if uncritical, is bound to secure that the best remedies prevail in the long run. Moreover, as has already been observed, there exists in regard to this kind of common-sense healing a sort of specialism, which may be nevertheless termed lay, so completely is it overshadowed throughout the savage world by the truly professional specialism of the medicine-man. The woman, for instance, who takes a leading part as midwife or nurse has exceptional opportunities of acquiring useful lore and of instructing others by her example. Or, again, the owner of some particular remedy is likely to discover, by verification made at the expense of his clients, within what limits its efficacy holds good. Thus in manifold ways crude observation and cruder experiment are bound slowly but surely to organise savage common sense in the service of medicine.

Savage common sense, however, is by no means free from mystic, not to say superstitious, accompaniments. It is thus only in a relative sense, namely, in comparison with the departmentalised and concentrated mysticism of the medicine-man, that one can identify it with a nascent empiricism. Thus, supernormal power is no exclusive privilege of the doctor. Everyone has some, though the latter alone has much. It is a question of degree.¹ In the case of the ordinary man it amounts to no more than an occasional stroke of luck. Only in the doctor's case does it rise to the heights of miracle. Common-sense procedure, therefore, is bound up with mystic

¹ Cf. the example cited by me in Hastings' *Encycl. of R. and E.*, viii. 251.

procedure on a small scale. Simples and spells go together in everyday use, and it may even be that normally the spell is regarded as the nerve of the affair. Besides, everyone, at any rate every male, in his public capacity participates in rites that are supposed to make for the health and happiness of all in some positive way, as, for instance, by causing fertility in plant, animal, and man. Other rites, in which everyone joins, are of the negative type, enjoining abstinences and precautionary measures of all sorts; under which head may be included purificatory rites such as are intended to neutralise or expel evils—for example, by means of the disease-boat, as especially in the Malay region, or by the almost universal expedient of the scape-goat. For the rest, every layman has his full share of beliefs that we should regard as superstitious. Doubtless he seeks to cure like by like, choosing his simples by their “signatures,” and so on. Again, he attaches special efficacy to blood and to its substitute red ochre, or, let us say, to his cicatrisations and tattoo-marks. So, too, he treasures curious oddments, and carries them about with him for luck. Thus a lengthy chapter might be written on this purely popular kind of mysticism in its bearing on the history of medicine. Clearly it has been responsible for many a salutary custom; as when refuse is destroyed to keep it out of the hands of the sorcerer, and sanitation is incidentally advanced;¹ or when the principle of “the hair of the dog that bit one” is by happy accident applied in a form of inoculation that works.² When all has been urged, however, by way of drawback to the statement that the savage pursues his daily round in the light of common sense, it remains true that, just because mystic ideas and practices are less subject to special elaboration, and, one might add, exploitation, in the sphere of everyday routine, it is here that we must look for common sense, or else must expect to find it nowhere in the primitive world. After all, if a more or less futile mysticism usually appears on the surface, it is often possible to detect a sound empiricism underneath. In particular, we must excuse the savage if, like most of us, he does the right thing without being able to produce the right reason for so doing. Thus, what can be more conducive to health than the vapour-bath, as provided, for example, in the characteristic American institution of the sweat-lodge? Yet the following theory of it, as expounded by an Indian of the Fox tribe, will hardly appeal to the modern physiologist, inasmuch as it turns on the notion of *manitou* or supernatural power; though, at the same time, it would correspond pretty closely with the facts, did it

¹ Cf. *The Golden Bough* ³, i. 175.

² Cf. *ib.* viii. 158 f.

not happen to entail an unnecessary and painful method of supplementing the natural pores of the skin. "Often," he said, "one will cut oneself over the arms and legs. . . . It is done to open up many passages for the *manitou* to pass into the body. The *manitou* comes from its place of abode in the stone. It becomes aroused by the heat of the fire, . . . proceeds out of the stone when the water is sprinkled upon it, . . . and in the steam it enters the body, . . . and imparts some of its nature to the body. That is why one feels so well after having been in the sweat-lodge."¹

Let us now consider the peculiar functions of the medicine-man, to see how far the difference in degree between his expert trafficking with the occult and the plain man's more diffident dealings with the same approaches to a difference in kind. The main point to grasp is that by his special initiation and the rigid taboos that he practises—not to speak of remarkable gifts, say, in the way of trance and ecstasy, that he may inherit by nature and have improved by art—he has access to a wonder-working power unattainable by common men. Therefore, even when he merely does what every dabbler in mystery is apt to attempt, he does it far better. The amulet that he sells, for instance, is stronger medicine than any odd-shaped pebble, shell, or root that one may have picked up for oneself. His knots can bind down devils, no less; while his emetics can bring them up. By reason of this superior competency, then, he can presume to tackle certain disorders, a raging epidemic, for instance, or a sudden fit, in the face of which common folk are utterly helpless. Thus a whole branch of medicine tends to be marked off, over which he rules supreme; and, agreeably with the heterogeneous nature of these visitations, his diagnosis reveals a set of monstrous causes, unclean spirits, vampires, the evil eye, and what not.

Moreover, many of his methods, if not entirely without analogy among the practices of the multitude, are at any rate carried to such a pitch of technicality that they amount to distinctive arts. Crystal-gazing, for example, or the manifold other processes of divination, augury, haruspicy, astrology, sortilege, and so on, are developed by the professional to a point at which they display much complexity, and at least some internal consistency, of doctrine. Now in certain connections, as especially in the case of astrology, mysticism has proved the forerunner of genuine science. It is less clear whether scientific medicine has been substantially advanced by

¹ W. Jones, "The Algonkin Manitou," in *Amer. Journ. of Folk-lore* (1905), 183-91.

any one of this group of occult disciplines, say by haruspicy, with its elaborate study of the position, form, and conditions of the organs of the sacrificial victim. Indeed, on the whole it seems doubtful. Divinatory processes in general have little to do with such diagnosis as relies on the exact observation of morbid symptoms. Thus, concerning the practical application of the dream-oracles of the classical world, we are told: "The remedies prescribed are wholly of a magical kind, and medicine in the proper sense is entirely absent."¹ One department, indeed, there is of specialised study in which the doctor-priest might be expected to shine, namely, that relating to *materia medica*. Granted that he concocts his nostrums out of ingredients fancied for their symbolic rather than for their intrinsic properties, even so, one would suppose, the sheer accumulation of outlandish substances must at length lead to conscious or unconscious selection in favour of those of real value. Indeed, it is certain that in ancient Egypt there developed under purely religious influence a knowledge of useful drugs which, by way of the Greeks and Arabs, has been handed on to us.² But it is no less important to remember that the peasant has his own set of homely specifics quite apart from what may be occasionally prescribed for him by the priest; and that on this independent source European medicine as notably, during Roman times, has also drawn to its great advantage.

Meanwhile, all these methods are reducible to one, the method of the faith-healer. It is this fact which brings the medicine-man of the savage world, at any rate for purposes of anthropological classification, into strict line with the priest who essays to cure the sick under the auspices of one of the higher religions. From primitive Australia to civilised Lourdes the same wonder-working power is set in motion in the same way. Psychologists are content to term it the power of suggestion. If our theologians claim, as well they may, to superimpose another and a deeper interpretation, let them at least do justice to the identity of principle that links their faith to quite rudimentary forms of religion or, as many would roundly term it, magic. In this context I am tempted to cite the judgment of a worthy missionary. He has been describing a successful experiment in rain-making by a Basuto *moroka*, who stirred a concoction of herbs and roots with a

¹ E. Thrämer in Hastings' *Encycl. of R. and E.*, vi. (1913), 552, referring to the Maffeian inscriptions of the *Insula Tiberina*.

² Even so, however, the main function of the Arab was to hand on the work of Greek writers, such as Hippocrates, *e.g.*, at Salerno; *cf.* H. Rashdall, *The Universities of the Middle Ages* (1895), i. 81, 85.

reed, while calling upon the spirits of his ancestors to move the Supreme Being. "It may be," he says, "that, being a good judge of the weather, like most intelligent natives, he used to occupy himself in this manner just when rain was probable; it may have been pure coincidence; or again, that the Almighty did indeed hear and answer the prayers of this untaught old heathen."¹ Surely it must make for better religion as well as for better science to emphasise the continuity rather than the discontinuity of the means whereby man during his long history has sought to obtain health, strength, and sustenance from a higher power.

Whether, then, it be by the aid of crude manual devices, such as the sucking-thread or the soul-trap, or through the more refined and ideal processes involved in sacrifice, prayer, purification, or sleeping in a holy place, the medicine-man and his lineal successor, the priest, uniformly practise what may be termed the method of encouragement. They are, in a word, soul-doctors. And the great need of primitive folk, be it noted, is for this healer of souls. The savage has a vigorous body, but a weakly intelligence. His is a narrow field of attention, occupied entirely by matters of routine. In the vast penumbra of his mind lurk all manner of dreadful phantoms, the progeny of a hazardous hand-to-mouth existence. As soon as the routine is interrupted, the hold on reality is relaxed; the few distinct notions are dissolved; the haunting shapes close in; the fear of the unknown settles upon the heart. Only faith can stem this rout of the faculties, a faith rendered steadfast by association with a clear impression. Almost any clear impression will do so long as it serves as such a rallying-point of attention. Hope grows through the mere reintegration of consciousness. Fixity of outlook as such brings relief. So the faith-healer's art consists in restoring a frightened man to himself by imparting determination of thought and will. He must make it known that he knows. A confident diagnosis is three parts of a cure. Thus the Malay medicine-man when at his patient's bedside reads the signs by throwing rice grains into water, and announces the name and pedigree of the power that partly by control, partly by cajolery, he summons to his aid:

"Peace be with you, Mustia Kembang, . . .
I know the origin from which you sprang. . . .
You I order, your co-operation I invoke."²

¹ D. F. Ellenberger (assisted by J. C. MacGregor), *History of the Basuto, Ancient and Modern* (1912), 93.

² W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic* (1900), 412.

Indeed, the modern doctor knows that often it is half the battle to name the disease.¹ The faith-healer must be impressive at all costs. Somehow he must strike home to the bemused intelligence and vacillating will to live, by the joint authority of his wild eye, his rigmarole utterance, his pantomime, his trappings, his general queerness, and the very aloofness of his life. Otherwise, the inertia of despair will lead to utter collapse. Indeed, the savage patient is so prone to a fatal despondency that Mr Roth has invented a special term for the tendency, naming it *thanatomania*, a positive craze for dying.² "There is no doubt whatever," write Spencer and Gillen, "that a native will die after infliction of even a most superficial wound if only he believes the weapon which inflicted the wound has been sung over and thus endowed with *Arungquiltha*. He simply lies down, refuses food and pines away." The same authors relate how an old native was induced to show them how the poison stick was used by way of purely mimic display. "When he had finished . . . he declared that the evil magic had gone into him and that he felt, as he looked, very bad." Luckily, the explorers were able to produce a powerful counter-magic from their medicine chest.³

Now we must be careful lest we misrepresent this type of healing process as a treatment of unreason by reason—the application to a case of hysteria of a science embodying intelligence purged of emotion. On the contrary, it is the operator's faith that creates faith in the subject. The doctor and his patient meet on the same plane of ideopathic experience. The one is just as suggestible as the other, obtaining by auto-suggestion the power to pass the suggestion on. In every phase of his many-sided activity—in the divinatory diagnosis, in the expulsion or neutralisation of the evil, in the restoration or communication of vitality—we can see how the ideal is made to seem real by sheer force of the will to believe. The best illustration of all, however, is afforded by the special type of procedure known as "shamanising." Here we find the doctor behaving as if he were no longer himself. He is for the time being possessed by a supernatural agency. Thus in respect to his normal personality he himself suffers a "control" in precisely the same way as does his patient. Those who describe the so-called magician as one who says

¹ Cf. C. S. Myers in Hastings' *Encycl. of R. and E.*, iv. 724.

² W. E. Roth, *N. Queensland Ethnography*, Bull. v. (1903), 28.

³ *The Native Tribes of Central Australia* (1899), 537; *Across Australia* (1912), ii. 326.

“My will be done” in a spirit of arrant bravado, would seem entirely to overlook the psychological conditions under which his will-power, or whatever it is held to be, is wrought up to the pitch of efficacy. The necessary force dwelling somewhere in the depth of his being must be met half-way by temporary abandonment of the surface-life. Communion once established, a new personality comes into play, a consciousness contracted but proportionately intense, for which the dominant idea, freed of all limiting conditions, becomes charged with the certain promise of its own self-realisation. Instructive examples of such shamanising are given in the late Major Tremearne’s book, *The Ban of the Bori*. Among the Hausas a *bori* is a disease-demon. There are many of them, and each has a character of its own and a special mode of self-manifestation. The doctor becomes possessed by such a demon, and in that capacity is able to cure the disease in question, as it were, by a sort of transcendental inoculation.¹ In another work Major Tremearne suggests that *bori* dancing originated as a treatment of the insane, who were induced in this way to moderate their transports.² Whether this be indeed so, I have not the means of knowing; but it is at least certain that those who now practise such dancing for the purpose of healing others work themselves up into a state verging on insanity, with its self-estrangement, its obsession, its sense of unlimited power. But perhaps enough has been said to make good the contention that the medicine-man’s doctoring is of altogether another kind to the plain man’s, being neither empirical nor would-be empirical in its interest and intent, but theurgical through and through.

At this point I must break off the argument at the risk of inconclusiveness. The present survey has been strictly limited to the phenomena of the primitive world, and can at most but establish a general presumption in favour of a particular interpretation of the facts relating to the later history of medicine. After all, the problem of the genesis of a rational science of health turns primarily on the question how Greek medicine, more especially in the form represented by Hippocrates, came to rely so exclusively on the study of natural causes. How this crucial stage of evolution was

¹ A. J. N. Tremearne, *The Ban of the Bori* (1914), 243 f.; for the idea of inoculation, cf. *ib.*, 20 and 464.

² On the authority of Dr Alexander, see the *Tailed Head-Hunters of Nigeria* (1912), 254; *Hausa Superstitions and Customs* (1913), 146. I may perhaps add that a remarkable case of the treatment of an insane person by a native doctor, resulting in an apparently complete cure, has recently been reported to me from Northern Rhodesia.

traversed we do not understand, and perhaps can never understand, in detail. It is plain, however, that enlightenment did not come in a single flash; but, on the contrary, involved much slow and precarious groping after a clue amid a maze of unprofitable fancies. Paradoxically enough, the very notion of "nature" may be lineally connected with the savage concept of supernatural power.¹ Further, even after nature had been in theory definitely equated with experience, the natural causes that were recognised in medical practice long continued to include many that, in our eyes, are but precipitates of superstition. Yet, when all is said on behalf of the influence of the theurgical kind of doctoring on Greek medicine—and the latter, let us remember, comprised various schools, some of which were less whole-heartedly devoted to empiricism than others—it would seem to have been on the whole a secondary factor. It is suggested, then, that in Greece, the least priest-ridden country of the ancient world, a common-sense medicine of plain men, such as we find to coexist with the theurgical kind all over the savage world, may have come early to the fore and remained there. Such a view, perhaps, could be most plausibly maintained in regard to the development of surgery, a department in which the peculiar effects of the faith-cure are never likely to be prominent at any stage of human progress. But it is surely possible, and even probable, that all branches of Greek medicine alike were in considerable part but refinements of popular practices concerned with the conduct or restoration of health—a case in point being that of dietetics, a subject to which the later Greek physicians gave so much of their attention. After all, popular tradition, conservative though it be, is less impervious to the teachings of experience than such religious tradition as is in the keeping of a priesthood. The faith-healer and miracle-worker were ever present in the ancient world, and are ever present among us to-day. But somehow the scientific tradition of Europe has kept clear of them and their ways. It belongs to the lay or profane side of our civilisation. My present task has been to show that even in primitive culture, permeated as it seems to be by the magico-religious element, this lay or profane side of life constitutes a separate dispensation, and one that is especially favourable to the organisation of common sense, that is, to science.

A word in conclusion. As an anthropologist I am bound to deal with facts, and to eschew valuations as far as I can.

¹ Cf. H. Hubert and M. Mauss in *L'Année sociologique*, vii. (1904), 118, 145.

Lest I seem, therefore, to have exalted common sense and its offspring, science, at the expense of such experience as is usually reckoned to be of another order, since it draws on hidden sources, alleging causes that are supernormal in the sense that they stand in no determinate relation to the sense-world, let me whisper in the ear of triumphant empiricism, "Remember that thou art human." Philosophy has always insisted on the inadequacy of so-called naturalism; and even science, so far as it deals with mind and the products of mind, is chary of pushing the theory of natural causation too far. Meanwhile, every practical doctor knows that he shares the healing function with the priest. Confession of sins may in its way be just as salutary as any purge or emetic.¹ A rational theory of the soul, then, must reserve a place for the soul-doctor. Indeed, the latter is nowadays permitted to enrol himself in the ranks of science, so long as he submit to the preliminary test of reciting the naturalistic creed. Now as long as naturalism stands only for a method, and not for the whole of philosophy, there is no harm in this. Experience is experiment; and, unless the faith-healer be willing to employ the strictest method of trial and verification, he must be banned as a charlatan. But our so-called empiricism must, in its turn, beware lest it reject the results of experiment when they contradict preformed opinions. To identify the spiritual life of man with the routine of his senses is a presupposition that, if it break down on trial, we must be ready to forgo; accepting in its stead a larger conception of human health, and of the vital forces in their relation to its maintenance and improvement.

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¹ Cf. *The Golden Bough*³, iii. 214, on confession as a "moral purgative," where he cites the Kikuyu term for the rite of confession, *kotahikio*, derived from *tahika*, "to vomit."

GERMAN POETRY : A REVALUATION.

MRS A. Y. CAMPBELL.

“ Aus der Jugendzeit, aus der Jugendzeit
Klingt ein Lied mir immerdar ;
O wie liegt so weit, o wie liegt so weit . . . ”

A GREAT deal is being written about the Prussianisation of Germany, yet the problem remains dark and perplexing. The fact, however, is clear—the Prussian Mr Hyde has assumed more and more control of his Teutonic Dr Jekyll. Most people are able to congratulate themselves on having always disliked that Mr Hyde. What English traveller on the Continent has had a good word to say for him? It was his unhappy partner that both we and America had loved, chaffed and respected, the gentle, unworldly, studious, generous German described so often in our fiction.

But in judging of German literature we have shown much less discrimination. For there, too, there are conflicting elements—and there we have lavished almost all our praise upon the less deserving.

Until about two centuries ago German literature was essentially undramatic; it possessed instead a wonderful faculty for the lyrical and “romantic.” In the literary renaissance which followed upon the outbreak of her political ambitions, this faculty was developed to a pitch which has perhaps never been equalled. But Germany was no more satisfied with this eminence than with her political power, and her writers set themselves grimly to wrest the laurels from other countries in dramatic and “heroic” literature as well. They toiled in imitation, they transplanted and Germanised. Whether they succeeded in producing a great drama is a matter on which there may be two opinions. It is possible to hold that their pursuit of the heroic in literature has been as little fortunate as their pursuit of it in politics.

Recently in German writings the adoration of will-power

and the worship of material success have become increasingly conspicuous, and have led to an expressed contempt for the Christian ideal. They have also led to the cultivation of that quality which only the Greeks were honest enough to find a name for—the *ὑπερηνόρῖα* of Penelope's grasping suitors—a repellent, strutting over-mannishness that has neither sympathy nor understanding for those who happen to differ from it in sex, character, or nationality.

Side by side with this the older spirit persists, and tends to find, as we shall see, in the traditional lyric and romantic forms a better medium for the expression of its noble piety, serenity, and simple human tenderness.

The efforts of Lessing to redeem the German stage from its utter subjection to the French were rewarded by a widespread enthusiasm for the creation of a national drama; and Lessing set the good example by at least one play, *Minna von Barnhelm*, the perennial charm of which is due to its complete sincerity to German thought and feeling. But his first attempt was *Miss Sara Sampson*, a play of middle-class life in imitation of Richardson: hardly, one feels, the foundation-stone of a national drama! Within a few years we have the whole "Sturm und Drang" movement in full pursuit of Shakespearian models; thus no sooner has the German stage risen from its knees before the French tradition, than it is prostrate at the feet of Shakespeare; and Shakespeare attended by such an odd pair of "supporters" as Ossian and Richardson, the one unreal and insipidly sweet, the other strongly and sourly realistic. Even Goethe and Schiller, though they soon detached themselves from the Sturm und Drang school, and outgrew the desire consciously to imitate, were never quite free from the influence of some one of this strange trio—Schiller remaining constantly attached to what he took to be the Shakespearian or heroic, Goethe gravitating steadily towards the realistic and problematical. But the Shakespearian, an essentially English conception of life, was never natural to the German mind; and though in many of their plays we may be gratified by very praiseworthy reminiscences of Shakespeare's language and method, these passages serve to impress upon us how almost impossible it is to grow a great national drama from a foreign stock. French drama, except where Molière planted it anew, suffered in every way from its attempt to imitate the classics; yet there has always been far more in common between the French and the Roman mind than between the German and the spirit of Elizabethan England.

In almost all the action plays of Goethe and Schiller we are conscious of incongruity: the themes are heroic, historical, robust; the treatment is perpetually following the natural bent of the German genius into meditation and romance, and lying down beside the still waters.

Schiller's trilogy of *Wallenstein* is, from the standard of true drama, the greatest German play: it has movement, "complication," irony, the sense of gathering storm, the culmination in inevitable catastrophe. But it is an isolated and not strikingly original work; and its effects are somewhat those of a conscientious and laborious compilation. Nearly all Schiller's other plays owe their value almost entirely to their poetry and moral feeling. A profound and keen historian, Schiller was yet by nature too mild and thoughtful, too restrained and philosophic, for the rugged highroad of heroic action: he turns perpetually aside into the flowery lanes of sentiment and arrests the movement of his play with inappropriate and often diffuse emotionalism. One very notorious example must suffice. Unable to satisfy feeling with the presentation of a Joan of Arc fired only by religion and patriotism, Schiller found it necessary to make her fall in love, suddenly, and in the middle of a battle, with an enemy whom she had never seen before and ought at once to have killed. At the celebration of her victory over her country's foes, this warrior maiden cowers in a corner, love-sick and ashamed, striving to steel her melting bosom against the too, too romantic suggestiveness of distant music—we imagine of a distant German band. The scene is very "poetical," only less so than the really great stanzas in which Joan bids farewell to her flocks and pastures—but it is a flat contradiction to all that is noble and natural, and hence in this case to all that is dramatic. The same tendencies and faults appear throughout Schiller's plays (though they are on the whole far better and more carefully constructed than Goethe's); so that if we except *Wallenstein*, we are compelled to feel that, whatever he did for poetry, Schiller made no real contribution to dramatic literature. Yet he wrote plays all his life—zealously pursuing an alien god.

If we turn to Goethe, we find a similar delusion: he perpetually wrote plays, although "action" clearly bored him, and he himself confessed in a letter to Schiller that imaginative drama was out of his reach—that he could only create out of his own experience, and that his natural tendency was to look at things from a pathological standpoint. Perhaps it was because he was half aware that drama was not his proper medium that he wandered so restlessly from one form to

another. In his early *Götz v. Berlichingen* he succeeds admirably—better there than ever again—with the historic romantic play, under the influence of Shakespeare. Herder wrote that there was in *Götz* “uncommon German strength, depth, and truth.” Present-day admirers of the play would be loth to condemn it to that particular variety of truth. It displays, as a matter of fact, more than any other of Goethe’s plays, a certain lucidity, spiritedness, and natural energy which, were we as exclusive a nation as the Germans, might be described as “absolute halb-historische-über-Englische Shakespearianische Wahrheit.”

Soon, however, under the influence of Winckelmann, Goethe returns to the classics, abandons the romantic style of *Götz*, and determines to have everything “grave, solemn, and dignified like a Greek statue.”¹ His *Iphigenie* was acclaimed with enthusiasm as being not a mere imitation but an actual facsimile of ancient drama. So careful was Goethe to work it all out accurately after the best possible recipes, that he revised and partly rewrote his play as a result of certain metrical theories about “longs” and “shorts” propounded by a German author whom he happened to meet in Rome. It is not then surprising that *Iphigenie*, though it has passages of fine poetry, is in the main a cold and artificial production.

Goethe tells us that there strove in him for many years a double soul, and that until these two spirits were fused together his achievements in literature were partial and faltering. To one who dwells upon the strange mixture of the lyric and didactic, the tragic and metaphysic, of pathos and pathology, which his collected works present, it appears that the union was never really achieved.

An unremitting consciousness of religious and moral problems, an insatiable curiosity about abnormalities of the human mind, are at the back of nearly all that Goethe wrote; are indeed of the very essence of such works as *Faust*, *Werther*, *Wilhelm Meister*, and the novels. Behind the morbid self-indulgence in sensitive misery of *Werther*, behind the melancholy speculation and aimless egoistic pursuit of *Meister*, the hawklike brain of Goethe hovers, restlessly eyeing the movements and spasms of human emotion. When once we have discovered this, we shall shed no more tears over *Werther*—if, indeed, we ever did.

In all Goethe’s larger works there is more intellectual force than natural tenderness, more curiosity than sympathy,

¹ See Professor K. Breul’s introduction to *Iphigenie auf Tauris*, Cambridge University Press.

and a strange sunless magnificence. His friend Horn said of him, though by way of praise, "Everywhere in Goethe you are on firm land or island: nowhere the infinite sea." And it is so. He gives us no prospects out of magic casements; no gods, no sprites, not even Calibans; the witches and fays of his Midsummer Night are foolish and degraded creatures tediously unreal; only throughout, in a greater or lesser degree, we have the "Ewig menschliche" surging, struggling, arguing, bent on finding a solution to the problems of its soul—and, surely we must add, never finding it! Of this attitude of mind, of this spirit in art, *Faust* is the complete and supreme embodiment. If it can be called drama at all, it is a new type of drama indeed; *here* we have no imitation, no spark of Marlowe's fiery vision penetrates into this gloomy metaphysical limbo; and the very legend is twisted, distorted, and reversed to satisfy the ethical predilections of Goethe's mind and age. And *Faust* remains a work with which the German nation is entirely satisfied—which they, and many other people too, regard as one of the half-dozen greatest creations of all literature. In England it has had the most enthusiastic admirers, right on from the time of Shelley (who was often a prodigy of misjudgment in matters of art). To such minds as George Eliot's, Carlyle's, and G. H. Lewes's it was the breath of life. It represented an attitude towards the world similar to their own, and applied to the ailing human being much the same intellectual diagnosis and ethical prescriptions as these writers themselves were apt to do. Nowadays it is the reverse side of the same bandage which is offered to the sores of the world, and our modern writers vie with each other to "stab our spirits broad awake" by the lacerating presentation of the world as they conceive it. In this method, too, *Faust* is before them; although poetry has lent to the horrible scene in Marguerite's cell and the more horrible scene between her and her brother a certain form and dignity which is lacking in modern parallels.

Faust has been closely compared by G. H. Lewes to *Hamlet*, to Shakespeare's masterpiece; every subtle cord of which is kept vibrating by the sentient and independent creatures in whom the whole *dramatis personæ* consists. Now *Faust* was suggested to Goethe by a puppet-play, and with few exceptions its stage is crowded with dolls. *Faust* himself we see roughly dotted from scene to scene at the end of a string, manipulated in its turn by his cardboard Mephistopheles: the blind leading the blind; the symbol

taking the symbol by the hand. And through the entire performance the deep voice of Goethe himself, the showman, converses, argues, expostulates, explains. This unfortunate Faust has not sinned horribly and does not suffer much: he has not chosen his course, and he does not control it. Only because he desired more happiness, less of the barren search for knowledge, he somehow becomes involved in a blood compact with the devil. He bargains away his soul in order to taste deeply, just once, of life. What does he get? Not a wild and wicked abandonment, which gradually, through satiety, becomes a misery in disguise; for he never realises the error of his ways. He accompanies his mentor on sundry visits to witches, and enters, with expressed disgust and tedium, into their revels; and he sullenly listens to their dull, querulous, abstract discussions, like the drowsy talk of a lot of gloomy pedants over a bad dinner. He meets, and to the best of his ability loves, the simple—the *very* simple—Marguerite. With the Devil compelling him at every step, he rather reluctantly betrays and deserts her. Once or twice he feels a twinge of faint remorse, as when he sees her phantom with severed neck in the middle of the witch caucus of the Walpurgis. But he hardly ever really struggles, except in the scene near the end of Part I. when he forces Mephistopheles to take him to Marguerite's cell; he merely totters for a moment, and, like the puppet that he is, is jerked upright again. In the allegorical confusion of the Second Part there is even less dramatic movement: there is no genuine development at all. Faust flickers at the end of his string from quite fairly respectable love-making with a very respectable Helen in ancient Greece, to quite respectable dyke-making in comparatively modern Europe; and here, unvindicated, unconverted, to the last moment persevering in stupid and passionless wrongdoing, without having reached any obvious conclusion, he suddenly concludes. Certain scenes of the First Part have merit, if to be harrowing is a merit; and the misery of the last scene, though it seems uselessly painful and horrible, being all the work of the *diabolus ex machina* and apparently unavoidable, is powerfully presented enough: while the last speech of Part I., "Her zu mir," where Mephistopheles (unfortunately only temporarily) claims his own, is by itself a masterly and impressive ending.

But how are we to be really moved by the spectacle of this man, under the perpetual chaperonage of a devil whose attentions he never really earned—a very Devil of rationalism, of dialectics and innuendos? We are told with accents of autho-

rity—as, for example, by G. H. Lewes—that such are the real traits of the utter Satan: if they are, he must have kept a strict watch upon his tongue when attempting to make palatable the “crude apple which diverted Eve. With Faust he is less cautious, and bores him ineffably: yet succeeds by an alternation of his qualities of pander and prig in driving his sheep-like prey in sullen weariness before him. He drives because Faust, for some reason or other, is content to be driven: but he has not a single feature of splendour or power, of the supernatural or of the strange, to recommend him.

Imagine a Lady Macbeth clothed all in scarlet tights, an expert in logic and metaphysic, and hailed, say, as Beelzebub: who would be really shaken by the scenes of Macbeth’s temptation, or effectively purged by the spectacle of his fall?

This play of Goethe’s, pervaded though it is with a peculiar atmosphere of morbid gloom, is yet, after all, no tragedy. The justification for all tragic drama is lacking: the stern and terrible workings of the moral law are not *felt*; they are merely the subjects of speculation and illustration, and that not with respect to any particular event in the play. Its profound ruminations on human life, its subtle meanings clothed in poetic metaphor and occasionally muffled in all the magnificence of unintelligibility, have won it its enormous popularity with a certain kind of reader. But is it not a little heartless, after all, this mingling of speculations and moralisings, allegory and realism, witches and harlots; of seduction, child-murder, drunkenness, madness, and damnation—and into it all, in the words of G. H. Lewes, a sprinkling of “clear bright painting, wit, humour, and pathos”? “It is a cry of despair over the nothingness of human life”—it well may be!

How different is the handling of the tragedy in Marlowe’s play of *Dr Faustus*!—the fame of which has been so weakly and slavishly sacrificed to the clamour and pretensions of Goethe enthusiasts.

Marlowe’s play has its faults; it has been repeatedly attacked for its numerous scenes of buffoonery and bombast; but these scenes convey, after all, some sense of life and stir, they give us the feeling that Faustus is getting a considerable amount of adventure and frolic in exchange for his soul, as he himself admits. They are consequently less far removed from the natural development of the theme than are Goethe’s endless allegories of charioteers and pedants and cupids and what not. Yet in spite of these nonsensical scenes, what an overwhelming tragedy it is, the damnation of Dr Faustus! Not for knowledge alone did he sacrifice his soul. The fitting

punishment for an arrogant endeavour after omniscience is the mental agony of humiliation and disappointment which Browning's Paracelsus suffered. Neither did Faustus sell himself for a little happiness. It was for *power* that he bartered his soul: signing it away in a compact of blood—as his countrymen to-day. And this is a crime which often enough in history has been punished with the uttermost destruction and despair.

The unspeakable anguish in which Faustus writhes, waiting alone in his study for the hour of his doom, is justified—if Hell can ever be justified—by the reckless, ambitious frowardness with which he has thrown away the soul that God had given him. Here is the voice of terror; and the hearer may almost feel no tragedy again can shake him where death opens after all a merciful prospect of annihilation, if not of Elysium. No prayers of a Marguerite, no philanthropic dyke-making efforts of his own, can save Faustus; no long-drawn, meandering, semi-well-intentioned future will end, in his case, with a sudden and inconclusive death: Faustus is damned. Moreover, damnation itself appears a far more awful thing because of the manner in which Marlowe has represented it. He has made the tempter himself speak of it with dread and passionate grief. The insolent savant boldly questions Mephistopheles on the nature of hell, and asks him how it comes that he has left it. To which Mephistopheles replies in words as subtle, quite as allegorically arresting and metaphysically profound, as any of Goethe's elaborate disquisitions:—

Why, this is hell; nor am I out of it:
Think'st thou that I, who saw the face of God,
- And tasted the eternal joys of heaven,
Am not tormented with ten thousand hells
In being deprived of everlasting bliss?
O Faustus, leave these frivolous demands,
Which strike a terror to my fainting soul.

Faustus retorts with truly blasphemous ridicule, daring to mock both heaven and the fierce and mighty demon of Marlowe's imagination:—

What, is great Mephistopheles so passionate
For being deprived of the joys of Heaven?
Learn thou from Faustus manly fortitude
And scorn those joys thou never shalt possess.

Set beside these lines (or the many others in the play that are as good) the most highly prized jewels collected all together from the immense mountain of Goethe's colossal work, and we shall not find them comparable in feeling, in

music, in power, or in depth; and though Goethe's lines may have certain other excellences, these are the qualities necessary to dramatic poetry.

Then, too, in Marlowe's *Faustus* there is the voice of pity, speaking not for a betrayed and very foolish girl, who alone rouses it in Goethe's play—though left unvindicated, and in Part II. practically forgotten,—but for the great, wicked, yet human Faustus himself. Three separate times he struggles to save himself, and suffers the deadliest pangs of a difficult penitence, only to succumb once more. On the very night of his end he retains so much of dignity, of amazing courage and human feeling, that he forbids his friends to watch with him, lest harm should befall them. Alone and unsupported he endures his awful hour.

In this temptation, in this fall and punishment, we have all the legitimate forces of dramatic art at work. Here the moral is not merely spoken, it does not figure as if it were given a rôle among the other *dramatis personæ*—it is immanent; and its pitiless working upon a strong, strange, yet pitiable nature—that is the play. In *Faust* there is a “moral,” and no play: a “play,” and no moral. We cannot justify the play and its moral by maintaining that Faust is supposed in the end to have tardily arrived at the conclusion that it is man's duty to serve his fellow-men—for this moral, eminently true, and painfully applicable to Faust throughout, is neither implied in the play, nor developed from its course. It is as if the end of *Hamlet* were replaced by someone's getting up and saying, “Better late than never.”

The moral that any real admirer of Shakespearian and Greek drama must feel to have been most emphatically drummed into him by the time he reaches the end of the Second Part, is one which, as it has been contradicted in almost every scene, finds appropriate expression in the mouth of the Spirit of Contradiction, Mephisto himself:

Grey, dear my friend, is all this theorising,
And green alone the golden tree of Life.

Strange that Goethe should have written these lines—while writing *Faust*. Still stranger that he who planted in that wilderness—like white stars of cactus blossom in the desert—such beautiful little lyrics as “Mein Ruh ist hin,” and “Der König in Thule,” should have cared to spend the greater part of his life still writing *Faust*. His imagination was too joyless to save him, either in life or literature, from the many blind alleys into which he was led, now by his restless egoism,

and again by his mighty but bleak intellect. When he had the power of composing such immortal poetry as is contained in the twenty-four words of "Ueber allen Gipfeln," he thought it worth his while to devote innumerable lines to *Sprüche*, aphorisms, of which the following are examples :

Who is the man that profiteth nothing?
He who can not command, nor yet obey.

Do the right in your own affairs,
And all the rest will follow.

Among such sands Goethe and Schiller and many another German poet, and presumably their public, loved to trudge. And this, like the existence and popularity of *Faust*, is but a sign of that curious, cold preoccupation of Germans with ethical questions, the answers to which they like to excogitate rather than to feel.

In this tendency more perhaps than anywhere else the explanation will be found for the present condition of Germany and for the long period of spiritual corrosion which preceded it. It is the divorce of reason and feeling, leading to a simultaneous growth of sentimentality and cruelty, which has been the crime and ruin of modern Germany ; it is their union in a singularly perfect harmony which is the greatness of her lyrical poetry ; so that when we turn to this from the unsatisfied and unsatisfying attempts at the heroic or analytical, the problem of Germany's self-ruin seems suddenly to become more perplexing than ever.

In Germany, as elsewhere, poetry in early times was mostly religious. The power to express the worship of God and the love of Christ in tender and delicate lyrics is one that belonged in perfection to the first bright dawn of English verse : the German poets have never lost it. Their religious songs are never perhaps so pure and so intense as the early English love-poems of a joyous creed—as Dunbar's "On the Nativity of Christ," as the "Quia Amore langueo," or as the divine little carol, "I sing a Maiden"; but from the poems of Decius, or earlier, right down to Nietzsche's offering before his Unknown God, all are remarkable for their deep sincerity and devoutness. In anthologies of German poetry we frequently find the naïf title of "Gott"; and many of the lighter lyrics end unexpectedly with a note of prayer.

To this religious attitude of mind is due a quality in German poetry which we practically do not find in English. Something which, for lack of another equally accurate but

less vulgarised expression, must be called a lyric cry; but it is a cry without resentment, wholly without bitterness, and of a sadness which is prevented by faith and patience from admitting the note of indignation, of rebellion, of passion, which makes English poetry more stirring but less consolatory. Only one of Germany's poets, and he the least favoured by them, the most by us, made passion and bitterness the heart of his work. As a poet (as distinct from being a Jew) Heine displeased his countrymen because he mingled his mockery and indignation with the tenderest feelings. They found in him a "negatives element," and thought that "frivolität wurzelt tief in seinem Wesen,"¹ that he was imbued with frivolity, and that he destroyed with his mockery the consecrating effect of emotion ("die Weihe der Empfindung").

That the same criticism should have been so often directed by the Germans against the English nation helps to throw light upon their attitude. We are too ready either to hide our emotions in half-serious laughter, or to reveal them only through a mist of violence and passion.² Seldom do we present them like a lucid pool to the eye of heaven, without adornment and without timidity. After having contemplated for a while the absolute purity and simplicity of the best German poetry, one comes to understand why they find something indecorous, something almost untruthful, in the mode chosen by Heine of expressing his feelings, as in the mode chosen by the English poets of partly disguising theirs, partly distorting them with passion. For passion itself is not feeling: it is the shape into which feeling is forced by the narrowness of earthly being: to pervert Browning's lines, it is a case of finite passion springing from the pain of infinite hearts that yearn. It is lack of passion which makes possible the strength and charm and imperturbable tenderness of Indian and Chinese poems. Among these peoples the state of mind which produces poetry is a contemplative and essentially reposeful one, very closely allied to the state of prayer; whereas, in spite of the precepts of Wordsworth, very little English poetry has the stamp of being composed in tranquillity. There is much in German poetry reminiscent of the Chinese, although the young life of modern Christian Europe has added

¹ See Kluge, *Geschichte der deutschen National Literatur*, and histories of German literature, *passim*.

² Schiller writes of Shakespeare: "When at an early age I first grew acquainted with this poet, I was indignant at his coldness—indignant with the insensibility which allowed him to jest and sport amidst the highest pathos."—Quoted in G. H. Lewes's *Life of Goethe*, chap. vi.

a touch of vitality and hopefulness which is foreign to the dream life of the retrospective Eastern world, mesmerised as it is by the sense of the subsidence of time over its immeasurable past. There is also much to remind us of the restraint and gravity of the works of ancient Greece: where philosophy united with religion to inculcate doctrines of sublime despair. It is the union of philosophy and poetry which gave the world Plato's *Phædo*: and such lyrics as his Ἀστὴρ πρὶν μὲν ἑλαμπες to the beloved who living was as the morning star among men, and dying shone as the evening star among the dead. Clearly it is the same union from which springs a poem like the following of Gottfried Keller's:—

Siehst du den Stern im fernsten Blau,
Der flimmernd fast erbleicht?
Sein Licht braucht eine Ewigkeit,
Bis es dein Aug' erreicht!

Dost see that star in the blue dark
With wan and tremulous light?
Its beams have travelled æons long
To meet thine eye to-night.

Vielleicht vor tausend Jahren schon
Zu Asche stob der Stern,
Und doch steht dort sein milder Schein
Noch immer still und fern.

Perhaps a thousand years ago
To dust and ash it fell,
And yet its tender light we see
Distant and peaceful still.

Dem Wesen solchen Scheines gleicht,
Der ist und doch nicht ist,
O Lieb', dein anmutvolles Sein,
Wenn du gestorben bist!

And like that shining presence there,
Which is, and is not, fled,
Thy radiant being shall endure
Oh love! when *thou* art dead!

Goethe also, in his serene moments, recalls the Greek (though hardly in his *Iphigenie*):—

Des Menschen Seele
Gleicht dem Wasser:
Vom Himmel kommt es,
Zum Himmel steigt es,
Und wieder nieder
Zur Erde muss es,
Ewig wechselnd.

The soul of man
It flows like water:
It falls from Heaven,
To Heaven rises,
Downward to earth
Again descending,
Changing for ever.

Seele des Menschen,
Wie gleichst du dem Wasser!
Schicksal des Menschen,
Wie gleichst du dem Wind!

O soul of Man,
Like water art thou!
O fate of Man,
Like wind thou art!

A rather earlier poet, Matthias Claudius, describes a girl gazing up at the stars in midnight solitude, with wondering and hungry eyes:—

Ich sehe oft um Mitternacht,
Wenn ich mein Werk getan
Und niemand mehr im Hause wacht
Die Stern' am Himmel an.

Often at midnight all alone,
When others sleeping lie,
After my daily work is done,
I gaze into the sky.

Sie gehn da, hin und herzerstreut,
Als Lämmer auf der Flur;
In Rudeln auch, und aufgereiht
Wie Perlen an der Schnur;

Dann saget untern Himmelszelt
Mein Herz mir in der Brust:
"Es gibt was Bessers in der Welt
Als all ihr Schmerz und Lust."

Ich werf mich auf mein Lager hin
Und liege lange wach,
Und suche es in meinem Sinn
Und sehne mich darnach.

I see the stars strewn far and wide,
Like lambs upon the mead,
In little flocks, or side by side
Like pearls strung on a thread.

Under the heaven's tent of gold
My spirit whispers low,
"A better thing the world doth hold
Than human weal and woe."

I seek my bed, but cannot rest,
Long trying to divine
Whether it lurks within my breast,
Yearning to make it mine.

It is hardly possible to read this without the mind's being filled suddenly with innumerable fragrant recollections of Eastern thought and feeling.¹ The stillness of the night, though full of stars; the reposeful nature of the speaker's soul, that yet holds a longing.

Night, which we meet so often in Greek or Chinese poems, is the theme or the setting of a large number of the great German lyrics; whether the hearts that beat beneath it be quiet or fevered, sorry or glad, shedding upon all a spirit of gentle melancholy and fundamental calm. Among the most beautiful is Lenau's famous "Prayer":—

Weil' auf mir, du dunkles Auge,
Übe deine ganze Macht,
Ernste, milde, träumerische,
Unergründlich süsse Nacht!

Nimm mit deinem Zauberdunkel
Diese Welt von hinnen mir,
Dass du über meinem Leben
Einsam schwebest für und für.

Stay, oh sombre gaze, and o'er me
Cast the magic of your might,
Solemn, tender, meditative,
Sweet beyond all knowledge, Night!

Round the world, that I forget it,
Let your spell of darkness roll,
And in solitude for ever
Take possession of my soul!

In this particular instance the song-like quality of German poetry is more than ever arresting. German poems are not always musical, though Lenau's "Bitte" is, but they are always meet to be set to music. In the ordinary finish of rhyme and structure German poets are astonishingly careless. We in England have only just discovered that a series of unrhymed, unrhythmical, unassorted, and uninteresting sentences will, if the author be sufficiently confident, be accepted by a large public as poetry. Perhaps we are about to enter on a period of "Sturm und Drang." More than a century ago German writers produced rather similar rigmaroles, and some of these,

¹ Cf., for instance, some translations from the Chinese, by L. Cranmer-Byng, entitled *The Lute of Jade*.

a very few, proved to be poetry. But German has a faculty for falling into the poetic. Quite short lyrics, such as would seem to need the highest polish, come before us with every other line unrhymed, and the rhymes lame at that: yet they have stimulated the great composers to set them to music; and many of them are music unset. There cannot be in literature much more perfect word melody than the first few lines of the poem beginning:—

“Hölty dein Freund der Frühling ist gekommen:
Klagend irrt er durch die Haine dich zu finden
Doch umsonst. Er sinkt bei deinem Grabe hin.”

“Hölty! thy friend the early Spring now cometh!
Wailing he strays through vale and wood to find thee,
But—in vain! He sinks beside thy grave.”¹

The lyrical instinct has been so strong in Germany that it has been able all along to make beautiful the most common and everyday, what might properly be called realistic, themes; it has also been able to withstand or transform the grotesque and morbid spirit of what is named “realism” at the present day. What in English would have become the moral ditties of Jane and Anne Taylor, or Isaac Watts, become in Germany such poems as “O lieb so lang du lieben kanst,” or “Wenn alle untreu werden”; and, still more wonderful, in an age of social problems, an age hurrying towards its Zolas and its Ibsens and its Shaws, arose Mörike, a master such as there has never been of the veritable art (most rare) of poetic realism. Without ever losing the accustomed note of dignity and calm, he was able to write one of the most disquieting and haunting poems of real life that the world knows; a poem that is itself full of a sobbing and syncopated melody, and when sung never to be forgotten by the not altogether enviable hearer. It is nearly impossible to attempt to call up in translation even the shadow of its ghost.

Früh, wann die Hähne krähn,
Eh' die Sternlein verschwinden,
Muss ich am Herde stehn
Muss Feuer zünden.

Early, when the cocks crow,
Before the stars dwindle,
I must to the kitchen go,
And fire kindle.

Schön ist der Flammen Schein,
Es springen die Funken;
Ich schaue so drein,
In Leid versunken.

Prettily the flame plays,
Sparks leap up flaring;
Into the fire I gaze,
Dumbly despairing.

¹ A translation is given here also for the sake of consistency, though useless as an illustration of the music of the original.

Plötzlich, da kommt es mir,
Treuloser knabe,
Dass ich in die Nacht von dir
Geträumet habe.

Träne auf Träne dann
Stürzet hernieder;
So kommt der Tag heran—
O ging' er wieder!

Faithless boy! suddenly
By the fire gleaming,
I know that at night of thee
I have been dreaming.

Tear after tear then
From my heart is rended,
So the day comes again—
O, were it ended!

Yes—the problem becomes more insoluble than ever. We may read these German lyrics with tears; in times like these we dwell with thankfulness upon that union of philosophic calm with human tenderness which is their message, a message of real guidance and true consolation; we love to sympathise and to associate with that romantic attitude towards the everyday adventures of the humble human being; with that fundamental content in what is, after all, the really beautiful method of our normal lives.

And meantime Germany has wrecked this whole natural scheme of human life, and stamped out for herself and for us what her people most have cherished.

Will she ever rediscover that her lyrics were worth more than her metaphysics: that her homes are worth more than her dreams of World-Empire?

If she does not, if, like the betrayed and betraying Wallenstein, she has built up a wall out of her own deeds which bars her return for ever, there will be all the more reason for treasuring what, next to her music, was her greatest gift to the world.

OLWEN WARD CAMPBELL.

CAMBRIDGE.

GERMAN MILITARISM IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

IT is often said that the "militarism" which we now regard as characteristic of the Germans should be regarded rather as Prussian than as, properly speaking, German, and that it is the Prussian hegemony which has transformed the nation whose empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century lay neither on the land nor on the sea, but (in a sense very different from that which the phrase would use, were it used for the first time to-day) "in the air," into the very type of a highly civilised nation which finds its principal vocation in the scientific preparation and ruthless execution of warlike enterprises. I do not propose to discuss here the measure of truth which there may be in this view, but only to call attention to the fact that the German nation did not acquire a reputation among her neighbours for "militarism" for the first time in the present age or under the leadership of the Hohenzollerns.

One of the most influential thinkers and teachers of contemporary Germany, Professor Rudolf Eucken, in an interesting essay contributed in 1899 to an American magazine, pointed out that in moving from contentment with the "empire of the air" (in the sense of the old epigram to which I have already referred) to seek pre-eminence in commerce and in war, his country was but reverting to ambitions which had been familiar to her sons in mediæval times. And it is certain that the great Hohenstaufen Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, whose crown a modern German song has celebrated as restored to Germany with the new imperial succession that began at Versailles in 1871, was regarded by his neighbours no less as the typical military monarch than is William II to-day.

In 1166 the exiled Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas

Becket, was in France with the great scholar John of Salisbury and others of his immediate friends, who for their loyalty to him were out of favour with their own king, Henry II, and in close relations with the reigning French king, Louis VII, whose sympathies were with the Archbishop in his quarrel with his sovereign. One of this circle, Gerard, called La Pucelle or the Maid (he died some twenty years later as Bishop of Chester and Coventry in England), left France to take up his residence at Cologne. The Archbishop of Cologne at that time, a certain Reginald, was considered by the French and English clergy to be in a state of schism, having, along with his emperor, Frederick Barbarossa—who indeed was thought to have acted at Reginald's instigation in the matter—separated himself from the spiritual obedience of Pope Alexander III and set up an antipope. Gerard's action therefore, although he was himself supposed to be sound in his allegiance to the lawful successor of St Peter, and though he seems to have represented himself as bent upon what we should now call "propaganda" in the interests of Alexander at the city which was the very heart of the schism, was nevertheless the cause of considerable heartburnings among his friends, which find lively expression in several letters addressed to him by John of Salisbury, to whom he seems to have been specially bound by a common interest in philosophy. In one of these letters mention is made by John of the displeasure of Louis VII at Gerard's departure from his dominions without taking leave of him, and sundry reasons for this displeasure are alleged. It is to the last of these that I now wish to call attention.

"His third reason is," so writes John to Gerard, "and whatever others may say, I think it is the reason which weighs the most with him, that you have gone over to the Germans, who, as he is persuaded, would, if they could and if they dared, be glad to make an attack upon his kingdom. And what they can do and dare to do, that they do: they talk big and threaten; and those of them who live in his kingdom, even the German colony in Paris, who are dwelling peaceably in his capital, despise him, as you know, because he lives among his people like a civilised citizen and does not in barbarous" (shall we say "Hunnish"?) "fashion affect the tyrant, and march about always surrounded by a military escort, as though going in fear of his life. He knows the ways of that nation and has often complained of them; I think you must yourself have heard him do so." Is not this letter of a great Anglo-Frenchman of seven hundred and fifty years ago a curious anticipation

of what Englishmen and Frenchmen are thinking and saying about the Germans of to-day; even to the touch about the attitude of Germans living in foreign lands towards the governments whose protection they enjoy?

An arrogant militarism, prompt to threaten and nervously sensitive to ridicule, was evidently regarded as characteristic of the German Empire in the twelfth century by its French neighbours. That entertaining gossip Walter Map has preserved a tale intended to illustrate the imperturbable good temper of Louis the Fat, the father and predecessor of Louis VII, receiving an insolent message from the "Roman Emperor" Henry V, son-in-law of our King Henry I, who chose to espouse the cause of Theobald, Count of Champagne, a turbulent vassal of the French Crown, against his overlord. "The Emperor of the Romans," so the German sovereign is related to have said through his ambassadors, "sends you his orders and bids you, as you would enjoy the stability of your realm and your own safety, within a month from now to come to such terms with Count Theobald as may be agreeable to his will and consistent with his honour; otherwise the Emperor, before a month is out, will besiege Paris and you within it, if you have the audacity and presumption to await his assault." Louis, says Map, replied to this ultimatum only with a vulgar phrase, which we may loosely render by "*sale Boche*"—a phrase which, we are told, always specially enraged the Germans and often caused disturbances between them and men of other nations. We may set this (very likely quite apocryphal) story of royal rudeness against the habit ascribed by John of Salisbury to Barbarossa's minister, Reginald of Cologne, of insulting Louis VII by speaking of him as a "kinglet" (*regulus*). But there is no touch of humour in the latter rudeness.

Frederick Barbarossa himself had an admiring chronicler of his deeds in his uncle Otto, Bishop of Freisingen. This emperor was a man endowed with some great qualities, but he certainly anticipated his successors in our day in some of the less amiable features of his character. Otto tells us of his contemptuous reception of the envoys from the self-styled "Roman senate and people" under the short-lived republican régime of Arnold of Brescia, when he was greeted by them on his way to be crowned by the Pope at Rome in 1153 with the offer, as from themselves, of the imperial dignity. He reproached them, according to Otto, with their degeneracy and decadence. The ancient dignities to which they laid claim as the heritage of the Romans had all, he told them, passed to the Germans. "They are all ours." "I am the lawful possessor of them.

Let who can wrest the club from the hand of Hercules." It is the "mailed fist" that is shaken, the "German sword" that is waved in the face of these poor patriots, with their dream of a greatness like that of their free and glorious past, a dream not then capable of realisation, but destined to serve as a source of inspiration to the heroes of the resurrection of Italy in a later day. The emperor's Episcopal kinsman and biographer records with complacency the subsequent execution of Arnold by Frederick's order, the burning of his body and scattering of his ashes on the Tiber lest the populace should venerate him. Nor has either the emperor or his uncle anything but indignation and horror for the obstinacy of the resistance offered by the Milanese at the storming of their city by Frederick in 1158, when he carried off from them their precious relic, the supposed bones of the Magi, to his minister Reginald's cathedral on the Rhine, there to become for after ages "the Three Kings of Cologne." It is true that not only in his own eyes, but in that of some of the Milanese themselves, Frederick was, as Roman emperor, the rightful lord of Milan and the other Italian cities. But even if we look at the conflict from his own point of view, one could have wished from Otto some word of appreciation for the courage and of pity for the fate of the beaten defenders of the famous city.

No doubt a certain school of modern German writers would welcome these stories of their great emperor as illustrating the persistency of an innate consciousness in the German soul of racial superiority to the Latin peoples; and, on the other hand, one might perhaps find, if one looked for them, similar manifestations in the mediæval representations of other nations. The claim made recently by some German journalists that Shakespeare's *King Henry V* exhibits a spirit akin to that which we note in our chief enemies to-day is not without some justification. We should be inclined to reply that, at any rate, such aggressive national arrogance is out of date now; and to say that there is something barbarous in reproducing it in an age which ought to have learned to appreciate a strain "of higher mood." But the passage which I quoted earlier from John of Salisbury shows beyond question that at a date long anterior to that of Shakespeare, or even of the hero-king of his great patriotic play, the most cultivated neighbours of Germany already saw in her, as she appeared under an emperor who was to become beyond any other among the successors of Charles the Great a national hero—the legend long lingered that he was still alive in an enchanted sleep, to return to Germany as her champion in her hour

of need,—the representative of a braggart and inconsiderate militarism.

But even in this most critical moment of our struggle with Germany, I am unwilling to end upon this note, as though I wished to follow the bad example of those Germans who desire to vindicate for their own race the origin of all that is excellent in their spiritual heritage, or again of those among ourselves who, in their indignation at the German way of waging war, would repudiate all that we have owed to Germany in the past. To German piety, German philosophy, German scholarship, German music, we are under deep and abiding obligations, which we shall best fulfil by doing all that it may hereafter be within our power to do towards helping Germany to cast away the worst and to develop the best in her national inheritance; while we shall also do well to examine our own traditions with a critical eye and see whether we too may not learn, from the judgments passed upon us by our neighbours throughout our long history, which among them best deserve encouragement, and which we might abandon as a hindrance to our playing the great part which we are called upon to take in building up the commonwealth of nations and the kingdom of God upon earth.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

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MIRACLES AND THE MEDIEVAL MIND.

G. G. COULTON.

ARTHUR YOUNG, on October the 16th, 1787, was entertained at Paris by "M. Lomond, a very ingenious and inventive mechanic. . . . In electricity he has made a remarkable discovery; you write two or three words on a paper; he takes it with him into a room, and turns a machine enclosed in a cylindrical case, at the top of which is an electrometer, a small fine pith ball; a wire connects with a similar cylinder and electrometer in a distant apartment; and his wife, by remarking the corresponding motions of the ball, writes down the words they indicate: from which it appears that he has formed an alphabet of motions. As the length of the wire makes no difference in the effect, a correspondence might be carried on at any distance: within and without a besieged town, for instance." These words were printed in 1792, in Young's book of travels, which was translated into many languages, and earned him the membership of many learned societies, with invitations to half a dozen courts of Europe. In that same year the Great War broke out, and lasted till 1815; yet during all those twenty-three years, this electric telegraph, which might have revolutionised the art of war, remained unnoticed or forgotten by all, including Young himself, who lived on till 1820.

It seems almost incredible; but all of us are children to-day in our restless curiosity, and children in our forgetfulness to-morrow. There is no strict chain of human thought from age to age, but rather a rope, in which the separate filaments disappear and emerge again, often ending as vaguely as they began. Marco Polo told Europe plainly how bank-notes were printed in China; the idea lay dormant for a century and a half. Ockham, being confronted with the question of women's suffrage, laid down a principle even broader than ours of to-day: women are as deeply concerned as men for the unity of the

true faith; therefore they also must have votes in the General Council of Christendom, which is to judge and condemn, if need be, the Pope himself. Many things that seem to us most modern were already more or less evident to medieval thinkers.

If the general public were asked what were the two distinguishing characteristics of the medieval mind, most men would probably answer, "Trust in miracles, and intolerance." Yet a good many medieval theologians found room for tolerance even at the expense of logic; true, no creature may be saved without baptism, but God may find a mystical and spiritual baptism for good Jews and Pagans on their deathbed. Miracles, again, meant one thing to the majority, another to the select few. On the one hand, Cæsarius of Heisterbach, a man of some real learning and strong sense of moral responsibility, will tell us exultantly how a parrot screamed, "Help me, St Thomas [of Canterbury]," and how the pursuing hawk fell down dead. Yet, on the other hand, in the realm of abstract speculation, it is extraordinary how many of the most orthodox writers admitted the comparative irrelevance of physical miracles to true religion.

Gregory the Great is, in a sense, the Pope of the Miraculous. His *Dialogues*, one of the most popular books of the whole Middle Ages, may almost be said to have given an official stamp to the then rudimentary doctrine of Purgatory. The book is one long string of marvels, some so vulgar and trivial that it is difficult to understand how this great pope could have taken them so seriously. But Gregory had his definite reasons for this emphasis on the miraculous. Like other medieval chroniclers of visions, he tells us that these stories which he alleges are here brought together in order to confirm the fainting faith of his age. He was an honest man, who honestly believed in these things not only as facts, but as facts that would tend to Christian edification.

Yet, as a sincere man accustomed to "dress and undress his soul" in solitary meditation, Gregory in another place frankly faces the fact that God's kingdom is within us, coming not with observation; and that those of whom Christ complains "except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe" must be stigmatised as Jews or Judaizers. Moreover, he was not afraid to proclaim this abroad. We have a homily of his (bk. ii. No. 29) "preached before the people of Rome, in St Peter's basilica, on the Feast of Our Lord's Ascension." He took for his text Mark xvi. 14 ff.; and his very first words struck the keynote of the higher faith. "That our Lord's disciples were slow to believe in His resurrection, was not so

much through their infirmity as (if I may so speak) for the confirmation of our own faith. For, whereas they doubted of the Resurrection, this hath been made evident unto us by many proofs; which when we read and acknowledge, what else is this but a strengthening of us through the disciples dubitations? For I am less comforted by Mary Magdalene, who was swift to believe, than by Thomas, who doubted so long. He, in his uncertainty, touched the very scars of his Lord's wounds; and thus hath he removed the wound of doubt from our breast." Then, coming to vv. 17-18, "These signs shall follow them that believe: in my name they shall cast out devils, etc. etc.," he continues:

"Now, my brethren, seeing that ye yourselves work no such signs, is it that ye believe not? Consider that such signs were necessary in the beginnings of the Church. For, in order that the multitudes of them that believed should grow unto faith, they needed to be nourished by miracles; since we too, in planting young trees, water them busily until we see that they have at last taken firm hold of the earth; then, when their root is once firmly fixed, we water no more. Hence it is that St Paul writeth (1 Cor. xiv. 22), 'Tongues are for a sign, not to believers, but to unbelievers.' Moreover, we have matter for still subtler consideration with regard to these signs and wonders. For indeed Holy Church worketh daily now, in the spirit, whatsoever the Apostles then wrought in the body. When her priests, by the grace of exorcism, lay hands on a believer and forbid that any evil spirit dwell in that man's mind, what is this but to cast out devils? And when the faithful, abandoning the worldly speech of their former life, attune their lips to sacred mysteries and proclaim to the utmost of their power the praise and might of their Creator, what is this but to speak with new tongues? Moreover, in removing malice from other men's hearts by their pious exhortations, do they not take up serpents? When, again, they hear pestilent persuasions yet are unmoved to evil deeds, do they not then drink a deadly poison, yet take no harm? And whensoever, seeing their neighbours to grow faint in good works, and hastening to succour them with all their might, they confirm by the example of their own good deeds these stumbling brethren—do they not then lay their hands upon the sick, that they may be whole? And indeed these miracles are all the greater for being spiritual; all the greater, inasmuch as they lift up not the bodies but the souls of men. Such signs as these, beloved brethren, ye yourselves work by God's help, if ye will. Moreover, those other outward signs

avail not to gain life for the men who work them ; for such bodily miracles sometimes show us to be holy, yet do not make us holy. On the other hand, these spiritual miracles, wrought in the mind, do not show but make the power of life. The former are possible even to wicked men ; the latter cannot be enjoyed but by the righteous. There are some of whom He said, who was the Truth : ‘ Many will say unto me in that day, *Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name, and in thy name have cast out devils, and in thy name done many wonderful works?* and then will I profess unto them, *I never knew you, depart from me, ye that work iniquity.*’ Wherefore, my beloved brethren, love not those signs which ye may share in common with the reprobate : but love such as I have already said, miracles of charity and piety, which are the more secure as they are the more secret, and whose reward from God is by so much the greater as their glory among men is less.”

A considerable portion of this homily was incorporated in the Roman Breviary (octave of the Ascension), but none of the words above quoted were thus immortalised. Yet they found their direct echo throughout the Middle Ages ; and others, who possibly had never read St Gregory, came to the same conclusion as he.

Ekkehard Minimus, Dean of St Gallen (about 1090 A.D.), wrote the life of his fellow-monk, Notker Labeo, author of that funeral anthem, *In the midst of life we are in death*. To excuse himself for having no miracles to relate, he expressly refers to St Gregory’s words, then five centuries old. Again, the writer of a remarkable contemporary life of St Bernard of Tiron (who founded a new Congregation of Benedictines and died in 1117), falls back upon the same plea. So also does the biographer of St Stephen of Obazine, writing about a century later. “ When we write a saint’s life, men especially require that we should record his miracles. . . . To awaken sinners to eternal life is a greater miracle than to awaken them from bodily death.” Even more interesting are the words of Odo of Cluny, the saint who may really be said to have founded the Cluniac Order. He recurs repeatedly to this subject in his *Life of St Gerard of Aurillac*, his *Sermon on the Burning of St Martin’s at Tours*, and his *Collationes* (Migne, P.L., vol. 133, cols. 65, 87, 157, 536). In the former books, he has to defend the two saints against the suspicion of thaumaturgic impotence. In the last, he has to deal with the prevalent belief that the world was in its latest stage, and the reign of Antichrist imminent—a belief which he himself shared and which was

by no means peculiar to his generation (about 940 A.D.). Odo was a diligent student of Gregory, and he writes, if anything, with less reserve than his master. There is (he says) a season to everything under heaven; the Church did indeed require physical miracles in the days when a handful of fishermen and artisans were striving to convert emperors and high priests; but now the Faith is settled on a firm enough foundation to dispense with such physical miracles; our motto should be, *The just shall live by his faith*. If miracles are ceasing in our day, this is because God wishes to search men's hearts; for "the followers of Antichrist shall work wonders, in order that those who revere the Church only for her miracles may cease to venerate her, and may transfer their allegiance to Antichrist." "When these Judaizers seek after signs, what do they make of John the Baptist, who is recorded to have worked no miracle since his birth?" "Many men have worked miracles, of whom the Judge will say, *I never knew you*. But those who do works of piety are they to whom it shall be said, *Come, ye blessed of my Father*." All these words are the more enlightening, as coming from a man who was believed by his contemporaries to have performed many miracles. St Odo doubtless knew that he himself had wrought no *miracula corporalia*; he must have suspected the authenticity of many other popular miracles; and, being a real saint, he fell back upon the kingdom within his soul.

We may find a somewhat half-hearted admission of what may be called the Gregorian doctrine in St Thomas Aquinas, who writes, "Miracles detract from the merits of a faith which will not believe except through miracles" (*Summa Theologiæ*, pars 3, q. 43, 3, 3^m; cf. *Contra Gentiles*, l. iv. c. 55). But let us take it up again at just one more point, which is of capital importance in religious history. Thomas of Celano, writing the official life of St Francis, at a pope's bidding, within two years of the saint's death and a few months of his canonisation, fell back again on this "*corporalia illa miracula ostendunt aliquando sanctitatem, non faciunt*." He rightly felt that, in miracles of the vulgar kind, his book would never compete with many lives of saints who had not been worthy to loose the latchet of his hero's shoe. He knew that even the Stigmata were seriously doubted by many; and he must have known, if he had not himself felt, the involuntary mental reservations of some who had known St Francis in the flesh. On this point we have the most valuable evidence from Celano's friend and fellow-missionary, Jordan of Giano, whose autobiography is one of the frankest and most trustworthy of early Franciscan

records. Jordan tells us, in his 59th chapter, how he once received an unusual and enthusiastic ovation attributable either to his own personal popularity or to the occult virtues of some hairs of St Francis, and fragments of the saint's frock, which he bore secretly upon his person. As a modest man, he gives all the glory to the relics, adding, "From that time forward Brother Jordan began to hold the blessed Francis in greater reverence—for he had seen him and known him in this present life as an infirm man, and therefore something of human weakness had clung to him—thenceforward, I say, he held him in greater reverence and honour, seeing how God inflamed the hearts of the Brethren by the Holy Ghost and would not suffer the relics of his [holy person] to remain unknown." To Jordan this *corporale miraculum* brought a deeper reverence for St Francis; but Celano, in the face of similar, if less marked, hesitations, seems consciously to throw his main weight upon the far safer ground of St Francis's spiritual miracles. In this, it need hardly be added, he is imitated by modern biographers of irreproachable orthodoxy, such as Father Cuthbert and Mr Jörgensen.

So far the Gregorian tradition; but there is another parallel and even more interesting line of medieval thought, going back (as almost everything does when we find leisure to trace it) to St Augustine. The idea in question is most tersely and pointedly stated by Dante (*Parad.*, xxiv. 106). "If the world turned to Christianity without miracles, this [one miracle, in itself] is such that the others are not worth the hundredth of it." The Augustinian passage from which this is concentrated runs as follows (*De Civ. Dei*, bk. xxii. chap. v., last paragraph): "It is incredible that Christ should rise again in the flesh, and carry it up to heaven with Him. It is incredible that the world should believe this; and it is incredible that this belief should be effected by a small sort of poor, simple, unlearned men. The first of these [three miracles] our adversaries believe not; the second they behold, and cannot tell how it is wrought, if it be not done by the power of the third. . . . If they believe not that the apostles wrought any such things for confirmation of the resurrection of Christ, it is sufficient then that the whole world believed these things without proof of miracles—which is itself a miracle as great as any of the rest."

Here, therefore, if we can accept Augustine and Dante with all their implications, we find all *corporalia illa miracula* cast into the same limbo of irrelevance to which an extreme Modernist would banish them to-day. If, indeed, it be the

highest of all miracles that the greatest event in recorded history (the rise and spread of Christianity) should have taken place without the aid of lesser miracles—if this spiritual miracle be actually heightened by the abandonment of physical miracles—why, then, should we not risk this venture of faith, and shake ourselves altogether free? Not, indeed, as *denying* the “*corporalia miracula*,” which would simply be an inverted dogmatism, but as frankly recognising their progressive irrelevance, and refusing to stand or fall by their authenticity?

To any mind which is willing to recognise development in religion, one glance backward will cast a flood of light on this Augustinian idea. There is no philosophical problem which cannot be illustrated, to some real extent, from even the driest facts of history; and Herder was probably right in contending that the next great stride in human progress will be made when men begin to take the actual deeds and thoughts of past humanity no less seriously, and to eliminate error in this field no less impartially, than they do already in their study of crystals or of gases. The task is certainly more difficult; but its difficulty is only a measure of its importance to civilisation. Let us therefore see what historical basis we may find for these two converging lines of argument, the Gregorian and the Augustinian, as to the progressive irrelevance of *physical* miracles (to adopt the distinction made implicitly by one author and explicitly by the other). Let us go back to the days when, as Odo puts it, the Gospel was preached to an incredulous world by “fisher-folk and lowly artificers.”

“When John had heard in the prison the works of Christ he sent two of his disciples, and said unto him: *Art thou he that should come, or do we look for another?*” Nothing could have been easier to Jesus than to answer with a plain *Yes* or *No*, thus making up the inquirers’ minds for them. But he preferred in fact to throw them back upon their own private judgment: *Go and show John again those things which you do hear and see*—the physical and moral miracles to which their own senses might bear direct testimony. Presumably there was enough evidence here to convince any honest inquirer.

But what logical force has that evidence for us? What had it already for Augustine and Gregory, when we examine it strictly, as indeed Christ’s own words prescribe a strict examination? John’s disciples had direct evidence of their own senses; John, again, had the evidence of witnesses whose personal equation he could measure to a hair’s-breadth; but we

moderns have only the evidence of a tradition long current orally before it was committed to writing, and admittedly retouched in places since that first written record. Moreover, social circumstances and human mentality have changed over and over again during these nineteen centuries; it may almost be said that, from the scientific point of view, the cogency of this historical evidence varies with the square of the distances. What man would be so rash, for instance, as to stake all his invested savings upon evidence no stronger, from the historical point of view, than this record of nineteen centuries ago? Who would take it as sufficient that the text itself was unimpeachably authentic, and that the facts there asserted had been accepted without question by millions of reasonable human beings in the past? We should not dream of staking our money on such bare evidence for a physical miracle; and if, in this case, men are still willing to stake their very lives on the Everlasting Yes, it is because they recognise that the whole centre of gravity has shifted since John first asked the question. To men who saw the lame walk and the blind receive their sight, it was easier to decide that Jesus was the Messiah; from the physical they argued to the spiritual. To us, it is only the spiritual belief in Jesus which makes it possible for us to think seriously about His physical miracles. We have only to imagine the discovery of some authentic Persian manuscript recording similar physical miracles, 1900 years ago, wrought by a man whose spiritual teaching had been colourless and whose wider influence had been null. Apart from philologists and folklorists, nobody would even pretend an interest in such records. Already to St Augustine, it was mainly the existing spiritual miracle of Christianity which rendered the original Christian miracles credible; and this change of balance has become more marked with every succeeding century.

We must not, however, look upon such a change as either conscious or constant. A few men, as we shall see, tried to see both deep and far; but most medieval theologians seem to have confined themselves as much as possible to colourless generalities;¹ or merely to have dealt with occasional difficulties in detail. Yet such difficulties were forced again and again upon thinking men by the thoughtless materialism of the multitude; and, in default of code-law on this question, we may gather from medieval writers a good deal of case-law. It may be well to quote a few concrete instances.

¹ St Thomas Aquinas, for instance, seems to show here a good deal less than his usual love of thoroughness.

Matthew Paris, in his *Lives of the Abbots of St Albans*, tells us how Abbot Leofric (about 1020 A.D.) planned to save St Alban's bones from the Danes. Ely, amid her fens, seemed comparatively safe; to Ely therefore he commended the precious shrine; but, being an abbot himself, and knowing the ways of abbots, he took his precautions even against his brethren of Ely. He secretly walled up the real bones at St Albans, and commended a false set, with all due pomp, to his fellow-abbot's generosity. The Danes came and went; and the "treacherous" monks of Ely "excogitated a fraud." They too sent back the shrine with all pomp and ceremony; but with the substitution of "certain adulterine bones." The original contents they kept to themselves; "and," writes Matthew Paris in righteous contempt, "let them keep the same, if it be their pleasure, to all eternity!" St Albans knew where the real bones were, but unfortunately Nature did not; these unhallowed remains worked miracles at Ely. Confronted with this problem, Matthew Paris soars into more spiritual regions. "If then our holy martyr be so honoured at Ely; and if, being so honoured, he works miracles there, then we of St Albans ought to desire that he may be believed to have left his bones in every great church within this realm of England. Thus will he get the greater honour, and be worshipped in the greater number of places." The story is typical; it was the materialism of the many which forced the few into immaterial regions of thought. Guibert of Nogent, a man of real distinction in Anselm's and Abelard's generation, was indignant that there should be one John Baptist's head at Amiens and another at Constantinople; in one case at least, the worship must be idolatrous; "*pro divinis demoniaca agunt.*"¹ But Sir John Maundeville, nearly two centuries later, is already on a higher plane. He was confronted, by that time, not with duplicate, but with triplicate heads; yet, after a tentatively rationalistic explanation, he falls back upon the philosophic conclusion, "But, howsoever men may worship him, doubtless the blessed John is satisfied."

We have already seen how St Gregory and Odo faced the notorious, but embarrassing fact that bad men might work true miracles. As Guibert of Nogent put it, Moses divided the Red Sea, but Alexander the Great divided the Sea of Pamphylia. Even more disconcerting must have been the fact that good men were quite ready to work false miracles. This same Guibert, who was by far the most honest and uncompromising opponent of the rage for relics and miracles among his con-

¹ *De Pignoribus Sanctorum*, lib. i., c. iii. § 2.

temporaries, does nevertheless justify one fraudulent miracle wrought upon the first Crusade, because it was successful.¹ The good friar Salimbene of Parma tells us in the same breath of true miracles worked by his fellow-friar, Gerard of Modena, and of gross frauds which this same Gerard concocted to impress the public which flocked to his mission-sermons.² These were cases which frequently came up for discussion in the court of conscience.

While such problems forced themselves upon men like Matthew Paris and Salimbene, who made no pretence of specialism in philosophy, we may imagine what went on under the surface in great thinking-shops like Paris and Oxford. There, as in modern universities, many matters must have been discussed freely in private which never found their way into the lecture halls; nor are we left to mere *a priori* inference here. Dr Rashdall has pointed out that Nicholas de Ultracuria, a Parisian philosopher, was condemned in 1346 for thirty-two propositions which, in effect, anticipate Hume's philosophy of more than five centuries later.³ There were not, perhaps, very many such bold spirits; and these found no wide echo for their speculations. Of Nicholas himself we should never have heard but for his condemnation; he recanted without any ceremony, and became Dean of Metz in 1348. Probably, to the end of his life, he shrugged his shoulders and muttered the equivalent of Galileo's *E pur si muove*. But, without going one inch beyond our documentary evidence, we may see how much potential latitude of thought existed even in the Age of Authority. In Arthur Young's case, the very wars which so sorely needed the electric telegraph seem to have distracted men's minds from that still rudimentary invention. So also, in the Middle Ages, there was a good deal of rudimentary Modernism which could never develop or spread under the untoward circumstances of the time.

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GREAT SHELFORD, CAMBRIDGE.

¹ *Gesta Dei per Francos*, lib. iv., c. xvii.

² *Mon. Germ.*, vol. xxxii, p. 76.

³ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1907*.

PILGRIMS.

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

SOME trudge the open road,
Without a fixed abode,
Their only lair the treeless down,
The lee-side of a stack, at most an outhouse floor ;
They loathe the crowded town,
They sicken in its fetid smoke,
That hides the healing stars.
But most they do abhor the bolts and bars
That make a house a castle to its folk,
To them a jail ; and let the sun but pour
Its largesse through the open door,
They never can withstand its subtle lure.

The wind at night
Astride the creaking vane,
Or tapping at the window pane,
Is far more potent than the firelight,
Or cosy chimney nook.
They cannot brook
Its ghostly call, and like a hound
That maddened at reiterated sound
Of drum or fife
Starts up and dashes for dear life
In corybantic circles round and round,
Unable its wild course to stay,
So they
Spring to their feet and leave the fireside warm,
To follow the pied piper of the storm.

'Twould seem their dream,
The Eldorado of their hopes
Lies ever on the further slopes
Of each successive hill.
And so their Odyssey is never done.

The distant flare
 On the horizon of some hidden town
 Draws them along. To most it is a home,
 A sure abode. To them 'tis but a fair,
 They linger but a night, then further roam.

At heart each longs to be at one
 With Nature, and as Nature's favourite son
 (For those who most love her, she loves them most)
 He looks on the whole earth
 From coast to coast
 As the inalienable right by birth
 Of all and none.
 And if the barren wold, the sandy plain,
 The forest shining in the April rain,
 The air, the sunset-sky
 Are all that doth remain of her once broad demesne,
 Common and commune of the human race,
 Rather than in some garden trim to lie,
 Seraglio, where in close captivity
 Poor Nature like a courtesan
 Must tire her hair and paint her face
 To please the whims of man,
 He outlaw-like prefers
 The water-lilied fen, the upland with its firs,
 The stony road, the strait and miry lane,
 That serve as passages and corridors
 Between the strips and shreds of this lost realm of hers.
 For here at least his soul is free
 And he may catch a glimpse of her true Majesty,
 And all the nymphs forlorn that still frequent her train.

But if the sea is in their blood,
 Then endless is their faring on its flood;
 Each rut their keel may chance
 To plot out on its changing face,
 The watchful winds and waves erase;
 And no geometer can trace
 The countless roads that find a meeting-place
 In each small drop upon its limitless expanse.
 So with their passion never sated,
 Their sense of wonder unabated,
 That steadfast look of grave surprise
 Like a clear taper burning in their eyes,

Their journeyings upon its pathless ways
Unending,
See them like Sisyphus the treadmill wave ascending
To sink into the trough the other side.
Truly their life is a perpetual motion
Upon the heaving Ocean,
As though upon a viewless plummet hung
That o'er the league-long hollows ceaseless swung ;
And when the hurricane doth blow
His horn, and every wave gives tongue,
Their puny boat half drowned amid the froth
Rocks like the float
Of some God angling for Behemoth.
And yet without the boisterous serenade
Of monsoon or of trade,
And thunder of the waters' ebb and flow,
They tire full soon of every port,
However eagerly they sought
Its sheltering mole.

Deep in the secret chart-house of their soul,
That mirrors everything—earth, air and sea,
Time past and time to be—
They dimly note like some dark mote
Flitting across its mists—their destiny.
Poor insect parasites of wood and steel,
Victoriously afloat,
The fiercest gales defying,
Yet in their heart of hearts they feel their dying
Will never on the solid mainland be.

But some from early youth to lingering age
Live out their days
In ceaseless pilgrimage
Of prayer and praise,
Wandering from shrine to shrine,
With the Divine
Seeking communion. Each time-worn fane
To them appears
A restful inn on the long road of years,
There to repose ere they regain
The common turnpike whose toll-bar is Death.
Each shrine is haunted by the living breath
Of myriad souls, that as they knelt
Poured out into the very stones
Their aspirations, fears, and sighs and groans,

And all the pent-up agony they felt,
 Part of their living selves that cannot pass,
 That mellowing time doth of all evil shrive,
 So that the walls themselves become alive
 With these their relics, like the hallowing bones
 Of saints immured. Their faintly fluttering tones
 Vibrate like a perpetual Mass
 In rhythmic beat,
 Till the entire fabric doth become
 From floor to dome
 A thing of spirit, immaterial seat
 Of the most High. But for the wandering wight
 'Tis but a moment's halt, before a second flight.

Soon, soon he leaves the august abode,
 Once more affronts the dusty road,
 Setting his face towards another shrine ;
 Anon he rests beside some wayside well
 His beads to tell,
 And once more seeks communion with the Divine.
 His chalice is a simple cup, his wine
 The well's pure element,
 And from his srip a crust of bread he takes,
 Assured that 'tis the intent
 That mars or makes
 The mystic leaven of his sacrament.

But some there be
 Who never stir from home,
 And yet the furthest roam ;
 Brave hearts perchance condemned to dwell
 In dreary slum or noisome rookery
 The life-long year,
 That oft mysterious music hear,
 To which their soul goes marching, strains
 Of that innumerable cortège
 Processional
 Of sad Humanity,
 Crossing Life's arid plains ;
 Or broken lives that in their cloistered cell
 Make pilgrimage
 Along that dolorous way,
 That passing through the heart's Gethsemane
 Mounts to that Golgotha and Calvary,

On which their self themselves have crucified ;
Or dauntless seers that hunger to explore
 From shore to shore
 The darkest continents of the World's soul,
Or with their search for truth unsatisfied,
 Voyage in thought beyond its topmost pole,
Or fain to plumb the heights and depths of Space
 Pass out behind its furthest star, yet find
 No resting-place.

Or with a faith unfaltering, they tread
A road that seems to reach beyond the dead,
Walking with God yet closer, their sure guide,
 Who ne'er their steps forsook,
And who, though out of sight,
 Ne'er quits their side.
Moved by a yearning to behold His face,
 Though death be in the look,
They force the portals of the Infinite,
Entering a realm of dim phantasmal seas,
Of mirage mountains whose immensities
 Do dwarf the Universe to nothingness,
Wherein their spirit neither floats nor flies,
 Poised in the vast Inane,
Far wilder still than Chaos' ancient reign,
 O'er quaking precipices,
O'er chasms formless, footless, fathomless,
 Where a mere glimpse astonies.

Here in the very cave and hollow womb
Of all Becoming and Rejuvenescence ;
Holy of Holies of the Eternal Essence ;
 Workshop and loom
Alike of space and time, of life and thought ;
 Seedbed and source
Of everything and naught ;
Eyrie wherein, o'er trackless solitudes,
 The all-creative force
 Conceives and broods ;
Mid a perpetual flux of day and night,
Beneath whose phantom empyreans,
Infinitesimal and infinite,
Like and unlike combine or disunite
Or cloud-like turn into their opposite,

Huge shadowy æons
Go circling, beside which all earthly Time
Dissolves and melts, as melts the morning rime
Before a vernal sun.

And yet their quest is never done,
For though their spirit like a wandering star
O'erleaps the narrow orbit of our ken,
And though all men to come their debtors are,—
Yet oft they seem most solitary of men.
The very deeps they sound,
Whether within or overhead,
Seem to remove them from the lowlier ground
Their humbler brethren tread.
And when they die, a faithful few stand by,
The future sowers of their deathless thought;
But in the common eye
Their life seems but a toilsome mockery,
Their labours nought.

And yet these divers pilgrims each attain
The soul's desire. Their errand is not vain;
The first find sanctuary in the heart of Earth,
Or in the sea they loved so well,
Since dedicate to each from birth.
They find themselves in death at one with them,
Henceforth to dwell,
Not lost in them, but re-incorporate,
Regrafted on their old ancestral stem,
Discovering in this dual union
That Earth was ever in themselves and they
In Earth, clay of her common clay,
Soul of her soul, and co-heirs that inherit
Each to the full with her in her immortal spirit.

The second, who in every shrine
A symbol of the Celestial City found,
Learnt ere they died
That the Divine
Is everywhere, that all is holy ground,
Yea, that the Earth herself is sanctified
By what her sons have suffered, that their blood
Her deepest wounds makes good.
And lo! before their dying eyes
A sudden glory o'er the landscape broke,

The stony road
Paved with unearthly splendour glowed,
And Earth threw off her penitential cloke,
Transfigured with the light of Paradise.

And of the third, innumerable clan,
Those humble ones whose soul
Follows the ghostly caravan
Of all souls and of every man,
Hear, ere it gains its goal,
The distant music in the van
To a MAGNIFICAT of triumph rise,
A grand VENITE sung in every speech and tongue,
Anthem and antiphon
Hymning the mysteries
Of Universal Man,
As many and yet one,
Te Deums of the Divine, to whom He stands
as son.

And those whose self-inflicted dole
Upon Life's cross appeared a grievous loss,
Yea! to the losing of their very soul,
Now see it was a paltry toll
To set them free;
As though a slave should of his own accord
Lay down before his Lord
His scanty hoard,
And suddenly receive his liberty.

While those that seemed of all the rest
The most forsaken and the loneliest
Live far the richest, die the richest, though
The seal of poverty be on their brow.
For such an one sees in his ample soul
The whole world pictured like a moving scroll,
A changing palimpsest,
O'er which the ages in their grand march-past,
Like clouds upon the waters, cast
Their image, making manifest,
As through a haze,
The immemorial times of yore,
The fleeting hour, within whose opening womb
Chance strives with its twin, Doom,

Or those remotest days
Whose birthplace lies
Mid stars as yet unborn, in skies
Yet uncreate.
Nay, more,
He, as the epitome of all humanity,
At one with small and great,
Alike to slave and superman akin,
Shares in the saint's God-given grace,
And in the sinner's foulest sin,
Suffering, enduring all things, knowing thus
He can vicarious
Help to atone and so redeem the race ;
His life a living testament,
That Pain transcended makes a God of man,
Its mysteries once seen and understood,
Since all true toil's a joy, can we but scan
Its meaning and intent,
Whose aim, as ever, is the highest good ;
And his example shows full well
That through the Divine within
Itself the human soul can win
Advent and access to the Ineffable,
And oneness with the Whole ;
E'en as the Human in the Divine doth seek
Communion with the human in our soul,
As heart with heart doth speak.

And so with willing lips,
His time on earth accomplished and fulfilled,
He freely chooses Death, for Death's eclipse
Is the last phase towards the soul's Apocalypse.

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

THE TRIUMPH OF LOVE.

(Translated from the Russian.)

P. E. MATHESON.

O my brother, my friend, weary, suffering soul,
Whoe'er thou art, faint not nor fail !
Though falsehood and evil with mighty control
Over earth, drenched in weeping, prevail ;
Though sacred ideals be reviled and downcast
'Mid the blood of the innocent slain,
Yet Baal, be sure, will be conquered at last,
And Love come to the world once again.

Not in circlet of thorns, nor in fetters of shame,
Not bowed down by a cross to the ground,
Love will come in his strength and a glorious flame
In his hands to give light will be found.
No more tears on the earth, no more foemen or strife,
Slave, or suicide's tomb shall be here.
Hopeless want shall be gone, want that murders man's life,
Sword and pilloried shame disappear.

Ah, my friend, that bright advent's no dream of the blind,
No vain hope to be quenched like a spark ;
Look how measureless evil oppresses mankind,
And night beyond measure is dark.
But earth, sick of torture and blood, will arise
Worn out by mad strife to despair,
And to Love, boundless Love, she will lift up her eyes,
Her eyes full of sorrow and prayer.

NADSON (1862-1887).

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

THE most considerable and important contribution to philosophical literature that has appeared during the last six months is undoubtedly Professor Norman K. Smith's *Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"* (London: Macmillan, 1918). The author has succeeded in doing what has hitherto baffled the attempts of other Kantian scholars; he has produced a complete Commentary on the whole of the *Critique*. Vaihinger started upon the task thirty-seven years ago, on the occasion of the centenary of the publication of the first edition; but up till now, although two huge volumes of his are in existence, he has contrived to get no further than to the end of the *Transcendental Æsthetic*. It is true that no part of the *Critique* has escaped the hands of commentators in one form or another; the literature to which it has given birth is simply enormous. But it is a great advantage to have in one compact volume a systematic exposition and critical handling of the entire work, more especially as full use has been made of the *Reflexionen*, the *Lose Blätter*, and other material which has only been made accessible within recent years. Professor Norman Smith finds himself often at variance with Caird, Green, and those writers who look upon the Critical philosophy as a half-way stage to Hegelianism; and, on the whole, I believe he is right. Hegel's own attitude towards the Kantian system is almost invariably that of antagonism—an antagonism which prevented him from doing justice to its deeper aspects. And there can be little question that Professor Norman Smith is right also in discerning conflicting tendencies in the *Critique* itself and in endeavouring to disentangle them. In particular he differentiates two trends of reflection which he describes as subjectivism and as (somewhat misleadingly, it seems to me) phenomenalism. By the former is meant the position to which Kant is repeatedly reverting of those who take *Vorstellungen*, or "ideas" in Locke's sense, to be objects of consciousness and the sole objects of which there can be any direct or immediate awareness. Consciousness so conceived is inevitably regarded as a property or quality which attaches to a merely individual existence—namely, the finite mind. The distinctively Critical standpoint represents, however, a total break with all species of subjectivism; from the critical standpoint the problem of knowledge is no longer to determine how an individual consciousness can transcend itself, but what a conscious-

ness which is at once consciousness of objects and also consciousness of self must imply for its possibility. Professor Norman Smith interprets Kant as answering that consciousness itself, in contradistinction to everything of which we are conscious, carries us beyond the phenomenal to its noumenal conditions. Psychical states constitute a certain class of known objects, or phenomena, and form together with physical events a single system of phenomena. Yet underlying this entire system, and conditioning both its physical and psychical constituents, is the realm of noumenal existence; and when the question of the possibility of knowledge—that is, of the experiencing of such a comprehensive natural system—is raised, it is to this noumenal sphere that we are referred. “Everything experienced, even a sensation or desire, is an event; but the experiencing of it is an act of awareness, and calls for an explanation of an altogether different kind.” The point involved is a difficult one in Kantian exegesis, and I cannot enlarge upon it here. The interpretation just alluded to implies, as I understand it, that Kant looked upon what he called the “unity of consciousness” as a real existent, whereas the question is whether, at least in the first *Critique*, he meant anything more by it than the ultimate logical unity presupposed in knowledge. I confess that, although at one time I was disposed to accept an interpretation not unlike Professor Norman Smith’s, later study of the text inclines me to the latter view, which, in any case, I think it is a pity not to indicate in the *Commentary* as a possible interpretation. Kantian exegesis is, however, a thorny path to tread, and we may well be thankful to the author for the excellent work he has done both in clearing away the brushwood and opening out new ways. Many of the contentions in his book will lead to discussion (as, e.g., that, according to Kant, pure intuition has an intrinsic content, and is the immediate apprehension of that content, though standing in no relation to any actual independent object), but Kantian students will be grateful to him for these fresh suggestions. And for the *Commentary* in its entirety they will have no feeling but that of unqualified admiration. It is, in every way, a most valuable and helpful piece of work, the fruit of long and careful toil upon the treatise in modern philosophy that most deserves and repays it.

Many of our readers will turn with expectant interest to Dean Rashdall’s article on “The Religious Philosophy of Professor Pringle-Pattison” (*Mind*, July 1918). Dean Rashdall criticises Professor Pringle-Pattison’s conception of the relation between “finite centres” and the Absolute or God, and urges that it is meaningless to speak of one consciousness as “included” in another. If God is conscious at all, and man is conscious, man cannot be a part of God. Hence God by Himself is not the Absolute, and if we must talk about the Absolute at all, the Absolute is not God alone but God and the “finite centres.” Dean Rashdall believes that Professor Pringle-Pattison is misled by the very tendency which he criticises in others—the tendency to confound “content” of knowledge with the consciousness which has or knows this content. Because the content of knowledge which is apprehended in fragmentary and confused fashion in “finite centres” must be supposed to present itself entire and distinct in the “perfect experience,” therefore he assumes that the finite centres which have these fragmentary experiences exist in and form part of the Being which has the “perfect experience.” While sympathising with Dean Rashdall’s main contention, I do not see how

it is reconcilable with an idealism according to which the "external world" (p. 263) exists only in and for Mind (p. 273). If an external thing can be known only in so far as it is "in mind," surely there would seem to be reason for holding that "finite centres," which, according to Dean Rashdall, are known through and through by God, must be in God in the same sense, whatever that may be, as things are. Professor Hiralal Halder, of the University of Calcutta, deals with the same problem, though very differently from Dean Rashdall, in an article on "The Absolute and the Finite Self" (*Phil. R.*, July 1918). Professor Halder holds that human selves are fragmentary expressions (a word, by the way, which covers a multitude of sins) of the perfect selves of which the Absolute is the unity. The finite self comes from the Absolute, owes its existence to the self-limitation of the Absolute, but in consequence it acquires a new value and is never a superfluous repetition of what already is. It draws the materials of its life from the infinite riches of the Absolute thought and experience, but once detached from the Absolute, while resting securely in it, sets up its own household and contributes its own humble but unique share to the total meaning of the Absolute life. The Absolute is an individualised system of the perfect selves into which it is differentiated for the realisation of its own purpose, and it "expresses" itself in the finite selves. The categories of our thought and the matter of our experience neither constitute the whole content of the Absolute nor screen the intelligible world from our view. They truly define, not the Absolute life as lived by the Absolute, but certain modes of its manifestation. The Absolute eternally knows the meaning of the world drama progressively unfolded in time. There is some thoughtful reflection and criticism in a book entitled *The Challenge of the Universe*, by the Rev. Charles J. Shebbeare (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1918), which is an attempt to restate, in the light of modern knowledge, the argument from design. The real strength of the argument lies, it is contended, not in showing that the order of the universe is the result of design, but in showing that it is *not* the result of accident. The world's order includes not only mechanical uniformity, though that is one of its most important aspects, but involves also laws relating to æsthetic beauty in nature, to intellectual correctness in the mind of man, and this a correctness which includes moral knowledge and what in a specific sense may be called "spiritual experience." These laws point to a general conception of the universe as a rational whole, and to the view that even its evil elements are ultimately subordinate to the purposes of Good. Mr Shebbeare admits that an ultimate optimism may conceivably be held in a non-theistic form, that the world may be regarded as being, in Platonic language, the embodiment of the "Idea of the Good" rather than as the work of a good God. But he urges that, although a non-theistic optimism is quite conceivable, the doctrine of a personal God is that to which optimism naturally leads. Mr Shebbeare would reject, however, the implications of such phrases as that "*mind* is the only ultimate reality," that "whatever exists, exists for mind and in mind alone." He thinks these notions arose from (a) the correct apprehension that every existing thing can exist only under a universal idea and that every existing thing implies the reality of relations, and (b) the erroneous assumption that both universals and relations are dependent for their being upon a mind that knows them. On the other hand, Mr J. W. Scott

in an able criticism of "The New Realism" (*Quarterly R.*, Jan. 1918) comes to the rescue of idealism of the Hegelian type. Idealism, he argues, is not interested in saying what the world has been made out of, except in so far as that prescribes what it must have been made into. It has no interest, for example, in proving that everything in the universe is psychical; which is probably the utmost that the Berkeleian argument proves, if it proves even that. The thesis of idealism is not that the world is ideas but that, in some legitimate sense of the term, it is good. God is all that we can conceive of ourselves becoming. He is, wholly and eternally, all that we are partially and fitfully. The "given" facts indicate such a Being, because the whole array of them, far from being a mere agglomeration of dead externalities, are a strenuous energising. And they are found to be the energising, towards its own perfection, of the one thing which we know from within. They are the energising of that which wells up in us as our own being when we are in any degree intelligent and good. Mr Harold P. Cooke, writing "On Certain Idealistic Arguments" (*Mind*, April 1918), shows, I think, in a conclusive way the untenability of the Berkeleian position. An interesting critical study of Royce's idealism, "La Métaphysique de Josiah Royce," appears in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (Mai-Juin, 1918), from the pen of G. Marcel, who deals chiefly with the two volumes of Royce's *Gifford Lectures*.

A long paper on "Scientific Method in Philosophy and the Foundations of Pluralism," by Mr C. A. Richardson (*Phil. R.*, May 1918), deserves attention. Mr Richardson holds that the scientific method in philosophy, which Mr Bertrand Russell desiderates, is, within its own field and for its own purposes, a powerful method of research. For the ends it has in view, the ignoring of the subject of experience is legitimate; but this only so long as it is recognised that the results obtained must not be regarded as giving an adequate account of things, even on the objective side of experience alone, but simply an account, which, in its proper application, is the most satisfactory that can be obtained, owing to the limitations of the conceptual standpoint. Moreover, the units with which it works are "sense-data," and a "sense-datum" is a purely artificial and conventional unit. The object of experience is an indivisible unity, and cannot be considered to consist in a series of members termed "sense-data," compact or otherwise. The type of result afforded by the scientific method is, however, unsatisfying. We wish to go further than mere description. The pluralistic hypothesis is an endeavour to satisfy this wish. Pluralism starts from the existence of the self. It makes the assumption of the existence of other selves. Thus it is based on the existence of entities, at least one example of which we know to exist, and whose nature we actually realise. It is, therefore, superior at the outset to theories which start from such entities as "sense-data." For we realise what a self *is*. We *perceive* a "sense-datum," but we cannot realise what it *is*, in itself. Moreover, selves cannot be resolved into "sense-data," whereas it may be possible to explain "sense-data" in terms of selves. As touching the doctrine of "self-data," reference should be made to Miss Beatrice Edgell's article on "The Implications of Recognition" (*Mind*, April 1918). Miss Edgell finds the root difficulty of Mr Russell's view of acquaintance to be the impossibility of making headway with an object of cognition which is without necessary relations to previous experience. For this reason she

holds that there never is a simple cognitive acquaintance with an object, but always "knowledge about," that every object is *ipso facto* set in relations. The "this" of sense experience is at least in respect of its *quale* differentiated from, or assimilated to, the sense-data of past experience. Mr Russell's assertion that it is possible to conceive of "knowledge by acquaintance" for a momentary mind shows clearly how inadequate his view is as an analysis of any act of knowledge. The object known by the experient is never divorced from past experience. Cognition cannot begin "ex abrupto."

A series of interesting studies by Eugenio Rignano, the editor of *Scientia*, have been collected together and translated into English by Mr J. W. Greenstreet, under the title *Essays in Scientific Synthesis* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1918). They deal with a variety of topics—biological, psychological, and religious,—but they are, so the author informs us, animated throughout by one and the same object: that of demonstrating the utility in the biological, psychological, and sociological fields of the theorist, who, without having specialised in any particular branch or subdivision of science, may nevertheless bring into those spheres that synthetic and unifying vision which is brought by the mathematician into the physico-chemical field of science.

I can only refer briefly to an extremely suggestive and important essay of Dr George Santayana on "Literal and Symbolic Knowledge" (*J. of Phil.*, August 1st, 1918). Dr Santayana contends that complete knowledge of natural objects cannot be hoped for. We know them initially as that which confronts us, whatever it may turn out to be. That something confronts us here, now, and from a specific quarter, is in itself important information; and the aspect it wears when we observe it more narrowly, though it may deceive us, is also a telling witness to its character. Symbols identify their objects, and show us where to look for their hidden qualities. Further, symbols, catching other abstracted aspects of the object, may help us to lay siege to it from all sides; but symbols will never enter the citadel, and if its inner core is ever to be opened to us (as it may perfectly well be), it must be through sympathetic imagination. We may, at best, intuit the essence which is actually the essence of a thing. In that case our knowledge would be as complete and accurate as knowledge can possibly be. Dr Santayana's account of the nature of symbols and the part they play in knowledge is particularly worthy of notice.

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REVIEWS.

La Religion. By Alfred Loisy.—Paris : Émile Nourry, 1917.

THIS is a beautiful book. It strikes a chord with which many earnest and perplexed souls, in this time of private and public grief, will vibrate in sympathy. To M. Loisy history is philosophy, and philosophy is history, and history is the living reality which is making itself. In this small volume he focuses history and philosophy and present reality on the problem of religion. It is a theoretical problem and it is a practical problem, and any hope and all our hope in this day of unparalleled disaster lies in finding in philosophy the solution.

There are some of us, to whom philosophical speculation is as the breath of life, who find ourselves sorely distracted with heart-searching doubt. In the crisis of this tremendous issue, now being fought out by the warring nations, has anyone the right to place himself, as the philosopher needs must, above the combat? Is not the philosopher who, at such a time as this, calmly pursues his work of thinking or of teaching, open to the reproach, *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*? Whoever reads this book, whatever view he may take of its particular doctrine, will at least acknowledge that philosophy at this time is not a mere luxury, even though the urgent cry be for force to meet force.

A notable change has come over M. Loisy. It gives new interest to his outlook on life, and new force to his spiritual influence as expressed in this book. The change is the complete disappearance of that note of being an *apologia pro vita sua*, which has given a somewhat querulous tone to his writings since the famous encyclical, *Pascendi dominici gregis*, drove him out of the Catholic Church. Two striking facts in connection with the world-war seem to have been mainly instrumental in determining his new attitude—the neutrality of the Pope, and the belligerency of the United States under the leadership of President Wilson. The visible head of the Christian religion, the man whom millions of professing Christians regard as the Vicar of Christ, has deliberately chosen to refrain from offering any moral guidance or making any moral stricture, lest he should by so doing lose his authority with one or the other of the contending forces. The man, on the other hand, who has dared to raise a moral protest in the name of an outraged humanity has found himself obliged to bring his country into the conflict. “Ce que le pape n'avait pas songé à dire, enfermé dans sa neutralité,—comme si une autorité qui se prétend religieuse et morale ne s'avouait pas morte en se faisant neutre devant une pareille

crise du genre humain!—comme si ce seul mot de neutralité, appliqué aux choses de l'ordre moral, ne signifiait pas une abdication de la moralité! —ce que le pape n'avait pas dit en rappelant l'Évangile, le président Wilson en a dit une partie en invoquant l'humanité. Il l'a dit en vain au moins provisoirement; et à peine l'avait-il dit qu'il s'est vu contraint de descendre lui-même dans le cercle infernal où se poursuit la danse de la mort, cependant que l'orchestre continue d'exécuter en sourdine les grands airs de justice et de paix universelles." M. Loisy sees in this the evidence that Christianity as a moral force is dead; and a religion divorced from morality is no longer a religion. This to him is the outstanding fact which the present war has thrown into vivid relief. It is not intellectual failure but moral failure which has brought home to the consciousness of stricken humanity the fact that Christianity is a dead religion.

What, then, is our hope and prospect for the future? If, as we confidently anticipate, the issue of the war be the complete triumph of the cause we hold to be just, if the awful devastation is to leave us, as in the deeply significant old-world myth of the deluge, a new earth for a chastened humanity to replenish, what ground have we for faith in the realisation of a new ideal? When Jehovah smelled the sweet savour of the sacrifice, we are told that he "said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake, for that the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth." Shall we too reflect that, after all, human nature is incurable? Or shall we seek to improve man's condition by a new conception of duty? "At the hand of man, even at the hand of every man's brother, will I require the life of man. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man."

There are many who think that the old institutions will receive new life in the great reconstruction which lies before us, and that our hope must be, not in discarding the old forms in which religion has found expression, but in finding the means to revivify them. There are others also who base their hopes of a new order on the rise of the working-classes to political power, and on the general increase and wider dispersion of material prosperity. Neither of these ideals, even could they be supposed fully realised, would afford the satisfaction of that absolute need of humanity expressed in the word religion. The nature of that need, as it is revealed in history and philosophy, is the theme of M. Loisy's study.

The leading thesis is as follows:—Religions are not religion. The various historical religions which have formerly, or which do now, hold sway are not the particulars of which religion is the universal. Religion is a living thing, essential, fundamental, and forming part of the very notion of humanity. It is "the Word which became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth." It was in the beginning with humanity, all things were made by it, and without it was not anything made which hath been made. The religions—primitive totemisms, nature myths, historical revelations—are the stabilised forms, the frames in which mankind has from time to time immobilised the living reality, for to immobilise is the mode of the intellect's activity. As the frames harden and become rigid they crush the growing, developing life within, till they crack and fall to pieces. "L'humanité se cherche, la morale se fait, les religions évoluent lentement, très lentement, vers la religion" (p. 95).

The fundamental phenomenon of religion is not a speculative belief

nor a rule of conduct, but a concept of duty. Religion and morality are inseparable in the life of humanity. Neither in idea nor in fact is it possible to dissociate the two, notwithstanding that many philosophers have professed to see in religion simple intellectual error, and in morality nothing more than practical reason, a wise extension of a principle of individual utility to the social relations of men. In its most general idea religion is the special relation in which man believes himself to stand in regard to the higher beings, or the higher principles, on which he feels himself dependent. The religious phenomenon is infinite in its variety, and no definition of it would embrace every form of belief and practice; but one essential character belongs to it—it is social both in feeling and in thought, bound up with the collective life of humanity. Even so scornful a definition as one which M. Loisy quotes, “un ensemble de scrupules qui font obstacle au libre exercice de nos facultés,” taken strictly implies an essential relation of morality and religion. But this essential relation of the individual to a collective humanity is not of itself enough to characterise religion, for religion further implies that there is in the relation something mystical, something not merely rational and empirical. The mystical character pertains to religion from the beginning and lies in its nature. If, M. Loisy tells us, we trace human experience to its origin, and imagine (theoretically, for we can never know actually) man in his first emergence from pure animality, we find it simply impossible to conceive him contemplating himself as the isolated individual of our cold scientific contemplation. Mystical inclusion in a greater life is in very truth man's heritage. The two concepts religion and morality are not in any sense identical, but they are inseparably related, and essential one to the other. Both strive to a common end, a perfect humanity. Religion is, as it were, the spirit which animates morality, morality the practice which completes and gives embodiment to religion. Religion gives to moral rules the character of duties.

The historical argument by which M. Loisy illustrates and enforces his thesis will be read with deep interest by all who are already familiar with his researches in this field. I will pass over it to notice the constructive part of the work. What is to be the new form of religion? What are likely to be the symbols by which the new faith will seek expression?

One very solemn reflection at the present time helps us to discern the answer. Whatever be our feeling with regard to the insensate folly and crime of the slaughter and destruction now desolating our world, we cannot fail to be moved by the significant fact that the individual actors in this tragedy are led by the pure motive of duty to the supreme act of self-sacrifice. It is duty, moreover, unsullied by any hope or by any illusion, fanatical or rational, of present gain in the form of individual reward. No Mahometan paradise, no Christian martyr's palm and crown lures us on, yet is there no holding back! What, then, is the object of this truly religious devotion? It is, M. Loisy replies, humanity. The answer does not strike us as new, yet it is very different from any we have had before. Some seventy years ago Auguste Comte proclaimed a new God, Humanity, to whom we were to offer worship and in whose service we were to institute sacraments and perform various rites and ceremonies. He aroused some enthusiasm and still has adherents. The humanity which M. Loisy indicates as the content of the religious

consciousness is a profounder and totally different kind of concept. It is not the abstract idea of a good man made perfect, it is not humanity idealised in the individual form of a god: it is the realisation of that concrete, though mystical, universality of present living activity, which man's intellect has hitherto sought to embody and immobilise in the image of a transcendent God, but which he may now come to recognise as immanent in the collective life to which he belongs. It is this which he expresses in his actions as duty.

What will be the symbols of this new faith? We dare not speak with confidence: we are waiting breathlessly the issue of the struggle, and we hope. If the outcome of this great disaster, greater than the deluge of the ancient myth, is in truth a new earth, then the festivals with which the nations, set free, will hereafter renew the covenant of everlasting peace will be sacraments. They will be the recognition of the "duty" which dwells in and with mankind.

"Et le devoir s'est fait homme
Il a habité parmi nous,
Et nous avons vu sa gloire
Perfection de bonté et de vérité."

H. WILDON CARR.

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The Quest of the Face. By Stephen Graham.—London:
Macmillan & Co., 1918.—295 pp.

It is a significant fact that at a time when the forces of hate and destruction have been let loose upon the world, there should appear a book the main object of which is to remind us that mankind is one in Christ Jesus; and it is this message that gives value and significance to Mr Stephen Graham's latest work, *The Quest of the Face*.

The volume consists of one long chapter called "The Face of Christ," and of several disconnected stories of unequal merit. "The Face of Christ" occupies almost two-thirds of the book, and is, as the author tells us, "partly a record of actual life and seeking in the streets and among friends." Accounts of small incidents and conversations with different people are intermingled with reflections upon various topics. It is only to this first chapter that the title *The Quest of the Face* really applies; the supplementary studies have little or no bearing on the subject and tend, indeed, to destroy the unity of impression produced by the book as a whole. True, each of them is preceded by a short epigraph which to some extent links them together, but such an expedient is necessary precisely because there is no organic connection between them. The best of the short studies are the two last, "Serapion the Sindonite" and "Simon on the Pillar," which are charming renderings of the lives of two saints held in great veneration by the Orthodox Church.

It is, then, to the first chapter we must look if we are to understand the meaning of the author's quest, and it will be best, perhaps, to quote Mr Graham's explanation of it. "We are all seeking a face," he writes. "It may be the dream face of the ideal, our own face as it ought to be, as

we could wish it to be, or the face that we could love, or a face we once caught a glimpse of and then lost in the crowds and the cares. We seek a face of such celestial loveliness that it would be possible to fall down before it in the devotion of utter sacrifice. . . . Each has his separate vision of the face. And as there is an infinite number and diversity of mankind, so the faces of the ideal are infinitely numerous and diverse. Yet as in truth we are all one, so all these faces are one." The dull, brutal, or commonplace features of the mass of mankind are only a mask that covers the sweet and beautiful face of Christ, who is both the ideal side of each personality and the unity which embraces and includes them all. And just because every human being is thus a member of Christ, each personality is precious and has its place in the whole. The unity of mankind in Christ is compatible with an endless diversity of the elements that compose it. Love for the individual, a reverent recognition of the unique and mysterious destiny of each human soul, is an inevitable consequence of the vision that discerns in everyone the ideal self. Insistence on the value of the particular and the individual, on the beauty of the infinitely varied ways in which the finite selves seek to express what is best in them, is very characteristic of Mr Graham's point of view, and has important bearing on his treatment of some practical problems discussed in the book. It leads him to plead for a system of education based upon respect for the individuality of the child and not upon a desire merely to attain a certain level of learning or a uniform type of character. The pages dealing with the problems of education are written with much feeling, and Mr Graham's arguments in this connection are unanswerable, but one rather wonders if the whole discussion is not somewhat out of date. The idea that the child must be trusted and treated with kindness, that the true natural beauty in it must be allowed to develop and not be warped by a stern and unbending discipline, is now a commonplace in the theory of education. So far from being a new word, "a message for which teachers have been yearning," and which they will receive with joy from the lips of Mr Graham, it has been the inspiration of all good work in education for a long time past.

Love for the individual lies at the root of Mr Graham's plea for a different penal system. Instead of punishing the criminal and hating him, we ought to feel a patient love towards him and remember that whatever measures we may have to adopt for protecting the community against the evildoer, he still remains one of us, a member of the great brotherhood of humanity where each is responsible for all and all for each.

The same attitude underlies Mr Graham's treatment of international relations; each nation and race must learn to love and respect the individual peculiarities of the others, and realise at the same time that they are all parts of the ideal body of humanity.

Love for the individual and a consciousness of the oneness of mankind are both involved in seeking for the Face. The individual is precious because the face of Christ can be discerned in each man; and because it can be discerned in each, humanity is one and indivisible. This conception will be familiar to the readers of Vladimir Solovyof; his message was that through love human beings attain to the vision of one another in God, and that the divine in us is the ultimate bond of union of all mankind in Christ. But although there is much in common between Solovyof's view and the ideas put forward in *The Quest of the Face*, there is an

important difference in the way the two writers conceive the nature of the unity to which it is hoped mankind may attain. For Solovyof, the fact of individuality was ultimate and irreducible, and the glorified humanity was for him a community of immortal spirits united by a bond of love with each other and with God. For Mr Graham, individuality proves, after all, to be a result of our imperfection. "Every man," he writes, "possesses an ideal self . . . and all the ideal selves of all men are one and the same." The most definite statement of this view he puts into the mouth of Dushan, the Serbian, whom, as he tells us in the preface, he had met in the course of his quest. These are Dushan's words: "Through Christ is the way to the spiritual unity which is at the background of us all. When you realise that, then if you will you can exchange bodies and become me, or your neighbour in the street, or anyone at will. You can exchange personality and being at will, and go in and out among humanity. . . . So you become one with Christ and have the Face you seek for, you become the changing one yourself and the redeemer."

Some of Dushan's speeches as reported in the book give the reader a curious feeling of being concerned with things that elude the grasp of thought and which cannot be adequately expressed in human language; to apply to them the logical test of consistency seems out of place. But one thing is clear: if Mr Graham intends Dushan's words to be a statement of his own view, it is a contradiction for him to maintain that "each individuality is precious in the vast and perfect plan." For if we are to find the Face, we must lose individuality in the only sense in which individuality has any meaning.

But, indeed, it would be a mistake to seek in *The Quest of the Face* for any coherent philosophical view or religious doctrine, or even for an artistic presentation of the author's beliefs. The real force of the book is in its moral appeal. It calls upon us to love our fellow-men, to try to understand one another and to remember that before God humanity is one. It may be a long time before this message of goodwill is heard over the clamour of hostile passions, but this is all the more reason why those who have not lost their moral bearings in "the midnight darkness that seems to threaten dawn" should welcome Mr Graham's book.

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LONDON.

Grace and Personality. By John W. Oman, M.A., D.D.—Cambridge University Press, 1917.—Pp. xiii + 295.

DR OMAN here continues and brings to fruition the studies of which we had the first-fruits in *Vision and Authority* and *The Problem of Faith and Freedom*. The titles of these and of his latest book are in themselves illuminating, all three being concerned with the dualism which sets spiritual vision over against authority, the religious dependence which is faith over against the moral independence which is freedom, and divine grace over against human personality. By these titles Dr Oman seems to sound a challenge to the dualism itself, and in *Grace and Personality* he returns to the task of removing it by a deeper conception of the relation between God and man. The source of error and confusion has been the failure to see the

relation as indicative of God's succour of man's weakness, and hence neither the succouring Person nor the person succoured has been rightly conceived, and by the very terms by which God and man are defined at the outset an irreconcilable opposition has been introduced which defies all subsequent attempts to remove it.

Dr Oman shows the pass to which both theology and ethics, piety and morals, are brought by the idea of God as Omnipotence working with irresistible might, and of man as the creature of God needing nothing for his making but the word of power. The underlying motive in the Augustinian and Pelagian controversy is religious. Man requires to feel an utter trust in God, and yet the demand for moral independence is insistent. The Catholic compromise (taken over by the Reformation) of a divine grace that works in a specialised sphere, leaving all outside it to human direction, breaks down in practice, satisfying neither religion nor morality.

The solution offered by this book proceeds from a deeper understanding both of the moral personality and of the grace that succours it. Autonomy, *i.e.* self-consciousness, self-determination, and self-direction, is the note of personality, and hence a divine grace that overbore it by irresistible force working from the outside would be no personal help. At no cost must moral independence be weakened or destroyed. Even religion demands it. On the other hand, a morality divorced from religion can never penetrate beyond good form to goodness, beyond manners to morals. Absolute religious dependence is as essential as absolute moral independence. Some other relation to God must, therefore, be sought than submission to an omnipotence that bears directly on the personality and overrides it. Some other conception of grace must be found, more in keeping with the personality it is to succour.

Dr Oman has an illuminating distinction between forces that act on the human spirit individually and those that act personally, and he limits the operations of divine grace to the latter. The former are of the kind that determine our individual endowment—physical, mental, and even spiritual—and form the raw material with which the free human spirit works, to its making or its undoing. And in that, which is life's task, it is helped or retarded by innumerable personal influences that are truly personal because consent to them is either given or refused. It is within the sphere of these latter influences that the grace of God belongs, acting not by irresistible external impact but by patient appeal, and dependent for its efficacy on the free response of the human spirit. Thus the Fatherhood of God is not a mystical but a gracious personal relationship, not confined to special channels or acting by way of special operations, but embracing the whole breadth of our experience. It tells us not only, or primarily, of a Father bestowing benefits, but of the whole way of that Father's intercourse with His children in all that concerns their life.

By the help of this conception of a gracious personal relationship Dr Oman interprets all life, secular and sacred, and throws a beam of revealing light on some of the deepest problems of theology. Human life to be blessed must not concern itself with moral demands, however high, but with rendering the fitting response to the gracious God. In that response which thinks not of itself and its merits but of the eternally loving and forbearing attitude of the Father the interests of religion and morality are reconciled. In the light of his conception of grace and its fitting

response Dr Oman interprets the life set forth in the Beatitudes, shows us redemption and reconciliation as experienced facts, defines faith and unbelief, and sets forth the significance of Christ in revealing the Father and evoking man's response.

In relation to more strictly theological matters, the definition of grace given in this book enables us to extract the living kernel from many a truth that has been obscured in centuries of controversy. Dr Oman shows us that the key to the solution of the deep problems of God's working is to recognise that His dealings being not direct but circuitous, because personal, certain oppositions or antinomies are involved. Of these "antinomies of grace," as he styles them, Dr Oman selects seven, and in expounding them gives us a living theology which, doing justice to man's personality and free from the error of "arguing down from the throne of God," exhibits God's grace ever succouring man's need, and delivers us from reasonings about omnipotence into a new understanding of the Father's ways.

G. K. MACBEAN.

MANCHESTER.

Essays on the Early History of the Church and the Ministry.
 Edited by H. B. Swete, D.D.—Macmillan, 1918.

THE editing of these Essays was the last work of a distinguished man whose services to theological science will not soon be forgotten. The book is a criticism by writers of repute of the conclusions with regard to the origins of the Church and the ministry commonly held by those who are called "Liberal Protestant" scholars; and it will carry weight with those who are under the influence of the prepossessions which it represents. Whether it will affect a larger body of opinion is doubtful. For the standpoint taken is Anglican rather than European; and the result is a *Tendenz-Schrift* which, while it is certainly not open to the dangers which beset "a little learning," is not free from the dangers which are apt to accompany great technical knowledge: the reader may find it difficult to see the wood for the trees.

Its scope "is limited to historical investigation"; or, as Canon Mason expresses it:

"What the Church is; what it was considered to be by the Christians of the first days; whether they, or any of them, were right in their answers; whether time has brought about such changes as make these answers no longer applicable; whether we ought to form a conception of the Church quite independent of the ancient theories, and to act freely upon it—these are the kind of questions which challenge our attention. The object of this essay is to deal only with the second of the series. It is for the ecclesiastical statesman to judge what answer should be given to the rest. The historian can only be required to provide him with such guidance as may be derived from a clear presentment of the facts."

It may be questioned whether this self-denying ordinance is a practicable one; and the more fundamental the inquiry the less practicable it may appear. For, in the case of a historical religion, this absolute dissociation between past and present is impossible; to effect it is to "divide the living child in two." If we replace Sohm's maxim, "that original

Christianity was not Catholic is beyond question," by Canon Mason's, "the Church was Catholic from the outset," it is idle to suppose that important practical conclusions can be avoided. One of them is that the Church of England is not part of this Church. For it has, and can have, no parts; it is an indivisible society, whose historical centre is Rome. The logic of ultramontaniam is rigorous. Whether in its original scholastic form, or in the modified shape in which it is presented by the essayists, the line of argument which makes for Catholicism—"das Ganze Wesen des Katholicismus liegt in der Vergöttlichung der Tradition überhaupt"¹—makes for the Papacy as its keystone: without it the fabric is insecure and incomplete.

A certain disparagement of the *Didache* is common to those who hold what is called the "Catholic" view of the ministry. The "glamour" of this famous document "beguiled us for a time"; but "at best it illustrates the practice of some remote Church"; "it does not represent the ecclesiastical conditions of an advanced period, and the sacramental doctrine contained in it is of a rudimentary kind." Naturally, on the hypothesis of a far-reaching transformation of Christianity in the second century: on any other the *Didache* is a stone of stumbling, and has to be set aside. A Montanist origin has been ingeniously suggested for the latter section. In view of the early date of this section—its substance can scarcely be later than 130—editing may seem the more probable surmise; and a recent writer is of opinion that "the attempts made to discredit the *Didache* by attributing it to Montanist sources—*e.g.* by Bigg, Gore (*Min. of Ch.*, App. L)—have failed."² These writers appear to overestimate the bearing of the *Didache* on the view of Christian origins which they dispute. This view was held before the discovery of that ancient source, and is independent of it. For what is essential to this view is not the hypothesis, difficult as it is to avoid it, that the ministry of Orders was preceded by one of Enthusiasm, but the fact that the ministry, as such, was the outcome of circumstances rather than of Divine institution. This was recognised by St Jerome: "Let bishops be aware that they are superior to presbyters, more owing to custom than to any actual ordinance of the Lord." Had the Church been "Catholic from the outset," it is incredible that the distinctive features of Catholicism—tradition, law, hierarchy, priesthood—should be conspicuously absent from the New Testament. There is, indeed, a sense in which Canon Mason's statement that "the mild anarchy of early Christianity is a fiction of modern imaginations" may be admitted. The discipline of the early Church was rigorous. But its source was not the authority of the clergy but the enthusiasm of the community. And its province was not articles of faith, but conduct; it was on this side that the accent fell, and the friction, where there was friction, came.

Dr Turner speaks of the "pregnant years" in which "earlier and simpler conceptions had perforce to be modified." The epithet is a happy one; and Scaliger speaks of the period in which this modification took place as a *tempus æθηλον*, or obscure age. The legal, doctrinal, hierarchical, and liturgical tradition of later Christendom comes to us from this *tempus æθηλον*, and bears its signature. The age was one of transformation: the greatest transformation that Christianity has ever under-

¹ Harnack, *D.G.*, i. p. 304.

² *The Evolution of the Christian Ministry*, J. R. Cohu, p. 44.

gone. But it was a silent and even an unconscious transformation: those most concerned did not realise either the extent or the significance of the changes that were taking place. In a famous passage, "Nay, dead and buried—and without gravestone," Newman indicates what he conceives to be the impossibility of such a transformation.¹ The answer is that the development in question reflected the change of circumstances experienced by the Christian community at the period; and that the wonder would have been had it not taken place as, and when, and to the extent to which, it did. Its sufficient reason lies on the surface: the Brotherhood had become a World-Church. Organisation, systems, professionalising followed naturally; and their detail was taken, as naturally, from the material that lay to hand. The present writer has attempted elsewhere to describe the process.² It may be summed up by saying that the most important events in religious, as in secular society, come about silently, unbidden and unforbidden, in virtue of the natural changes incident to human circumstances and life. And the age was one in which the development of new forms of life, and of new combinations of existing factors of life, was rapid: vegetation springs up in a night in a tropical forest which would be the growth of years in our temperate zone.

Prophecy was the "note" of the Apostolic age. It was the outcome of a χάρισμα, or spiritual gift, descending from above on the recipient, and spiritually received by him: "they were all filled with the Holy Ghost" (Acts ii. 4). The later conception of "Orders" was one less of a spiritual gift than of an office transmitted by those who held it to their successors. The former was occasional, the latter persistent; and the distinction between the two is one of kind. The bishop ordains; the priest celebrates or absolves, because he has received a particular power of Order, which he can exercise at any time. But the prophet prophesies because the Spirit comes upon him; and he can only do so when, and as, the Spirit gives him utterance: "it is not ye that speak." The prophet, then, is an organ of revelation. Not so the bishop. He is a witness to a tradition; and the value of his teaching depends not on the testimony of the Spirit, but on the authenticity and quality of the tradition. He is on a lower level, and teaches "as the scribes." Often, no doubt, there was an overlapping of time and function: the prophet and the bishop might be contemporaries, and the bishop might possess and exercise the prophetic gift; but he did so as prophet, not as bishop. The two ministries were produced by different circumstances, and looked different ways.

What is now known as the Priesthood was the last of the Greater Orders to be differentiated. As late as in the Cyprianic period the ministry of the Word and the Sacraments was in the bishop's hands. He alone preached, baptized, celebrated the Eucharist: there was but one baptistery in the city—this was so at Florence down to the sixteenth century—and that at the bishop's church. But already there was a gulf between the episcopate of the second century and the Cyprianic bishop. It is essential to remember this, if we would not take names for things. There is no indication, *e.g.*, that the writer of the Ignatian epistles is upholding the episcopal against any other form of church government, as for instance the presbyterial: the alternative which he contemplates is lawless isolation and self-will. We do not find in them the idea either of Apostolical succession,

¹ *Essay on Development*, edition 1881, p. 8.

² *Studies in Modernism*, ch. x.

or the rite of ordination or consecration, or the parallel between the bishop and the Jewish high-priest. The stage was rudimentary and formative; and Dr Lindsay reminds us that there are communities in which it may be seen in existence in our own time.

"A visit to the mission-field is the magic carpet which transports us back to the times of primitive Christianity: it is here, rather than in the long-established Churches of Europe, that analogies in organisation illustrative of the life of the primitive Christian communities may be most easily and most safely found."¹

Seldom has a more suggestive and illuminative remark been made.

It is difficult to think that the essayists have done more than indicate, what no competent scholar will deny, that from a very early date two currents, the inspirational and the institutional, can be traced in Christian literature. The presence of the latter in our "Gospel according to Matthew" entitles us to describe this compilation, in view of subsequent history, as "the most important work ever written." But internal and external evidence combine to show that the former is the authentic stream, the latter the tributary, whose "sub-introduction" can be accounted for, indicated, and assigned to an at least approximate date. For in the Apostolic age we must not look for organisation. There was none; and as soon as we think there was, we are on a false track. Both ideas and institutions were fluid; the hard and fast lines of later Christianity were the product of another age. The whole question of ecclesiastical polity would, therefore, have had neither meaning nor interest for an Apostolic Christian. Could we cross-examine him on the subject, his answers would be evasive and uncertain: "I do not know," or "It does not matter": he would look at things from another side.

An eminent man whose life was devoted to the study of ecclesiastical law—Professor Rudolf Sohm—has expressed his deliberate conviction that no such thing ought ever to have existed—that it is in contradiction with the very essence of the Church.² It is so: in the ideal Church it would not be found. But the ideal Church is not here; and there are evils which, while they are evils, are necessary evils. We can escape them only at the price of more and greater evils; they must be endured "by reason of the present distress." Yet, Sohm's judgment may remind us that the essential elements in religion are the simplest; and that there is a true sense in which "whatsoever is more than these is of the evil one."

ALFRED FAWKES.

ASHEY ST LEDGERS, RUGBY.

Liberal Judaism and Hellenism, and other Essays. By Claude G. Montefiore.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1918.—Pp. xii+328.

IF Liberal Judaism ever comes to its own, both as a system attractive to the masses of Jews and worthy of consideration by the wider world, the result will be mainly due to Mr Claude G. Montefiore. Liberal thought in the theological sphere tends often to assume negative aspects. It

¹ *The Church and the Ministry in the Early Centuries*, preface, p. xi.

² *Kirchenrecht*, p. 1.

denies rather than affirms; it clears the ground rather than builds. Mr Montefiore is indeed critical, but he is also constructive. Nor is this the only quality which gives his writings their persuasive charm. He is at once fair and confident. He is thus an ideal advocate of a cause which cannot be maintained unless these two faculties are combined: the confident belief in the possession of the truth, and the fair admission that other expressions of truth are potent. To be at once an absolutist without fanaticism and a pragmatist without indecision is given to few. Mr Montefiore is of the small band.

Put otherwise, Mr Montefiore realises that religion has, as well as had, a history. No great religion has ever stood alone; it has been eclectic. Hence if in our days, and for the future, a religion is to become or to continue great, it must retain this "historical" faculty of eclecticism. Mr Montefiore believes in Judaism, and is inspired by the hope that the time may come when it will take its place as a universal religion, "as the faith of many races rather than the faith of a portion of a single race." Obviously he gives no support whatever to the neo-nationalism of the Zionists, and his criticism of "Jewish Nationalism" is one of the finest and most effective things in his present book. But if Judaism is to regain, or attain to, a world position, it must be a Judaism which not only admits the contributions made to the world's spiritual store by other systems, but which also realises the obligation to make conscious use of those contributions. To win all, you must use all. The contributions of Hellenism, of Christianity, of modern social idealism are to be welded with the original Hebraic truths, formulated as the latter were in the terms of a past day, but essentially valid to eternity. Unconsciously there is always absorption; Mr Montefiore is a prophet of the conscious. His is an inherently honest mind; what he sees, he tries to announce. Moreover, he is no mere dreamer. He deals with practice as well as with principle. He does not occupy a position of aloofness in a library. He is the author of a series of admirable treatises and essays. Yet, he is also a lay-preacher, frequently heard in the pulpit of the Hill Street Liberal Jewish Synagogue in London. Of that congregation he is the president. Thus he is no abstract theorist, he has to consider the application of theories in the communal organisation. In all that he writes we have the worker; in all that he does we have the thinker. He has been at once pioneer and builder; he has led the way in new ideas, and has helped to translate the ideas into institutions.

In his new volume he is at his best. Perhaps it gains some of its excellence from the fact that its six chapters were composed as lectures. The main defect in Mr Montefiore's work hitherto has been his diffidence, amounting to an unfounded self-depreciation. He has been too inclined to underrate his own learning, to deny his profound philosophical insight. In the lecture form he is happily compelled to dogmatise. And it is all to the good. He is as interesting as ever in matter, but he is less tentative in manner. It may be that he is becoming slowly convinced that the admiration of his friends is based on a sound appreciation of his services; it may be that he is winning a juster belief in himself. Be that as it may, he has never been at once so lucid and so instructive, so full of justice to others, so little given to apologetics in behalf of himself.

The result is a volume which affords a clear insight into an ardent phase of religion, an exposition which may be commended to all who

would understand the living force of Judaism. The six chapters all treat of fundamental problems: (i) "Liberal Judaism and the Old Testament" (part of which appeared in the *Hibbert Journal* for Jan. 1918); (ii) "Liberal Judaism and the New Testament" (appreciative of the Gospels, which, however, are to be regarded as only supplementary to the Hebrew Scriptures); (iii) "Liberal Judaism and the Rabbinical Literature" (in which it is shown where the former agrees with, and where it diverges from, the latter); (iv) "Liberal Judaism and Hellenism" (so fine a study in identities and contrasts that the book is deservedly entitled from the subject of this chapter); (v) "Liberal Judaism and Democracy" (to such an alliance the author "looks forward with confidence and hope"); and (vi) "Liberal Judaism and the Future" (when the word "Jews" will mean "those who belong to Judaism, who accept and practise the Jewish faith, be their race and be their nation what it may").

In the course of these chapters many outstanding issues of religion and life are faced with power and ability. But the outstanding quality of the book is what has been indicated above—it is the combination of assurance with impartiality. Men who can see both sides of a case are wont to evade a decision. Mr Montefiore is never one-sided, and he is seldom indefinite. And though he is so firm an advocate of his own views, there is in his style a remarkable suavity, a rare absence of the provocative. In him, indeed, the style is the man. There is a lovable quality in his book, because the man is so lovable. Among the grounds for praising this work, not the least is the fact that it reveals as fine a character as it does a mind.

I. ABRAHAMS.

CAMBRIDGE.

Personal Liberty: The Great Problem of To-Day. By E. F. B. Fell.—
London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1917.

THIS book is a deep and closely reasoned study of the Christian doctrine of Personality, in its bearing on the great questions of the present time. In this doctrine lies the secret of that great difference of which we are all conscious between the pre-Christian and the Christian world; that sense of change which we feel, that breath as of spring in the air, when we pass from Pagan antiquity with its huge masses of stone, its nameless myriads of slaves, its imperialist triumphs, into a world where the Christian leaven is working. Mr Fell ably and lucidly expounds the doctrine. "The realisation of Personality and the recognition of the sacredness of every individual person is due to Christian teaching," he tells us. So some of us have long been saying and reiterating, especially since the beginning of the war, in a world where that teaching seems altogether denied and set at nought, as it were, whistling to keep our courage up as we pass through this dark wood. The present writer, for one, is most grateful to find this essential thought of the sacredness of Personality elucidated and fortified as it is in this book by such a thinker as Mr Fell.

This is the great service of Christianity, the bringing of this life-giving truth into the world, and in the real acceptance of this doctrine with all its implications, lies, at least in the writer's judgment, the hope of the Future. The impotence of the Church in the face of such a fact as the war—its failure, either in the first instance to prevent it or at any time

since its outbreak to bring it to an end, or even to mitigate its horrors; nay, even its surrender to the war-spirit as shown in the blood-shot ravings of so many clerics in all the belligerent countries, must have tempted many humane spirits to turn altogether away from the spiritual and the supernatural, and to take refuge in a rationalist and philanthropic humanitarianism. But the only secure basis of humanitarianism is the Christian doctrine of Personality—the sacred authoritative dogma that man is created in the Image of God. Mr Fell enumerates some results of the belief in this dogma in our modern world:

“We are not content simply to seek the good of the State apart from the sacredness of the individual Person as such, as a Greek would have done. We will not employ slavery, whatever may be the arguments in its favour. The weak in body we refuse to dispose of, however humanely. We refuse to torture witnesses, however convenient to the State. We should not entertain for a moment the idea of exposing babies to the weather, however ‘good for the State’ the most learned Spartan might consider it. We now assume (to a much greater extent than most people are aware of) that the good of the State will follow, not probably in the manner of our calculations, but in some unforeseen way, from the justice and righteousness with which the citizens treat each other.”

But this practical humanitarianism in fact depends upon the mystical background which is behind it, and would not long survive its disappearance. It has indeed no merely rational basis or justification. Let the general apprehension of the Christian dogma of Personality be weakened, and in no long time we hear whispers of the advantage to the State of the doing away with weakly children and useless old people, proposals for the segregation and sterilisation of the so-called “unfit,” plans for the exploitation of “inferior races,” and the like. These things are deeply repugnant to the profound Christian instinct of the English “common people.” The strength of their belief in the sacredness of human Personality is shown in the popular use of the term “a Christian” for a human being. This is not always the case with their “betters.” The support given by some ecclesiastics and other Christians to war as an institution and, speaking generally, to the schemes and methods of a Pagan Imperialism, comes from a loss of sensitiveness with regard to the crucial point of Christian teaching.

In the Eastern fairy-tale the diamonds thought they were bits of glass until the merchant bought them. So diamonds are in fact, or would be, apart from the value they possess in human eyes and the price that men are prepared to pay for them. The assertion that the bits of glass are in fact diamonds is the abiding service of Catholic Christianity, the great compensation for all its failures to realise its own teaching. The late Father Stanton amazed and perplexed an inquirer who came to ask him what “Ritualism” was, by telling him that it meant the belief in the infinite value and dignity of every human being. That is the thought underlying the sacramental doctrine, there is no doubt. By denying the mystical basis of humane effort, a merely secular Socialism plays into the hand of its enemies, the Pagan Imperialists.

The Christian idea of the value of man as such is well expressed in the following little story, itself a variant of the three parables in St Luke xv. It is quoted from the *Golden Legend*. The provost asked what it was the Christians believed. “Tranquillinus answered: ‘If thou knewest of a ring of gold in which was a precious stone lying in the mire of a valley, thou

wouldest send thy servants to take up this ring, and if they might not lift it up, thou wouldest unclothe thyself of thy clothes of silk, and do on a coarse coat, and wouldest help to take up this ring and make a great feast.' The provost said: 'What understandest thou by this ring?' Tranquillinus answered: 'The gold of this ring is the body human, and the precious stone signifieth the soul which is enclosed in the body; the body and soul make a man, like as the gold and the stone make a ring, and much more precious is the man to Jesus Christ than the ring is to thee. Thou sendest thy servants to take up this ring out of the mire and dirt, and they may not. Thus sent God into the world the prophets for to draw the human lineage out of the mire of sins, and they might not do it. And like as thou wouldest leave thy rich clothes and clothe thyself with a coarse coat, and wouldest descend into the mire and put thy hands into it to take up the ring right, so the Majesty of God hid the light of His Divinity by a carnal vestment, which He took of our nature human, and descended from heaven and came here beneath into the valley of this world and put His Hands into the mire of our miseries in suffering hunger and thirst, and took us out of the filth and washed us from our sins in the waters of Baptism.'"

Here is the doctrine of Personality that came into a world of things and tools used, and used up, in the service of an abstraction, the absolute State. Mr Fell disputes T. H. Green's statement that there is a "substantive identity" in the "fortitude" of the Greek suffering for the State and that of the Christian martyr for "the Kingdom of Christ." He points out that to the Greek the State was the End, while to the Christian every individual of which the Kingdom of Christ was composed was an End in himself. We think he might have put it more strongly even than this. The Christians had moved out of a world of institutions and abstractions into a world of Persons, rather, of a Person. All that the Church was to them she was through and because of a Person. To quote the Spanish theologian Balmes: "The Roman died for the State; the Christian did not die for the Church, he died for God."

Well may Mr Fell say: "Democracy and Liberty have the same foundation, the essentially religious doctrine of Personality." From the same source have come Gothic art, romance, the play of fancy—above all, humour. It seems that a decay of creative power in art and literature goes hand in hand with a decay of the Christian idea of Personality, as in Germany since 1870. The Gothic churches and town-halls, as at Reims and Louvain, with all their inexhaustible wealth of imagery springing from the free unfettered play of the creative mind did not rise amid militarised peoples. To the present writer Dickens has always seemed to incarnate the very spirit of the old free, liberal, humane, personal, essentially Christian England. One hardly looks for a Dickens in a conscript country. The value and importance of the common man is what Dickens insists upon. It is what Christianity had insisted upon all the time. To Pagan Imperialism, new and old, the common man is just cannon-fodder.

In a striking passage Mr Fell says:—

"It is an essential feature of the Christian religion that it insists upon the superficiality and transient nature of non-moral differences between men, but emphasises the common Personality and Divine Relation. Just those differences which were emphasised by Pagans, and are again emphasised by materialists, are those to which Christianity is most indifferent. The differences between individuals and races which cultured Pagans

emphasised and regarded as essential in their nature have their origin in what is, taken alone, a disuniting principle, viz. the assertion by the individual of intellectual or physical power superior to that of his neighbour—in other words, Self-assertion. The principle, on the other hand, asserted by Christianity is that of the common Personality and Relation, and is therefore a unifying principle, so that he only is superior or excels who excels in Unity." This is illustrated by the truly democratic practice of the cultus of the Saints. Many of the shrines to which in humility the great and noble came were the tombs of peasants, slaves, children, sometimes even idiots. The mystic value and dignity of human nature itself has thus been asserted in the strongest possible way.

It is not strange that Imperialists, ancient and modern—those who regard men not as Ends in themselves, but as means to serve the purposes of the Absolute State,—should have instinctively recognised in Christianity a deadly enemy. The modern Imperialist with any intellectual pretensions almost invariably does so, though the mere muddle-headed Jingo is often a fervent, if very inconsequent, Christian. Mr Fell writes:

"Socialistic Absolutists, it must be remembered, and also the modern monarchical and military Absolutists of the Prussian type, regard very properly, as many of their writers have already testified, the historic Christian religion as their greatest obstruction and intend to deliver mankind from it, if necessary and possible, by any and every means."

It will be seen that Mr Fell here links together Socialism and Militarism as enemies of human Personality. The thesis of the book is stated to be that "the denial of personal liberty . . . underlies equally Militarism and true Socialism." We confess that as far as we ourselves are concerned the enemy is Militarism, and not Socialism. We are interested in Socialism rather as a spirit and tendency than as a dogma. Its spirit and tendency seems to strive towards the light. Whatever danger may lie in Socialism is matter of a problematic Future. In the Present it is Militarism which sits enthroned as a grotesque and hideous idol, and to which Humanity is being offered as a bloody sacrifice.

We read recently a work of fiction in which the Agnostic heroine embraces Christianity because she comes to the conclusion that "the Church is out to destroy War." We wish we could think so; we ourselves see little signs of it. But at any rate in the Christian doctrine of Personality she possesses the only firm basis of any effort towards that end, and of any hope of attaining it. We repeat what we began by saying, that all those to whom this doctrine is dear, who, in whatever else they may have faltered, still cling passionately to this, owe a debt of gratitude to Mr Fell for his powerful statement and reinforcement of it.

R. L. GALES.

GEDNEY VICARAGE, HOLBEACH.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF WAR FINANCE.

L. P. JACKS.

"Begin to make visible the community of mankind, not merely, as at present, in the form of alliances which are ambiguous, and at times irritating, and of arbitration treaties which are likely to be broken at some passionate moment when they are most needed, but in the form of a sufficiently large board of financially expert trustees, whose membership is international, whose services are duly compensated from the funds of the trust, and whose conduct is guided by plainly stated rules which have the substantially unanimous consent of all nations concerned in the plan."—Professor ROYCE, *War and Insurance* (1914), p. 67.

To avoid "talking in the air," the common vice of international theories, the present article will in due course propose certain definite modes of international action. When that point is reached the argument will be found to trespass on the province of the expert. The writer is well aware of the dangers attending this kind of unauthorised entry; but he is not without a hope that the expert, to whom he willingly submits as a judge, may eventually become a helper. He would wish it to be understood that, from the point where the trespass begins, his proposals are fluid, tentative, and open to revision—tabernacles in the wilderness rather than lasting habitations. So far as they trench upon expert ground they are little more than types, or rough sketches such as a man makes in the sand with the end of his stick when he is trying to communicate a somewhat novel idea to his neighbour's mind. Some lines in these sketches, he thinks, will probably be found correct, but they are certainly not finished drawings. At all events, he would rather run the risk of error by trying a dangerous path than lose himself, at the crucial point, in a fog-bank of abstractions. And what is the crucial point?

In the pamphlet on the League of Nations by Viscount Grey of Fallodon are words which furnish the answer: "The second condition essential to the foundation and maintenance of a League of Nations is that the Governments and Peoples of the States willing to found it understand clearly that it will impose some limitations on the action of each and may entail some inconvenient obligation."

This is another way of saying that each of the combining or contracting States will have to *renounce* something that it holds to be of value and would rather not part with; the word "renunciation," indeed, has already been used in this connection by eminent statesmen.

It will be observed that Viscount Grey in the above passage draws no distinction between great States and small; he applies his condition to *each* Government and People. That is important; for the mistake has often been made of representing the presence of small States in the League as though their sole object were to be protected and looked after by the great ones. Apart from the fact that such a view is an offence to the self-respect of small States, it shows a false apprehension of the essential nature of all co-operative enterprise, whether between individuals or between nations. Renunciation is the first law of co-operation; that is to say, the League demands a positive contribution from each of the co-operators to the common enterprise, which contribution it will cost him something to make. No human association, least of all a "League of free and independent peoples," could be constituted on the understanding that some are benefactors and others beneficiaries; for this would make the benefactors masters of the situation and the beneficiaries their dependants. To each according to his several ability; but for all alike, great and small, the rule holds unconditionally that they must place at the service of the League some portion of the wealth, opportunities, possessions, privileges, labour, skill, and genius which they have hitherto regarded as exclusively their own. Something must be renounced by each. *What is it to be?*

Except on the basis of *self-renunciation all round* the League of Nations is not even a thinkable proposition. But the test of our earnestness will not come until we pass from the general statement that renunciations must be made, to the precise offer of *what* we are willing, here and now, to renounce. It is futile, nay childish, to wait for the others to begin, each reserving its offer until the rest have made theirs; on which terms, it is clear, no offer will ever be made. The project of a League of Nations will remain in the realm of

discussion, a mere theme for debate, until some great State, or some State with a great soul, steps into the arena with a bold offer of *what precisely* it is prepared to give up for the common good of mankind. This is the crux of the whole problem. To this danger-point all the statesmen and governments which have endorsed the League must sooner or later come; to this test all nations must submit. But to the great States, which have much to renounce, the test will be more severe than to the small, which have little. How hardly shall States that have riches enter the Kingdom of God!

Let us, then, before we say any more about a League of Nations, try our earnestness (and our courage) by the test question—What in particular, precisely what, are we as Britons prepared to renounce? *What* “limitations” are we prepared to impose on our national action? *What* “inconvenient obligations” are we willing to incur? On the main point there should be no illusion. If any of us think that a League of Nations will endorse our national valuation of our own merits, confirm us in possession of all our present advantages, and give us a charter to make a good thing for ourselves out of a pacified world—we are surely pursuing a vain thing. We shall have to submit to international discipline—like all the rest; to obey rules that are not entirely, nor mainly, of our own making; to endure correction and rebuke; to hold loosely by our self-valuation; to accept a place in the world’s affairs more in accord with the world’s estimate of our merits as distinct from our own estimate; and, above all, to be ready, when occasion demands, to enforce the ideal of the League *against ourselves*, against what may seem to us our national advantage. There must be no mistake about the fact that the League of Nations is an heroic enterprise, in the sense that it calls for *unselfishness* on the part of all nations concerned in its foundation or in its maintenance. These are stern but inevitable conditions, and it were well that they should be solemnly taken account of from the outset.

It can hardly be denied that the dealings of political States with one another in the past show little evidence of such a disposition; nor are the signs of it always to be found even among propagandists who are most vehemently advocating a League of Nations at this moment. International morality has not yet risen to this level; nor is it easy to believe that an international *coup d’état*, however impressive, could suddenly effect so great a change of heart. Some process of education seems to be demanded, some method of gradual and pro-

gressive approach. It may be that the community of mankind would come sooner, and come in more enduring form, if we laid aside the attempt to compass international morality at a stroke and contented ourselves at first with some more modest proposal, as a growing-point for the great design. "The best teaching of international morality," says Royce, "must take at present indirect forms."

In the belief that the foundations of international morality are not yet strong enough to sustain some of the vast structures that are now being planned, I am venturing to bring forward a proposal for the international control of war finance as a beginning of co-operative enterprise and of co-operative education among peoples. This proposal, I am aware, lacks the moral splendour that attends some of the others, and is a poor theme for eloquence; but it has certain business-like pretensions which may perhaps entitle it to a hearing. At the same time, the element of heroic unselfishness, involved in all schemes of co-operation, is not altogether absent from this one; there is probably enough *to begin with* in a world so backward as ours in the knowledge and practice of international morality.

Before passing on I wish to make it clear that I am indebted to the late Professor Royce, of Harvard University, not only for the general conception of community life which forms the background of this article, but for some of the practical proposals explicitly brought forward. His views on the subject will be found in a little book, *War and Insurance*, published shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.¹

To whatever extent we establish international control of war finance, to that extent we obtain international control of the whole war situation. A militant State controlled in respect of its war finance would at the same time be controlled in respect of its power to make war.

Though finance need not be counted among the positive causes of war, it is at least one of the essential conditions without which the positive causes cannot operate. To withdraw an essential condition from a group of causes is, of course, to render the whole lot inoperative; and the question arises, therefore, whether the war-making forces could not be effectually defeated by putting a decisive international check on war finance.

The more one considers the nature of war finance, and the conditions that surround it, the stronger becomes the conviction

¹ *War and Insurance*, by Josiah Royce, The Macmillan Co., 5s. 6d.

that this is, indeed, the Achilles-heel, the vulnerable point, in the whole system of war-making forces, or, if the figure be preferred, the weak link in the chain. The others are more conspicuous and morally more challenging; but many of them occupy almost impregnable positions which seem to defy direct attack. They are protected in their seats by ancient traditions;¹ they have powerful allies in patriotism and national honour; they run in the deep grooves of habit; they are entangled with baffling questions of sovereign rights. War finance, on the other hand, is relatively unsupported by these great alliances. Were the British nation, for example, required to surrender the Navy to international control, patriotism and national honour would at once arise in most formidable opposition. But were the proposal made to place our war loans under international trust, the question would mainly be one of good business or bad. It could be argued with less disturbance from the side of habit, prejudice, and sentiment. And yet it would be found that the war finance which pays for the Navy is fully as relevant to peace and war as the Navy itself.

There is another reason for regarding war finance as the least difficult—I will not say the easiest—of the war-making forces to be placed under international control. The control of finance in general has already acquired the character of a highly theoretical science, commanding abundant resources of expert skill in all the civilised communities of the world. This science is now in a position to deal with the largest and most complicated problems, and to give them answers which, in respect of exactitude and trustworthiness, compare most favourably with the kind of answers to which we are accustomed in the realms of political speculation. In addition to its theoretical principles, finance has acquired, as the result of long experience, a body of working methods the general nature of which is not only familiar to the public at large, but almost universally trusted. These methods, in the hands of the banker, the actuary, or other expert, have proved themselves of the highest value as means of uniting divergent interests into a common interest, and of making transactions profitable to all parties which would otherwise be profitable to none. Most of them may be described, without fancifulness, as methods of reconciliation, by which risks are distributed, disasters averted, burdens shared and resources pooled for bearing them. Thus they possess a high moral value in addition to their economic usefulness. In the institutions which finance

¹ See the writer's article on "Arms and Men" in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* for October 1918, to which the present article is the sequel.

has created there is indeed a large element of unprofessed Christianity, which might be illustrated by many notable texts from the New Testament, but for which these institutions have received less credit than is their due; so that one is often tempted to think the bankers and the actuaries will go into the kingdom of heaven before the diplomats and the political philosophers. It is enough, however, that we concentrate attention on the practical efficacy of the methods in question, both in the negative way by preventing collisions and cross purposes, and in the positive way by harnessing divergent interests to a common purpose, enlarging the scope of enterprise, providing incentives to industry, and greatly increasing the forces on whose activity industrial civilisation depends. All this science, together with its methods and working institutions and its highly skilled personnel, now stands ready for application to war finance and for extension to the international scale. This is a great advantage.

What has been said should make it clear that the proposal now before us is at no point and in no sense opposed to the project known as a League of Nations, nor to the programmes associated therewith. International control of war finance shares the motive and aim otherwise expressed, for example, by international control of armaments. The motive is a positive interest in the community of mankind, and the object is a secure and lasting peace. Such differences as exist between the two proposals resolve themselves mainly into differences of method. Let us glance at them.

The proposal to put war finance under international control attacks the problem higher up—that is, nearer to its source—than the proposal to control armaments. Instead of putting its hand on armaments after they have come into being, it would check the forces which bring them into being; instead of prohibiting their manufacture, it would place obstacles in the way of paying for them; and instead of prescribing the circumstances under which they may be used, it would make their use under all circumstances so expensive and hazardous that every nation with a due regard for its own interest would think not twice but thrice before embarking on war. Whether war can ever be profitable to the nation making it is of course open to debate; but this method would so obviously impair the chances of profitableness as to diminish greatly the risks of its occurrence. And it would do this without appealing to force, and might even render the institution of international police, with all its difficulties and dangers, unnecessary. At the same time it makes no pretence to be

a magic formula. It is, or claims to be, no more than a business-like proposition.

To grasp the nature of the proposal we must turn aside for the moment from the question of peace and war and consider certain broad economic facts.

The first is the fact that as a result of war finance industrial civilisation stands at this moment enormously *in debt*, its future mortgaged to an extent which in the total cannot fall far short of fifty thousand millions sterling. Most unfortunately this sum by meaning so much is apt to mean nothing, our minds being wholly unable to grasp it.

The second is the admitted need of an *industrial revival* of unexampled magnitude and energy to make good the losses of the war, to meet the charges on the debts aforesaid, and above all to supply the immense resources required for reconstruction in a multitude of forms.¹

The third is *the close connection between these debts and the possibilities of industrial revival*. The debts are a heavy burden on industry: they bleed its resources; they divide its forces; they shake its morale; and, above all, they threaten the foundation of international credit, which must be rendered secure if the industrial revival is to take place at all.

Obviously there is a large element of very formidable risk in the general economic situation, which if not guarded against may prove the downfall of our hopes, however bright these may otherwise be. These risks are common to all industrial nations; they threaten vital interests in which all are involved together; they beset the industrial enterprise of the world *as a whole*, and the question at once arises—Can international action be taken for minimising the danger, *by pooling the risk and by pooling resources to meet it?*

If that question can be answered in the affirmative, observe what follows. In the first place, there rise before us the outlines of a positive co-operative undertaking, of pith and moment, in which all nations *great and small* may at once combine some portion of their resources, energy, and skill, and this not for the purpose of guarding against each other's illwill (a most questionable motive for co-operation), but for mutual protection against risks which threaten them all alike—an undertaking, therefore, which has from the outset the character of goodwill, and for that reason is likely to stimulate a

¹ See, for example, the election programme of the Labour Party, in which the State is to pay off the war debt by a tax on capital for thousands of millions, and at the same time raise capital for a long series of vast undertakings.

rapid development of the co-operative movement in many other international forms. In the second place, the contemplated co-operation, in so far as it deals with the results of war finance *in the past*, opens an opportunity for putting decisive checks on the war finance *of the future*—as I shall show more fully later on. Thus two birds are killed with one stone. The nations combine to guard and insure the stability of the industrial enterprise on which all their fortunes depend in common, and in so doing they combine for peace. Could the object which the League of Nations has in view be more truly defined?

Is it possible to describe in advance the kind of method which would be required to initiate active co-operation, on international lines, under circumstances such as I have just indicated? This, I think, can be done.

It would be, on the whole, a method which unites divergent interests into a common interest, and thereby creates a relatively safe situation out of a multitude of dangerous relationships. To the combining States it would give motives for respecting each other's rights, guarding each other's property and desiring each other's welfare, and in this way would introduce mutual loyalty and a sense of honour among all concerned in the enterprise. It would direct the common activity of the unit-nations with as little aid as possible from coercive forces of one kind or another, these being provocative of the conflicts which it is intended to supersede; its penalties and rewards would be automatic, and it would not depend on the issue of political controversies, on the caprices of public opinion and on the intrigues of diplomacy. It would be at once scientific and ideal: scientific in the precision of its rules and the orderliness of its procedure, ideal in the sense of pointing to community life. As affecting the interests of vast populations and therefore requiring their consent, our method would have to be familiar to the public at large and thoroughly tested by experience; a method of proved trustworthiness and efficiency; commanding resources of expert talent in those appointed to make use of it and enjoying respect from those on whose behalf it is to be used. In brief, it would have to satisfy the economic demand by indicating *good business*, and it would have to satisfy the moral demand by indicating *goodwill*.

Is any method of finance, fulfilling all these conditions, known to exist? Has any such been tried on a scale sufficiently wide to warrant the belief that by a further

extension it might be carried into the international field, become a principle of international action, and so create a relatively safe situation out of the dangerous complex of international relationships?

There are at least two such methods, fiduciary and non-political in their nature, which answer to most if not all of these conditions: the one is Banking, the other Mutual Insurance. Of the first I say nothing here (though much might be said) beyond remarking that international banking might either precede or follow international insurance, with which, in any event, it is related. For reasons which will presently become clear, I desire to call attention to the second as an instrument of extraordinary power and promise, ready to hand for accomplishing the first task of a League of Nations, as this has been conceived and set forth in what has gone before.

In a matter of this kind, involving vast issues on the one hand and requiring scientific precision on the other, the right order of thought is, I take it, to begin with the ideal or the dream, and then, if we can, to develop our vision, by reference to existing facts, into a business-like and practicable proposition. Let us follow this order.

Indulging our imagination, then, after the manner of idealists, and waiving for the moment whatever practical difficulties may hereafter suggest themselves, let us suppose that the nations, desirous of concerted action for the common benefit, and moved by a powerful co-operative impulse, *have created a vast fund by contributions all round, to be internationally administered as a protection against certain risks in which they are all involved together.* Whatever resources a nation may possess on which to build up its own industrial revival, let the nation in question be supposed to have invested—or, if the term be preferred, to have renounced—a portion of such resources in the fund, and let it have done this either in the name of good business, or in that of the moral ideal, or in both.

Great Britain, for example, is said to be in a position to treble her wealth after the war,¹ and to have resources adequate for the purpose. Very well: let Great Britain contribute, invest, or renounce a portion of these resources to the International Fund, and let other States do likewise according to their ability.

¹ I take this from the publisher's announcement of *Economic Statesmanship*, by J. Ellis Barker.

The resources to be thus invested are doubtless of many kinds: they consist, for example, of capital in actual being, of trading advantages, of tangible things like territory, ships, routes, ports, coaling stations, markets, gold; and of intangible things like credit, or even intelligence, skill, experience, good faith. Let each State, then, according to its ability, stand ready to make its contribution in one or other of these forms, not only investing its "money" in the fund but lending it the means and the men that are needed to put the "money" to the best account. Let the total thus created, with or without territorial basis,¹ constitute a reserve against certain risks which expose the industrial interests of the nations, regarded as unitary, to possible shipwreck. In all this, be it observed, nothing more is demanded in principle of States or peoples than would be demanded of a number of shipowners insuring their ships, though of course the scale of operations would be larger. Self-renunciations, truly, would be involved, but they would be of the same nature in the one case as the other; and in both they would be justified, where practicable, on grounds of good business, as well as on grounds of sound morality.

But the risks against which this international fund is deposited are not, of course, to be left indeterminate. There are a multitude of international risks from which selection might be made, from crop failures to world war. Some, perhaps, are not insurable on any terms, though one hesitates to say this in view of the number of accidents once deemed outside the range of actuarial method but now insured as a matter of daily business. In a certain sense it matters little what particular type of risk be chosen, so long as it be one in which nations are reciprocally concerned; and I would emphasise in passing that the value of the general proposal is by no means bound up with the particular selection I am about to offer. Moreover, it is certain that if a beginning were made at *any* point where the common interests of industrial nations are vitally threatened, *the process would rapidly extend until it had permeated the whole realm of internationally insurable risks*—thereby repeating the wonderful history of enlarging conquests which insurance has achieved in the particular communities which practise it.

Other things being equal, however, attention would naturally

¹ The suggestion has been made that a vast region in Central Africa, formed by contributions from several States, should be handed over to the International Trust, to be administered in the interests of all nations. The suggestion is worth consideration. Might it not help to solve the problem of the conquered German Colonies?

be concentrated, at first, on the risk which is most immediate, most menacing, and most widely shared by the various industrial communities. What this is I have already indicated. It is the risk of national insolvency, *occurring here or there*, as a result of war finance, and threatening, wherever it occurs, a breakdown of international credit and the consequent paralysis of the industrial revival on which all depends. Is this a risk against which the nations can take concerted measures? If it is, such measures clearly ought to be taken.

Pursuing our dream, then, we are now to suppose that the whole mass of *war indebtedness*¹ which is the source of this danger has been placed under international management and control, the necessary power being vested in a Board of Trustees chosen *ad hoc* on the ground of their ability to deal with such matters and their proved loyalty as public servants. Let one of the powers in question be that of selection and rejection, as exercised in ordinary insurance, so that our international Board can decline responsibility for debts that are technically "bad." *Let the Board now charge itself with the task of organising the whole finance of war indebtedness as a unitary system, collecting from each nation the revenues required for the service of the debts selected as reasonably "good," and guaranteeing, under specified rules, the payment of the interest.*

The International Reserve being constituted in the manner described in a preceding paragraph, let each guaranteed State now make an annual payment to the International Trust, proportionate to the guarantees it was seeking, the funds for such annual payment being raised by a compulsory insurance tax² on the whole of its debt-holding population, in a manner presently to be described. By these two means our International Trust or Board is now equipped with funds in hand and with prospective revenues.

The next stage in the development of our dream is to imagine that the vast funds thus placed under international control are employed in the manner and under the rules proper to an incorporation of insurance: that is to say, they are to be invested in productive and well-accredited enterprises all over the world, and in whatever other business the nature of a great public Trust might warrant; *and so distributed in the invest-*

¹ If the beginning were made with *war* debt the process might be easily extended to national debt as a whole. This indeed is implied in what follows.

² There are other methods of doing this, which might vary from State to State. After reviewing many, I mention, for the purpose of compressed illustration, that which appears to me the simplest.

ment as to be virtually inaccessible to the predatory designs of any State.¹ Let the profits of all this business (conceivably immense) flow back under a scheme of equitable distribution to the various contributing States, to be applied by each to promotion of social warfare, whether in the paying off of its debts or in anything else the popular will might determine.

And in the event of any State defaulting in its obligations to the Trust, breaking its contracts either by treachery or misfortune, let the Board be empowered, by international sanction, to take over the public finance of the said defaulting State, in so far as this might be necessary to make good the default.²

It is obvious that such an arrangement would have many marks of insurance procedure, and if a name had to be found for it (though the name is of little importance) it would be called Insurance. The International Trust might indeed be described as an International Friendly Society, a not inappropriate name for the scheme in its moral aspect. It would be equipped with a Reserve; its contract with a contributory State would have the character of a policy; the annual payment would be a premium; the rules, the safeguards, the benefits, the penalties, the forfeitures would have much in common with those now familiar in the practice of insurance. On the whole, we may say that its nature would be fiduciary in the first instance and political only in the second; its methods would be those of business rather than those of diplomacy; it would command no armed forces, would stand clear of the fortunes of parties, and would be comparatively undisturbed by national pride and wholly undisturbed by warlike traditions. Its managers would not in the main be politicians, but skilled and approved trustees. In short, the insurance character is manifest throughout. The resources of actuarial science would be enlisted in the service and high demands made on moral responsibility. Both are points to the good: the one as assuring a body of sound principles to begin with; the other as providing a much-needed school for international morality.

These last considerations have brought us down somewhat from the realm of dreams in which we started, and we begin to feel the solid earth. This feeling is strengthened as we turn to consider the probable consequences if our dream were fulfilled.

By giving a measure of security to international credit—absolute security of course is not claimed—one at all events

¹ Royce shows with great clearness how this can be done.

² I owe this important suggestion to a very able critic in the *Financial News*.

of the conditions would be attained without which industrial revival cannot take place. Whatever security might be gained in this manner would have indeed an immediate repercussion in sustaining and stimulating productive enterprise all over the world. Equally important would be the effect on *distribution*. For, be it noted, the essential principle of the whole undertaking is that of pooling the resources of nations for a common but defined benefit. That this distribution of pressures, burdens, and resources would be attempted on the international scale, *between whole peoples*, adds greatly to its significance as a distributive measure. May it not be that the right and only method of solving the problem of just distribution is that which begins with the largest units in the industrial enterprise, to wit, with an adjustment of national inequalities, and gradually works downward from international ground until its principles have permeated and transformed the social structure of each separate community?

But how does all this affect the question of peace and war?

In the first place, it should be obvious that to whatever extent *any* vital interest of all the nations is covered by insurance, you give to each insured nation a strong motive for protecting that interest from damage.¹ Moreover, any insured nation which by warlike action damaged the insured interest in question, whether it be credit or merchant shipping or anything else, would *pro tanto* be damaging itself. Having insured my house along with my neighbours, it is clearly against my interest to set my neighbours' houses on fire.

But if this were not enough—and, in a world subject to fits of madness, it might not be—a simple provision in the policy of each insuring nation would introduce a yet stronger deterrent motive. *This provision would state that the guarantees accorded to existing war indebtedness were strictly subject to that indebtedness being increased no further; and that any State embarking on an unpermitted war and thereby involving itself in further debt would immediately forfeit not only the guarantees it had purchased but the whole of its deposits and payments up to date, pending investigation of its conduct by the Court of the Trust.* This would give pause even to the maddest. The first occasion on which such action was necessary would reveal to the world, beyond all

¹ These proposals have been attacked on the ground that only dishonest nations would want to insure. Every form of insurance, when first introduced, was attacked on the same ground. It is the weakest of all the objections.

gainsaying, the truth of the proposition with which this article set out—that to have international control of war finance is to have international control of the whole war situation. By applying our method to the results of war finance in the past we obtain control over the war finance of the future, through the power thus possessed by the Trust to put decisive checks on any State that took action likely to increase its war indebtedness.

To the expert objector who urges that the technical problems involved in these ideas are too complex to be handled by actuarial science—to him I am willing to make concessions. Let the scale of the dream be reduced. Instead of taking up the whole mass of war indebtedness, let us be content at first to put some considerable portion of it under international trust; and instead of leaving the question of time indefinite, let the guarantees be limited to five years (more or less), so as to cover the period of extreme danger, as the next five years unquestionably will be. From such a tentative, experimental, and time-limited beginning let the proposal go forth to try its fortune in the world; there is enough *prima facie* evidence to warrant a trial. The mere effort to start it would do good, if only as proving that we are in earnest, and not mere phrasemongers, when we talk of a League of Nations—that, in short, we are prepared “to put money into the business.” If successful, the scheme would rapidly develop from its first form; if unsuccessful, the world would incur no greater loss than it is otherwise threatened with. Moreover, it might well prove the beginning of that much-needed reform of international finance in general of which Mr Hartley Withers has written so wisely.¹

In order to establish a yet firmer footing on the solid earth I will offer two concrete examples of the working of such a scheme.

We will suppose the International Trust in being, and that Germany, one of the insured nations, attacks the United States, also insured. Automatically Germany at once incurs a staggering financial penalty: all international guarantees in her favour lapse, her deposits are forfeit, and the whole weight of her indebtedness is flung back on her own shoulders. Undeterred by these prospects, Germany, we will imagine, persists in the attack, hoping to make good her losses by confiscating the Trust's investments in her own territory, and by plundering the United States. *But at both these points she attacks the consolidated interests of the whole body of insuring nations,*

¹ *The Business of Finance*, p. 192.

who, in consequence, automatically range themselves against the aggressor. Meanwhile no damage which Germany could inflict upon the United States would extend to American interests in the general property of the Trust, save in so far as these happened to consist of investments within American or within German territory. On these terms Germany's prospects of plunder would be reduced and her prospects of loss would be enormous. And if the question is raised, what would happen in the event of a nation being utterly destroyed by conquerors, the answer may be given in the words of Professor Royce: "If a nation loses its life [this would apply also to its natural death], then its insurance rights, and of course its funds deposited in any form with the International Board, simply revert to the common fund of mankind, and are henceforth used . . . for the benefit of all insuring nations" (*War and Insurance*, xxxi).

The next illustration is chosen from different ground. I suppose myself to be the holder of £1000 in National War Bonds bearing interest at 5 per cent. Not reckoning taxes, this yields me an income of £50 a year. But in order to provide funds for paying its annual premium to the Trust, the State informs me that my £1000 will be subject to an Insurance Tax in the shape of a reduction of interest from 5 to 4 per cent.,¹ thereby reducing my income to £40. But the £10 of which I am thus annually mulcted is by no means a loss to me—is in fact no more than a form of compulsory saving; for the terms on which the State has insured itself with the Trust are such that these annual payments of mine, together with those of my fellow-citizens similarly insured, will accumulate into a capital sum, so that, when the time arrives for the redemption of my £1000 thirty years hence, I, or my heirs, will receive £300 in addition, together with a portion of such interest and profits as the fortunes of the International Trust may allow. This, on the whole, I accept as good business, remembering that I have already insured my life, with several eminently sound societies, on much the same principles. Some temporary renunciation would no doubt be imposed upon me, as it is by my life-policies. But am I in earnest about a League of Nations? If I am, far greater renunciations than this would be gladly embraced.

A few of the salient difficulties involved in these suggestions will now be briefly dealt with.

¹ This would involve that the insured interest would be at the rate of 4 per cent.

It has been pointed out by several competent critics that an actuarial difficulty arises from the small number of insuring units (corresponding to the number of States involved) and the magnitude of each individual risk (corresponding to the war indebtedness of each insured nation). In regard to this the following points should be noted :—

1. The debts selected being reasonably “good,” *total* default on the part of an insuring State is practically out of the question. The actual risk would be that of partial default. This reduces the magnitude of the individual risk.

2. The last consideration has suggested to some who have studied this plan a method of breaking the total debt into a large number of “blocks,” which might be treated as separately insurable. Obviously the risk on the last “block” of (say) ten millions would be greater than on the first, a progressive increase being shown from the first to the last. This would introduce the problem of average involved in all insurance, and would be susceptible of mathematical treatment.

3. Assuming the risk to be still abnormally large, it should be noted that the method of insurance taxation renders possible exceptionally high rates of premium. In the illustration given, where an extreme limit was purposely chosen, £4 of interest would be covered by £1 of premium, or 200 millions of interest by 50 millions of premium. Doubtless this would be found in any case excessive, but it shows the range of possibility.

A second objection takes the form of stating that debt, as such, is not insurable. This, I would venture to submit, is hardly correct. If a tradesman whose books are open to inspection can insure himself against bad debts, there seems no *prima facie* reason why lenders to the State should not do the same thing. Strictly speaking, it is not the debt that is insured but the loan. This difficulty is mainly one of terminology.

The last difficulty I can here deal with is connected with the formation of the International Reserve. In the original draft of these proposals, as published in the daily press, I contended, and still contend, that the nucleus of the Reserve should be formed by whatever indemnities the victors may impose on the vanquished. This aroused much criticism, on the political ground that Germany might in the long run derive some share of benefit from her own punishment. I confess that this has little weight with me, even on political ground, against the general reasons for the international funding of the indemnities, no doubt with special application of a portion of them to individual cases. Moreover, I can conceive

of no method for the pacification of Europe from the benefits of which Germany can be excluded, even if it is desired to exclude her; and surely the method to be preferred is that which makes the benefit strictly contingent on her future good behaviour, as this does.

However, the indemnities would form no more than a nucleus of the Fund, though possibly a vast one, and would need to be backed up by contributions all round from the co-operating States. These I can conceive as *investments*, strictly so called, though the idea of *divestments*, or gifts, need not be excluded if one chooses to suppose that the nations are in deadly earnest about the League. There are at least some unexhausted States which could *lend* on a large scale to an international undertaking, and with far better results to themselves and to mankind than they would get by lending to backward and corrupt governments notorious for disreputable finance. And there are no States so exhausted as to be without valuable resources, which might profitably be diverted in the same manner. It is, once more, merely a question of whether they are in earnest. If nothing whatever is to be either lent or given to international enterprise, the sooner the League of Nations is dropped the better; the question for each State to ask itself being, primarily, not "What shall I get *out* of the League?" but "What am I willing to put *in*?"

Such, then, is one of the modes (doubtless there are others) in which a few men, after careful study, have thought it possible to give concrete form to Lord Grey's second condition for a League of Nations. Whether or no these proposals will stand the scrutiny of the expert, it will probably be agreed that the difficult problems involved in the League are not to be solved by rhetorical methods, but require, above all else, the stern application of scientific principles. At least, it may be granted that proposals of the type suggested above might serve the useful purpose of testing the earnestness of "governments and peoples" which have professed their adhesion to the League. This they would do by raising the commonplace but significant question of *how far these converts are willing to put money into the business*.

From much of the propaganda put forth in favour of the League of Nations it would almost appear as though the object in view were the purely negative one of "ending war for ever," and as though the only method known to the propagandists for achieving this object were the negative method of entering into political compacts not to fight, thinly dis-

guised as positive compacts to fight the fighters. But this is wholly unsatisfying to those who are genuinely interested in the community life of mankind. Peace, conceived as not-fighting, affords no basis for active co-operation (the secret of all community life), which invariably reposes on a positive deed-to-be-done, and abhors the negative as surely as nature abhors a vacuum. One cannot doubt, indeed, that positive designs lurk behind these negative programmes, but too often they have been either concealed or vaguely stated in abstract terms, such as Justice, Liberty, Fraternity, International Right; all of which terms lend themselves to various and even contrary interpretations, and thus provoke more quarrels than they allay, thereby justifying the motto, *societas mater discordiarum*. It is at this point, when the negatives are so dangerous and the vagueness so bewildering, that our proposal offers a positive, concrete, and definite deed-to-be-done—and to be done at once, for the matter will brook no delay. A beginning has to be found; and this is not likely to happen so long as we are content with abstractions like Justice or even Peace, or with negatives like not-fighting, as defining the business of a League of Nations. And is it not obvious that if the League succeeds in making a positive contribution to industrial stability, and thereby to industrial revival, it will be in a far stronger position for dealing with other and perhaps greater matters hereafter? Whereas by beginning at the other end the whole enterprise may conceivably come to nought.

For the fact that we are living in an industrial age clearly warns us that international peace can never be established on a foundation of industrial peril or ruin. The political States which are to be the units in the new fraternity of “free” nations must be more than “free”—they must be assured of a reasonable measure of industrial order and prosperity within their own borders. “Soon there will be a League of Nations, and then the time will come to settle old scores at home, and to make things generally hot.” This remark, overheard by me not long ago in a public place, where it was applauded, indicates the point of view I am here venturing to call in question. The picture of a number of “free” peoples “making things hot” within their own borders, and at the same time combining together to keep things cool in the world at large, is the picture of something which can never exist on this earth. International stability and industrial stability are interdependent; neither can be without the other; and I am inclined to think that the best service the

League of Nations can render to the first is by making a substantial contribution to the second.

This suggests an immediate application for President Wilson's famous motto, "to make the world safe for democracy." *As a practical first step towards making the world safe for democracy let the League of Nations begin by taking what measures it can to make the world safe for the industrial revival.* For unless the industrial revival is secured there will be no world in which democracy or any other system can thrive. There will be neither prosperity nor peace.

A few propositions will suffice to sum up this article.

1. Good national conditions cannot exist in the absence of good international conditions. The interests of this working world are unitary. The age of isolated national prosperity is past.

2. Since we are living in an industrial age, international reconstruction will deal largely with industrial forces, industrial motives, industrial methods, industrial renunciations, and industrial aims.

3. It is on the field of industry that the nations of the future are destined to be either friends or foes.

4. It is impossible for any nation, even our own, to "treble its wealth, production, and income" after the war *unless the other nations are doing much the same thing.* Let the nation, then, which hopes to do this help the others to do likewise, making "renunciations" accordingly.

5. The more the nations co-operate in this way, the stronger will become the motives to peace and the weaker the motives to war.

6. Political aims have a tendency to develop into war aims, and have, in fact, caused most of the wars in history: whereas industrial aims have a tendency towards peace.

7. On a survey of existing industrial institutions we find that several are admirable models of community life. One or other of these may be better adapted for extension to mankind at large than the particular model known as the political State, *hitherto far too exclusively considered.* A corporate union of peoples is thus foreshadowed "which is neither a nation, nor a court of arbitration, nor an international congress, nor a federation of States."

8. The principle to guide the formation of this new entity is approximately, and to begin with, that of bearing one another's burdens, in the scientific expression of it known as Insurance, which has already permeated the social structures

of separate societies, developed a high degree of theoretical accuracy, and proved itself endlessly flexible and fruitful in reconciling antagonisms.

9. In giving to the League of Nations this orientation it is most desirable that its establishment should not be left too exclusively in the hands of statesmen, diplomats, politicians, international lawyers, political philosophers, and others, likely to be in bondage to purely political traditions, but that every opportunity should be given to labour, business, and finance to contribute their experience, their science, their methods, their loyalties, and their ideals to the matter in hand.

10. Finance is not, as some think, the rich man's art. It is the art of the Public Trust. Its business lies at the centre of community life, as developed by industrial civilisation.

11. In all this the man to be sought for, and on whose discovery everything depends, is the man who unites in himself the breadth of the international mind, the trained accuracy of science, and the faithful spirit of the trustee.

It is the last-named individual, the faithful trustee, to whom we should learn to look more and more as the saviour of industrial society and the guardian of the peace of the world. Fortunately the type is not uncommon; as Royce truly says, it is a type which our society has been singularly successful in breeding. We find the faithful trustee everywhere; we find him even at the centre of things, bearing the weight of the industrial system on his strong shoulders, as Atlas bore the world, wise, skilful, patient, hidden, unacclaimed, but of all men the most essential. Let him withdraw his support, and down comes the whole structure in ruins which neither the diplomat nor the agitator can rebuild. The faithful trustee goes by many names and appears in many characters, often unrecognised, sometimes hated by those whose interests he serves, but always at his post. He is the man we need, and need most of all for the great reconciling work now afoot which is to establish the community of mankind. This was the burden of Professor Royce.

L. P. JACKS.

THE NEW COMPATRIOTISM.

ERNEST RHYS.

“THEN did the Governor of the Universe let go, as it were, the tiller, and depart into his own Watch-tower, and fate and inborn impulse began to cause the Universe to revolve backwards again. . . . And the Universe was shaken as with a great earthquake to its depths by reason of the concussion of the reversed revolution, and the strife betwixt the two contrary motions, . . . whereby was wrought a fresh destruction of living creatures of every kind. Thereafter, when the due time was come, the Universe at last ceased from its tumults, and confusion, and earthquakes ; and coming into a calm, and being set in order, went forward duly in its course, calling to mind alway the teaching of the Maker and Father of all.”

Plato's account of the Universe out of gear and of its return to order after the era of disturbance is one to strike home to us in the moment of escape from war. We too have felt a shock, like a cataclysm in Nature itself, and we are not yet out of the vortex. And not only our physical consciousness has been shaken. Our two philosophies—that by which we live, and that which we think out for ourselves of a night—have been shaken too ; and we are glad to turn for comfort to any myth of earth's renewal, believing with Plato in the law that reinstates, and trusting to that resiliency in human nature which helps men to find again the true concurrency.

Those of us who are political veterans, old hands in the difficult matter of living and moving concertedly, may find ourselves in the rôle of the Eleatic Stranger in the Dialogue, only to hesitate in fulfilling it. We are bound to see that the party of youth, figured by Plato in the guise of the younger Socrates, is out to speed the process of restitution as we cannot hope to do. If our young Socrates has come back from the wars, having fought for us, and risked his very life to bring

the world-at-odds back to its even stride—it seems fair that he should do most of the talking, and not we theoretic onlookers and stay-at-homes. At any rate he claims, and is bound to claim, a positive voice in setting the world to rights and assuring to mankind a happier future. He is not satisfied to act as prompter to his elders. His tone is that of the opener of the plea, his accent that of the young soldier I met on the pier at Havre, in the second autumn campaign, as he was gazing homeward across the Channel:—"We are not going back after the war," he said, "to the same old state of things. No, we shall not be satisfied till we have swept away some of the rubbish, and made a better place of it to live in."

The terrible ordeal our young soldiers have gone through, one that has brought them into closer relations with those of other races—American, Australian, French, Italian, Indian—has not failed to quicken them to a sense of vast new opportunities and a more assured commonalty in the time to come. We gather it from their casual sayings, their letters home, and their latest books of war-verse. It sounds in the lines of a Welsh poet who wrote under the name of "Hedd Wyn"¹ and died in the field—lines that figure the young man militant as Prometheus:

"Before, earth's woes and clouds are sped:
Behind, the day-dawn breaks the night:
There, terrible in revolt, I said,
Prometheus waits with uprear'd head
To lead the Crusade of the Morning Light."

It is heard from the latest Jewish poet, "Moysheh Oyved," whose new song of the Children of Israel has recently been translated from the Yiddish:

"Their way was dark, and they stumbled and trod on the weaker ones;
But I will take them all under my wings, endow them with my spirit,
illumine them with my light,
Till all nations shall serve one God, speak one language, and sing one song."

Less hopefully, it is heard in Mr Alec Waugh's book of poems, published while he was a prisoner of war in Germany:

"O clanging bells, O brazen pride,
Forget, forgive;
Remember for a moment those that died
And those that live."

And in America a rebel poet, whose extravagant assertion of his own powers has prevented his getting a hearing—Mr

¹ White or Blessed Peace.

Nelson Gardner,—sounds it when he writes that they who build with stone and mortar

“ Or will that wildest archways shall be thrown
Across historic tides—theirs is a guild,
Whose visions are by verities fulfilled.”

Other reminders we might take from the same sources to prove their stubborn belief in the freer and surer human opportunity that is bound to come. This faith of theirs is no doubt closely allied with the irrepressible claim of youth to happiness, urged by that brave impulse of the blood, which is strongest in our forecasting years. The formula of deliverance, which it seeks, was summed up long ago in the Golden Rule, as recognising that human happiness, in its enlargement growing godlike, and in the exuberance of its delight becoming fluid, must flow out to one's fellow men and women in the whole universe. “As the morning sun to me, so be it to thee!” said the Sheikh. In truth the young poets and the true lovers, in the largesse of their hearts, transcend the desire for individual bliss and draw all the rest of the living world into their communion. They are citizens of a city, so of all cities; children of a mother-country, so of all countries. They say with another new poet in her song of “The Stars on the Town”:

“ As I sit at the door of my house,
And as far as the eye can see;
There are houses and houses like mine,—
It seems very strange to me.”¹

It means that the expanding circle of goodwill is determined at one's own door. If the door is kept shut, symbol of a closed portcullis, the spirit of good-fellowship is left out in the cold.

We need not pretend that these notions sprang up yesterday—for, like most new ideas, they are very old. They existed, it is certain, long before a certain Doctor Price preached the bold sermon that fired Burke in his famous *Reflections on the French Revolution*. The idea of a great heritage, to be shared freely among one's fellow-men, stated by some of our new poets, was realised by the old Celtic apostles with an even more fervid belief. Its echo sounds in the Latin hymn of Seachnall, sung at the communion in the old Irish churches; in the preaching of Cadoc, in the story of Nindid the bookman who gave Brigit the Sacrament at her death: “So it came to pass that the comradeship of the world's sons of reading is

¹ In a delightful book called *Finding*, by Helen Direks.

with Brigit, and through her the Lord gives them every good thing." It is expressed in Brigit's naïve desire for a perpetual ale-feast in Heaven :

" I would like a great lake of ale,
For the King of Kings ;
I would like the people of heaven
To be drinking it thro' all the ages."

This great lake of ale, if you see it with Brigit's eyes, is a symbol of the true communion, and gives reality to her belief, even as that glimpse of Wordsworth which shows him entering Coleridge's cottage at Nether Stowey after a long hot tramp and taking deep toll of the ale-jug on the table gives reality to the schemes of Pantisocracy which he and Coleridge were then excogitating on the Quantocks. That " Little Academe " of theirs, and the Celtic Isles of Youth, and the hopes for mankind that are latent in our new poets are one. " The Lyrical Ballads " and the pages of " The Prelude " are instinct with the feeling that sped those day-dreams :

" Dare I avow that wish were mine to see
And hope that future times would surely see
The Man to Come, parted as by a gulf
From him who has been . . . "

And again :

" Even so could I unsoul
More mysteries of being which have made,
And shall continue evermore to make,
Of the whole human race one Brotherhood."

The " Young Italy " of Mazzini, the " Young England " that Disraeli sketched in his political novels, the " Young Ireland " of Gavan Duffy and Thomas Davis, the little group of the Transcendentalists in " New England," the " Pre-Raphaelites " in London, the " Cymru Fydd " of the Tôm Ellis and Lloyd George of a generation ago—these are other manifestations of the same spirit, working for the renewal of mankind.

Disraeli looks a strange figure to be set up in this gallery of visionaries, for now one hardly thinks of him save as the astutest of reactionaries, the sophisticated old statesman whose early Victorian romances are lost in the heavy upholstery of *Lothair*. Yet, it was he who said that if he wanted political foresight he would go to the young men for it. What would he have said, I wonder, had he been told that in the year 1844—the year in which he wrote *Coningsby*—a little group of city drapers' assistants, meeting in an upper

room in St Paul's Churchyard, was forming a sacred brotherhood destined to spread over the whole world?

From a worldly point of view everything was against these humble and pious rebels. Barely educated at all, according to 'Varsity notions; in habit puritanical, and narrow-minded according to the opinions of the gilded youth about them, they had in their hearts a fire of conviction that would not let them rest. Some of the records of their early association, that tell their fears for their own souls and their incontinent faith in their mission to save others, read like passages out of St Augustine. The diary of their leader shows that he was much influenced by the sayings of one eloquent divine: "Let us live with one another as if we really believed that there was such a thing as brotherhood." So the first manifesto sent out by the society spoke of winning "the eternal welfare of our fellow-mortals." It was in fact a neo-Christian compatriotism, worked by an ardent League of Youth, that they sought to set up. "We shall not be surprised," said the same document, "if the project, be reckoned by some a Utopian scheme." One likes rather to dwell upon the criticism, and the derision too, that these would-be world compatriots of 1844 faced, because it is the cold wave that tests the long-distance swimmer. The idealists who scheme the restoration of a universe must be ready for the objectors and the believers in "Let things be." The reply to the old critics of the Y.M.C.A. is the circle it has put round the world. Its familiar soldiers' shanty is a movable Shanti Niketan, a House of Peace built on the edge of battle-fields, where men of all faiths, sorts, and conditions forgathered as at an inn of strange meetings. This plain wooden hut with the sign of the Red Triangle, where our men repaired on dark nights out of the mud and rain, shrapnel and shell fire, of France and Flanders, or where they sheltered from the hot suns of Egypt and India, is the pledge of a world citizenship that knows no ban. The chain of these huts has been drawn loosely, but surely, around the world; and what touches one's imagination most in this interlinking of the lands is the fact that it is the direct result of what seemed a mortal fracture in the commonwealth.

The simplicity of the service makes its effect the more reassuring, and the concrete argument it offers for a world-wide concurrency of effort is better than many theoretic conjectures about the social, civil, and remedial instincts of mankind in a state of war. The disease creates or educates the doctor; the world-shaking inducts the return to the cosmic rhythm; the famine teaches us to plant corn where before the land was

barren. And yet no mere working out of a law of compensation in spiritual and human affairs will satisfy our young Socrates. He says in effect, standing at the door of his hut of vision, that the great adventure is only now beginning. He declares that "the old order is going out, in the wake of the Kaiser; that the ineradicable fighting energies of man will now go to tackle the actual forces of anarchy, the political Kaiserism" (whatever he means by that) "and the threatened ugliness of a machine-made civilisation." He says that the old compatriotism, as it appears in the military romances of Marlborough's or Napoleon's time, was instinct with a national egoism that shut off good-fellowship with the folk of other countries. Its prime word was that famous saying of the world-conqueror, quoted by Montholon, that he had wished his people should be The Great Nation,—what matter if ten nations were murdered to make that one? He will quote you that passage of Burke's *Reflections* which deprecated the process in France from regional to national sentiment, by which its sons should become "Frenchmen with one country, one heart, and one assembly"—the *reductio* of that argument being the parish clerk.

In the dialogue we began by quoting, Plato led us to an idea which Burke too would have undemocratically, but eloquently, expanded—the idea of the Eternal Statesman overruling the temporal statesmen of our choice. It is by a boldly un-Platonic extension of that idea that our soldiers home from the war, who are ready now to become soldiers in the "war of liberation of humanity," are urging the claims of a common mind of man, which shall give us our wiser Demos and equip him with the Folk Moot, the Commons, the Commonalty and the Commonweal of the future. If they add a League of Nations, and we point to the spoilt pedigree of that League in the past, they reply that what failed in the dry tree need not fail in the green. The old order is going, or has already gone. What of a League of Nations with a league of peoples behind it? So they cite a pragmatic philosopher (though he has sometimes argued on the other side) to the effect that "the spirit of fellowship is in the air," and its breath has passed into the life of England and the whole civil world. The war is over, but its master-emotion is still powerfully with us, and it is one that serves for great experiments, and tempts us to make our newest proverbs out of St Augustine's *City of God* and St Brigit's "Lake of Ale."

ERNEST RHYS.

ON SOME PARALLELS BETWEEN A LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND A RE-UNION OF CHURCHES.

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IT is difficult to define with completeness and precision either the term "Nation" or "Church." We all feel what we mean when we say we belong to this nation or that Church, but when invited to explain clearly what our nation or Church exactly is—its origin and bounds, its rights over us, and our rights in it—we hesitate, because we find ourselves confronted with problems both complex in their character and intricate in their solution. A nation is manifestly something more than a mere geographical expression. Nations are not made by rivers and mountains: though rivers and mountains play a part in compacting them. Even seas and oceans do not altogether either divide or unite them. All Ireland is bounded by the same seas, yet it is not one nation but two. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, although sundered by vast oceans, are in close national fellowship with Great Britain: a family fellowship whose bonds no distance weakens or breaks. Nationhood sometimes also includes varieties of race and language: as do both the British and American nationhoods. Even diversities of ordinances, regulations, and laws may co-exist among the various provinces of a single nation: each province administering its own local affairs in its own way, and all the provinces uniting together in a single Commonwealth for the good of the whole.

The purpose of the proposed League of Nations is to extend these bonds of common interests and brotherly fellowship beyond the internal limits of separate nations, so expanding them as to include many nations in one inter-

nationality for their mutual advantage. It is a great and lofty ideal; so great and lofty as to appear to multitudes altogether impracticable. And no wonder. For hitherto the most common attribute of nationhood has been exclusiveness. Even patriotism has been scarcely distinguishable from national selfishness. "The balance of power" has generally meant a trimming of the balance in favour of ourselves and against others. Neutrality itself has not been always generous; and much diplomacy has been a clever game played by men trained in the notion that the strength of one nation is best ensured by the weakness of other nations, the freedom of one by fetters on others, the prosperity of one by the adversity of others, the honour and glory of one by the shame and abasement of others.

The utter falseness of these suppositions is one of the great moral discoveries of modern times, and is calculated to prepare the way of mankind towards the attainment of felicities undreamed of as yet. Their realisation will be slow. An imperfect world and an imperfect human nature will not suddenly, or even swiftly, learn the things that belong to its perfection. Traditions of the patriotism of exclusiveness are very tough and will die hard. They have a deep root in the old Adam which lurks in the best of us. For, as a quaint observer wrote long ago, "Every man is the Adam of his own soul." Whatever view we take of the ancient story of Satan in Eden, we can hardly doubt that some sort of Satan, either within or without us, or both, has often successfully tempted men through every stage of human history to make the lower choice between things good and evil: otherwise how could the world have failed to become long before now a better world? Its Creator meant it to be a very good world: nor have men's vices and egotisms entirely frustrated the Creator's design by making it an altogether bad world. Every succeeding century has left it on the whole a little better, touched with higher aspirations and emotions, than the centuries that went before. It is on the historic experiences of these gradual ascents that we may confidently build our hopes for the future unions of both nations and churches, and especially for their fuller and higher Christianisation.

The present world-wide war, notwithstanding its innumerable infamies and atrocities, seems to be hastening this process of Christianisation, especially in the deepening and widening of our perceptions of the indefeasible fact of the brotherhood of men. This brotherhood is not a discovery due to revolutionists: for revolutionists who have most loudly proclaimed

it have not seldom been amongst its most ruthless violators. Revolutions, indeed, have sometimes owed their origin and strength to the general negligence of the fact of human brotherhood, and their furious onslaughts on this negligence have frequently been the means of disinterring the living fact from the sepulchres of oblivion. But both the fact and its proclamation are older than all revolutions. They are among the foremost of sacred revelations. "God hath made of one blood all the families of men that dwell on the earth." In the sight of God mankind has from the beginning been regarded as one family. He is the Father of all men alike, without respect of race or person. The primal mission of Christ was to open out to the gaze of mankind this long-observed fact of the universal Fatherhood of God, together with its inseparable corollary of the universal brotherhood of men: and to put the divine seal on His mission by the sacrifice of Himself.

It should obviously have been the principal passion of the churches to proclaim and promote this primal mission of their Lord. But for our sad knowledge to the contrary, it would have appeared inconceivable that any other objects should have absorbed their interests and their energies. As the churches, however, have largely failed to illustrate among themselves this spirit of brotherhood, it is not surprising that the nations should have failed also. But under the stress laid upon them by the war many nations, as witnessed by the general favour accorded to their proposed league, are at last becoming alive to the fact of human brotherhood and of the paramount necessity of bringing themselves into line with it in their interrelationships one with another. In this supreme matter they are giving a splendid lead to the churches, and happily the best of the churches are manifesting a strong desire to follow their lead. The most progressive nations are rapidly drawing towards the conviction that mutual co-operation is immeasurably better than mutual jealousy, both for the promotion of their own national interests and the common good of humanity: and the most Christian churches are more clearly perceiving that a narrow exclusiveness is altogether oppugnant to their religion, and that by the exercise of brotherly love they can best advance their own sacred work, best commend themselves to each other and the world at large, best adorn the doctrine of their Founder and their Lord.

It is from the rich depths of these convictions that the proposed League of Nations and the desire for a closer re-union of the churches have sprung into being and are continually

renewing their strength. The proposed League of Nations is no mere political or diplomatic league, and consequently worthless and impotent as that of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 proved itself to be. It is to be a great moral league, founded on universal and irrefragable principles, and not merely sketched by the pens of potentates for the advancement of their own purposes. It is more than a treaty or series of treaties. It is more of the nature of an organism than a parchment. During the last hundred years we have had overwhelming evidence of the impotence of treaties to secure either peace or the preservation of international agreements. If the new League of Nations is to fare better than previous Leagues and Concerts, it must be built on different foundations and enlivened by a different spirit. It is the spirit that quickens and alone makes anything strong. Systems are more dependent on their spirit, than spirits on their system. Every system lives or dies according to the character and vigour of its spirit. The spirit of the proposed League of Nations is shown (1) by its decision not to attempt to intervene in the internal affairs of any nation—its forms of government, its laws and their administration—but only to claim a voice in the determination of such policies as touch the welfare of other nations ; (2) by its recognition that every nation is, or ought to be, a member of the universal family or brotherhood of mankind ; (3) and that when national affect international interests they must be treated internationally, *i.e.* as part of an indivisible whole, and not separately. These are some of the high ideals which the League of Nations seeks to actualise in the world. Nations like Germany, Austria, and Turkey, to which such ideals are abhorrent, can claim no right of admission to the league. Their introduction would be the ruin of the league. Morally they are backward and barbarous peoples. Might is their deity. Force their only conceivable solution of international conflicts. They worship animal strength, and like animals they rear their hopes on the downfall of others. The co-equal brotherhood of nations, the independent freedom of States however small, is entirely foreign to their thoughts and wills. Individually they are often kind : collectively always cruel. They have one standard for personal, another and far lower for public conduct. In technical, industrial, economic knowledge, all knowledge, *i.e.* concerned with materialistic pursuits, some of them, notably Germany, are in the vanguard of the world ; but in moral aspirations and spiritual aims such as those which animate and inspire the League of Nations they lag deplorably behind.

Some day, let us hope, they may advance and be morally abreast of the civilised world; but to admit them to the League of Nations now would be something like translating a *Kindergarten* to the Sixth Form and requiring the Sixth to delay its work till the infants had reached the level of its attainments.

The machinery needful for putting into practice the ideals of the League of Nations will be difficult to design and more difficult still to establish effectively. No nation finds it easy to devise means for framing and enforcing even its own laws, for so controlling their administration as to protect the rights and redress the wrongs of its citizens, for policing and punishing offenders and obtaining full security for the innocent and law-abiding, together with equal liberties, equal opportunities, equal justice for all alike. But international affairs will be vastly more difficult to direct and decide, owing to their greater magnitude and complexity, than national affairs. No one has yet contrived a workable constitution for a Parliament of Nations, or an effectual police for enforcing its decisions. Perhaps the time is not yet ripe for the invention of an adequate machinery. The nations are not yet sufficiently leavened with the ideals of the league to discover and supply the machinery for actualising them. Hence the opportunity of the practical man for denouncing them as impracticable. But who is the practical man? Lord Beaconsfield once described him as "the man who practises the errors of his forefathers." The world is, however, growing weary of these practical men whose sustenance is dry memories of a dead past, and who have no vision of a more living, more beautiful, and more bountiful future. Practical men seldom dream dreams or see visions. Their vocation is, and far from an ignoble one, to find out the way for making practical use of the dreams of others, for inventing fit and adequate machinery for applying and carrying them out in everyday life. Some sort of ideals every man, even the most practical, is bound to adopt and submit to. The more materialistic the man, the more materialistic will be his ideals (in his case ideals are idols): the nobler his ideals, the nobler the man. The ideals of the League of Nations are confessedly more noble than those that have so largely directed the policies and practices of nations in the past. Let them therefore remain fixed and shining in the firmament of our lives. The existing league of the Allies, comprising most of the great nations of the world, is already producing very practical results as a fruit of its ideals. Its main machinery indeed, for the present, is military force; but the bare fact that even the machinery

of war can work for the promotion of these ideals encourages the hope that when a righteous peace has been secured a nobler machinery will be discovered for their fuller realisation. Christ was content to lift up before mankind His matchless ideals, but He bequeathed no designs or forms of machinery for putting them into practice. The ideals are divine, originating in God; the machinery is human, and left, therefore, to the reason and inventions of men. For two thousand years these ideals, by means of many forms of machinery, have been very slowly, yet most surely, performing their work. Few evidences of the power of these ideals have been more convincing than that recently given by President Wilson and the United States of America. No selfish interest had any share in persuading this great war-hating people to battle for the liberties and humanities of the world. The all-impelling force in their decision was the force of an ideal: the ideal of brotherhood among nations and the necessity of subjugating the despotisms which barred the way to its accomplishment. Only give ideals time and opportunity to work and invariably they prove themselves the strongest of all forces among men.

What are some of the parallels which naturally suggest themselves between the proposed League of Nations and the proposed re-union of the churches? The term "Church" is as difficult to define with precision as the term "Nation." The Catholic has his own definition, and the Congregationalist his also: each being opposite to the other. We know with some certitude and definiteness what a church was in primitive Apostolic days. It was a local congregation of Christian people, sometimes numbering only two or three members. A congregation of twelve was entitled to have its own superintendent or bishop. Clement says there were several bishops in the single city of Rome at the close of the first century. At a later date there were some hundreds of bishops in the province of North Africa alone. Gradually, however, under the pressure of altered circumstances, the need for adapting ecclesiastical organisations to the changing times, the inordinate multiplication of little local churches and the obvious wisdom of increasing strength by promoting unity, leagues of churches were successively formed. Urban bishops, being generally men of greater ability and higher culture than rural bishops, slowly superseded them by the simple process of arranging that the rural vacancies should not be filled. One bishop thus took the place, and did the work, of several bishops. One church also came to comprehend and include several

churches. The visible bond of this amalgamation of churches was the bishop. He was the impersonation of the united strength and co-operative fellowship of the several churches: the symbol of their unity. So overpowering was the need of unity felt to be among the churches, especially in face of pagan and imperial foes, and Gnostic with other heretics, that unbalanced zealots like St Ignatius and St Cyprian, in language which, as Bishop Lightfoot truly says, seems to us "blasphemous and profane," declared that the "bishop stands in the place of Christ and even of God: he that has not the Church for his mother cannot have God for his father: the bishop is in the Church and the Church is in the bishop, and if anyone be not with the bishop, he is not in the Church." What a Nemesis of faction and strife has for centuries dogged the heels of these false and extravagant utterances! Ignorantly intended to promote the union of the churches, they have proved a prolific cause of their disunion; and until they are disclaimed and abandoned the complete re-union of the churches can never be achieved. Even if it could be achieved by such false persuasions, it would not be worth achieving, seeing that no fabric founded on falsities can be good or lovely or safe.

It is remarkable that churches which pride themselves on their historic continuity should accord much weight to the assumptions and assertions of men like St Ignatius or St Cyprian. Neither shows any trait of genuine historic sense or historic perceptive. Research into their writings is rightly crowned with wreaths of learning; but for practical purposes very few of their opinions are to-day of worth to us because (1) they are only fallible opinions, (2) the opinions of deeply prejudiced men, (3) opinions formed in an age whose spiritual needs and tests of truth were wholly different from ours. They imagined subjective or supposed revelations to be guarantees of truth. We have learned that the only satisfying guarantee of truths, as of trees, is their fruit. Ignatius had probably been a slave. At any rate, his conceptions of authority were essentially servile. He claims no historical basis for his assertions, never alludes to the Apostles as his witnesses, but bravely announces himself as the favoured recipient of direct revelations from heaven, as also on occasions did Cyprian.

Cyprian began life as a heathen; and heathen notions remained embedded in his mind to the close of his career, as is shown by his free and frequent use of such terms as *sacerdotium*, *altare*, *sacrificia*; which, in the sense ascribed to them by

Cyprian, are wholly foreign to, and significantly absent from, the New Testament. He had also been a lawyer, and legalism was the virus which saturated all his plans for the organisation of the churches. Both Ignatius and Cyprian were intensely earnest men and sacrificed their lives for their convictions; but martyrdom, although a splendid proof of the martyr's sincerity, is no evidence whatever either of the truth of his opinions or the worth of his theories. Otherwise flat contraries would be equally true, such as the beliefs of Savonarola and Servetus, of Fisher and Cranmer. It is one chief characteristic quality of the modern mind, a quality strongly nourished by experimental science and the appeal to experience, to distinguish clearly between assumptions and actualities, theories and truths, opinions and facts. This characteristic is a principal token of the vast gulf which often separates patristic from scientific ways of thinking.

It is on the full and unreserved acknowledgment of this potent quality of the modern mind that every hope of a genuine re-union of the churches of Christendom ultimately depends. Make-beliefs will not serve. Neither will suppression of beliefs. Least of all will the patient and scholarly disinterment of the opinions of men who died long centuries ago. It is of course highly interesting to know, *e.g.*, what Ignatius or Cyprian wrote about Episcopacy or Apostolic Successions; but, even supposing that they were accurate thinkers, and that their general statements were in accordance not merely with facts as they viewed them but with facts as they actually were, which is a generous supposition, yet it is altogether impossible for the modern mind to think in terms of the patristic mind or to look even at facts from the same angle and point of sight. Our needs and circumstances, our ways and laws of thought, are so entirely different from theirs that it is not possible for us to think exactly as they did without stagnation or to believe all that they believed without reversion.

Bishop Creighton once most truly said that the Church of England stands for sound learning; but unsound applications even of the most sound learning can never make any institution or society to stand securely. And what application could be more radically unsound than that which seeks to fix the mind of the twentieth century, even in ecclesiastical affairs, which after all ought to have some life and "move" in them, in the moulds and grooves of a long-vanished past. Our forefathers thought narrowly both of God and the Church: to us has been vouchsafed a wider, brighter vision. We can no

more go back to their ways of thinking than to their ways of travelling.

Dr Turner, in his learned and temperate contribution to a recent treatise on *The Early History of the Church and the Ministry*, has practically but not completely grasped this basal truth. He contends that Apostolic Creeds and Apostolic Scriptures without Apostolic Successions would not have been sufficient for the continuous life and expansive vigour of the Catholic Church. Why? Because of their fixity, their immobility, their adhesions to the past. Apostolic Successions therefore, as I understand his argument, were necessary to keep the Church on the move, to help it to adapt itself to the changing wants of successive ages, to provide a channel in which religious evolution could freely flow. I do not agree with Dr Turner about the fixity of Apostolic Scriptures. To me one of the strongest proofs of their heavenly origin is their boundless elasticity and adaptability to the fresh requirements of progressive ages. But I ask, if Apostolic Successions were vouchsafed for purposes of continuous adaptation to environment, why have they shown themselves so singularly inadaptate? Why, if the successions seemed to demand manual transmission in ages when other forms of transmission were scarcely conceivable, should they necessarily be supposed to demand manual transmission now when the manual transmission of spiritual gifts—"grace-gifts," as the Dean of Wells so happily designates them—is as inconceivable to the modern mind as any other form of transmission was inconceivable to the patristic mind, compounded as it largely was of Jewish and pagan mentality? If the succession means nothing more than an official seal of appointment, and not the bestowal of grace-gifts, then it is not a matter worthy of much serious discussion, far less is it a reasonable or sufficient cause for divisions.

It is on the acceptance and more complete carrying out of Dr Turner's principle of the need for keeping the churches, for the sake of their life and fruitfulness, in vital correspondence with their environment that we must build our hopes for their ultimate re-union. As the Apostles were in correspondence with their age, so must their true successors be in living touch with their several ages, otherwise they cannot be essentially Apostolic. This is, perhaps, the only form of genuine succession, at any rate the best of all successions, because in most close relation to God's gracious promise to be with and guide His Church all the days of all the ages. To a considerable extent the churches have for long lost touch with their environment: a

loss which the proposed re-union aims at repairing. They have also grievously lost touch with the cardinal fact that God, as manifested in His Son, does not limit Himself to any single channel for the full and free conveyance of His gifts and graces. He is not a geographical God, tied down either to Jerusalem or Mount Gerizim. Nor is He a class or tribal or ecclesiastical God. He dwells with the meek and lowly of heart, whether Episcopalian or non-Episcopalian, Roman or Greek, Anglican or Presbyterian, Methodist or Baptist, Congregationalist or Salvationist—aye! and often with some attached to no visible Church at all. As the League of Nations must depend for its stability and strength on the conviction of the universal brotherhood of men, so the league of the churches must depend for its loveliness and power on the full conviction and frank recognition of the universal Fatherhood of God without distinction or respect of denomination.

Until we are prepared to curse only that which God has cursed, *viz.* sin, and to hold out the hand of co-equal fellowship to all whom God has blessed, no re-union of churches worth having can either be attained or receive the divine benediction. As nations, without forfeiting their nationhoods, must become international before they can be leagued together; so churches, without necessarily forfeiting their denominationalisms, must become interdenominational, or, better still, super-denominational, Christianly Catholic and Catholically Christian, before they can be joined together in godly union and concord. But when once the Spirit of the All-Father has permeated all the churches, then the fact of their re-union will be assured, although the form of it may still remain unsettled. All the churches will then be united as one family in God, with many family resemblances and also some particular differences.

Meantime, while still preserving their independence, may not the churches learn to draw closer together by interchange of pulpits and intercommunion at the Table of their common Lord? In battle areas these *rapprochements* are already being gloriously fostered. As no nation resolute on keeping separate from other nations can be fit or worthy to join the League of Nations; neither can any Church which stands apart from other churches be meet or ready to join a league of churches. In this league of churches no Church should attempt, or even desire, to intervene in the internal affairs of other churches. Each should be autonomous and independent, yet all inspired with the spirit of affiance and alliance. Then instead of suspicion there will be trust;

instead of antagonism, brotherhood ; instead of aloofness, love. The one Lord, the one faith (not necessarily, and in every detail, the one Creed, but the one conviction of things eternal, immortal, and invisible), the one baptism, the one God and Father of all, will be their bond ; and in the warmth of this bond the chill of minor differences will gradually melt away, so that perhaps before very long the world may see not only a commonwealth of nations for the furtherance of the good of all the nations, but also a commonwealth of churches for the unity in diversity, the common good, of all the churches. This catholicity of the churches will help onward the commonwealth of nations, and the commonwealth of nations will contribute to the catholicity of the churches. The League of Nations aims at no uniformity in the government of nations, whether monarchic or republican. To wait for the advent of this uniformity would be to postpone the establishment of the league with all its benefits indefinitely. Similarly with the league of churches. It may be long before the churches can all agree upon forms of government and methods of administration ; but surely with the messages of the war and the example of nations placarded before its eyes, no Church which does not confuse forms with faith, the letter with the spirit, means and channels of grace with its streams and ends, will be willing to wait indefinitely for the spiritual, as distinct from the ecclesiastical, re-union of the churches in the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the fellowship of the Holy Ghost.

J. W. CARLIOL.

WANTED : ANOTHER ARCHBISHOP'S COMMITTEE ON THE TEACHING OFFICE OF THE CHURCH.

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I AM going to break a promise made nearly forty years ago to Archbishop Tait that no account should appear in public of a meeting of scientific men which he convened at Lambeth in the year 1881.

No one will, I hope, consider the promise of silence binding any longer. I do so because the development of thought in the highest scientific world of that time, to which that meeting gave articulate expression, is now widespread, but is still largely inarticulate; and because some account of the meeting may help to focus on a very fundamental question the attention of those who are called on to consider and advance the teaching of the Church. I believe that of those who were present at that meeting Lord Justice Sir Edward Fry¹ and myself are the sole survivors.

The atmosphere of those days in the more thoughtful religious circles was one of serious perplexity. In face of the evidence for evolution, illustrated, reinforced, and popularised as it had been by Darwin, the defenders of the old form of the faith, as it was then held, felt that some points would necessarily, in the interests of truth, have to be surrendered: and they did not know where they would be ultimately able to make a stand. Their opponents were confident, not to say contemptuous. "We will not argue with you," was their

¹ Since this paper was written Sir Edward has died in his 91st year. I had intended to send him a proof of this article, that he might check my recollections of the conference. Lady Fry has most kindly sent me an extract from his unpublished autobiography confirming my recollection, and mentioning the presence at the conference of Dr Asa Gray.

tone: "we will explain you; in fact, we have explained you away, and you know it." The prevailing views among men of science, so far as they found expression, were negative and materialistic, as well as confident. The wisest were silent, suspending judgment; many retained their old faith. The men of the younger generation were also in suspense, but alert. The scientific arguments, the balance of reasoning, seemed all on one side. But was it wholly a question of argument and of reasoning? The pulpit and religious papers were busy, but were not convincing. They nibbled only at the fringes of the matter, we thought. They lacked knowledge, and insight, and weight. Such is my general recollection of the time, and of the talk of the time. The Victoria Institute for Christian Evidence was in existence, and was no doubt of some value. But it gave us the impression of apologetic.

Under these circumstances the Archbishop of Canterbury, Archibald Tait, formed the idea of inviting a number of eminent men of science whose names would commend attention and respect, men who were also known in their own religious communions as faithful and earnest, to meet him in conference, and to put forth some joint, simple, and well-considered statement of their Christian faith. He hoped that it might reassure the anxious and the waverers. It would at any rate prove that the weight of scientific authority could not be appealed to as inconsistent with the Christian faith. Naturally, I never knew how many were invited; but about twenty to twenty-five attended the meeting in the Library at Lambeth. The oldest man present was Sir Thomas Watson, M.D., the *doyen*, I believe, of the medical profession. I recall a few names: Fuller of Aberdeen, if I remember right; Salmon and Haughton of Dublin; Stokes of Cambridge; Wyville Thomson; Dr Gladstone of London; and Sir Edward Fry. I cannot be sure of others; but Oxford, Edinburgh, and Glasgow were represented.

The question is obvious and must at once be answered: "How did I come to be included among such magnates?" The explanation is this. I had been an assistant master, as a teacher of science and mathematics, at Rugby School, of which Tait had formerly been headmaster, succeeding Dr Arnold. I had written one of the essays in F. W. Farrar's volume of *Essays on a Liberal Education*—that on "Natural Science in Schools." And in that essay was a paragraph bearing on the probable effect on religious belief of introducing into the ordinary course of higher education some knowledge of results of science, and some training in

scientific method and habits of thought. The essay had attracted Tait's attention, and he asked me to attend. I was at the time head-master of Clifton College. I took no part in the Conference.

The Archbishop had drafted a short statement in general terms such as he thought all would accept, and after a few grave introductory words he circulated it amongst us. There was a period of silence. Then point after point was touched on: an expression here or there was questioned, demurred to, modified, and withdrawn. A more general criticism followed, of the substance and trend of the statement as a whole: what it assumed, and what it implied, and what it omitted. Was the putting forth of any such statement expedient? How would it be received? Then Sir Edward, apparently the youngest except myself of those present, in a masterly speech which impressed us all, gathered up all the threads and presented to the Archbishop very gently, very sympathetically, the conviction of all present that the idea was impracticable. He moved a resolution, which was accepted by the Archbishop and by the Conference.

The Archbishop sadly accepted the disappointment. He asked us to return his draft. He hoped that we would not make public what had passed, but that each of us, in private or in public, as far as was possible, would in accordance with the resolution make it plain that in our own personal case scientific results and methods were not incompatible with the faith of a Christian. To this there was general agreement. He then shook hands with all, with words of warm thanks. He spoke to me last of all and asked me to stop. He took me into a little room, off the library, and lay down on a sofa, tired and silent. Tea was brought in—a large pot, I remember—and two large breakfast cups, and thick slices of bread-and-butter. A few words passed about Rugby, and some of his old colleagues there. Tea was cleared away.

Then he said, "I suppose you saw from the beginning that it was hopeless." I assented. "But even now," he continued, "I don't see why. No one wished to deny anything that I asked them to affirm." I was silent. I had never till that afternoon seen an archbishop, much less talked with one. But he pressed me, and referred to some words in my essay. "What was the real objection to the draft?" So we really conversed for a long time. I remember saying that men of science were incapable of signing any statement unless the words employed in it had been defined in terms which all could accept. Of course, for expressing emotion, feeling

of all sorts, they used words confessedly undefinable. He had asked us, I said, to use in a formal and scientific statement words of the latter class. This was only to put bluntly part of what Sir Edward had put, clearly but delicately, in a different way.

Of course, he asked what words I referred to. There were naturally a good many, but the conversation turned entirely on one, the last I mentioned—God. I remember his long silence, and my fear that I had said something that jarred on him. But he was very gentle, and the talk was resumed. He spoke of the Jewish monarchical conception of Deity; and how, though unlike Christ's thought, it had inevitably passed into the rigid framework of Christian theology, suiting as it did the Western thought of God. I wish I had written down at once what he said; it was largely new to me, and I have now only the recollection of recollections to go upon (for in private I have often talked over this conversation), not in general the recollection of the talk itself; and thus my memory has doubtless become coloured by later thoughts. But I remember his saying with a smile, "We are talking heresy, I fear!" He asked me, again referring to my essay, whether I thought that the teaching of science would lead to the disuse of creeds. This had been, I think, hinted at in some of the addresses, though somewhat obscurely. I ventured to say that I thought that creeds belonged so far at least to the past that no new creed, such as in fact he had suggested, was possible, for the reason already given; and that the progress of education in scientific method and in the resulting precision required in thought and language, and in the estimation of evidence, would necessitate gentle handling of the old creeds; they would come to be regarded as historic documents rather than as scientific statements. They implied, or suggested, rather than stated, the realities that underlay them. Here I was saying what I had learnt from Temple, and said so. The Archbishop thought the creeds indispensable for popular use, as giving a nucleus of agreement in belief. This in answer, I think, to some tentative suggestion made by someone at the conference that union might be secured by a declaration of loyalty to Christ and the acceptance of His lordship in conduct, rather than of belief as to His nature.

Then conversation followed on the definiteness, or want of definiteness, of the religious beliefs of the scientific Christian mind; specially on the conception of Divine Personality as modified by the doctrine of evolution. But here I did not

apprehend his views with sufficient clearness to remember them. In fact, I was too ignorant of philosophy to do so.

He was extraordinarily kind, and wise, and simple. I remember his final words, to the effect that he saw that the religious faith of these men, real and deep as it was, would not go into propositions and articles, and therefore that his idea was not practicable. Then he bade me good night, and I never saw the dear old man again.

I have published this account now because it suggests, not thought only, but possibly action, on the subject of the important *Report of the Archbishops' First Committee of Enquiry on the Teaching Office of the Church* (S.P.C.K.). If the present Archbishops were to convene a similar Conference of the representative laity of England, men of scientific and literary or other eminence, not necessarily Churchmen, or if otherwise such a body were invited to consider and report upon methods by which the "teaching office of the Church can be more effectively exercised," what would be the chief points and substance of their report?

Is such a Conference impossible? The Committee almost suggest it. The Report itself says (p. 20) that "in the wide complexity of modern thought it is not likely that a single theologian, or one school, will be able to solve every problem: and we must in these days seek such a solution in the *corporate action of the whole Christian society*." Might not a report from such a Conference be a weighty and necessary factor in guiding such corporate action? The Committee represents Churchmen fairly. Does it even profess to represent the whole Christian society?

The report of such a Conference, we may be sure, would be very modest, very reverent, very illuminating, and written with a profound sense of responsibility at being thus called on to give articulate expression to the convictions held, but unexpressed, in the hearts and minds of a very important section of "the whole Christian society" of the British Commonwealth: a great multitude loyal in spirit and love to Christ, and also desiring to be loyal to the ancient Church; but loyal, of necessity and first of all, to truthfulness in thought and word, and unable wholly to reconcile the two loyalties.

On many points such a Conference would endorse or repeat what this strong and able Archbishops' Committee has said so well: "the necessity of expressing the message of the Church in the thought and language of the time, and in the light of advancing knowledge" (p. 2); "that many do not now get from the Church what they need" (p. 6); "that the clergy

do not possess a reasoned theology which can build up the religious life of the laity" (p. 8). And if it were objected by anyone against their being consulted that such a Conference of non-theologians could not be expected to give valuable advice on the "teaching office of the Church," they would quote from p. 18 that "again and again it has been the enlightenment and conscience of the age which have forced a reluctant Church to reform itself, when its teaching was corrupted or had deteriorated, and it was 'making the Word of God of none effect by its tradition.'" They would perhaps continue the quotation: "In our day there is, we believe, a *Divine* movement in the development of science and historical study, and in the progress of democracy. A new body of ideas occupies the minds of men and women, and constitutes the very fabric of their thought. It is the business of the Church, and of the teachers who speak for the Church, to interpret the old Catholic message in terms of current thought and aspiration."

This plain speaking is further pressed home on p. 19 by the paragraph on the importance of a strong and intellectual position; and by the illustrations of Church history, leading up to the words on p. 20, quoted above, on the necessity of appeal to the *whole Christian society* for a solution.

Such a Conference would also agree that our ordinands might be better trained. It would be suggested that they are put in possession of propositions of which they do not know the basis of facts; and that they have ready-made opinions provided them, a mass of opinions which they are taught to regard as knowledge. They are thus disabled from understanding the mental attitude of men whose opinions are less definite, but spring out of first-hand experience.

The lay Conference would, however, probably bring out several points which would both largely qualify the Committee's verdict of failure, and would ascribe responsibility for such failure as they would admit chiefly to other causes. They would, I think, speak with much more emphasis on the part that the Church—of course in its widest sense, embracing all Christian influences—has played in England in the last hundred, or four hundred, or thousand years, in the education of the hearts and heads of the people; and, speaking in particular of the latest period, they would do far greater justice to the general welcoming in Christian society of new truths, the dissolution of old prejudices, the passing of toleration into appreciation, almost welcome, of different points of view, the immense advance throughout the nation in the sense of

joint responsibility for the welfare of all, in the increasing humanity of legislation, and in all that marks the difference in the moral standards and ideals of England between the eras of Waterloo and the first battle of the Marne.

For effecting all this, moreover, they would assign, openly and gratefully, a much larger share than does the Committee's Report to the ceaseless, ubiquitous, pious influences, past and present, of devoted Christian clergy, ministers, and lay-folk of all classes. The nation's debt to them is unspeakable. It is they who have made the soil out of which these higher religious standards have sprung. In all this there has been not failure, but imperfection of course and slowness, as in all things human.

The failure that the Committee brings out and censures so severely is of quite a different kind. It is the admitted failure of the established Church to win for itself an intellectual leadership; its marked failure, in spite of its efforts and ability, to win to the whole-hearted acceptance of its teaching (other than moral) more than a mere fringe either of the more highly educated or of the industrial class. Its teaching is plainly unacceptable to the one, and it takes no root in, and is at once forgotten by, the other. It is an exotic. For these failures the lay Conference would see other reasons than those assigned; they would ascribe them, not, as the Report does, to the intellectual weakness or want of training of the messengers, but rather to the form in which the message, which is given them to deliver, is expressed. The Committee does not seem to see this. Their one cure is to give more, and more skilfully, and more definitely, of the teaching that has already failed. I am reminded of the story of someone who inquired, in a remote Highland village where no doctor was accessible, what they did in case of illness. "We give him whisky," was the answer. "And if that does not cure him?" "We give him more whisky."

If one may go on to speculate still further how the Report of such a lay Conference would proceed, it would probably express regret, and some surprise, that while the Committee avow themselves to be aware of the existence of "a new body of ideas, constituting the very fabric of current thought and aspiration," and while they hint as possible that teaching in the Church may be even now, as it has been in the past, "corrupted or deteriorated," and admit that it "lacks a reasoned theology," while they confess that it is "the duty of the Church to interpret the old message in terms of new knowledge," they then drop the subject entirely: they look

these facts in the face and pass on. No hint is given as to the nature and scope of this new body of ideas ; no expression of the obligation on the Church to get it brought before them at its best, and to understand it sympathetically. Even if the new ideas so widely established seem to them at present, with their imperfect knowledge of them, to be negative, incoherent, ineffective, irreligious, unchristian, yet should they not have taken steps to have them brought before the Church as a whole by those who do feel their power, by those to whom what "constitutes the very fabric of their thought" does appear "positive, coherent, effective, religious, Christian" ?

This need, this omission, the lay Conference would therefore feel itself called on to endeavour to supply ; and its members would gird themselves to consider the great questions which emerge from the circumstances :—"How far is the failure of the Church to command intellectual respect, to unite, to lead, to inspire the Christian world, due to the form in which it still conveys its old message ; and in particular to the failure of its official teachers to apprehend and study the 'Divine movement' which they dimly see in God's continued revelation to men ?" And further : "Is that 'Divine movement,' in its essential nature, not only reconcilable with, but a true development and extension of, the Catholic faith ?"

Such, after the necessary preface, would be the real subjects of their Report. Is not such a "Church Teaching Reconstruction Committee," with such a wide reference, needed for the Church ?

I will not pretend to follow further in imagination even the outline of what such a Conference would say. I am no longer in the scientific world ; and I have never had the slightest right to speak for literature, or history, or philosophy, or sociology, or for the brotherhood of labour, all of which would rightly be represented on such a Conference. I can only speak as an old man who has lived in sympathy with the young, who has tried to see good in things new as well as old, and has striven to turn both the hearts of fathers to their children and those of children to their fathers. Specially, perhaps, I wish to speak as one who at every stage of his life, both before and after taking Holy Orders forty years ago, has learned religion from many types of mind. I regard as among the finest embodiments of the religious spirit, and among the truest and most loyal followers of our Lord, men and women who hesitate or refuse to call themselves Church or even Christian folk ; so painfully are they repelled by some of the traditional theology, deeply imbedded in Christianity in the only form in

which it has been presented to them—in the form which, rightly or wrongly, they think is regarded as indispensable by the present official teachers of the Catholic faith.

Would that I were qualified and worthy to be their spokesman! Would that I could make their position, as members of “the whole Christian society” intelligible to the official mind of the Church! But this needs abler pens than mine.

“The finest embodiments of the religious spirit.” I have placed them in that category. What is the religious spirit? It has been well defined—so far as a definition of a spirit is conceivable—as “the sense in a community that all its members are occupied with some great business; and that they look for and assume the best in each other because of their common purpose.” Such a religious spirit did pervade and unite the Church of the Apostolic age: but it does not very widely pervade our Church to-day. We Church people do not assume or look for the best in all who profess or call themselves Christians, or feel passionately a common purpose with them in a great business. The common great purpose, though it does exist, is buried in a multitude of separate little and distracting purposes. It is overlaid, hidden, in a jungle of after-growths.

It would be a revelation, on the other hand, to most of us to know how ardent, how direct, how uniting, is the “great business,” “the common purpose,” of the men and women, young and old, whom I have in mind. But can we not all get some glimpse of it in the central quality of the lives of myriads of whose churchmanship little could be said? Does not the spectacle of our country and of the U.S.A. reveal some such firm, uniting, central quality? It springs from some deeper source than we can trace in their words or professed beliefs. It is ultimately traceable, as all good is traceable, to God and to men’s conception of Him. It is to that question we come, sooner or later, in all fruitful discussion. What is your conception of God? On that all religion turns.

That was the point reached by our conference of nearly forty years ago. And at that time the Church, even in the person of the good and wise Archbishop, made no sign of showing practical sympathy with new thoughts of God then forming themselves in many circles. But since that time, what was then the barely formulated, half-concealed conviction of comparatively few Christians has, through the spread of scientific knowledge and method and of general education, filtered down till it pervades the whole educated Christian world. It is perhaps also the unconscious basis of the faith of all our people.

It cannot but be of the first importance that those who control and limit, and might inspire and expand, the teaching of the Christian faith, should do more than acknowledge the existence of those "new ideas"; they should try to understand them by sympathetic study. These ideas must either be regarded as a further stage in God's self-revelation of His nature, to be reverently assimilated by the Catholic Church as included in its admissible faith; or they must be regarded as a denial of God, a heresy in the Church to be resisted to the last ditch. It is that an irresistible appeal may be made for the former of these alternatives, and that the Church may be saved from the disaster of the second, that I press for such a Conference as I have spoken of.

But someone is sure to ask, "Are further revelations of God's nature, amounting to changes in man's conception of Him, conceivable?" It seems surprising that such a question should be asked. For the whole history of religious thought is made up of such revelations and changes. Is there no difference between the conceptions of God in the second chapter of Genesis and in its Babylonian precursors? Is not the first chapter an advance upon the second? Is Deuteronomy on the same level as Exodus? What is the book of Job but a protest against the then orthodox conception of God as reiterated by Job's three friends, against the belief in a God who sends misfortunes as a punishment for sin? "My righteousness I hold fast," says Job, "and I will not let it go." What is Ezekiel's teaching, that "the soul that sinneth, it shall die," but a reversal of the orthodox doctrine of the time that God punishes children to the third and fourth generation for their fathers' sins—an injustice we would not tolerate in a magistrate or schoolmaster? What, above all, was Christ's teaching about a Father in heaven but a protest against the established theology of the day which taught that God was a Being who demanded bloody sacrifice to win His favour and avert His anger, and was very particular about many trifles? Of course, we all admit that *this* was revelation; but it stands in a sequence, whose beginning is lost in the far past, and which Christ Himself bade us to expect to continue in the future. The end of revelation, and change in man's conception of God, is not yet. An appeal to the past bids us expect change. Revelation never ceases. Life is constant change. But it is superfluous to press the point.

But what, if it can be briefly expressed, is the change which is said to have taken or to be taking place? It is the *depersonalisation of the theological conception and doctrine of*

God. At present, not only in prayers and hymns, where, within reasonable limits, it is welcome as the language of emotion, but in the teaching of the pulpit and Bible classes, and in that of theological text-books, the Church retains, repeats, and endorses a Judaic and early conception of God, and apparently regards it as the only conception legitimate to us Christians. That is the impression that Church teaching leaves on its recipients.

That this thought is the easiest, and therefore the earliest, both in the individual and the race, is admitted. The fact is evident. That it prevails even with adults of a certain type of mind is also true. But that the Church should require, or at least seem to require, that no one shall repudiate this, and hold any other thought, is resented. To many of us this faith is one of the childish things which a man is called on to put away. To do so involves a change in thought, but not negation, and not subversive revolution. It is a step in education, it is a stage in evolution. And we know that this evolution is going on all round us. When shall we say so publicly? This depersonalising of God, this deanthropomorphisation of God, if I may coin so terrible a word, has largely taken place already, and ought not to be feared and denounced as a denial of God. It is very far otherwise. It is the exclusion of this conception that has helped to alienate men's minds from the teaching of the Church. This is the matter which I wish to see the ablest and best representatives of the whole Christian society bring before the official teachers of the Church with a force that is beyond my power. None but those who know the power of this thought of God can describe its effect on the mind and heart. And it has taken root in thousands of hearts. It has already to be added to the splendid and victorious "heresies of truth."

Now the Report of the Committee shows little trace of practical sympathy with such a view. They interpret their reference, "To report upon *methods*," as if it excluded anything more than vague allusions to form and subject. And this is the great disappointment in the Report. The appendices, which express individual opinions, are somewhat franker. Dr Goudge (p. 115) wishes absolutely to abandon teaching the Thirty-nine Articles. Dr Barnes, as one would expect from an F.R.S., frankly admits the biological evolution of man. But no real change in the authorised conception of God is hinted at, and by some it seems to be excluded. Thus the Bishop of Oxford writes on p. 67: "The word of God took shape

from the very earliest days of the Church's life in a closely coherent body of doctrine. . . . This constitutes the body of doctrine which it is the function of the ministry of the Church to maintain." This seems to demand of the clergy to maintain the form—the coherent body—of teaching as it took shape in the earliest days. It is true that later on (p. 70) he writes that the clergy are bound not to shirk the unpopular tasks set them. They are "to see what exactly the Church is committed to, what exactly the New Testament requires of us, and also to see what the requirements of the best conscience and science of to-day really mean, so as to be able, by the help of the best writers, and their own meditation, to teach the ancient faith" (and he specifies hell, original sin, and atonement by the blood of Christ) "in language compatible with present-day knowledge and the soundest conscience of the time." But what if Church and New Testament, and the best conscience and science, give discordant results? On this the Bishop has nothing to say.

Again I say the root of the difficulties will be found to be in *our conception of God*. That must be faced. Let me put side by side, for the sake of clearness, two conflicting views: the anthropomorphic, in what may be presumed its best form, and the depersonalised. For the former I take as the interpreter the Dean of Christ Church, as a man universally respected, a scholar and theologian, author of a well-known *Manual of Theology*, and, what is far more, holding the unique position of "Warden of the Central Society of Sacred Study for Clergy of the Church of England." I must give the passage at length from chap. vi., p. 278, of the manual named above:—

• "It will be well to recapitulate our conclusions as to the position in which man was placed at the time of our Lord's coming, and as to the nature of our Lord Himself. We shall then be able to see how the doctrine of the Atonement flows out from these.

"Man was in a position of irrevocable alienation from God. He had severed the link which bound him to God by his own act, and the breach could not be healed from his side. God had threatened him with various penalties in case of disobedience, and it would not have been consistent with His changeless love and wisdom and justice to let these threats fall to the ground, even supposing that it were practically possible. Moreover, the condition of alienation was transmitted hereditarily to the descendants of the first sinner. All men shared his condemnation. They were, by nature, children of wrath. They had lost the harmony of their being and fallen

from its ideal. They progressed in science and in art, and even morality, but their progress was partial and chequered, and lacking in definite guidance. They were not sure of themselves; only the foremost realised in any way to what ideal they were moving, and these only in an inadequate way. They needed to have put before them anew the ideal of manhood; they needed to be reconciled to God by obedience and sacrifice; they needed to be reunited with Him in the old close communion which they had lost.

"The person who came forward to effect these changes was none other than the Son of God. In some sense, not very clear to us, the second Person of the Holy Trinity took upon Himself this work."

This may, I suppose, be taken as the doctrine of the Fall and the origin of the Atonement in its best form, as formulated in the anthropomorphic theology that I am speaking of, for the use of clergy.

What, on the other hand, is the conception of God depersonalised? "When I say God," writes the Rev. R. J. Campbell (*New Theology*), "I mean the mysterious Power which is finding expression in the universe and is present in every tiniest atom of the wondrous whole." Those for whom the Conference I desire would speak can accept nothing less than this: and that, not as a tolerated view which may be held by sciolists, and others on the fringe of the real Church, till they know better, but as equally legitimate, and conceivably as the highest conception of God that man has yet attained to, and the one most in harmony with other highest thoughts. Philosophy is recognising the spiritual life of the world; statesmen and soldiers must and do reckon with it. Poets and artists perceive something more in Nature than Nature itself can explain. The theologian says it is God of whom man has become conscious. He explains the beginning by the end.

There is a saying of Confucius that "fishermen use baskets to catch fish. When they have got the fish they forget the baskets. Teachers use words to convey ideas. When they have got the ideas, they forget the words. May it be mine to converse with men who have forgotten the words." Is the conception of God as a Transcendent Person, with qualities of a Personality such as those of men, to be regarded as the basket or the fish? That is the question. Surely it is only the basket; indispensable for catching and holding the fish, but not for an instant to be confused with the fish itself. Through that metaphor of Personality, which we should all alike for many an age use when we are young, and use always in prayer

and praise, the world has been educated to conceive its Creator. Thank God for that. But we must not give the metaphor the precise solidity of a doctrine or of an article of belief, and bar from the Catholic Church all who have seen below the metaphor, and are able to realise the ever-presence and urge of a Vital Power, a Life Force, immense, eternal, manifesting itself in all creation and supremely in man.

It is from this basis that, I do not say the Creeds, but Christian theology has to be rewritten. It is no new thing that the theologies have to be rewritten. The shelves of our cathedral libraries groan with the weight of extinct theologies, milestones in the history of man's advancing thought of God.¹ And the time has come for the clergy to recognise the widespread existence of a powerful Christian faith, seen as the fundamental truths symbolised in our Creeds, but moulded now in forms other than those given in their text-books of theology.

But to this re-writing the Report of the Committee gives no help or sanction.

It may be said that the doctrine of Immanence is now recognised by theologians. It can scarcely be otherwise; it is so plain in the New Testament. But the theologians do not let it stand alone. They are willing to speak of God as "not a Person standing outside of Nature, sometimes interfering with it, and sometimes letting it alone." But they go on to say that they mean "a Power which exercises constant care and watchfulness, and a supreme will directing all." What is this but a Person under another name? That the life of God is being manifested *in man and through man, and is only thus known to us*, is the interpretation put on human history and experience by those whose thought as Christians does not rest on the anthropomorphic basis. The depersonalised conception of God is the basis of their whole religious life. Cannot their claim be acknowledged?

It is, in fact, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, only expressed in different terms, and resting on different authority. It is the manifestation of the Life-force of all Nature shown in man as the Life of God. This faith rests on observation, induction, and verification. It stands scientific tests. This is the revolution that has taken place. Will the Anglican Church recognise such a view?

Of course, I am not thinking now of the Roman or the Greek Church. Our Anglican Church is opening its heart to

¹ I happen to have on my table a duplicate of a book in our library, dated 1631, on Leviticus, "wherein more than a thousand Theologicall Questions are handled." Who can now read five pages of this great quarto?

recognise non-episcopal Churches as within its unity; will it not also welcome these our friends, who are not less loyal than we are to Christ's leadership, but whose thoughts of God are cast in other moulds? There is a widespread, deep, and earnest Christianity in all classes which feels shut out from the ever-narrowing limit of the so-called Catholic Church. There lies the danger to Christendom, and in particular to the Church of the English-speaking race. There lies the field for Christian statesmanship as well as Christian faith. These two conceptions of God are not to be thought of for a moment as in opposition to one another, in the sense in which the German and the British ideals of life are opposed. They can live side by side. There is an obvious illustration. Monarchy and democracy live happily side by side in England. Some of us find our inspiration and unity in "God save the King"; others in the grand hymn, "The people, Lord, the people—not thrones and crowns, but men." It is only when monarchy becomes despotism that it provokes war. These conceptions of which I have been speaking are not opposed; unless those who hold the one deny to those who hold the other all claim to be worshippers of the same God, loyal to the same Christ, animated by the same Holy Spirit, and therefore members of the one Catholic Church on earth. Such a claim to monopoly is resented.

It should also at least be indicated that the wider conception of God helps men to face the old problem of suffering and evil, and of a suffering Saviour and God. And it throws light on the meaning of our great world-war. May we not say, as was said on 4th July 1918, in a sermon in Worcester Cathedral: "The idealism of the American nation *is* the indwelling, directing, ruling Spirit of God. They are identical. God rules and guides the world through man as the agent of the Indwelling Spirit. That Spirit is not localised, as old-world Jewish theology conceived it, in an Almighty Being above the sky; but is, as Christ taught, truly Spirit—the Spirit of truth and love and light and justice, the *Holy* Spirit diffused, but not less divine and not less Almighty because diffused, in the hearts of men, and working through them."

But I must go back to my appeal for a Conference of lay Christians standing outside Churches, invited, if possible at the request of the Church, to share in its councils. Let them speak and make themselves heard and understood; and may the Lord open the ears of the Church to their voice!

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CHRISTIAN FAITH.

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I.

SEVEN years ago it was still dangerous to claim for students of the New Testament a right which was generally allowed to students of the Old—one which all secular historians assume, and without which they could not do their work—the right to eliminate the miraculous from their records. During the last seven years the situation has changed rapidly. I need not mention details, the more so since an admirable account of them has been published quite recently.¹ The upshot is that, under cover of an official pronouncement—certain resolutions of the Upper House of the Convocation of Canterbury in April 1914, which were “intended to be as cautious and conciliatory as possible”²—it is becoming safe to deal with the New Testament in the same way as the Old, and many books are appearing in which “liberty of interpretation” is claimed even with regard to those miracle-stories which are embodied in the Creeds.

It is with no intention of belittling what has been done, or of embarrassing those who have done it, that I wish to point out an aspect of their position which they have not emphasised, and to suggest the necessity of a step which they have not yet taken.

Seven years ago it was enough to claim liberty to reject on historical grounds, if need be, the commonly accepted accounts of the Virgin Birth and Resurrection; and it was no concession to orthodoxy, but an elementary act of faith in Christianity, to add that this rejection, if demanded by loyalty to truth, could

¹ *Conscience, Creeds, and Critics*, by the Rev. C. W. Emmet (Macmillan, 3s. 6d.).

² Emmet, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

not be disloyal to any true doctrine of the Incarnation. That act of faith still stands: it is an axiom of Christian criticism. But it was not meant to, and obviously could not, shut out the possibility that a line of argument, which at that time only dealt with the accidents of traditionalism, might come in due course to apply to its essentials; and that a sounder apologetic might have to be found than that which criticism was in process of demolishing. It is difficult to judge just how far this anticipation was or is in others' minds; and I do not want to generalise too much from my own experience. But I think that among those who are prepared to question, if not to reject, all the miracle-stories of the Gospel-history, a disposition has grown up to put in their place the "moral miracle," as they sometimes call it, of the Gospel-hero—the character of One who, though he did no miracle, was himself miraculous. By falling back on this position the Liberal theologian seeks to assure himself and his readers that nothing vital has been lost in the surrender of the Virgin Birth and Physical Resurrection. But the remedy is superficial: his only real assurance is his conscience; their only means of judging is his life, not his creed. Besides, whilst I am sure that nothing vital has been given up, I think that this way of stating the situation hides the more important fact that a real change has taken place, and that something vital has been gained. Let anyone, whose reading of history has forced him to believe that our Lord was born and lived and died according to the way of all flesh, look into his mind, and see whether the word Incarnation stands for the same conception of God in man as it did before. If there has been a change it is his duty to be conscious of it, to express it, and to work out its implications for Christian thought and life. There has been a change: it is his privilege to show that it brings, not loss, but gain, and to preach a higher doctrine of the Incarnation to a world increasingly conscious of its need. Until this is done the Liberal is under suspicion as a man who dare not speak his whole mind, and Authority has an excuse for condemning the destructive side of a doctrine whose constructive side has not been worked out. Both these inconveniences could be illustrated from the present situation. A third is even more noticeable. The Liberal asserts that his surrender of the miraculous accompaniments of the Incarnation leaves the miracle of the Incarnation untouched. The Conservative quite reasonably answers, "Granted the central miracle of the Person, I find no difficulty in accepting the miraculous circumstances: indeed, it seems to me more natural that they should than that they should not have occurred."

The Liberal is thus put into the invidious position of one who gives up a lesser error whilst retaining a greater; worse, he can be represented as a mere giver-up, surrendering to popular clamour this or that part of the faith, with no positive teaching of his own to put in its place, or any gospel that can convert and save. But Modernism is not a list of errors to be given up, which can be cut short at this point or that. It is a method, a temper of mind, a philosophy, which cannot rest until it has modified every part of life. The Modernist does not ask for more truth, as a matter of Church policy or of private taste: he seeks for the whole truth, as a necessity of life. And the proper answer to such charges as I have mentioned is not to minimise our demands, but to work out the full implications of our principles.

II.

I have said that the present tendency of Liberal theology is to surrender the miraculous accompaniments of the Incarnation, but to retain the essence of orthodoxy by describing the character of the Incarnate himself as a "moral miracle." Now, if that which is retained is "miraculous" in the same sense as that which is given up, this position is self-contradictory, and cannot be permanent; if, on the other hand, the word "miracle" is being used in two senses, we must try to define the new meaning that our revaluation of the historical evidence allows us to give it.

The first step in this direction is to realise that the chief line of argument which applies to the miracle-stories of the Gospels applies also to the "moral miracle" of our Lord's person. There are two ways of discussing the problem of miracles. One is to argue from the laws of nature and thought that the occurrence of miracles is probable or improbable. The other is to argue from such historical evidence as is available that this or that alleged miracle did, or did not, happen. It may fairly be said that, whilst neither party to the controversy has surrendered its own view of the first argument, both have come to see that the second is more decisive; the real question is, what is the historical evidence? Now, I am not forgetting the possible difference between a miraculous person and a miraculous event, and I am not denying that the *a priori* argument has more force in the former case than in the latter, when I say that here too the *a posteriori* argument is primary and crucial. It is possible to argue on philosophical grounds that a miraculous Incarnation, if not necessary, is at least not improbable.

It is possible to argue that the religious experience of Judaism demanded such a fulfilment, and that the religious experience of the Christian world is inexplicable without such a cause. It is possible to argue that the traditional belief of the Church cannot have been so long and so thoroughly mistaken. But it is the peculiarity and pride of Christian apologetic that it checks these arguments, all of which are indeed debatable on their own ground, and most of which can be paralleled in other religions, by a unique body of historical evidence, written down and open for inspection to the whole world. The first question, here as elsewhere, is the question of evidence. Biblical criticism may be the lower court, the philosophy of religion the higher, but it is criticism which must decide whether or not there is a case to go before philosophy.

The critic is here in a doubly difficult position. For, first, he has as yet no definition of the "moral miracle," for evidence of which he is to study his records: he does not know for what to look. And, in the second place, it would be a long and delicate matter to weigh the meaning of every passage which might bear upon the point at issue; and such a proceeding might give the same wrong impression of his aim as has sometimes been given by critical inquiries into the evidence for miracles—it might suggest that his purpose is to destroy, not to construct. I must therefore content myself with taking two points, neither of which could well be excluded from any definition of the "moral miracle," and make some general remarks about the historical evidence for them.

Those who reject the miracle-stories of the Gospels, as well as those who retain them, speak as though they still had historical proof of our Lord's sinlessness. They are quite right in maintaining that the absence of miraculous powers is no disproof of moral perfection. But what ground have they for thinking that a body of evidence which fails to prove one kind of miracle can prove another? For I assume that by "sinlessness" they mean a complete absence of any wrong thought or act throughout our Lord's life: a state quite as foreign to all our experience as the power to multiply bread, or turn water into wine. When we consider the nature of the historical evidence—a collection of stories and sayings, and the outlines of a biography, edited by men with no special gift for historical accuracy; when we consider its extent—covering at most three out of thirty years of our Lord's life; its date—that in its earliest form it was not written down till twenty or twenty-five years after; its motive—not theological definition, not historical research, but

the instruction of the faithful in a sacred tradition handed down by their society ; when we remember the apologetic and devotional background of the New Testament, and the lack of independent testimony ; is it not clear how far we must remain from any historical proof of our Lord's sinlessness ?

The other point I have in mind is our Lord's declarations about himself, some of which are quoted as evidence of a "moral miracle." The issue is here even less plain, because there is no general agreement as to what personal claims are compatible with human saintliness or religious leadership, and what are not: the old dilemma, *aut deus, aut homo non bonus*, has broken down before the study of religious experience in its more exalted or fanatical states. But even if agreement could be reached as to one or two crucial sayings, the evidential difficulties would remain: how could we be sure enough that those sayings have been reported and preserved with literal accuracy ? Would any school of history allow us to build so much upon them ? I do not think so ; for, whilst modern criticism has done much to re-establish the historical value of the Gospels, it has at the same time put out of court the old appeal to "proof-texts." The most favourable verdict it can record with regard to the "moral" miracle is "not proven." In other words, the line of argument which has forced us to reject, or to keep an open mind with regard to, the historicity of the Virgin Birth and Physical Resurrection, may at any moment force us to reject, or to keep an open mind with regard to, the historicity of our Lord's sinlessness, or of his consciousness of divinity.

III.

So far I have said nothing which ought not to be common ground with all impartial students of the Gospels. But at this point there is a choice of roads. Some will protest against isolating the historical evidence, and will maintain that, when all the evidence is considered—more particularly the arguments from Christian tradition and religious experience which I mentioned a little way back—we get as near to proof as we can reasonably expect to do in such a matter. This position would satisfy me, but for the stubborn conviction that no amount of *a priori* argument (I am not thinking here of the presuppositions proper to history as such) can prove a historical fact. It can show what ought to have happened ; it can show what would best satisfy the demands of our mind, or the needs of our soul : but the mind has been so

often deceived, the soul has so often satisfied itself with substitutes for truth, that nothing short of the strongest historical evidence—stronger than any we have in this case—justifies translating “it must have been” into “it was.” Others, perhaps, will prefer to do as they have done in the case of the Virgin Birth and Resurrection: they will keep an “open mind” as regards the historical fact, whilst resting their faith upon the spiritual truth for which the fact stands. Now, an “open mind” is reasonable, and perhaps necessary, as something more than a temporary expedient, under two conditions: first, that the “faith” is sufficiently independent of the “fact” to subsist without it; and secondly, that there is hope of fresh historical evidence, which may enable the “open” mind ultimately to be “closed.” But in the present case neither of these conditions seems to be satisfied. The likelihood of new evidence being found is most remote: whilst the “fact” of sinlessness will hardly be thought unnecessary to the “faith” in the “moral miracle” of our Lord’s character, even to the extent that the Virgin Birth and the Physical Resurrection may be thought unnecessary to the “faith” in the Incarnation. Or else, if it is thought so, the “open mind” becomes of little significance, and the argument enters upon a new phase hardly distinguishable from that which I hope to describe. For these reasons I find myself driven to carry the matter further, along a third road, which seems to offer a better line of advance.

What is the real position that historical critics are reaching with regard to the Gospels? What is the meaning of their rejection of the nature-miracles, of their “open mind” as to the Virgin Birth and the Empty Tomb, of their silence as to our Lord’s sinlessness? Why, on the other hand, do they lay increasing stress upon the social and religious background of the story, and upon all the human details of our Lord’s life? Is it not simply this—that when studied with all the help that historical science can give, and by those who are most competent to judge it, the Gospel story is found to be the record of a completely human life and human experience, whilst not merely some incidents, but everything that used to be thought miraculous in it, becomes part of the inevitable setting of the narrative—the ideas of those who witnessed the events or handed down the tradition? There is no room here for depreciation of the “modern mind.” Considering the Gospels as a historical record, the present generation is in a better position to judge them than any before it since they were first written down. The above statement of the position may therefore

be re-expressed in wider and rather different terms. For all who have minds to see, and hearts to feel, the Gospels preserve a true picture of a character whose religious insight and moral goodness have no equal in history: but the Church is not, and never was, in possession of historical evidence sufficient to prove that this character was miraculous or superhuman.

Nor has the best Christian apologetic relied upon any such argument. How does the Christian act of faith in Christ first appear in history? As belief in his Messiahship. What chiefly sustained the apostles' faith between Calvary and Pentecost? Not the evidence for the Resurrection, which they did not preach till forty days later: not the memory of our Lord's life and experience, which they did not record for twenty years: but the ineradicable hope that, although rejected as an impostor and put to death as a criminal, he would shortly return as the Messiah. When the "Spirit of Jesus" transformed the band of fugitive disciples into a missionary Church, the Christian preachers used an argument from miracles and an argument from scripture: but, if they mentioned the miracles of the Gospel, it was as a beginning of those Messianic signs which were being multiplied through their own hands; or if they spoke of the Gospel story, it was to prove that certain incidents in it had been foretold in Messianic prophecy. When Paul's conversion, and the gradual failure of the Apocalyptic hope, fixed the outlines of Catholicism—still more when mysticism and modernism were canonised by the Fourth Evangelist,—the true line of Christian apologetic did not run from a study of the historical records to a demonstration of the miraculous character of our Lord's earthly life, but from the present evidences of his power to the conviction that in him God could be seen loving and saving the world. The attitude of the Fourth Gospel is specially instructive. At first sight it seems to be hostile to my contention, for it presents under historical guise an obviously miraculous Jesus. But closer study shows that, whatever the exact meaning of this feature, the writer's main intention is to deprecate a faith based upon miracles, or limited by the historical life and bodily presence of our Lord. To him Jesus' absence from the world was necessary for the life of the Church, which he taught to subsist, not on the study of the dead, but in communion with the living; his divine sonship was not incompatible with human parentage, nor did his risen life need the proof of bodily survival; his return to judgment was already experienced in the self-conviction of the sinner; his only Beatitude was, "Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed." It need hardly be said that

this Gospel has been misunderstood by being equated with the others as a historical record of Jesus' acts and words; but I think that its proper influence could be traced at many points in the development of Christian thought; and I am sure that its doctrine is of the greatest importance to-day. This generation is not, indeed, Docetist: it does not need recalling to the Gospel story, as St John's first readers did, with the reminder that "the Word was made flesh." On the contrary, laying almost too much stress on history, it suffers from a confusion of mind as to the proper relationship of fact and faith. It calls the acceptance of historical traditions faith, and when they are accepted calls them facts. Real faith—the faith of "that disciple whom Jesus loved," the faith which finds God in Jesus by spiritual insight, and holds what it has gained all the more firmly when the evidence of his bodily presence is withdrawn—it finds rather frightening.

But I am sure that the first condition of further progress is to face the paradox of Christian faith. Christians are people who assert about a historical person, Jesus of Nazareth, that he is the Christ, the Logos, the Saviour—claims which they cannot possibly prove by historical evidence.

This does not mean that the Church is, or has been, wrong in its great act of faith in our Lord's divinity, but only that it has been and is mistaken if it regards this divinity as a historical fact to be proved by historical evidence, instead of (what it really is) a hypothesis about the religious significance of a historical person, framed by religious need and verified by religious experience.

There are two judgments that can be made here, and they must not be confused together: the one a judgment of fact, as to the character of Jesus himself; the other a judgment of value, as to his effect upon others, and the significance they attach to his person. As to the first, he *was* whatever the best historians may decide; as to the second, he *is* for religion whatever is demanded by the highest religious experience. Historical science has its own presuppositions and rules of evidence; so has religious faith. Both are valid in their own spheres; either is invalid in the other's. If the historian believes that Jesus was humanly born, and humanly died; that his teaching was that of a prophet, his religious experience that of a saint; and that he won his perfect holiness, as others have done in lesser degree, through the experience of moral weakness faced and overcome: that need not hinder the act of religious faith which finds in him the supreme revelation of God. Conversely, if the believer cannot describe the influence

and value of Jesus in any terms but those otherwise reserved for God Himself, yet his experience has no power to alter the verdict of history that Jesus was a man. The historian, if he becomes a Christian, does not cease to be a historian, nor the Christian, if he becomes a historian, cease to be a Christian. I must somehow, in my own thought and feeling, be both. I must be ready, if need be, to say that Jesus was the son of Joseph, and that Christ is the Son of God; that Jesus worked no miracles, but that Christ does greater things than miracles every day; that Jesus learnt holiness through the conquest of real temptation, and humility through the consciousness of moral failure, yet that Christ is in very truth our Master, and the Saviour of sinners; that Jesus' body rests in Jerusalem, but that Christ is alive evermore: in a word, that Jesus was a man, and that Christ is rightly worshipped as divine.

IV.

It may be objected that this is no more than a restatement of the central problem of Christian faith, and gives no help towards its solution. Not quite: for it is some help to recognise that Christian faith is not a circle with one centre, but an ellipse with two foci, one of which we may call historical and the other mystical, and that the symbol of the one is "Jesus," and of the other "Christ."

Nevertheless, two contrary difficulties may be felt. Some may deny our right to identify "Jesus" and "Christ"; others our right to keep them apart. A short consideration of each objection will give the best approach to any further advance that may be possible.

As to the first, the real problem is, what I mean by "Christ." The word is a title, not a name: it stood originally for an office, a work, an ideal, and only secondarily for the person who might assume the office, do the work, and realise the ideal. Our idea of God's purpose for the world and man is not what theirs was who first dreamed of the coming of the Christ. But we have our dream, our ideal of a perfect humanity, a Son of God, a Saviour; the love of it ennobles our lives, the worship of it reveals God; it is our religion. Why do we call it "Christ"? Because that was the symbol under which this dream was summed up when Jesus dreamed it, and when others dreamed it of him; and because the best of that which European religion has added to the ideal has been marked by that symbol, and derived from that dream. Why do we identify this "Christ"-ideal with Jesus of Nazareth?

Not because he perfectly expressed all that is in it; but because his life explained and illustrated and enriched it as no other ever did. Not because it contains nothing different from or beyond what he revealed, but because, for a Christian, the elements in it which are his must always be crucial.

But here the contrary objection may be urged. This method of identifying "Jesus" and "Christ," it may be said, is too loose and subjective: it rests Christian faith upon an inadequate historical verdict, and an accident of European experience. And, in professing to identify, it really divides. The historical fact, it may be maintained, signified by the name "Jesus" cannot be abstracted from the religious faith symbolised by the title "Christ." What we have in the Gospels is a figure already compounded of faith and fact; and the composite portrait which is the object of Christian worship can never be resolved again into its constituent parts.

There are two things to be said about this objection. First, it is quite true that the Gospel portrait, though drawn by memory, is coloured by imagination, that the two processes went on side by side, and that it is not always easy to disentangle the results. But the problem is an ordinary one for historical science, which wins its greatest successes by working down through the colour and other accessories of a traditional picture to the original drawing: and to suppose that it cannot do so in this instance is to adopt a sceptical attitude towards the historical basis of Christianity which involves far greater difficulties than it avoids. The act of faith which colours the portrait is, of course, unlike the act of memory which drew it: but its work, once done, forms as fit a study for history as it forms, in the doing, for the psychology of religion.

In the second place, whilst insisting that history can and must distinguish between fact and faith, I do not deny that in practical religion the two have often become so involved with one another that the simple believer may well shrink from disentangling them. And I am not surprised that many Christians, who see this difficulty ahead of them, turn to other aspects of Christianity, and find comfort in them. But these, however important, are side issues. Let me emphasise this point; for it is important.

Christianity sprang from the moral teaching of Jesus; but it never was or can be the simple application of his morality. Apocalyptic elements have been transcended; Jewish ideas have been blended with Greek, Roman, and "Gothic"; a private unworldliness has become the policy of societies and of states; and the essential work of the Church is not to stand

for a distinctive moral code, but to cultivate the sense of communion with God in Christ which will enable it to choose what is good and to reject what is bad in the moral ideas of every age. Again, Christianity inherited from Judaism the loftiest theism in the ancient world, and from Hellenism an ideal of human dignity unmatched in rival religions; but neither its theism nor its humanism is so distinctive as its belief in the union of God and man in Christ. Popular Christianity is often Unitarian, and often a philanthropy without much sense of God. But the centre of its faith and the secret of its permanence lie in the act of faith by which it identifies God and man in Christ. Once more, just as it is possible at one extreme to represent Christianity as a literal *imitatio Jesu*, with all the limitations of outlook which that would imply; so at the other extreme it is tempting to regard it as an Idealism freed from bondage to the historical Jesus. But this, too, solves the problem by leaving out one side of the paradox. The true aim is rightly expressed as *imitatio Christi*—not the copy of a portrait, but a life of loyalty to an ideal.

No, the claim that Jesus is Christ cannot be evaded, because it stands at the very centre of Christianity. It must form the starting-point of the Modernist's doctrine of the Incarnation. He must try to disentangle what is fact and what is faith in it.

V.

The line of further advance can best be entered from the side of history. The story of any great leader of men, more particularly of any founder of a religious movement, shows how complex are the constituents of greatness. In some instances the personality of the leader seems to create its own opportunity. In others the occasion is so urgent that almost anyone with the wit or courage to seize it may become a leader. In others the organisation is supplied by the leader, the ideas and enthusiasm by his followers. Yet in each case popular tradition tends to credit everything to the leader. He becomes the hero, and his name the symbol of the movement. All that was done he did, or inspired. All that remains to be done must be done in loyalty to his ideas. To hero-worship may be added apotheosis, and the leader, with all his acts and teachings, be looked upon as divine. In course of time it comes to be thought disloyal, if not impious, to suggest that, without the help of circumstances, without the creative faith of his followers, the leader might never have become a hero, nor the saint the centre of a religious cult.

This simplification of the issue is undoubtedly a help to popular faith; but at the expense of truth; and not least in the case of Christianity. No religion has in reality a more complex origin. Its seed was the spiritual teaching of the great Jewish prophets; its soil, the Jewish apocalyptic hope; its sowers, Jesus and his disciples; Hellenism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Modernism, the changing atmosphere which determined its growth; we do not know what it may yet become, or when it may be ripe—"the harvest is the end of the world, and the reapers are the angels." It would be an over-simplification of the facts, and a very misleading one, to represent Christianity as suddenly and completely given to the world in the person and preaching of Jesus.

But how does this affect the Modernist doctrine of the Incarnation? I think vitally. For it means that at no point in the development of Christianity has Christian faith been the simple acceptance of the person of Jesus, any more than of his miracles, but that the believer has always brought something with him, and that something not the same. He has formed Jesus in the image of his own needs and ideals. Christian faith is never merely receptive, but also creative: it makes what it finds. The idea is a familiar one, but it has been used chiefly to depreciate faith as subjective and self-centred; it ought to be welcomed, and given its proper place in Christian apologetic. To a Modernist the Incarnation includes two essential things, the life of Jesus, and the Church's belief about it: the one a historical fact, taking its place among other incidents of the past; the other an act of religious faith with a past, a present, and a future; and both are involved in his definition of it. Thinking of the Incarnation as St John thinks of it—as the age-long presence of God's Thought among men—he finds it as old as the world, and as complex as the religious development of mankind. Thinking of it as the Church commonly does—as concentrated in the earthly life of Jesus—he still insists that it is not simple, but complex; that the apocalyptic hope of the disciples was required to make that life so significant; that God was present in them as well as in him; that his divinity was not simply something they found in him, but also something they gave to him; because the Word was made flesh, and dwelt, not only "among," but also "in" us. And if this is a true account of the past, it will also be a true account of the present. The faith of the Church is still necessary to give divine value to Jesus' humanity. Faith in the Incarnation means belief that God's love for the world, and His will for its redemption, fulfils

itself, not through Jesus' life uninterpreted by us, nor through our religious sense unaided by his revelation of God, but through the unique result of his life and our faith meeting together.

Does this seem to lessen the unique character of the Incarnation? Is it not more likely that, as we are discovering that the uniqueness of the Incarnation is not diminished by the acknowledgment of Jesus' human birth and death, so we shall come to see that it is not injured by emphasising the religious faith which gave and gives his human character and experience their divine significance? The uniqueness of the Incarnation, unprovable as a historical fact, an objective "moral miracle," begins, indeed, in a historical argument, but ends in a faith which is just as unique as we allow God to make it.

This does not mean that we are to give up the historical defence of Christian faith in favour of a pragmatic argument from religious experience. The kind of historical argument we must distrust is one which tries to prove too much, and by its failure compromises our whole apologetic. We could never substantiate, and soon we shall no longer believe in, the miraculous figure which is at once the Jesus of history and the Christ of devotion: but we can prove beyond question that Jesus is worthy to be the source and the continual inspiration of Christian faith: and we are able to meet the charge that our faith is illusory just so far as we can show its harmony with that historic background. We can never, by the mere comparison of results, prove that one view of Jesus' person is truer than another. Indeed, we cannot by such means prove the validity of any faith at all, but only its vitality. A historical argument is needed, not to prove that everything which faith asserts about Christ was literally true of Jesus—that it can never do, and, if it could, there would be no further need of faith,—but to show that there is nothing accidental, or illusory, or improper in the identification of the divine Christ-ideal with the historical and wholly human figure of Jesus of Nazareth.

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AGAIN WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY ?

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IT is a matter of frequent comment that from the earliest days of Christian history there have been two opposing views of the nature of Christianity : one maintaining that it consists in the teachings *of* Jesus, the other that it is the teachings *about* Jesus. Though both views together were probably held by most Christians of the Apostolic Age, it is plain that the Jerusalem church regarded the new religion as chiefly a continuation of the teachings of the Master, while St Paul and his followers concentrated their attention upon the nature of Christ and the consequences that flowed from it. These rival views have been continued down to our own time, the Jerusalem church finding its successors in thinkers like Harnack and President Eliot, while the more Pauline view is championed by equally representative thinkers such as Father Loisy and Otto Pfleiderer.

The view which would make Christianity consist in the teachings *of* Christ is based largely upon an historical analysis of the Church's doctrines *about* Christ. These doctrines, it is pointed out, took their rise considerably subsequent to the death of Jesus, through the speculations of Paul and later theologians, and were based upon the Hebrew and Hellenic presuppositions of the times. The Hebrew conception of the Messiah and the Greek conception of the Logos were merged into the figure of Christ as conceived by orthodox theology : and these conceptions, together with the other philosophic presuppositions of the day which were woven into the Church's teaching about Christ, though appropriate and useful in the first century, have been long outgrown. No thinker of the twentieth century would seriously consider the Greek and Hebrew philosophies as anything but very symbolic expressions of his own belief. Yet, as I have just pointed out,

they were plainly decisive in the formation of the Church's Christology. It is equally plain, moreover, that this elaborate Christology can find no real warrant in those teachings of the historical Jesus which modern criticism allows us to regard as authentic. Thus the doctrine that he was the Second Person of the Trinity, or the Son of God in some supernatural sense, is plainly something that was read into his life by the Christian community, looking back upon it after many years. This view of him as a supernatural being, based as it is, not on Jesus' own words but on the outgrown philosophies of the Hebrew-Hellenic world, we cannot honestly accept. We must, therefore, go back to the historical Jesus—the man, the prophet, the teacher—and find our Christianity only in his teachings.

This view of the nature of Christianity obviously gives to New Testament criticism a very great importance. If we are to get back to the historical Jesus and discover his environment, his views, his teachings, we must do so in scholarly, critical, unprejudiced fashion. The result of such study shows us many things, some of which not all of us, perhaps, had been prepared for. And here those who would identify Christianity with the teachings *about* Christ take up the argument. The critical study of the New Testament, as Loisy and others of his school point out, shows that Jesus was undoubtedly a child of his time: that he shared many of its intellectual limitations and many of its views, both philosophical, historical, and eschatological; that some of these views have been long since outgrown, and some have been shown false by history. Several of the beliefs which Jesus shared with the Jewish community of his time, and on which he laid considerable stress, can be acceptable to the modern Liberal, if at all, only on the ground of some sort of supernatural insight and authority in him. But Jesus, we have learned, was not a supernatural being; the view that he was so is due to Pauline interpretation and to Hebrew-Hellenic philosophy. Hence, oddly enough, it seems impossible to accept many of the teachings *of* Jesus just because we do not accept the teachings *about* Jesus.

Theology often makes as queer bedfellows as politics, and in the present instance it is interesting to see the Radical scholars who deny even the historicity of Jesus fighting side by side with the extreme Conservatives against their common foe, the Liberal of the Harnack-Eliot school. And certainly the difficulties just pointed out in the view that would make Christianity consist in the teachings of Jesus seem to give a

real advantage to their opponents. But these opponents also have difficulties of their own, as was in fact pointed out above. No New Testament scholar of whatever school can seriously urge us to accept the teachings of the Church *about* Jesus, *if* they are purely Pauline and post-Pauline, and based ultimately on the speculations of early thinkers and the philosophers of Greece and Israel. These philosophies and speculations, appropriate for their time, are quite inappropriate for ours, and can hardly be taken as final. If it be true that Jesus himself never accepted the ideas about himself which the Christology of the Church has taught, if their origin is in fact to be traced to a time considerably later than his, they can make little appeal to men of our day. If Christianity be identified with these ideas, and if, therefore, it consists merely in the speculations of the Christian community in the first and second and later centuries, its defence will be a very difficult matter. Surely if Christianity is a living and lasting thing, a modern as well as an ancient thing, and if it consists in certain teachings about Jesus, these teachings must have some higher source than Hellenic-Hebrew ideas and the speculations of a few first- and second-century Jews of Asia Minor and Rome. If they are to be established as worthy of our acceptance, the essential part of them must be regarded as coming from Jesus himself. Only on the supposition that he shared these views and taught them himself can they command our adhesion and reverence. Hence it would seem that one can seriously identify Christianity with the Church's teachings *about* Jesus, only by insisting at the same time that they are also the teachings *of* Jesus.

The views that Christianity is exclusively the teachings *of* Jesus, and that it is exclusively the teachings *about* Jesus, would therefore seem to be alike untenable. Each needs the other. But if Christianity is neither of these, there remain but two possible alternatives. Either it is *both* the teachings of Jesus and the teachings about him, or else it is neither. The former of these seems at once the natural conclusion. It is, moreover, the orthodox conclusion. It is a view thoroughly consistent with itself. But one must add that if it be the true view, it makes Christianity something which a constantly increasing number of scholars and very many unscholarly but honest thinkers will hesitate to accept; it depicts Christianity as a religion which can no longer really satisfy the needs of Christendom. Every honestly critical study of the New Testament and of Christology will show that many of the teachings purporting (in the Synoptics) to come from Jesus

—notably those dealing with eschatology—were plainly quite mistaken; and that many of the ideas of his nature which have been adopted into Christian theology are altogether foreign to his whole scheme of thought. Is it possible, then, to take the other alternative suggested above—that Christianity is neither the teachings *of* Jesus nor those *about* him? If we should accept this view, would there be anything of Christianity left? What, in fact, would Christianity be?

It would be—and on this view it is—not a collection of teachings but a movement in the spiritual life of the race. It is not a simple thing, but a complex thing, as all living things are. It is not to be confined to any one province or aspect of the human mind, but makes its appeal to a large part of our many-sided nature. Of its several aspects, however, there are three that stand out with special prominence, corresponding as they do, in a general way, to the three aspects of mental life which psychology has often distinguished. It is, namely, an experience, an activity, and a belief.

These three words, I trust, will be sufficiently suggestive to the reader's own thought, and I need expand them but little. As an historical fact, and as a present fact, Christianity has been and is a certain type of "inner" experience in the lives of its adherents. The Christian experience, quite aside from Christian activity and Christian creed, is of many sorts, varying from individual to individual according to temperament and training, a rich field of study for the psychologist and for every loving observer of the finer things in human nature. Much the same thing might, indeed, be said of each of the great religions. Each one of them is, among other things, a many-sided experience. But these types of experience which the great religions produce, and which to so large an extent they *are*, though similar, are by no means identical. The Christian experience is rich and varied, but it has characteristics of its own which may be called in some peculiar sense Christian. If we compare the Christian experience with that of the three other great religions of to-day—the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Mohammedan—we shall see plainly enough that it is peculiarly characterised by love: love for God and love for man. Throughout the two thousand years of its existence, Christianity has been, among other things, an overflowing stream of love, an inner life of love. To such an extent is this generally admitted that no one who has failed to taste at least in some degree of this experience is recognised in popular parlance as "truly Christian," while everyone who shares in it to any notable extent is at once acknowledged by

common consent to be not far from Christianity, no matter what his race or creed.

The second aspect of that spiritual movement which we call Christian is closely related to the one just considered. It is, namely, an active outpouring of that love which forms the centre of the Christian experience. The impulse to helpfulness and to service has ever characterised those acts and those individuals whom common speech likes to call peculiarly Christian. This characteristic comes out even more markedly than the first if we compare Christianity with the other great religions. Noble as they unquestionably are—and for my own part I have great admiration for them all—their most ardent advocate would hardly claim for them that the active helpfulness which springs from love is as characteristic of them as it is, and always has been, of Christianity. And when we say, as we often do, that at certain times and in certain communities Christianity has become “less Christian,” we usually mean by that paradoxical statement that it has lost some of its love and impulse to service.

Finally, Christianity is in part also a belief or a teaching. It does not consist altogether of teaching, but it includes a teaching or belief as a necessary part of itself. The love which it feels, the activity which it displays, have for their background, and to some extent as their presupposition, a certain kind of attitude toward the universe. This more intellectual aspect of Christianity, this way of viewing things, is as intimate a part of itself as are its love and its impulse to service. This too has formed an inseparable part of that spiritual movement which we call Christian. Plainly it will be impossible to include in this universally Christian way of viewing the world and man many of the details of the historical Christian creeds. Yet the Christian point of view is sufficiently characteristic, sufficiently definite, to be capable of considerable specification. I shall not attempt to make an exhaustive list of the beliefs which seem to me peculiarly Christian, but at least the following should certainly be enumerated. Christianity believes, among other things, in the reality and the great importance of the experience and the activity already discussed. It not only loves and serves, but it *believes in* loving and serving. It regards love as the fulfilling of the law, and service as the supreme duty of man. While Christian theologians and philosophers have differed greatly, and probably always will, as to the nature of God, the common point in all those theologies which can be called Christian has been the insistence that, whatever else be said

of the Divinity, He must be so pictured as to be describable by the word "Father." From the fatherhood of God has followed, as another ever-present fact of Christian thought, the belief in the brotherhood of man. It is, of course, the attempt to work out all that this implies which particularly characterises the more progressive part of contemporary Christianity. In common with some of the other great religions, though in a very distinct sense, Christianity has always emphasised the responsibility of the individual. In common with all the other great religions (except Hinayana Buddhism), Christianity affirms with triumphant assurance the endless life of the human soul.

Other beliefs pretty surely should be included in this, very incomplete, description of the Christian faith. Most of these I shall leave the reader to fill in, but there is one which is far too important for even my partial list to leave unmentioned. Christianity, namely, believes that while the great spiritual movement which it is, had its roots, historically, deep in Hebrew and Greek antiquity—and, psychologically, deep in the foundations of human nature,—still, as a special and recognisable movement, it had its beginnings in the first century of our era. That some of its ideas and some of its spirit are due to St Paul and to the writer of the Fourth Gospel and to many of their fellow-labourers, it fully recognises; but it is sure that, more than to any other one individual, its source is to be traced to the religious life and spiritual insight of Jesus Christ. In this sense it regards him as its Founder. It was he who started the whole movement going, he who gave it the impress and the character which it has never lost. Its most treasured teachings it finds expressed in his reported words and illustrated supremely in his life. It believes in these teachings, not because of his authority, but because of their intrinsic merit—as is shown by the fact that some of the things he taught it has quietly rejected as due to the limitations of his time. But it finds the lessons which he gave lighted up by a sort of glory when presented by him, and it looks in vain through history for so complete an illustration of their application in concrete living as in his life. Finally, it knows as a past historical fact and as a psychological and present fact, that it draws and always has drawn from his figure its greatest inspiration for the life of love toward God and of service to men.

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THE LIBERTY OF THE SPIRIT.

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THERE are certain party cries which are not even remotely related to reality: they represent the barren reiteration of prejudice, not the intelligent enunciation of principle. "Great is Diana of the Ephesians" was one of this class; "The faith in danger" is another. Now, it seems obvious that a faith that can be "in danger" is not a faith worth preserving, and it is necessary to make it clear that what the devotees of a rigid ecclesiasticism wish to preserve is not "the faith" but their own formal apprehension of it. It seems almost superfluous in these days of intellectual enfranchisement to insist upon the distinction between an inner moral or spiritual impulse and the mutable forms in which that impulse has been enshrined in history. There are some people who, like the unhappy Bourbons, "learn nothing and forget nothing." Such people are busy building round themselves a zareba of theological prejudice which exponents of a normal healthy type of Christianity have no desire to penetrate. But this does not satisfy them. So convinced are these trustees of mediævalism that they are the sole depositories of at least the "form" of sound words, to say nothing for the moment of the "substance," that they are not content to leave "the world that lieth in darkness" to itself. It must conform or suffer the penalty of anathema. The psychological basis of this attitude is not easily determined. It may be the desire to save souls that are perishing; it may be the consciousness of rather irksome intellectual limitations that it is the duty of all Christians to share alike, as the fox in the fable who lost his tail tried to equalise matters by suggesting that the other foxes should remove theirs. It may in some cases spring from that irresistible logic which demanded some definite "note" of Church-

manship in the early Catholic Church, as a merely moral or spiritual assent was too indefinite and impalpable a criterion of conformity. But we are less concerned with the source than with the strength and persistence of this embarrassing altruism. That spirit is still rampant that could inspire a young missionary bishop to pronounce solemn *pro formâ* excommunication against a prelate of the English bench old enough to be his grandfather, and which created all the unseemly bickering that resulted from the recent Hereford appointment. Humour, however, has never been a strong *nota ecclesiæ*, Anglican or Catholic. This impenetrability of outlook is the strongest weapon in the armoury of reaction; but it did not save the Church from looking foolish in the sixteenth century, and it will hardly save the faces of those zealous brethren of ours in the twentieth who are determined to impose their own measure of salvation upon a reluctant world.

Since the days of Galileo and Torricelli obscurantism has been one of the principal strongholds of traditionalism; but it has never yet been able to check the growth of the human spirit, and it is safe to assume it never will. It is as easy to trace its genesis as to account for its isolated energy. Most great ideas are connected with palpable and persistent forms with which in course of time they become identified. This does not mean that one should get rid of the forms, but merely imposes the necessity of recognising them as such. To separate form from substance is not easy, but its necessity in all stages of religious growth is nowhere more closely shown than in the gospels. As the Catholic Church does not appear in the gospels, or only in such a rudimentary and doubtful form as to supply very little data for the purposes of propaganda, they are often in danger of being overlooked. But they are still the only safe depository of first principles, and, on the question now under discussion, the teaching of Jesus is so plain and unmistakable that nothing but wilful prejudice can fail to profit by it.

It is a mistake to suppose that in matters that have such a natural congruity with the human spirit as religion and morality there is any great difference in the modes by which they are apprehended by one age and another. Human nature does not change much. The psychological problems that faced Jesus in the first century would face Him to-day if He were to return. He would find, *mutatis mutandis*, exactly the same spirit at work in all phases of social and religious opinion. He would find the same weapons being used by all parties as those in use in His own day. He

would find the same passion for novelty, the same superstitions, the same invincible prejudice; and it is safe to assume that His attitude towards them all would be that in which He disengaged the pure stream of spiritual principle from the deposits and accretions of Rabbinism by which the word of God had been made of "none effect" by the "traditions of men."

That Jesus was the avowed enemy of "system" seems established by every phase of the gospel ethic. He was the despair of the Pharisaic party, who could find no "note" of His religious philosophy on which they could base information and get His dangerous teaching stopped. His was the sin of Socrates. A morality without a label is a menace to public order: every kind of revolutionary propaganda may lurk beneath it. Men will be generally found ready to crush what they do not understand. The Pharisees plainly demonstrated their uneasiness. "How long dost thou make us to doubt?" The way in which Jesus fenced with these masters of craft and casuistry has been the instruction and delight of all succeeding ages. Never once was He caught out, and it is clear that they vented their rage and disappointment in a charge that invoked the aid of the Roman government, and was only indirectly related to Jesus' animadversions on Jewish theocratic privilege.

Thus, while Jesus never railed at Judaism *per se*, He never ceased to denounce its official exponents, and with only one possible result. The Pharisees occupied for the Rabbinism of our Lord's day precisely the place occupied by the trustees of tradition who in our own time are making use of the same arguments as their Jewish predecessors. Jesus was sapping the foundations of the faith; He was an enemy of public order—this last accusation is too much of an anachronism to be in common use to-day, but the spirit and attitude of mind which inspired it are still vigorous to-day. It became a solemn duty to denounce His teaching, if the whole structure of Jewish polity were not to collapse; and the Pharisees, from their psychological and historical standpoint, were right. They would have been poor patriots indeed if they had not fought for the system it was their special function to protect. But the error of these zealots lay, not in their clinging to a system with which the national hopes had for centuries been identified, but in their blind refusal to read the signs of the times. Since the conquest of Alexander, Rabbinism had begun to undergo a profound transformation; it was in our Lord's time practically a "creed outworn"—it had no inner principle of life.

In the eyes of the Græco-Roman culture the Jews were a race of tiresome bigots, as we learn from the witness of Tacitus. Social and intellectual movements were on foot that were gradually leaving Rabbinism high and dry, and within half a century of the solemn pronouncement of Jesus of the end of the Jewish theocracy the catastrophe had come, and Judaism was scattered to the four corners of the empire.

There are those among us to-day who cannot read the "signs of the times" and who persist in clinging to a changeless formula with which they consider the whole future of the "faith" is inseparably identified. Men have had this obsession in all ages, and the event has invariably been against them. In the days of Rome's supremacy, when "kings were going to Canossa," it was an article of faith that the Papacy was an eternal institution: that Jesus Himself had decreed its apotheosis. It is not criticism but *tempus edax rerum* that has done for the Papacy what it did for Judaism, and will do for all human institutions that are not informed with those principles of the spiritual life that cannot decay. What men think of Jesus matters little, or rather *how* they think of Him matters much: it is the only thing that does matter. If He is regarded as the creator and guardian of a particular system within the limits of which alone can His spirit reach the hearts of men, then it is clear that His own teaching is rejected *in limine*, and we are faced by contradictions in the spheres of history and psychology that cannot be resolved. Nor do we find the least evidence that Jesus contemplated such an utter perversion of His spirit and His teaching. A creed or a Church is no more sacred, no more guaranteed against the disintegrating touch of time, than any human philosophy or any human institution; there is only one test: it is not intellectual, nor strictly moral—it is a religious test in the only sense in which that word has a congruity with the experience of the race. It is a test that combines all the human faculties as they unite in the search for truth, and has no more to do with a correct gnosis to-day than it had at that profound moment of human history when Jesus said: "Not everyone that saith unto me 'Lord, Lord,' shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father."

R. F. RHYND.

LONDON.

ETHER, MATTER, AND THE SOUL.

SIR OLIVER LODGE.

THERE was a time—not so long ago—when electricity was thought of as something vague, mysterious, and immaterial—a mere affection of matter; it was sometimes called a form of energy, sometimes popularly spoken of more specifically as a kind of vibration; it seemed, in fact, like a mere outcome of the properties of matter, which displayed themselves in this singular fashion. Those who studied it closely knew very well that electricity was not a vibration, and not even a form of energy, but what it was they did not know. Some pioneers, greatly daring, spoke of it as a fluid, and the notion of a fluid got into popular language and acquired a sort of spurious definiteness which was unjustifiable and had to be condemned; for the term suggested that electricity was merely an imponderable form or variety of ordinary matter. Heat also was spoken of as a fluid, and the facile term became useless and misleading.

The progress of discovery soon showed that heat was not a form of matter at all; that it really was a vibration, a mode of motion, a form of energy; and we also learnt that without ordinary matter heat as such could not exist. The idea of temperature became rightly associated with the conception of the rapidity of motion of material particles; and the irregular motion of such particles—molecular motions at random, disorganised, and in every direction—turned out to be precisely what heat really is. A useful analogy is sound. Everyone knows that sound is due to the vibration of bodies as a whole—that such vibration disturbs the atmosphere, and that this disturbance when conveyed to our ears is what we call sound. Without a vibrating body, and without a conveying atmosphere or other material vehicle, sound cannot exist. A ghostly or disembodied sound is meaningless. In a vacuum there is no such thing. A vacuum is permeated with absolute silence. Ring a bell in empty space and there is nothing to be heard.

Heat differs from sound in being not due to any vibration of a body as a whole, but a material body is necessary, for heat is a quiver of its ultimate particles. Given a purely molecular disturbance of quite irregular character—then this irregular movement, if vigorous enough and applied by contact to any portion of the skin, is what stimulates the nerves with the sensation of warmth, and is accordingly known as heat.

But what about light? Is that a material vibration too? or is it a projected substance? Is vision due to a bombardment of particles? or is it caused by the impact of aerial vibrations? The answer now accepted is, Neither. Light is not a stream of particles—though that view has been held by influential thinkers,—nor is it transmitted as any disturbance of the atmosphere, nor as any affection of ordinary matter. It is a vibration certainly, but a vibration of something far more perfect and fundamental than any form of matter known to chemists. It is only hindered by matter; it is a kind of disembodied vibration; its home is vacuum. Across empty space it can travel with perfect ease. The filament of a glow lamp is enclosed in a vacuum—in a vacuum as perfect as can be made; for although the vacuum is not really perfect, the lamp would be all the better if it were—*i.e.* if exhaustion of air could be carried to the extreme limit. The space between the stars is still more empty of matter—as empty of matter as anything we know; and hence it is that their light reaches us with ease across those terrific distances, even though it take a thousand years on its journey. Not until their light enters the gross and matter-containing region of the earth's atmosphere is the free progress of star-light interfered with. Then indeed it encounters difficulties, and visibility may be impaired. To light, matter is an interference, an obstruction, never an assistance. Light is a kind of discarnate heat. And, when incorporate in matter, heat is what it becomes.

I use the term "light" here to signify briefly every kind of radiation conveyed by the ether at one and the same definite pace. Sometimes a portion of such radiation is called radiant heat, but it is all one essentially, the varieties only differing as bass notes differ from treble ones. "Radiant heat" is a popular not an accurate term, and it is sufficiently erroneous to be confusing. The thing that travels is not heat, but has the power of generating heat when absorbed by matter. But in this respect every sort of radiation is in the same predicament. The kind of radiation longest known to us is that which affects the eye, and so it is permissible to use the term light occasionally in a generalised sense, covering the whole range from X

and γ rays to the waves of wireless telegraphy—at least when we do not wish to discriminate. Etherial radiation, however, is the correct term whenever we wish to be precise.

By studying the effects of matter upon light something may be learnt about the properties of both, especially about the properties of matter. Light passing through the difficulties of matter is trained and analysed, and may be made to yield up its secrets, but in itself and apart from matter it is invisible and intractable. Matter helps us to deal with it, but matter is no help to the light itself. And yet it is through or in matter that it originates: in some sense that is true. Every source of light known to us is a piece of matter. By matter apparently it may be generated, by matter it can be destroyed, but not by matter can it be conveyed; nor is matter in the least essential to its existence—only to its accessibility.

Light is known to be a vibration, a particular kind of vibration which is able to stimulate the nerve filaments embedded in the retina of the eye; but what the thing is which is vibrating, the thing which really does transmit light through empty space—about that we may popularly be said to know nothing: for it is a medium which does not appeal to our senses in any way. If we try to experiment upon the luminiferous medium, we fail. It is absolutely intangible and insensible, and yet it has properties of its own; and one of its properties is the easy transmission, at a perfectly definite pace, of that strange tremor or vibration which we call light.

Do we know anything else about it? Yes, essentially and really we know a great deal, but our knowledge has not yet been properly formulated. It would take too long to explain. Suffice it to say that we utilise the properties of the luminiferous medium not only when we send telegraphic messages or drive electric tram-cars, but also when we wind up our watches, or bend a bow, or fire an explosive—yes, even when we raise a weight or bicycle down hill. The strength of materials depends upon it, and half the energy of all terrestrial activity exists not in sensible and ponderable matter, but in this subtle and elusive medium—the medium which transmits light, and which is known as the ether of space.

Light is an affection of the ether. Light is to ether as sound is to matter. What about electricity and magnetism, then? Are they related to the ether as heat is to matter? Is electricity some peculiar affection of the ether of space? So it had been thought. In various vague forms this idea must have been in the back of our minds.

Electricity seemed something immaterial and elusive, only

becoming apparent when associated with ordinary matter. In the form of an electric charge on the surface of bodies, in the form of an electric current running through metals, electricity became known and was studied for a century. But whether there was anything substantial about an electric charge, whether there was anything really running along a wire conveying a current, that was greatly doubted and thought improbable. Ideas about it were vague and unsubstantial, notwithstanding a vast accretion of both theoretical and practical knowledge. It seemed a thing almost hopelessly inaccessible, only to be dealt with in association with matter, only tractable in its innermost nature by the power of high mathematical analysis.

But a change has come over the spirit of electrical science ; and, largely owing to the genius of men still living, electricity has put on body, and form, and size, and mass ; it has become corporeal. It is a substance—a fluid if we like to call it so,—it consists of particles, not material indeed, but corpuscular. It has become concrete and substantial, though it remains inaccessible to our senses. Electricity is no form of ordinary matter, but suggests itself as the raw material out of which ordinary matter is composed. It is still refined and subtle, but it is no longer elusive. The corpuscles can by indirect and most ingenious means be counted and weighed and measured. They crowd on the surface of a charged body, and constitute its charge. They rush through a wire conveying a current, and constitute the current. They whirl in almost infinitesimal orbits, and constitute what we know as magnetism. They swirl and change in speed or in direction of movement, and thus excite in the ether the specific disturbance which appeals to our eyes as light. That is how light is generated, by the changing movements of electric corpuscles. And when light is absorbed or mopped up again, it is to the astonishing evolutions of those same corpuscles that its energy is entrusted. The period of indefiniteness and recondite puzzledom has come to an end, and the period of definite conceptions in this department of physics has begun.

Subject to all the laws of time and space, fully amenable to the laws of energy, largely the source of terrestrial energy, governing all the manifestations of physical forces, at the root of elasticity and tenacity and every other static property of matter, the ether is just beginning to take its rightful place in the scheme of physics ; and the etherial corpuscles—the specks of modified ether which we know as electric charges—are beginning to be recognised as substantial little entities in

terms of which are to be interpreted the very constitution of gross and ponderable matter. They are the units of which atoms are composed. They, and not primarily the atoms of matter, appear to be the ultimate foundation-stones of which the material cosmos is built. Electricity is no longer vague and mysterious, it has become unexpectedly accessible and tractable; many things about its constitution remain to be discovered, but these little substantial nuclei, with their definite and ascertainable movements, are dim and ghostly no longer.

Not that these electrical units or electrons displace or supersede the material atoms. They help to explain them, but they co-exist with them. Electrons are themselves material, and by their organisation have acquired some elementary properties of matter. And yet they can be considered separately, and they are not ordinary matter. We know both matter and electricity, there is room for both—one involves the other, though they can be detached and considered separately; and if ultimately our conceptions attain a more comprehensive unity, it will be the electric and not the material unit which ultimately and most fundamentally survives. Electric charges, composed of modified ether, are likely to prove to be the cosmic building material. Meanwhile atoms and electrons co-exist, and for practical purposes are separable; even if only as a swarm is a unit distinct from its constituent bees, or a wall something different from its constituent bricks. The differences may be greater than what is here suggested: we do not at present clearly know. The two kinds of electricity seem to combine to make one kind of matter: or rather to make many kinds—to combine in different ways so as to make all the chemical elements.

But, besides these peculiar portions—the modified minute electric units—there is the great bulk of undifferentiated ether, the entity which fills all space and in which everything material occurs. A duality runs through the scheme of physics—matter and ether. Matter appeals to our senses, but the unmodified ether makes no such appeal; it is so inaccessible that its existence even has been denied. No one can deny the existence of matter, at least not on common-sense grounds; common sense can easily deny the existence of the ether. Yet one is as certain as the other, and in all the activities of the cosmos the interaction of the two entities is essentially and clearly involved. All kinetic energy belongs to what we call matter, whether in the atomic or the corpuscular form; movement or locomotion is its characteristic. All static energy

belongs to the ether, the unmodified and universal ether ; its characteristics are strain and stress. Energy is always passing to and fro from one to the other—from ether to matter or *vice versâ*—and in this passage all *work* is done.

Now, the probability is that every sensible object has both a material and an etherial counterpart. One side only are we sensibly aware of, the other we have to infer. But the difficulty of perceiving this other side—the necessity for indirect inference—depends essentially and entirely on the nature of our sense organs, which tell us of matter and do not tell us of ether. Yet one is as real and substantial as the other, and their fundamental joint quality is co-existence and interaction. Not interaction everywhere and always, for there are plenty of regions without matter—though there is no region without ether ; but the potentiality of interaction, and often the conspicuous reality of it, everywhere prevails and constitutes the whole of our purely mundane experience.

Many other instances can be quoted, in science, of the gradual progress from vague and indistinct conceptions to something tangible and concrete. I have drawn an example from electricity, but a biologist could readily draw upon other branches of knowledge. For instance, it is popularly known that *malaria* simply means “bad air,” and the disease was attributed vaguely to the unwholesome atmosphere of marshes. But the source of the disease has been traced to the bite of a creature which breeds in water, a familiar insect which can be seen and heard and crushed. Indeed, the whole treatment of disease in general has been revolutionised by Pasteur’s discovery that it was usually the result of poison secreted by actual little organisms visible in a high-power microscope. The vague and indeterminate always tends to become the substantial and definite, as knowledge advances.

Now, applying all this, as a sort of parable, to the probable progress of psychical research, I must foresee a little. I must look ahead. It is a *tendency* which I recognise, not an accomplished fact.

Our ideas about the nature of the soul have hitherto been for the most part vague and tentative ; the term “soul” has been used more or less apologetically, and the corresponding reality has been difficult to grasp. Some reality was felt to be underlying the term, but it was too vague and indefinite to be susceptible of satisfactory definition ; it seemed too subtle and elusive for everyday use. The term was usually avoided. Body we knew, and spirit we might in sort imagine—for clearly the matter of living things is controlled and arranged

by something. But soul, what was that? Well, I foresee a time when the term soul will be intelligible, and I think it will be found that soul is related to the ether as body is related to matter. I suggest that it will turn out to be a sort of ethereal body, as opposed or supplemental to our obvious material body. That is what I foresee as lying in the path of the progress of discovery. We shall find, I think, that we possess, all the time, a body co-existent with this one that we know—a body essentially substantial and related to space and time, not really transcendental, but yet in no way appealing to our present senses. Intangible and insensible, it may yet exist; and if it exists it may be detachable and capable of separate existence. It will be the ethereal aspect or counterpart of our present bodies, but more permanent than they. For there is no property in the ether which suggests ageing, or wear and tear. These, and other temporal disabilities, such as fatigue, imperfect elasticity, friction, dissolution, belong always to an assemblage of material atoms. No imperfection of any kind has yet been detected, or even suspected, in the ether of space. In so far as it is a fluid at all it is a perfect fluid: its elasticity and all its properties are perfect.

It may be asked, How can we acquire any knowledge of a supersensuous thing? So long as any portion of the ether, or an ethereal body, interacts with matter we can know something of it—not of it itself, but of what it can do. While still in the flesh we shall probably only know our ethereal counterpart through its interactions with matter. Directly these cease, it passes beyond our ken; but it exists just as really as before. Indeed, freed from the disabilities and imperfections of matter it can lead a less abstracted and livelier existence; it enters on a less troublous career, its vehicle is no longer this gross matter, with its heaviness and its dissipation of energy, but the free and perfect ether; of which, in some way yet to be discovered, it appears to be composed.

Hypothetically and tentatively I am inclined to postulate a duplicity of construction even in inanimate objects, for without it there could be no unity or coherence or any individual object at all—nothing but a dust of disconnected atoms. Ether is the medium of cohesion, it is that which holds the particles together, and it is that which is strained when the particles of an elastic body are displaced. The material particles are only shifted in position: the joining substance—the ether—is strained, and makes them spring back. The ether and the matter are interwoven.

Naturally it is only among animate objects that any psychic significance attaches to either the material or the interwoven etherial aspect; and the amount of psychic significance to be attached to any particular specimen of animated matter depends on its grade in the scale of existence. But whatever spiritual or mental affinities can be found in one, presumably belong equally to the other—that is my hypothesis; and co-existence of the two aspects is involved in, and renders possible, the familiar terrestrial life which we are aware of here and now.

As to the psychic relation: I assume, as a working hypothesis, that whenever a psychic element acts at all, it normally interacts with both the material and the etherial aspects; it may be suggested that perhaps it makes use of one for the activities we call conscious, and utilises the other for the activities which at present are unconscious. I do not press that, nor think it very likely. But I do postulate interaction with both matter and ether, and not only with one, as hitherto contemplated by perhaps the majority of philosophers. Whether the etherial portion can actually continue its psychic connection, apart from any material counterpart, is a question for evidence, not for dogmatism. But assuming the possibility—assuming that a withdrawal of the mental or spiritual guiding agency from the material aspect, so that that ceases to be animate, need not mean withdrawing control from the etherial aspect also—a good many things become vaguely explicable, or at any rate can be brought into a state ready for contemplation; though it is clear that to produce any manifestation to our present senses some elements of the material fraction must be temporarily restored.

The bringing in of the ether into the scheme of psychics, as it has already been partially brought into the scheme of physics, is the work which I feel sure is lying ahead for generations of men. Then—when a serious beginning in this direction has been made—the term “soul” will acquire a definite and clear connotation; no longer will the idea of a spiritual body seem vague and indefinite and difficult of apprehension: soul will no longer be regarded as a term to be avoided, but will become as real and recognisable, as concrete and tractable, as are the corpuscles of electricity. The interactions which are possible between the matter of this planet and the etherial bodies or souls associated with spiritual intelligence will then be understood; and with this knowledge, under proper regulation, a new power will be gained; and this new power will be utilised and put into action. The

meaning of human life, and the puzzles which surround it, will then become clearer and more intelligible. The obscure communications and strange movements which are now studied or experienced in spiritualistic circles, and which by some are thought to be miraculous or impossible—so impossible that the reports of them usually excite ridicule—will gradually take their place in the orderly scheme of recognised science. Such things as travelling clairvoyance and reciprocal dream experiences may become intelligible. Gratitude will surely then be felt to those early pioneers who in past centuries maintained their form of truth in spite of persecution, and testified to what they had known in face of undeserved contempt. Ultimately the subject will emerge from its dark and difficult period—a period clouded with traces of superstition and obstructed by well-meant but antiquated prejudice—and familiar intercourse across the veil or gulf of death will become sufficiently common to prove an untold blessing to the human race.

OLIVER LODGE.

BIRMINGHAM.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE.

The relation and the differences between matter and ether are often felt to be puzzling.

Matter is that which moves, locomotion is its characteristic; matter is what can be moved by human muscles or their equivalent. It appeals to the muscular sense. An appearance which cannot be felt strikes us as immaterial, like a will-o'-the-wisp or an image in a mirror. But innumerable things which do not appeal to the muscular or any other sense may have a perfectly real existence nevertheless. Our senses are inherited from the animals: they were useful in the struggle for existence; they are no test of reality. We have no direct apprehension of ether; hence if any psychic entity were to embody itself in ether instead of in matter it would be outside our direct ken.

Ether belongs to the physical frame of things, no one supposes it to be a psychic entity; but it probably subserves psychical purposes, just as matter does. Professors Tait and Balfour Stewart surmised a psychic significance for the ether of space so long ago as 1875, and treated it from a religious point of view in that much criticised book *The Unseen Universe*. And that great mathematical physicist James Clerk Maxwell concluded his article "Ether" in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* with an expression of faith, not indeed in this speculation, about which he evinced great caution, but in the real existence of a supersensuous universal connecting medium, and in the probability of its having many unsuspected functions.

AN ANCIENT ARRAIGNMENT OF PROVIDENCE.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

IN spite of the admirable work of Mr Box,¹ it is probable that comparatively few persons are familiar with that strange apocalyptic writing known as "2 Esdras" or as "the Fourth Book of Ezra." Even in the Revised Version of the Apocrypha it is not very intelligible as it stands, with two chapters at the beginning and two at the end, later accretions, which do not belong to it, and without any explanations or introduction. The truth is that books like 2 Esdras are on the horns of a dilemma. Without comment of any kind they are unintelligible; a full and elaborate commentary is too long, and says too much, for any but the professed student. But in the excellent *Translations of Early Documents* (Series I., Palestinian Jewish texts, pre-rabbinic), published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, Mr Box has now provided the average reader with just what he wants, and no more. He has given a very short introduction, a translation, and a few very brief notes under the text. The whole thing only comes to 107 small pages, with good type and good paper.

2 Esdras is one of those odd books for our knowledge of which we depend upon translations of a translation. Not only is the original Hebrew lost, but the Greek translation of that original is lost too. All we have now are translations of that translation. The rendering in the A.V. and the R.V. is from the Latin. Mr Box has now given us a rendering from the Syriac, but his notes indicate the more important differences between the Syriac and Latin texts.

Now, it may be conceded that Jewish apocalyptic literature

¹ *The Ezra Apocalypse*, being chapters 3-14 of the book commonly known as 4 Ezra or 2 Esdras, translated and edited by the Rev. G. H. Box (1912).

is in general only suited for the student and the specialist. In most directions and respects 2 Esdras or 4 Ezra is no exception. The book is full of valuable material for the history of apocalyptic doctrine and terminology. But how many want, nowadays, to know anything of that terminology or doctrine, or of its history? Many of the apocalyptic conceptions have become obsolete. And as to the New Jerusalem, or the day of judgment, or the resurrection life, or the fortunes of the good and the bad beyond the grave, the apocalyptic writers, including our Ezra, knew as little as ourselves, and, in spite of all their angels and their visions, their ideas on these high topics fail to satisfy our modern requirements and our modern thought. Their vaticinations have only an interest to the professed student of theology, and *he* (if the truth were known) is sometimes rather wearied by them.

But the Apocalypse of Esdras contains something more than visions of the end of the world and of the new age. It contains also an arraignment of Providence of which Professor Burkitt—a very high authority—observes that there is “very little like it either in Jewish or Christian literature, till we come to modern times.”¹

Unique in its special kind as the arraignment in Ezra is, it is not the *first*, or even the greatest, arraignment in Jewish literature. For it is the Bible which contains this first and greatest arraignment, and its title is the Book of Job.

Job’s arraignment concerns the unequal distribution of prosperity and adversity to the righteous and the wicked. The principle of proportionate justice and retribution became very dear to the Jewish mind. The righteous should receive good things: the wicked bad things. But too often in actual life, while the good are seemingly overwhelmed with calamity, the wicked are apparently surfeited with happiness.

Even to-day one could hardly put the problem with greater simplicity or force than in those famous and pregnant words: “One dies in his full strength, being wholly at ease and quiet. His pails are full of milk, and the marrow of his bones is moistened. And another dies in the bitterness of his soul, and has never tasted happiness. They lie down alike in the dust, and the worms cover them” (xxi. 23–25).

Job deals with the individual. In the Psalms we get the same problem from a sectional, and also from a national, point of view. There is in Israel a party of the good, who fear God and seek to observe His law. And there is a party of the bad,

¹ *Jewish and Christian Apocalypses* (The Schweich Lectures for 1913), p. 43.

who live loosely and oppress the pious. Why are the first miserable, and the second prosperous? Or, again, Israel, as a whole, is the chosen people of God, with whom He has made a Covenant, and among whom is the House of His Name. The Gentiles, as a whole, know not God: they are sinners and oppressors. Yet they are triumphant, and Israel is subjected to their rule.

Between the work of Job and the Psalmists (who wrote anywhere between, let us say, 400 and 200 B.C.) and the composition of the Apocalypse of Ezra, came the introduction and the acceptance of the doctrine of the resurrection and of a blissful (as also of a retributively painful) life beyond the grave. This doctrine, with the kindred doctrine of the immortality of the soul, made a gigantic change in Jewish religion and theology, a change so great that Gunkel is right in saying that by it the whole religious history of Israel can justly be divided into two parts: before it; after it. When the Apocalypse of Ezra was composed, some twenty to forty years after the destruction of the Jewish State and the burning of the Temple by the Romans in 70 A.D., the doctrine had already become the official dogma of the Synagogue.

The most important effect of the new doctrine was, perhaps, the new answer it afforded to the problems of Job. The reward of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked are postponed and transferred to the life beyond death, where both can be displayed upon a grander and more permanent scale. If no man is wholly sinless, it is well worth while to undergo temporary sufferings for the sake of endless felicity. And what does earthly prosperity amount to, if it is to be succeeded by eternal woe? The doctrine could thus account satisfactorily for the unequal earthly lot both of righteous and wicked individuals, and of Israel in its calamities as compared with that of its oppressors in their triumphs.

The surprising novelty of our Ezra consists in this: that in spite of the doctrines of the resurrection and the life, of bliss or pain after death (nay, even because of them), he manages to make a fresh and more terrible arraignment of Providence than was made by, or was possible to, the author of Job.

He still puts forward the old national complaints. In the midst of the overwhelming calamities which had befallen Israel, how could he possibly omit them? Why has God, the Omnipotent, delivered His chosen people into the hands of the unbelievers? As compared with Rome, Israel is righteous. And even though Israel has sinned and is sinful, how can it

be maintained that *such* a punishment was just? Is it not a terrible profanation of the Divine Name? Why must the wicked heathen triumph? "If thou didst hate thy people so much, they ought to have been punished with thine own hands" (v. 30). Such expostulations and complaints are on old lines. But why is Ezra not satisfied by the new comfort? If immediately after death for the individual, and collectively, at the coming of the Resurrection and the Judgment (which, like all the apocalyptic writers, he believed to be near at hand), for the nation as a whole, felicity and triumph were ordained, does not this faith compensate and atone for any amount of earthly suffering?

A further doubt prevents it doing so. It is true that, as contrasted with the heathen, Israel is *comparatively* righteous; and it is still, at any rate, the chosen people to whom the Law was offered, and by whom it was accepted, treasured, and beloved. But Ezra is convinced that the innocence of the Israelites is comparative only. In themselves they too share the general frailty of man, nor has the Law been able to prevent this sinful tendency from ripening within them into actual sin. They too are sinners. Who among them has not yielded to the temptation and bondage of iniquity? Few indeed. And thus what is the use of a future world and a life of bliss, if this life and world are reserved for the righteous? For then the mass of men, even the mass of the Israelites, are excluded from that felicity of the future, and—horrible thought—are condemned, perchance, to an eternity of woe. Thus the new doctrine, instead of being a consolation, becomes a terror and a snare.

And who is responsible for this awful prospect? Why, who else than God?

Is not this an even more appalling arraignment than the arraignment of Job?

It is true that Adam by his sin set the evil ball rolling. But, then, why was he created so frail? Or why did God permit the tendency to sinfulness, the evil heart, to be the awful result in each and every generation of Adam's disobedience? The apocalyptic writer presses his argument home.

"Better had it been that the earth had not produced Adam, or else, having once produced him, for thee [*i.e.* for God] to have restrained him from sinning. For how does it profit us all that in the present we must live in grief, and after death look for punishment? O thou Adam, what hast thou done? For though it was thou that sinned, the fall was not thine alone, but ours also who are thy descendants. For how does it profit us that the eternal age is promised to us, whereas we

have done the works that bring death? And that there is foretold to us an imperishable hope, whereas we so miserably are brought to futility?" (vii. 116-120).

The foreknowledge of physical and spiritual death makes the lot of man worse than that of the beasts. Ezra's lament over man's evil fortune is daring in its outspokenness.

"O thou earth, what hast thou brought forth, if the mind is sprung from the dust as every other created thing? It had been better if the dust itself had even been unborn, that the mind might not have come into being from it. But as it is, the mind grows with us, and on this account we are tormented, because we perish and know it. Let the human race lament, but let the beasts of the field be glad. Let all the earth-born mourn, but let the cattle and flocks rejoice. For it is far better with them than with us, for they have no judgment to look for, neither do they know of any torture or of any salvation promised to them after death. For what does it profit us that we shall be preserved alive, but yet suffer great torment?" (vii. 62-67).

The evil inclination, the *cor malignum*, as the Latin calls it, the grain of evil seed, is the cause of the mischief; but why did God allow it to arise, or why did He give for it no remedy? Ezra does not say, like St Paul, that the Law made things worse, but he does say that the Law made things no better. God bestowed his glorious Law upon Israel, but:

"Thou didst not take away from them the evil heart, that thy Law might bring forth fruit in them. For the first Adam, clothing himself with the evil heart, transgressed and was overcome; and likewise all that were born of him. Thus the infirmity became inveterate: the Law indeed was in the heart of the people, but in conjunction with the evil germ; so what was good departed, and the evil remained" (iii. 20-22).

The result of all this wickedness must be that, unless God is gracious and forgiving, "the ten-thousandth part of mankind cannot attain unto life," and "very few will be left of an innumerable multitude." And if, indeed, that is to be the case, if God is going to destroy "him who with such infinite labour has been fashioned by God's command, to what purpose was he made" at all? (vii. 138-140, viii. 14).

It is strange that Ezra, while capable of rising to the ethical height of these noble doubts, falls very low in the answers which he attempts to give to them. He leaves unused the best suggestions of the Old Testament: he is also oblivious or ignorant of the Rabbinic teaching, which, even in the beginning of the second century A.D., was already, in all likelihood, fairly prevalent and familiar.

He seeks to stifle his own admirable doubts by callous and inadequate replies. It is true that the angel, into whose mouth these replies are put, formally asserts that, as regards Israel, the seer is "powerless to discover the goal of the love which God has appointed for his people" (v. 40), and that, as regards mankind as a whole, Ezra "comes far short of being able to love God's creation better than God" (viii. 47). But this Divine love for Israel and for man is manifested in an extraordinary manner! It is perfectly true that far the greater part of humanity (as also of Israel) will be wasted. Perdition is their goal. What is precious is rare, and *vice versa*. As the flood is greater than the drop, so those that perish are more numerous than those who survive. Like the seeds of the husbandman which are wasted, so is it with man. Many have been created, but few shall be saved. God does not grieve over the multitude of them that perish, neither should the seer. Cold-blooded harshness could hardly further go.

As to the Divine responsibility, the only attempt at a solution is to press man's free-will, which existed and exists in spite of the "evil inclination" and the "*cor malignum*." Neither wicked heathen nor wicked Israelite need have sinned, or need sin, unless they chose and choose. Therefore, they deserve their fate, and God is guiltless. It was "not the Most High who willed that men should come to destruction; but they—his creatures—themselves defiled the Name that made them, and proved themselves ungrateful to him that gave them life" (viii. 59, 60).

In his doubts Ezra is superior, in the replies which he seeks to force upon his agonised heart and mind he is much inferior, to the current teaching of the Rabbis.

And here we can at once observe the inadequacy of the customary, but too facile, explanation of the difficulties which his book presents to us. Ezra's religion was, it is true, rooted in the Law. It was, in that sense, a legal religion. So we are told that he could only know the problem and the anguish: he could not, like Paul, find the solution and the healing. He bewailed the sinful impulse, the depravity of man, the universality of transgression: the law ought to be obeyed, yet it could not be obeyed. Hence "the unconscious and unexpressed cry of the book is for a moral dynamic which legalism could not supply."¹

This is inaccurate. The moral dynamic could be supplied

¹ Maldwyn Hughes, *The Ethics of Jewish Apocryphal Literature* (1908), p. 240. Quoted approvingly by Mr Box as setting forth the religious significance of Ezra in a sentence.

both by legalism and by Paulinism. It could be, and was, supplied (God be thanked) on more than one religious hypothesis, and from more than one kind of religious faith.

Ezra certainly honours the Law, but he makes inadequate use of it. He mentions, and even appeals to, the compassion of God, but he strangely restrains and overlooks its power. He remembers, and even quotes, the famous description of the Divine nature in Exodus xxxiii.—a description of which the gracious elements were even augmented, while the severe elements were blunted and explained away by Rabbinic ingenuity,—but he never trusts, and is satisfied with, those fundamental attributes of mercy and loving-kindness which were revealed and emphasised by the Law. The Old Testament, in spite of its limited outlook, knows better than Ezra. It insists on the Divine justice; it emphasises the doctrine of retribution; but it does not run it to death. It prefers, and surely it rightly prefers, a wholesome inconsistency as more consonant with the true nature of God. God rewards every man according to his work. He does, but He also does not. For He, as God, would act unjustly if He did. Divine justice is equity, Aristotle's equity, which makes allowances. "If thou, O Lord, shouldst mark iniquities, what man could stand? But there is forgiveness with thee, that thou mayest be feared." Yes, also, that thou mayest be loved. Hence there is no need for all this agony and apprehension. Greater than God's justice is His compassion. And it is this simple, Old Testament doctrine which was continued and elaborated by the Rabbis. They well understood that the language is human; they knew well enough that there is no real contrariety or opposition between the Divine justice and the Divine pity: God is one, and His unity is perfect. But the Law speaks in the language of men, and they, the Rabbis, imitate the Law. None were greater sin-fearers than they; none regarded sin less lightly, or gave more heed to its consequences; but for the great mass of men, who are neither very righteous nor very wicked (I am not thinking here of the distinction between Israelites and Gentiles), the prevailing Rabbinic view is one of hope and comfort and trust. Sinners we are, frail is our nature, but, nevertheless, we shall not perish everlastingly, as poor Ezra feared, for more powerful than our sins are three forces which will save us from so awful a doom: the merits of the Fathers, the efficacy of the Law, and, above all, the loving-kindness and pity of God. The excessive individualism of Ezekiel is abandoned: a martyr's death has atoning power; the virtues of the saints compensate for the

inadequacies of the modern sinner. But far more important is the Law. Whereas in the Pauline system the Law was the experienced strength of sin, in the Rabbinic system it was the experienced strength of goodness. The Rabbis would have agreed with Ezra in the potential strength of the wicked heart, the *Yetzer ha-Ra*, the evil impulse or inclination; but they would have asked him why he had forgotten to mention the remedy which God has granted us for holding the evil impulse in check, for stopping its growth and getting the better of its unholy solicitations. This remedy was the Law; and if you try to procure this medicine, God Himself will aid you in your purchase. In other words, seek to obey the Law, and God will aid you to obey it. The Rabbis, it may be added, would have agreed with Ezra in denouncing the sinners with a high hand, the informers, the apostates, the deliberate violaters of the Law. For these they would have agreed with him (for they too had their limitations, which have only been transcended and overcome by the Judaism of our own times) in predicting either complete annihilation or eternal pain. But they would by no means have allowed that it was either logical or consistent with the Divine compassion that a similar fate should befall those who, though often succumbing to human frailty, were, nevertheless, not wholly oblivious of God or of His Law. For whom was the Day of Atonement instituted, if not for these? Upon whom were God's pity and love to be exercised, if not upon them? Confident in our own virtues or merits we have indeed no right to be: trustful in the compassion and goodness of our Father and King—that, on the contrary, we have every right to be.

We may notice in the next place that the Rabbis, while believing stoutly in hell and eternal punishment, or in annihilation, for the worst sinners, rose to the more ethical and more merciful doctrine of a temporary purgatorial and disciplinal punishment for the mass of “inbetweeners” as they called them—that is, those who were neither fit for immediate heaven nor for everlasting hell. And some believed that, for shortening the purgatorial period, the prayers of children on earth and the intercession of the righteous in heaven possessed mediatorial efficacy. Ezra, however, cannot allow himself to be comforted by such ideas. He knows of heaven and hell, but nothing of disciplinal purgatory; while on the day of judgment the righteous will not be suffered to intercede for the ungodly, fathers cannot give aid to sons, or sons to parents, or brothers to brothers, or kinsfolk to their nearest, or friends to their dearest (vii. 102–115).

There is something austere and noble in this emphatic insistence upon the separate responsibility of each individual soul. Yet it is not here that our author's true claim to greatness lies. It is the arraignment on account of which, in spite of the replies, we shall always return to his book with interest and respect. And not the least remarkable point in that arraignment is its universalism. In his compassion even for the Gentile sinner, which more than once makes itself heard, Ezra breaks through the customary Jewish particularism—that particularism which neither the Old Testament nor the Rabbis were ever wholly able to discard. He would not be fully satisfied even if Israel were saved and the rest of mankind should perish. That “this world has been made for the sake of many, but that which is to come for the sake of few,” seems to him, what indeed it is, horrible doctrine, though he puts it into the mouth of God. He speaks, he even prays, for “all men,” and it is only reluctantly that he at last quaintly observes, “Concerning man in general thou knowest best, but concerning Israel, I would fain pray before thee, for myself and for them.”¹ How noble is this compassion even for those who wrought such irremediable ruin and cruelty on his beloved Israel! And how sublime is his depreciation of the world to come, if it is a world not for the many but for the few, if the evil heart has been suffered by God to remove men far from life and bring them near to perdition, “and that not a few only, but well nigh all that have been created” (vii. 47–48)!

Now, the Rabbis trusted more to, and believed more in, the compassion of God—at least so far as Israel, God's people, was concerned. The number of the saved was, for them, far larger than for Ezra. But for the unrepentant sinner, for the wilful and high-handed violator of the Law, as well as for the heathen oppressor and the heretic, they had no scruple, no pity, and no concern. They undoubtedly believed that most of them would be either annihilated or suffer everlastingly, and they viewed this end and doom with satisfaction and calm. Ezra, however, even as he shows his elevation of soul by rarely longing for, and never gloating over, the future destruction of the wicked, so also shows it by his large-hearted and inclusive grief for the doom of *all* sinners, whether of one sort or of another, whether Jewish or Gentile. His laments and appeals prove clearly enough that

¹ So according to the Latin. The Syriac version is different. “I have spoken concerning all men, but even more, as thou knowest, I mourn concerning Israel, and therefore do I pray for them.”

he questioned the fairness or propriety of eternal death for earthly faults—and all the more in the case of a creature who is born with a weak and sinful nature, which only a few, with much striving and great pain, are able to overcome. Even for the careless livers and deliberate transgressors among his people, Ezra the doubting, as distinct from Ezra the would-be rigid and orthodox teacher, is fain to crave for the Divine forgiveness. “Regard not the deeds of the godless; will not to destroy those that have lived like cattle; be not wroth with those that have lived worse than the beasts” (viii. 27–30). Strange, noble, and most unusual prayer.

The distinguished scholar Gunkel asks: What are the causes of Ezra’s peculiar compassion with sinners and their doom? One cause is said to be that he includes his own beloved people among the sinners. A second is that he regards himself as a sinner. For he is humble, and not self-righteous. He doubts his own salvation, for he too, like the rest of the world, possesses the evil heart, so that he too can hardly fulfil the Divine commands. “It is characteristic,” says Gunkel,¹ “of the crushed and broken spirit of the Judaism of Ezra’s time and circle, of its debility and prostration, that it despairs of being able to accomplish the injunctions of the Law”; and this same crushed and broken spirit is regarded as partly the cause of Ezra’s compassion with the sinners and their doom. And the agonising spiritual conflict, of which our apocalypse is the witness, was due, according to Gunkel, to the writer’s moral earnestness and honesty. God’s punishments are just; Ezra refused to soften the sharpness of the problem by any subterfuges or evasions. A mind of an ethical delicacy less keen, of a moral sensitiveness less acute, might have found in them comfort or solution. To Ezra, however, the problem presents itself in all its sharpness and horror, and for that very reason no adequate reply is forthcoming.

There is much in Gunkel’s judgments with which we may agree, though it would be far from accurate if we were to suppose that the Rabbis, by emphasising the compassion of God, even more than His justice—which only means changing a lower justice into a higher equity, and thus largely solving the problem,—broke the edge of it by evasion. How far, moreover, is it true when Gunkel adds that “compassion for sinners who remain sinners to the end—for unrepentant sinners, that is—is foreign to strong and healthy ethical religions, and thus also foreign to the Gospel”?

¹ In his introduction to his excellent translation in *Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des Alten Testaments*, ed. Kautzsch (1900), vol. ii. p. 338.

It is probably accurate to say that strong natures in old days, with the religious premises from which they started, could not feel a pity of this kind. The men who *did* things, who were epoch-making, resolute, and determined souls, convinced that they were right, and that all who differed from and opposed them were wrong, did not feel this pity. Ezra could never have been a leader of men. He was no Paul, or Luther, or Cromwell. Such men thought of their opponents' doom with equanimity, if not with satisfaction. They never doubted its justice, they saw in it no infringement of the Divine love. But it takes all sorts to make a good world: the tender, weak, pitiful natures as well as those that are stern, uncompromising, inflexible. And in modern times, and from now onward, we may, I trust, have strong and healthy ethical religions which can abhor sin, but yet feel pity for sinners, and strong and healthy religious teachers, who, just because of their profound belief in God and in His equity, will refuse to believe that He allows any soul to wither, to stagnate, and to perish, or that there can be anything more than a temporarily straying sheep within the universal orbit of His love. Abiding goats, or abiding hells, will be to such teachers as impossibly incompatible with God's truth as that five and four make ten.

If I am right in this supposition, the complaints and problems of Ezra, though the answers to them fall below the religious level of the Rabbis, yet in themselves rise above it. We may even go so far as to say that they rise, perhaps, above anything in antiquity. So for his great arraignment of Providence we will do our Ezra honour, and hold him dear. As God was made to say of Job's friends and their arguments that they "had not spoken of Him the thing that is right, as my servant Job did," so could we fancy that of Ezra's clamorous protests God might say, "Thou hast spoken the thing that is right of me; and because of these thy protests, thy errors and thy weaknesses shall be forgiven thee and ignored."

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THE DISTINCTIVE EXCELLENCE OF THE FIRST GOSPEL.

J. R. MOZLEY.

I HAVE long been convinced that the true inward purposes of Jesus of Nazareth, and the development of his mighty plan for the redemption, renovation, and exaltation of this earth on which we live, are exhibited to us in the First Gospel with a clearness and fullness unrivalled in any other part of the New Testament. It is true that the First Gospel has many faults; legend and miracle are superadded in it abundantly to the scantier array of such narratives which we read in Mark; the anti-Jewish animus, towards the end, startles one. It is a gospel, plainly, built up by degrees; of its successive authors, the Apostle Matthew was one of the earliest, and by very much the most famous.

I do no dishonour to Mark, Luke, and John. Mark adds one or two important facts, not read elsewhere, to our historical knowledge; Luke does the same, but still more increases our knowledge of the teaching of Jesus by some important sayings and parables; John is the ardent loving disciple, a poet rather than a historian; but a writer different from the son of Zebedee edited and completed the Fourth Gospel as we have it.

When, however, we ask, What was the great end which Jesus had in view? What were the methods by which he proposed to attain that end? What were the difficulties in his way, and can we regard him as having overcome those difficulties? If we may look upon him as victorious, how did he win the victory? These questions, all-important for the correct understanding of what Christianity is, find their main answer in the First Gospel, taken in connection with the courses of history down to the present time. But if we begin with any other part of the New Testament we shall find tracks

overrun with jungle—though enriched, I allow, with worthy fruits of many kinds.

Let me trace the career of Jesus. No one who carefully considers the Gospel records can doubt that, from the moment of his baptism, he regarded himself as the Messiah promised to Israel. The whole narrative of the temptation implies a confidence in his own unique position, though his first tentative thoughts in the way of obtaining external confirmation of this were in wrong directions, and were never brought by him to actual trial, but discarded at once. In place of crude experiments, he waited for the revelation of God's law in the intimate union of other human beings with himself. That union consisted essentially in help rendered by him, in love and trust reposed in him by those whom he helped. But over and above this general character of his acts and words, there were particular acts and sayings which showed that he bore in mind the prophecies of the Old Testament, and held that they were fulfilled in himself. When he spoke of himself as "the Son of man," he used a title which, in the book of Daniel, has a Messianic meaning;¹ and that he was familiar with the book of Daniel we know.² When he chose twelve apostles or missionaries of his teaching, the inference was not remote that he implied a peculiar connection between himself and the twelve tribes of Israel. Indeed it was immediately after he took this step, as Mark tells us, that his relations tried to control him, saying that he was out of his mind;³ clearly they felt that there was a dangerous significance in this act of his. And when, soon after, his mother and brethren tried to speak to him,⁴ and he refused to see them (for this is the plain meaning of the narrative in the Gospels), it is evident that they wished by gentle means to dissuade him from the course on which he had entered; yet why should they have wished this, if he claimed to be no more than an ordinary preacher? If, again, there be truth (as there probably is) in Luke's narrative of his first preaching to his fellow-citizens at Nazareth,⁵ and of their rejection of his claims, it is clear that those claims were easily capable of being interpreted as claims to be the Messiah.

However, I have not yet got to the point in which the distinctive superiority of the First Gospel appears, nor have I got to the point which shows the most remarkable characteristic of Jesus himself. For we must not think that he deliberately intended to claim to be the Messiah. What he deliberately intended was to act as God's messenger; to act as having

¹ Dan. vii. 13.

² Matt. xxiv. 15.

³ Mark iii. 21.

⁴ Mark iii. 31-35.

⁵ Luke iv. 16-30.

divine authority; and this involved a claim which he could not disguise: but still the important thing in his eyes was obedience to the commands which he issued, not personal recognition of himself. All through the Sermon on the Mount, which gives the essence of his early Galilean teaching, this is the spirit which reigns. It is the spirit of command; if men will not obey his commands, he tells them that they will suffer for their disobedience.¹ If his hearers said to him, "You have no title to command us," his answer was, "The kingdom of God is at hand, and when it comes, you shall see that I have a title to command you."² In truth, he did win a measure of obedience which was not to be despised; men and women listened to his words and entered upon a new life. Many of these had already been baptized by John the Baptist and had taken to themselves new rules of self-denial; but it was Jesus who exalted that self-denial by the spirit of love, and irradiated it with happiness. He led men into intimate intercourse, as with himself, so with each other; he made men feel the happiness of that union, when each man loves his neighbour as himself. With individuals, then, he had great success; but it was not only with individuals that he had to deal. For the whole Jewish people were governed by a great religious system, which, though it had ordinances and laws which tended towards real goodness and piety, had yet absorbed so much of the imperfection of human nature that the total effect was dangerously insecure, and menacing to the well-being of the entire nation. It was necessary, then, to replace laws falsely understood by a truer interpretation of the divine will, drawn from original insight; and with this object Jesus sent his Apostles to preach to the citizens of the Galilean cities.

This was the nearest approach to political action on which he ever embarked; but political action it was not. It was meant to be a substitute for political action; to lead men to compose their quarrels, to seek cure for their ills, by the help of the divine spirit rather than by elaborate human contrivances. If we read the Gospels carefully we shall see that Jesus undervalued human contrivances rather more in his early preaching than he did at a later date—for instance, when he spoke the parable of the talents;³ and other expressions (*e.g.* ⁴ "He that hath no sword, let him sell his cloke, and buy one") lead to the same inference. But nineteen centuries ago all human contrivances, as far as political action is concerned,

¹ Matt. vii. 21-27.

² Compare Matt. iv. 17, Mark i. 15, with the phrase "in that day" in Matt. vii. 22.

³ Matt. xxv. 14-30.

⁴ Luke xxii. 36.

were in a very rudimentary state. There may have been public councils in the principal cities, but how feeble such councils were may be seen by anyone who reads the account which Josephus gives (*Antiquities*, xii. ch. 4, § 5) of the dealings of an emissary of one of the Ptolemies with the people of Askelon and Scythopolis. It was the object of Jesus to infuse into men that confidence, that strength, which has its root in God, and which animates all worthy human action (political action included). Parliaments were unknown in that age; public assemblies were of little account; but Jesus did try to infuse into men—and especially into the people of his own race—a natural vigour and public spirit resting on divine help.

The Galilean cities would have none of this message; and this first mission of the Apostles was a failure, and Jesus knew it to be a failure. But when I say that Jesus knew it to be a failure, we are dependent for our knowledge of this fact on the First Gospel alone. Had we Mark and Luke alone to guide us, we might think that the Apostles had succeeded brilliantly;¹ but then, also, we should greatly underrate the meaning of the Apostolic message. (The Fourth Gospel does not mention the mission at all.) The First Gospel alone gives adequately the real meaning of what happened.

The Apostolic mission is recorded in the tenth chapter of the First Gospel, where we read the instructions of Jesus to his Apostles (a few verses, the 17th to 22nd, and the 38th and 39th, ought to be put later, where Mark and Luke put them²); in the eleventh chapter the results of the mission appear. The mission had created a great stir, and the news of it had reached the ears of John the Baptist in his prison by the shore of the Dead Sea; but emphatically it had not done what Jesus intended it to do. The cities of Galilee had not repented—had not changed their ways. The authorities of the Jewish people, as far as Galilee was concerned, had no more listened to the preaching of Jesus than they had listened to the preaching of John the Baptist; they had been dull, impenetrable. “Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida!” cried Jesus.

But then, what was to be done? That was the practical question which stood before Jesus; and a very difficult one it was. How was he to get himself heard with any effect?

¹ Mark vi. 13, 30; Luke ix. 6, 10.

² The 17th to 22nd verses are practically given in Mark xiii. 9-13, Luke xxi. 12-17, towards the close of these Gospels; the 38th and 39th verses are almost repeated in Matt. xvi. 24, 25, Mark viii. 34, 35, Luke ix. 23, 24, and partly in Luke xiv. 26, 27.

There was need, he felt, of immediate consolation to himself, under the sense of failure; and listening to the divine voice, he had consolation. "I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth," he cried out in the hearing of his disciples, "that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes." His own rectitude, the rectitude of his preaching, was not altered one whit because the authorities had rejected it. "All things are delivered unto me of my Father," that remained true. If he was unknown to men, he was not unknown to his divine Father, and he, and he alone, could reveal to men what that divine Father truly was. "Come unto me," he cried, "all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." Rejected by the great and the wise, in the love of those who trusted him and leaned on him he still had happiness.

The First Gospel alone gives us fully this strain of divine passion in the heart of Jesus (for Luke, though quoting most of the terms of it, scatters it so as to deprive it of its natural fitness to the occasion); the First Gospel alone shows us this great crisis as a crisis, tearing up all thoughts of a superficial solution of the problems of human society, and making it imperative to have recourse anew to the fount of Eternal Love. Moreover, the First Gospel alone gives us correctly the next step taken by Jesus; placing, as it does, the beginning of the teaching by parables at this point. For the teaching by parables was avowedly and expressly instituted because plain, direct instruction was of no avail; parables implied that the Jewish nation were dullards,¹ and that they deserved to be left in their blindness and ignorance, unless they themselves desired to be liberated from it. It is therefore quite out of place to put the commencement of teaching by parables, as Mark and Luke do, before² the mission of the Apostles; the true sequence of events is thereby violated. (It will be remembered that that very early presbyter, contemporary with the Apostles, whom Papias quotes,³ declared that Mark put the sequence of events wrongly.)

Still the teaching by parables, though a natural step on the part of Jesus, was not a solution of the problem before him. How was he to make an impression that should never be obliterated from the memories of men? How should he in-

¹ Matt. xiii. 10-15, Mark iv. 11, 12, Luke viii. 10.

² Mark iv. 1-32: the mission of the Apostles is related in Mark vi. 7-13; Luke viii. 4-15: the mission of the Apostles is related in Luke ix. 1-6.

³ Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, iii. 39.

culcate methods of action that should never lose their potency? How should he prevent the waves of Time, which had swept away the names of so many conquerors, the teaching of so many sages, from sweeping away his teaching and his name? That was the problem; and a very valuable verse of Mark is evidence to us, if we needed evidence, that Jesus pondered over it. For while both our First Gospel and Mark tell us that Jesus shortly after this time withdrew into the heathen parts near Sidon, Mark adds the information,¹ "He entered into a house, and would have no man know it." Why, except for purposes of private thought, should Jesus desire to be in retreat? And his unwillingness to listen to the Syrophœnician woman who came to him emphasises this desire of his.

A problem, indeed, it was that necessitated much pondering; and we see from the result what was the solution which Jesus arrived at. He searched more deeply than he had done before into the meaning of that great title, Messiah or Christ, which he had long felt belonged to him; and in psalms and prophets he found it written that the Messiah must suffer and die.² He then must himself suffer and die; his kingdom was not to begin till after this suffering and death. Moreover, it was also written that the Messiah should die as a transgressor,³ by the judgment of men; he himself therefore must not shun the appearance of transgression; he must do acts which would ordinarily be regarded as sinful. Why must he do such acts? Because only in this way, only by submitting to the death which such acts would naturally bring upon him, could he make perfectly plain to all men his absolute conviction that his preaching of morality and religion was in accordance with the will of God, and would bring eternal life to those who accepted it. It is true that his enemies would not share his conviction, would not accept the morality and religion which he preached. But disciples might accept the position which he laid down; if they did so, he had ground, through his trust in God and through his reading of the Scriptures, for the belief that after his death he would rule the hearts of men eternally.

His plan was one which most people would think extravagant in its personal anticipations. It has of course been well known in all ages that the death of an individual may be necessary for the victory of the cause which that individual champions; and the victory of his cause, or, in other words,

¹ Mark vii. 24.

² Isaiah liii. 8-12, Zechariah xiii. 6, 7; more imperfectly in Psalm xxii. 15, 16, and some other Psalms.

³ Isaiah liii. 12.

of the kingdom of heaven, was what Jesus himself held to be of the first importance. But with the victory of the kingdom of heaven Jesus felt that his personal victory was inextricably bound up; this was the sole issue that accorded with the justice of God, and this was the issue to which the utterances of prophets and psalmists pointed; this, therefore, was the issue which Jesus must teach his disciples to accept and welcome *after* his death. Would they accept and welcome it? That they should not recoil was indispensable; but it was quite possible that his disciples might recoil when the issue was plainly put before them. It was not easy for them to look forward with equanimity—nay, with a certain measure of confident triumph—to the death of their leader.

He tried them after his return to the land of Israel, walking with them in the extreme north, near Cæsarea Philippi. He had a question to ask; and if that question were answered satisfactorily, then he had information to impart. The question was, What did they think of him? and it was answered in the most satisfactory manner. “Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God,” answered Simon Peter. This answer, with all the enthusiasm which it breathes, is not fully recorded anywhere but in the First Gospel. What is even more remarkable is, that the response of Jesus to Simon Peter, full of gratitude, full of enthusiasm, full of thanksgiving to God, is not recorded anywhere but in the First Gospel. “Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jonah; for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven. And I also say unto thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it. I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.” There we have the heart of Jesus; there we have his response to that disciple whom, in spite of the Fourth Gospel, I must consider to have been his best-beloved. And this knowledge we owe to the First Gospel—an unsurpassable debt!

But having accepted honour and praise, Jesus must accept shame also; such shame as man could inflict upon him. That he must be treated with extreme contumely and be killed was the next communication which he had to make to his disciples; and though he added that he should rise again, the whole prospect appeared incredible to those who were at that moment his ardent followers; and Simon Peter ventured, with some energy, to express the impossibility of it.

How Jesus replied, maintaining with the most unbending decision the scandalising utterance, is written both in the First Gospel and in Mark, and I need not repeat it here.

But how is it that Mark, the devoted follower of Peter, who tells in his Gospel how Jesus rebuked Peter, does not tell also with what extraordinary praise Jesus had accepted Peter's acknowledgment of him as the Christ? I know only one answer. Mark's gospel was published at Rome; and though Paul was at that time no longer alive in the flesh, his influence at Rome was supreme, and the exaltation of Peter would have struck a jarring note there; possibly even Peter himself, in conversations with Mark, may have counselled silence on this particular point.

I will venture to say that no passage in the Gospels bears more decisive signs of genuineness than this whole scene at Cæsarea Philippi; for imaginative adornment is totally absent from it; and even supposing that mixture of suffering and glory, which is the theme of the passage, and which also is the great characteristic of the Christian religion, to have had its root in some disciple of Jesus rather than in Jesus himself (though I must deny such a possibility), yet the combination of extraordinary honour and sharp censure in the treatment of Simon Peter would, I am sure, have been impossible for anyone to invent without historical warrant. As in the eleventh chapter, so also in the sixteenth chapter, the First Gospel goes deep into the personality of Jesus, far deeper than any of the other Gospels goes, and shows us a model of conduct which no one in any later age can equal, but which we must each of us try to the best of our ability to reproduce in ourselves.

As we approach the end of the First Gospel, we find that it has indeed fewer of those touches of pathetic beauty which we associate with the parable of the prodigal son,¹ or with the exclamation of the agonised father,² "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief"; but it gives more faithfully than any other Gospel the exalted spirit of Jesus. In that description of the future judgment with which the twenty-fifth chapter concludes, and to which Christians generally have given so terrible an interpretation, we must indeed refuse to see the extinction of hope for any mortal soul; and we must remember the words which Jesus spoke on another occasion, "With God all things are possible"; but this being premised, how thoroughly is it pervaded with love of man, with pity for man! Again, in the First Gospel alone do we read this instruction, addressed

¹ Luke xv. 11-32.

² Mark ix. 24.

to every child of man : " Call no man your father on the earth : for one is your Father, which is in heaven " ;¹ a passage from which the inference is immediate that our personal existence began before this body of flesh was framed for each one of us.

I will not quote further. If I chose, I might refer, more than I propose to do, to those parts of the First Gospel in which pure imagination reigns ; of which the principal are the first two chapters, several passages in the twenty-seventh,² and the greater part of the twenty-eighth or concluding chapter. But it is more important to call attention to truth than to call attention to error ; and I am quite satisfied that the elements of truth in the First Gospel are of surpassing value. How did this come ? I answer, because in the First Gospel, far more than in Mark or Luke, we have the Palestinian tradition, which lay nearest to the real facts. That tradition was, in a certain degree, scattered over the whole Christian world ; it exists in Mark, it exists in Luke ; there are parts of Mark, especially the third chapter, where the tradition has been preserved better than in the First Gospel. But on the whole, in Mark it has been much more shorn of its characteristic elements ; and this has partly happened in Luke also, besides which, Luke has thrown it into disorder ; and it is not an adequate recompense, though it is some recompense, that Luke gives us some interesting information which the other Gospels do not give. In all three Gospels the wonderful cures recorded excite our interest ; our critical faculty fails when we try to determine the measure of truth that they possess ; that they have some truth, I cannot but believe.

After all, it is not incidental facts, but the whole character and soul of Jesus of Nazareth which it is important for us to apprehend and value rightly ; and the First Gospel tells us more that will guide us in our search for this knowledge than any of the others, though I am not saying that we can dispense with them. The question, which Gospel was first published in its present form, is not of the highest importance ; I agree with the common opinion that this was Mark. It is to be regretted that the Gospel of the Hebrews has been lost.

In conclusion. May we hold that Jesus of Nazareth has, by surrendering himself to crucifixion, attained that aim which was so deeply in his heart, the implanting of true order among mankind, so that the fruits of mutual love may and shall be ours, both in this life and in that eternal life which we hope to reach after passing through the shadows of death ? Yes, it is even so. Let anyone compare the present age, faulty

¹ Matt. xxiii. 9.

² Matt. xxvii. 19, 24-25, 62-66.

though it is in many respects, with the age in which Jesus lived, and he will be sensible that a great advance has been made, not only in the power and range of the intellect, but also in the care which men have for one another, in their mutual regard and affection, in their power of co-operation. Though we still fall short, still go wrong, in many ways, the desire for improvement, moral as well as intellectual, is in us. Moreover, the centre of this progressive movement lies in Christian nations; and, be it remembered, the Christian influence has reached even to the sceptics among those nations. Now my interpretation of the history of the centuries which have elapsed since the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth is that he, the Christ of God, has since then been continually pouring love and strength into the hearts of those capable of receiving it, associating them with himself and making them partakers of his immortal happiness, and thus carrying out the purpose of his divine Father; in which work he, and we with him, shall continue through all eternity.

J. R. MOZLEY.

LEEDS.

AMERICAN SOCIETY AFTER THE WAR.

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IN the preface of his *Mixed Essays*, Matthew Arnold enumerates briefly the powers which, as he says, contribute to the building up of human civilisation. "They are the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, the power of social life and manners. Expansion, conduct, science, beauty, manners—here are the conditions of civilisation, the claimants which man must satisfy before he can be humanised."

The paragraph is marked by the "sweetness and light" which characterise the interpretations made by the wise and tender-hearted critic of our manners, our books, our education, our theology, and of our whole life. But at the present moment in America, life in its institutions, formal and permanent, seems to be brought under a criticism deeper and more thorough-going than that which Mr Arnold in many instances gave. Our present questioning and our criticism relate to the constitution and not to the by-laws of our complete and complex being. The questioning, too, touches the future, with either a promise or a foreboding, unlike that which the critic at once playful and serious adopted.

First in time and first in importance is the institution of the family. What is to be the human family in the decades following the close of the war? In this brief interpretation let me at once say in answer that the present position of the family as a social unit and agency will be influenced largely by the possible change in the so-called headship of the family. The change is made through a change in its economic status. The change concerns itself largely with the wife and the mother becoming a more important wage-earner. The family headship has been vested in the man by reason largely of his being the

producer of the family income. The woman has been the spender, or the trustee, of the resulting revenue. This condition no longer so commonly or fully obtains. The wife is now earning or can earn in many instances as much money as the husband.

This economic change is accompanied by the political change of the enfranchisement of women in many States. This enlarged function tends to emphasise the enlarged domestic freedom and power.

The narrower and the broader interpretations of this vast social revolution are a part of the movement for individualism, which has been progressing with ever-increasing swiftness since the French Revolution of 1789. Against this stronger emphasis of individualism the American family, as a family, is to contend. But that the monogamous family will still remain as the great social unit is not to be questioned. Its place is firmly fixed in the history of civilisation and in the heart of man. Neither the plural religious marriage of Mormonism nor the Teutonic polygamous State-marriage can secure a footing at all lasting or broad. Each example of it will remain exceptional and sporadic. The heart of man abominates such doctrines and practices, and the same heart by instinct and training is devoted to the preservation of the highest and noblest institution of society.

Regarding another institution the war is bringing to a head certain processes and conditions long operative. That institution is the Church. (Purposely I write of the Protestant only.) In thinking about the Church there are at least five points of interpretation. They are the churches, or denominations, the creed, the Bible, the clerical order and its relation to certain other organisations, and Sunday. In America the Church stands for the churches. There are, I believe, somewhat over a hundred and fifty different types or orders or ecclesiastical denominations. They are based upon or determined by principles more or less fundamental, or upon fancies as trivial as buttons or hooks and eyes of personal apparel. The war is serving to bring the churches of the great faiths into more intimate affiliation and closer administrative co-working. In the light of the need of economic efficiency, the expense of much denominational individualism and support is seen to be nothing other than ecclesiastical extravagance and luxury. In the light of fundamental principles, minor beliefs are recognised as unworthy of serious and large-minded men. It may also be added that the process going on in the different denominations, in the wiping out of sectarian differences, is

also occurring within the churches of each individual faith. The change is found in the abolition of ecclesiastical rivalries and in the uniting of churches which, on the basis of geographical and social conditions, do belong together.

These closer affiliations are the result of both administrative conditions and of the lessening of differences in doctrinal formulas. The next centuries, if one may be allowed to prophesy for a very long time, are not to be, like the sixteenth century, centuries of the making of creeds or of the elaboration of theological systems. The specific articles of the great Confessions are to have less significance for the community. Doctrines so important even as the divinity of Christ are not to be made the subject of such prolonged thinking or the object of such emphasis in application as they have received in the remote or recent past. Definite theories of eschatology will come to be regarded almost as archæological specimens. But with such declines will synchronise an increase of emphasis on the great fundamental fact of religion itself. Religion will be based, as of course it always is primarily based, on a belief in a God, and on a belief in the duty of promoting human well-being. It will in fact include, and include not much more than, the two great commandments of Christ himself, or Micah's sententious threefold interrogations. Neither will the forthcoming faith question very deeply who or what is its God:—whether this God is to be interpreted as personal or impersonal; whether its Supreme One is to be spelled with a capital or not. To us as individuals the old faiths will have lasting meanings and controlling values; but the community will employ the elective system in its theological adoptions. Whether the community shall adopt as its divine one the Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness, or Herbert Spencer's Unknown and Unknowable, or John Stuart Mill's obscure guess at divinity adopted in late life, or the Apostles' Creed, is a subject for its own consideration and selection. But, at all events, that religion which is accepted will be a religion which shall be at least a comfort to the human heart in life's sorrows, which shall give at least some guidance to the human mind in its questioning and doubting and bewilderment, and which shall be as the bread and the water of life for daily sustenance.

It would not be strange to find in such a revival of deep religiousness an element of mysticism. The heart will come to assert itself more than ever as having reasons, as Pascal says, which the reason knows not of. Faith will have a meaning which, if unlike Paul's conception, will still possess

a significance quite as forceful as that which the writer of the Epistle to the Romans gave to it in the upbuilding of human character. Religious confidences and confirmations will find themselves outstripping rational evidences. Already in that most rationalistic of all churches, the Unitarian, intimations of such a revival are felt.

A similar freedom will also be manifest in the beliefs about the holy books of the Church. For a generation the Bible has been the object of assault—textual, historical, dogmatic. Yet the Bible as a piece of noblest religious literature still stands, and will continue to endure. It will remain, at least in its New Testament, a worthy ethical and religious guide and interpreter. It will endure as an incomparable religious standard, because it bears to humanity the biography and the personality of Jesus Christ. Minor considerations concerning the Bible have dropped away, and will continue to be eliminated, only to emphasise the permanent essential element of the personality of Christ.

In every system of religion, pagan as well as Christian, sacred days seem to go along with sacred books. The integrity or the disruption of either serves to accentuate the integrity or the disruption of the other. The holy day of each week of the Christian Church seems almost to be a part of the question of the maintenance of the Bible itself. The old commandment of the 20th of Exodus, directing rest and worship, is interpreted by Christ's statement that the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath. Christ's statement in turn is liable in modern life to be interpreted in terms of man's pleasure or immediate convenience, rather than in terms of human and rational enrichment. In war many things are silent beside the formal laws, and many things become noisy beside cannon and ammunition wagons. The necessary preparation for war, the inevitable consequences of war, disrupt or destroy the physical, ethical, and other conditions which Christ's remark seems designed to promote. They also take away the opportunity for worship which He by practice and by precept commanded. It is doubtful whether the old Sabbath, even in the form of the ante-bellum days, can be restored. Individualism will yet more deeply characterise the observance or lack of observance of the day. It may be said also that the Church and the clergy should find in such freedom of individual observance the richest opportunity for pressing their claims upon man—man who is still to be recognised as naturally Christian, or at least religious. What a chance for the great preacher!

The position of the clergy is to be beset, as it already is beset, by at least two influences or human impressions. One is the impression that the profession has not quite done its proper part in the war. Its ministers seem to some observers to have nursed a "cloistered virtue" and its priesthood "has warmed itself at the fire." The impression, I believe, is thoroughly false. Historically, from the Middle Ages, the freedom of the clergy from bearing arms has had a good basis. The hand that administered the sacraments was not to be suffered to incur the risk of being stained with human blood. But the exemption from military service, given by the Government to the clergy and to the theological students, has made a false impression on the public mind. It has created the impression that the clergy either did not wish to bear arms or was unable to bear them. The fact is that the clergymen do wish to bear arms quite as thoroughly as do lawyers or architects or editors or teachers. A second influence besetting the profession lies in the growing belief among certain classes that the chief function of the calling, excepting the sacerdotal, may be taken over by the Young Men's Christian Association. Of course the Young Men's Christian Association is simply a federation of the churches. This comprehensive and commanding organisation gets its power, personal and financial, from the churches. Without the churches, or the lay leaders of the churches, the Association could not live for a single day. But the community forgets the fact. It thinks of its "Y.M.C.A." as apart from the churches, and at times as almost opposed to them. Such an impression is harmful, as it is contrary to the facts. •

Another of the great human institutions will emerge from the crisis with certain parts weakened and other parts strengthened. I refer to the Government. The Government as a legislative fact or function will be less significant and influential. The Government as an executive force will be greatly strengthened. The judicial body still retains and will continue to retain its high place in the respect of the people. That body is our anchor; and it is an anchor which is attached, and properly attached, to the ship of State with a long and flexible cable. The causes of the weakening of the legislative and the strengthening of the executive force are manifold. But two causes seem to be chief. The decrease of the intellectual power of the typical legislator, and the absolute necessity of the executive force assuming special functions in a time of war, are perhaps the two most conspicuous causes of the change. This enlargement of executive power will in

my judgment be easily continued and readily assented to by the people in the forthcoming time of peace.

Despite the increase of executive forcefulness, we are also to see a vast increase of what is known as Socialism. Accepting the definition of this undefined or ill-defined term as standing in its ultimate elements for the condition in which the community does for the individual what in many respects the individual did formerly for himself, one need have little fear of evil resulting. In fact the community has already become far more socialistic than it usually recognises, and the community still exists, and the individual is still safe!

Both by formal law and by judicial interpretation and executive application our Federal system is vastly to be extended. The increasing unity, the developing solidarity of the American nation in sentiment, commerce, education, industrialism, administration, are both cause and result of our stronger Federal system. What we call progress has helped Alexander Hamilton's principles and methods unto a complete triumph.

In respect to foreign commercial relations of the Government, America will find herself in much the same relation that Great Britain found herself in the middle of the last century—a condition in which a free-trade policy will make for commercial and industrial prosperity. This policy may be accompanied by a system of protection among lesser nations, or with a system of preferential tariffs with certain peoples more or less closely allied with the American. Gradually, however, the free-trade method will come to obtain among all nations.

Business in its largest relations of making and exchanging goods is to see a vast development. The *vacua* which the war has created, abhorred by peaceful industrialism, will be filled up with unexampled rapidity and in probable confusion. The demand for labour and for capital, commanding as it now is, will become yet more insistent. Costs will mount up and all contributing forces which make for the increase in prices will be vastly magnified. To only one important element in this vast and complex field do I now wish to refer, namely, the relation of capital and labour. This relation, which by personal influence and under war pressure has been made peculiarly satisfactory in the war period, will probably continue to be more friendly than it was in the pre-war years. In this crisis capital has become far more sympathetic with the hardships and limitations of labour, and labour in turn has become far more intelligent and discriminating regarding the conditions which attend capital. The labour union is receiving wiser

leadership. That all difficulties in this field have passed away, or are speedily to be eliminated, would be a grossly unjust interpretation, but it is fair to say that the outlook for terms of permanent peace between these two vast forces of humanity is far more promising than it has been for a generation. In all this debate, moreover, armed or unarmed, we are to see a lessened accent on the merely financial and materialistic side of business and an increase of emphasis on the ethical and human side. In fact a general sense of the unity of all the forces and interests of mankind—a lack of which was one of the hard and dark marks of the last century—is to come to prevail.

The gain which the cause of labour has made during the war, in the consciousness of its own power, and also in a worthy sense of self-respect, will be still further enhanced. Labour will occupy a place yet more compelling over capital and in the general community. In passing it may be said that this enlargement of labour's faculty and function lays on the community a tremendous duty and right of the education of those who at times seem to aspire to become, or may become, its masters.

To one other field I must turn, and it is a field in which my feet are perhaps a little bit less insecure than on any other. I refer to the future of education.

It is evident that the flood-tide of education which arose soon after the close of the Civil War is still to go sweeping on. Its force remains unabated, its volume undiminished, and its height and breadth unlesened. The hunger for education among all Americans, both old and new, seems to have the force of undying instinct, reinforced by the imperatives of a Puritan conscience. The appetite is recognised in the increasing annual budgets of public school boards, of colleges, and of all diverse educational agencies. "Americanisation" schools form one unique type and illustration of the means used for satisfying the ever unsatisfied craving. Education, and more and more of it, will be a mark of the next decades. It will prove to be the one great integrating power in our diverse American life.

Education, moreover, will take on forms of vast variety and diversity. Differentiation will be as truly its mark as integration. The variety will be based on the needs of individual children and races so far as these needs can be appreciated by the leaders of the community. These needs will be interpreted in terms personal, and especially in terms of the probable future of American youths. Children whose intellects give little or no response to the stimuli of knowledge

after the age of thirteen, but whose wills are interested in doing things, should have, and will have, a different educational course offered to them than that course which is proposed for children whose intellects develop normally with each passing year. Children whose futures are apparently to be commercial or industrial will have, and many should have, an education from the age of thirteen to eighteen unlike that of the boy whose education will be continued up to the age of twenty-four. But be it quickly added that in such early determination of career lies a peril. For many boys and girls do not wake up or find themselves before the age of sixteen. The child may finally eventuate into an early manhood or womanhood which is quite unlike the character which he seemed to possess in his sleepy, changeful, tempestuous, adolescent period. As Lord Bryce has lately said (*Cambridge Essays on Education*, p. x), "The . . . problem is to find the finest minds among the children of the country and bring them by adequate training to the highest efficiency." The determination of a youth's future should be put off as long as is consistent with keeping that youth interested in his tasks. In this differentiation occupational education will have an enlarging place. Yet be it emphasised that this place may easily become too large. For it is ever to be borne in mind that there is a vast difference between education educative and education occupative.

At the other end of this great subject and force we are to see a vast enrichment. Professional education is to become the object of unexampled improvement. Professional schools, which have since the Civil War been revolutionised in method and somewhat in content of study, are still to be made the object of further strengthening. The chief question concerning them is what degree of improvement is the community willing to pay for—to pay for in dollars, and not in dollars only, but also in higher recognition and appreciation. Theological education is now in a state of flux and flow, and largely by reason of the mixed condition found in the churches. Legal education is to adopt in the larger number of its schools standards of admission which now are found in only two or three schools of the whole country, namely, a Bachelor's degree. Their course of study itself is to be made more intellectually remunerative and compelling. Schools of medicine in particular, mighty as is the improvement secured in a generation, are to become agencies of deeper research, of more thorough prophylactic emphasis and of truer interpretation and application of medical facts to the conditions of public health.

We are, further, to find an increase of emphasis on the advantage of education of women, strong as that emphasis now is. This increase of emphasis will arise from the enlargement of the whole field of professional and other service of women. All professional schools will finally admit them as students. The experience of the recent past gives no ground for fear that the function of the home will be narrowed or made more superficial. We can securely depend on the value of the primitive instincts.

It is my judgment also that the American college system will on the whole remain intact. Covering the four years between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two, or seventeen and twenty-one, it has for the individual youth a sound psychological foundation and significance. The beginning of this quartette of years is too early for the undertaking of professional studies. Of course, the four years will in some colleges be cut down to three by means of continuous sessions, or through the doing of extra work by students; but the system has become so fixed that change will not be general. The mind of the youth is not sufficiently mature, nor the heart sufficiently firm, nor the will sufficiently strong, to shoulder medical or other pre-professional responsibilities. Education should be built like the geometrical pyramid—not the Egyptian pyramid, a sepulchre for beings that once lived—broad at the base, and by successive, gradual, and broad steps coming to its outlooking, even if narrow, apex. Aside, too, from preparation for the professional school, which the college education gives, and aside from psychological fitness, which nature demands, the college will remain a school for gentlemanly living and for large citizenship.

It should also be said that both types of the higher education will persist, the privately endowed and the publicly supported. The elimination of either would be among the greatest of all disasters. Each system can give an educational service which the other cannot.

In all grades of education the physical side will receive increased emphasis. The war has proved that the bodies of our boys and of our men are far less effective and healthy than they ought to be. The schools and the colleges will give more heed to medical supervision. With this supervision will be united more adequate facilities for the promotion of health and the increase of strength through physical exercise. In many schools and colleges this exercise will take the form of military drill and tactics. The friends of peace should not object to such discipline. It will not be saturated with the war spirit. It

will be conditioned by a sense of obedience that the American-born young man has lacked. It will promote an appreciation of courtesy and of respect which also has been lacking. It should be made free from the evils which belong to a universal military training. The present is no place to discuss details of such a system, but such a system as a part of public healthfulness and of individual development should be so adjusted as to lift up the great ends of living, and to increase the force for gaining these ends. It shall not only promote the survival of the physically fit, but it shall increase the number of the fit.

For education of both of the lower grades and of the highest schools will come to exist less and less for itself as an end, and more and more as a means for the elevation and development of the supreme object—man himself. Education will be carried on, not for knowledge or for learning or for scholarship primarily, precious as these results or causes are; but rather for life, for life richer in content, broader in relation, more intense in affections, wiser in judgment, more vigorous in self-control, more sympathetic with all, embodying the reverence of the Hebrew, and a sense of the beauty of the Greek, civilisation. The more abundant life shall be and will be its goal.

As I read what I have written I find, almost to my surprise, that the prevailing or originating idea of these paragraphs is found in one word—Freedom. It is freedom which characterises the enlarged or changed headships in the family. To freedom the Church is indebted for its increasing variety of beliefs and of the wider application of its forces. The change of emphasis in governmental relations has arisen under a freer condition of men's minds and of a greater willingness to alter forms and formulas. Business finds its enlargement in theory and in practice through the same great force. Above every other force, too, education discovers in freedom both its end, its fullest content, its wisest method, its best condition, and, in no small degree, its strongest power.

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TWISTED SAYINGS.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

ONE evening recently, in a tramway car, I happened to overhear two citizens discussing a club dinner at which they had evidently been enjoying themselves. One of them, the less convivial of the pair, remarked, with a belated twinge of conscience, that he thought the custom nowadays was to follow the King and drink no wine. His bacchanalian companion blew this suggestion aside with a puff of scorn, pooh-poohed it utterly, and clinched the matter by declaring in an oracular tone that such a custom was more honoured in the breach than in the observance, that he had rarely seen it followed in any club he had been at.

Probably this gentleman did not know that he was quoting Shakespeare. Perhaps, if he were to read *Hamlet*, he would complain, like the American humourist, that it was too full of quotations. But I could not help thinking, what an odd misuse of Hamlet's aphorism! In the fourth scene of the first act we are on the platform in front of the castle at Elsinore with Hamlet, Horatio, and Marcellus in the nipping cold of the midnight, waiting for the appearance of the ghost. Suddenly the silence is broken by a roar of trumpets, kettle-drums, and cannon from the castle. 'That's the king, says Hamlet sarcastically, that's the king revelling away, and celebrating his feats of drinking by the crashing of cannon and the blasts of music! "Is it a custom?" Horatio asks. And Hamlet answers:

"Ay, marry is't:
But to my mind, though I am native here,
And to the manner born, it is a custom
More honour'd in the breach than the observance."

That is, it is more honourable to break a custom like this than to keep it. Whereas our friend the clubman meant that

the custom to which he referred was more often broken than kept. And I fancy this interpretation is fairly common. So far as I can judge, from oral speech and from written words, people generally mean by the phrase that some custom is not kept properly or regularly. They put an ironical sense into the word "honoured," as if the phrase implied that when men attended to the custom at all, it was more frequently to break it than to keep it. What Shakespeare meant, of course, was that the custom of heavy drinking was better broken than followed. There is more honour, Hamlet said, in violating this fashionable habit than in observing it, royal and popular though it may be.

This is an example of what I call "Twisted Sayings," sayings which in process of time have somewhat acquired a sense which is more or less at variance with their first meaning. A number of popular phrases in English have drifted loose from their context, and are being employed in ways that defy or at least deflect their original aim. This has not happened consciously or deliberately; it has come about through their sheer popularity. They have passed into the lips of people who have quite forgotten where and why they were first written; they are caught up without a notion that they ever had a literary origin. For twisted sayings are not misquotations. There is no alteration in the actual words. What renders the twist possible is that the words are susceptible of different meanings. The twist comes just because by their vogue and flexibility they have appealed to a wider range of interest than that of mere literature. They are no longer quotations, or, if a sense of quotation still clings to them, it does not control their application, it does not stereotype their meaning. They fit into connections undreamt of at their birth.

Every language, I suppose, could furnish analogies to this process. There is an amusing instance, for example, in Greek. On the plates and cups of some Scottish hydropathics, and on the drinking fountain in the quadrangle of the University of Edinburgh, you find this phrase printed: "*ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ*." "Water is most excellent." So it is, for outward and inward uses. But here is a saying which has been twisted from its original shape. It lies at the opening of Pindar's first Olympian Ode; Pindar was by no means a teetotaller, and he is not known to have been a particular advocate of bathing—certainly he had not that in mind when he wrote, "Water is most excellent." The Greek poet is speaking about values. The value of anything is determined by its usefulness, and the

shining excellence of water, as of gold, he says, is that it is most necessary to human life. Oddly enough, even the later Greeks were puzzled by the phrase. It soon became twisted, even in its own country. At least, not more than a hundred years later, we come upon Aristotle quoting it as a popular saying to prove that what is abundant is greater than what is rare, since there is more of it. This seems to be his interpretation, although some scholars think that Pindar originally was thinking of the philosopher Thales, with his theory that water was the material cause of the universe, the most fundamental thing in nature. However this may be, Pindar's phrase has undergone a sea-change by the time that it reaches a water-fountain and a hydropathic. The Greek poet would not have appreciated the Scottish proverb, "The clartier the cosier," but he would certainly have been more at home in a public-house than in a hydropathic—though I do not forget that Robert Fergusson, of all men, found time in the dirty public-houses of eighteenth-century Edinburgh to write a poem on the virtues of cold water.

The Latin classics offer a still better proof. Most people know the tag, "Homo sum, humani nil a me alienum puto." "I am a man, I hold that all concerns of man are a concern to me." It is the motto of all who are seeking to rise above provincialism and selfishness; in our popular usage these words represent the better spirit which views the human race as a unity and disclaims any privilege of isolation or of indifference to one's fellows. The terse Latin defies translation, as usual, but the meaning is unambiguous. "I am a human being; I consider that nothing affecting human beings can be remote from myself." Yes, but these words have risen in the world. They did not always, they did not originally, breathe this exalted air. Hunt them down, and you run them to earth in a comedy of Terence, the *Heauton Timoroumenos*. A decent old man is digging in his field; he has just bought a small farm, at which he is working anxiously from morning to night, and suddenly his neighbour looks over the fence to remonstrate with him for doing too much. "What are you after? You're sixty years old at least, I'm sure. You have plenty of workmen for a job like that, and it would pay you better to keep your labourers at the task than to try to do it yourself." The toiling farmer is exasperated at this busybody interfering with him. Why cannot he mind his own business? "Have you so much time to spare from your own concerns, that you can attend to other people's?" This is an ungrateful response to our first friend, who splutters out, "Homo sum,

humani nil a me alienum puto." It is the pretext of the busybody, you see, the specious excuse of an officious creature who likes to meddle with other people's concerns. But the world has thought the phrase too good for the busybody, and has lifted it to serve as a flag and cry for humanitarians.

Suppose that we turn, however, from the classics of Greece and Rome to a couple of our own Elizabethan classics for illustrations of twisted sayings. Our English tongue provides them in Shakespeare and in the Authorised Version of the Bible—that Authorised Version which was not a version and which was not authorised.

To begin with Shakespeare. Another trace of a twisted saying lies not far from the one we have just noted, in the same scene of Hamlet. When the ghost does appear, Hamlet at once starts to cross-question it.

"Be thou a spirit of health or goblin damned,
Be thy intents wicked or charitable,
Thou comest in such a questionable shape
That I will speak to thee."

The ghost plainly invited questions. That is the sense of "questionable." It was ready to enter into conversation. There may be some conventional means of bringing out this upon the stage; perhaps when Shakespeare played the part of the ghost in his own play he contrived to suggest it. Anyhow, he tells us that Hamlet felt this disposition of the weird spirit. Whatever you may be, he reflects, you mean to encourage me to put questions to you. "Thou comest in such a questionable shape." It is a phrase which has passed into popular usage, but in the other sense of "questionable"—the sense which even Dr Johnson wrongly gave to it in this passage of Hamlet. Last year an American leader-writer, who was discussing the Pope's peace note, remarked warily that it "came in such a questionable shape" that prudent persons wanted to know more about its *bona fides*. Here "questionable shape" meant doubtful or dubious. The American publicist saw or suspected designs in the peace note, and he used the phrase as it is current to-day. But that was not what Hamlet meant. Whatever the aims of the ghost might be, good or bad, he was conscious that it wished him to address it. Such was its "questionable shape"; he was to speak first, and it would answer. It was willing and able to be "questioned."

Here is a still better illustration from Shakespeare. The Globe Edition bears upon its cover a gilt representation of the globe, surrounded by this motto: "One touch of nature makes the whole world kin." Unthinkingly we agree. The quotation

seems entirely appropriate ; it brings out the universal appeal of great poetry. "Deep in the general heart his power survives" is true of more than of Burns, for men respond everywhere to the note of genuine natural feeling, and as poets have the power of striking that note they live. Eccentricity dooms any book or poem. Men draw to what is natural, and to that alone. I do not know who was responsible for selecting the phrase, but Messrs Macmillan made a wise choice when they adopted it for their Globe Series of English Classics, although, so far as Shakespeare is concerned, Lamb's *caveat* needs to be remembered modestly: "It is common for people to talk of Shakespeare's plays as being so natural that everybody can understand him. They are natural indeed, they are grounded deep in nature, so deep that the depth of them lies out of reach of most of us." When we apply the Globe motto to Shakespeare, we had better think of Lamb's sly reminder that we and Shakespeare have not all things in common by nature. But my immediate point is that if you happen to be cursed with an accurate memory, you may lose the charm of this quotation. *Troilus and Cressida* has never held the stage or even the general reader like most of the other classical dramas. It is too un-Homeric, I suppose, to suit our modern taste. But if you open it at the third act, you find Ulysses arguing with Achilles. Achilles is an unheroic figure in the play, boastful, soured, and suspicious. Ulysses plays upon his mood, and warns him, in a man-of-the-world tone, that the people have a short memory, and that, unless a man keeps on impressing the public by fresh achievements, they will soon forget his past exploits. The speech, a masterpiece of adroit, experienced wisdom, draws to a close thus :

"O, let not virtue seek
Remuneration for the thing it was ;
For beauty, wit,
High birth, vigour of bone, desert in service,
Love, friendship, charity, are subjects all
To envious and calumniating time.
One touch of nature makes the whole world kin,
That all with one consent praise new-born gawds,
Though they are made and moulded of things past,
And give to dust that is a little gilt
More laud than gilt o'er-dusted."

No wonder, adds the crafty Ulysses, that the Greeks are beginning to adore Ajax ; he is doing something that strikes and impresses the public mind to-day, while you are content to rest on your reputation of yesterday. There is a touch of bitter wisdom in these arguments used by Ulysses to rouse

Achilles into action. It is Shakespeare in a mood of almost cynical resentment against the short memories and fickle gratitude of the public. He knew that public life was a heart-breaking business, and he vents his experience and observation through a satirical exposure of romantic ideals. When he wrote, "One touch of nature makes the whole world kin," he meant that it was a universal and familiar trait of human nature to ignore or disparage the services of great men, and to be carried away by an extravagant passion for any novelty of the moment. Men are all alike in that, he dryly observes. Anyone who serves the public has to lay his account with their fickleness. Such was the end for which Shakespeare shaped this phrase. When we read it on the cover of the Globe Edition, or when we come upon it in Mr Lecky's essay upon "Queen Victoria as a Moral Force," and listen to the assurance that "in no one was the touch of Nature that makes the whole world kin more constantly visible. She was never more in her place than in visiting some poor tenant on the morrow of a great bereavement, or uttering words of comfort by the sick bed of some humble dependent," we realise how the quotation has been twisted and transformed.

Let us now pick up a couple of twisted sayings from that contemporary classic, the English Bible of King James. Over two years ago I read an article in some angry little English weekly entitled, "Wounded in the House of his Friends." The title spoke for itself. Every reader knew that this meant an act of base ingratitude; the writer was out to stigmatise what he chose to regard as a dastardly and treacherous attack on one man by a supposed friend. The article was a party-bleat over Mr Asquith's ejection from office, and the friend was the present Premier. Biblical allusions were rampant in the Radical press of the period. "Had Zimri peace who slew his master?" was another title for an onslaught on Mr Lloyd George, an allusion which, I fear, was much less obvious to most readers than "Wounded in the House of his Friends." The latter phrase implied some acquaintance with the Old Testament, at any rate, on the part of the journalist; but the original context of the words makes them singularly incongruous to any such modern situation. They come from a fragment written apparently during the sixth century B.C. which has been preserved among the prophecies of Zechariah. The decay of the prophets is described; the religious degeneration has gone so far that the very name and vocation of "prophet" is a reproach. "The prophets and the unclean spirit" are bracketed together, and

the new reformation is to sweep both out of existence. To be a prophet in these latter days was to be a demagogue or a professional seer—lower even than the type which Browning satirised in Mr Sludge the Medium. No one believes nowadays in a prophet, says this writer; in fact, if any man were to come forward as a prophet, his father and mother would kill him sooner than see him playing the rôle of a charlatan in religion. The very prophets hurry to disclaim their calling, and drop the discredited robe of a prophet. “We are only farm-labourers,” they protest; “pray, do not take us for prophets.” Ah, but what are these cuts and scars on your body? So people ask. You did not get these marks when you were ploughing or digging! “Oh,” says the quondam prophet, “these are the wounds I received in the house of my friends,” *i.e.* my friends fell upon me with fury when they heard I was a prophet, they tried to kill me, so disgusted were they with my prophetic vocation. This miserable creature is as anxious to disclaim his old avocation as a German in Britain to-day is anxious to change his name and cover his tracks; popular opinion is too strong for him. He wants to protest at first that he never was a prophet at all. Then, after his wounds are pointed out, and he is asked to explain what they meant, he has to own up: “Yes, I was a prophet, and my friends, my relatives, turned on me with violence, so that I could hardly escape with my life.” It is a far cry from all this to our modern application of the phrase. We read, for example, in Lord Morley’s *Recollections*, that, in writing to the Indian Viceroy about the deportation of seditious agitators and the attacks made upon him for this supposed breach of political principles, he remarked: “Since deportation began, I am often wounded in the house of my friends—‘shelving the principles of a life-time,’ ‘violently unsaying all that he has been saying for thirty or forty years,’ and other compliments of that species. This from men to whom I have been attached, and with whom I have worked, all the time!” There is also a Christian application of the phrase which is still to be heard, unfortunately; I mean the use of “wounded in the house of his friends” as a prediction of the ingratitude shown to our Lord, as if the words were relevant to such a situation. But, even in the ordinary and legitimate sense of ingratitude, they are twisted. Originally they had nothing to do with such a thing. They denoted a violent attack on some one in one’s own circle who was committed to a disgraceful profession; they were a furious Oriental outburst of hate against a religious masquerader. But here again we have a

phrase floating clear of its context and being picked up by popular usage for applications which were less compromising. Only a great classic, as a rule, can produce sayings of this kind, and they are produced and circulated orally. The Authorised Version of the Bible, like Shakespeare, sent phrase after phrase into the memories of people who heard them rather than read them, and who carried them off, rich with a certain suggestiveness and authority, to be employed in fresh connections.

The other twisted saying I shall select from the Bible is this. On brooches and bracelets, even on picture-postcards, you will sometimes see the word "Mizpah." It has come into use, partly through some circles of piety, as a sentimental term of affection, a sort of watchword between friends who are absent from one another. "The Lord watch between me and thee when we are absent one from another." So the meaning of "Mizpah" runs in the thirty-first chapter of the book of Genesis, and, as it is employed by moderns, it breathes a pious wish or prayer that God will watch over those who are temporarily separated. "Mizpah," in this sense, is one of the numerous additions to the popular vocabulary which the biblicising influence of Puritanism, often so disastrous to real literature, has been able to make during the past three hundred years. One is almost loth to disturb the associations of the word, but the blunt truth is that it is a twisted saying of the first order. As it occurs in the Bible it breathes anything but affection and trust. It is an expression of incurable suspicion; it is even a threat. The historical origin of the term was this. Jacob was parting from his father-in-law Laban on bad terms. He had managed to get away surreptitiously with his two wives, both daughters of Laban, one of whom had stolen her father's household gods. When Laban overtook his crafty son-in-law there was mutual re- crimination. Each had done his best to outwit the other during the past twenty years; there had been sharp play on both sides, hard practice, and oppression, and the deceit which oppression always develops. At last, the two men agreed to part amicably. But Laban was afraid that once Jacob got clear away he might ill-treat his wives in revenge for their father's crooked behaviour. He had no respect for his son-in-law. He trusted Jacob no further than he saw him. He could not put the slightest faith in any promises from that person's lips. Who could tell what so unscrupulous a creature might not do when there was no father to protect Leah and Rachel? Might he not strike at the father by degrading or

insulting the daughters? So Laban made him swear to an agreement over a cairn of stones which was erected as a silent witness to the compact. The name of the cairn was to be Mizpah or Watch-tower: for, said Laban with a warning note, "The Lord watch between me and thee, when we are absent one from another." That is, if you venture to take a mean advantage of me behind my back, if you insult or injure my daughters, may God punish you! The appeal is to God, because Laban cannot trust Jacob. Any violation of the compact will have God as its invisible witness and avenger. It is with this threat that Laban lets his son-in-law go; he binds the scheming Hebrew by working on his religious feelings, or rather upon his religious fears, warning him of what God will do to him if he ever dares to break the vow which this cairn of stones commemorates.

What a remarkable twist the saying has received in passing into its popular vogue, a vogue more honourable than the sense with which it began its long career! "Mizpah," in fact, denoted originally that miserable lack of trust which a prolonged course of treachery and sharp practice produces between individuals and nations. The time comes when neither side can put any confidence in the word of the other. And the Oriental fell back upon the divine sanction and retribution; if your neighbour could not give you any adequate guarantee that he would keep his promise, you threatened him with celestial wrath. "The Lord watch between me and thee, when we are absent one from another." The emphasis falls on the word "Lord." When you are out of my sight, God will keep an eye on your behaviour; you are still within His sight and reach. That fear of the divine retribution was evidently the one thing left in Jacob's nature which Laban felt he could work upon. Indeed, the whole incident reminds us of the famous sketch in *Quentin Durward* of Louis XI.'s superstitious, shifty nature, and of the difficulty of securing him by an oath which he would regard as binding—his good faith being a thing of nought for all who had any dealings with him.

Sayings and phrases are like families; their fortunes alter, they may rise or fall, in the course of generations. One or two of these twisted sayings may show how the popular usage has redeemed a phrase from compromising associations, till the acquired sense is almost exactly the opposite of the original. For example, that saying which Shakespeare put into the lips of the shrewd Ulysses has risen like "Mizpah"; and this is all the more interesting because, as it has been

pointed out, Ulysses, the unscrupulous, astute man in Homer, is in some respects an ethical parallel to the Hebrew Jacob, both having little hesitation in deceiving their friends and relatives, both carrying their qualities of management to the pitch of craftiness upon occasion, although the Greek story fails to punish its hero, while Jacob was a living example of the calamities that overtake treacherous dealing.

But it is the general philosophy of these twisted sayings which calls for a word of analysis. They are twisted, but not distorted; the twist they have received has only turned them into something else, into something with life and purpose in it, and the twist is not perceptible except to those who inconveniently happen to remember the first phase of the saying in question. Even they would be guilty of pedantry if they bewailed such twists or refused to recognise the later form. The one form is as legitimate as the other. Pragmatism is the real philosophy of such sayings; if they manage to justify their existence by meeting a real need, their departure from some original meaning is condoned—or ought to be condoned. Even a rough-and-ready analysis shows that two factors really contribute to the process of transformation. One is the indefinite and elastic character of the language used by a great classic. It is so vital that it is not to be bound down to “this or that.” When a notable phrase or saying is put into the revenues of the human spirit, it may be spent without a thought of the original author’s intent; he cannot earmark it, even if he would, for a special purpose. And it is so spent, so laid out, because it is appropriated by men and women who need words for life and not for words’ sake. Lord Morley tells us, in his *Recollections*, that “it is after all the ignorant, like Pascal, like Descartes, like Rousseau, who had read little but who thought and dared—these are the men who make the world go.” The world would go better if its busy men had anything like the ignorance of Pascal, and if it were only true that everyone who read little thought much. But it is true that many of the moving forces in any age are not consciously dependent upon books and reading, and it is down among these moving forces that sayings get twisted into some new shape and sharpness. This may serve as a partial compensation for the breaking of illusions which accompanies any bit of research into popular sayings. There is something disheartening in the study, we must admit. Lay the cold hands of historical accuracy upon these sayings, and they sometimes shrivel up into nothingness. Some of the finest phrases in ordinary tradition either were

never uttered by their reputed authors, or defy any attempt to connect them with a single personality. There is no evidence, for example, that Galileo ever uttered the famous saying by which he lives in the mind of men—*Eppur si muove*. Mary Stuart's *Adieu* to France was composed by a French journalist long after her day; Pitt's dying words are more than suspect; and Wellington did not shout, "Up, Guards, and at 'em," when Waterloo was being won. But these phrases, and others like them, often did their work in history, for history is made not simply by what actually occurred or was said, but also by what is believed to have happened or to have been said. So it is with these twisted sayings—and this is the second factor in their evolution, not simply that they are flexible, but that life is flexible and capable of assimilating materials for its own ends, capable of dealing drastically with what it appropriates and of ignoring technical accuracies. Even with the twist these sayings are not wrong, they are just different. Life is more than literature; and life, in the street and in the field, where men do not talk in inverted commas, life seized upon these phrases for its own purposes, indifferent to their original aim, perhaps unconscious that they ever had an original aim at all. We know how a living language develops, moulding phrases under the influence of new associations and interests, modifying this, dropping that, and creating fresh expressions freely for its changing environment. This is going on under our eyes. And the same kind of process goes on in the region of popular sayings. No considerations of literary tradition take us very far in an endeavour to account for their psychology. When St Anthony invited the devil to supper and set before him one parched pea, the devil remarked that it was good as far as it went. We say much the same about any attempt to furnish a theory of twisted sayings from mere literature; it requires to be supplemented with richer considerations. The truth is, a great writer starts such sayings on their course, but he does not remain their master. His genius fits them for more uses than his own. Presently they are commandeered, and on the high seas of current speech they are chartered by men and women who probably never heard of the port from which they were launched. It is in this way, and not as the result of literary mannerisms and inaccuracies, that such twisted sayings get afloat. There is no question at all of some later author deliberately changing the language of a predecessor for the sake of literary effect. Twisted sayings are not born in libraries, but in the open air of popular existence, and, as

a matter of fact, their birth is generally invisible; when we come upon them first it is on the lips of people who are not quoting consciously from an author or even employing vague reminiscences of some passage in a book, but taking liberties with what has become a living possession of their own. A twisted saying is like a Scots ballad. You cannot fix it down to any individual's credit, and indeed almost all you can be sure of is that it never rose from the brain of some author who, over pen and ink, said, "Go to: let me twist this saying—thus." It is outside libraries that these sayings acquire their twists and turns. Their origin is communal, and to understand them we require to keep our eyes on that world of men where fastidious accuracy is at a discount, and where human beings talk without verifying their quotations, even on the rare occasions when they do quote. All manner of instincts and interests enter into this world as factors in the changing use of words and sentences, and none recognises the control of books—not even of scriptures and classics. Consequently, in order to do any sort of justice to the genesis and genius of such twisted sayings, we must resolve to study them not from the academic windows of the literary purist who looks down with some scorn upon them as aberrations to be deplored for their inaccuracy and illegitimacy, but from the position of the market-place, where books are second to the business of the day, and where phrases are not only made but remade, not only coined but recast, in the perennial reaction of a nation's life upon its language.

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THERE is in the Gospels a parable of a rich man and a poor man, and the rich man had everything he wanted, but the poor man nothing. When they died, the rich man, we are told, went to hell, and the poor man to heaven. Now this is called poetic justice, and though in this case a little drastic, we cannot help feeling that it is an excellent thing. Indeed, the obstinate, almost passionate manner in which human nature has clung to its belief in poetic justice does it infinite credit. Though it may be clumsy and mistaken and absurd, it shows an inherent sense of what is right. A good illustration might be taken from the tragedy of *King Lear*. The end of that tragedy is frightful, and all the more so because at least one of those overwhelmed in the catastrophe is quite innocent. Dr Johnson used to declare that he read *King Lear* with his hand before his eyes, for the tough old moralist could hardly bear it, it so outraged his sense of right and wrong. And in Johnson's time a version of *King Lear* was actually written to try and put all this right. Edgar marries Cordelia, the old king looks on with a kind of imbecile pleasure, and they are all happy ever after. From an æsthetic point of view this version is a perfectly appalling performance, and Charles Lamb has condemned it for ever. Everyone must accept the logic of that condemnation. But at the same time I confess to having a sneaking feeling that there is a sort of pathos in this lamentable attempt to restore poetic justice, for it is deeply implanted in us that good ought to triumph and bad be punished, and the flat defiance of this rule leaves us in a state of moral chaos.

And yet poetic justice is not a law of life. This is a hard fact, but we have got to face it, and it requires enormous courage to do so. They will always get a hearing who speak

comfortable words to Jerusalem, crying unto her that her warfare is accomplished and her iniquity pardoned. The world loves these prophets, the sons of consolation. It does not love the dismal preachers who have the courage to speak uncomfortable words. For myself, I confess that I do love some of them. But if the majority of us cannot love them, at least we ought to respect them, for if they say what we do not like, and what makes havoc of our fine sentiments, it is not because they want to say it, but surely because they must say it.

Of all these prophets probably the best known is he who wrote the book in the Bible known as Ecclesiastes. It is remarkable that such a piece of writing should have found its way into the collection. It always seems to me that it is the only piece from end to end of the book which has the flavour of pure literature. The writer is an artist, and like an artist delights in his work for its own sake. Like Hamlet, he tastes his melancholy with something of the satisfaction of an epicure. He is a mournful, disillusioned, cultivated man, living at a time when the hopes of Israel were at their lowest. All her splendours have faded. Generally at such times all kinds of fantastic ideas are in the air. Prophets dream dreams and see visions. Quacks and mountebanks reap their harvest. Redeemers are foretold. Ancient glories are to be restored. Our writer cynically holds himself aloof, and shares in none of these beliefs. He is deeply dissatisfied with life. He cannot understand it. But he is a man of imagination and sympathy, and far too humane for his complaint to be merely selfish. It is the unfairness, the absurd lack of proportion, which strike him. With a kind of forlorn mirth he imagines himself a King Solomon, surrounds himself with all the pageantry of the great king, assumes for himself wealth, power, learning, and then measures all the experiences of existence, and sums them up as vanity and pursuit of the wind. He is quite certain that it is better to be virtuous than vicious, better to be wise than a fool, better to be rich than poor; but there is no reading the riddle, for we are the victims of circumstances that baffle us. Virtue, money, and wisdom are weapons, but man is outmatched. The race is not to the swift, the battle not to the strong, but time and chance happeneth to all.

This view of time and chance has enlarged with modern life. It may even be regarded as the romantic in opposition to the classical. For the classical sees man as the architect of his own life, and bids him, though human, to show the

fortitude of a god. The romantic is the recognition of the forces of circumstance. The outline of the figure is no longer simple, but complex, and atmosphere and background are added to the figure, so that man is seen beaten, broken, and blinded by dread things over which he has no control. These ideas are ingrained in modern literature because they are ingrained in modern life. They abound everywhere, but in certain writers they entirely predominate. It is not too much to say that the note of "vanity of vanities" runs like an accompanying undertone throughout the whole of French literature. No literature is more classical in form, and no literature is really more romantic in spirit. The tinge of pessimism is universal, for it is found even among the optimists. It may be in the form of a gracious melancholy, a bitter mockery, or a careless cynicism; but whatever the form, there it is. We get it in a religious writer like Pascal, in the deeply affectionate La Bruyère; we hear it under the rhetoric of Bossuet, and it is behind the grinning mask of Voltaire. There is nothing of cruel, wanton delight, but a kind of wistful pensiveness over the dreams of man and their dull or ludicrous fulfilment.

If in England the note of pessimism is not so universally heard, we have at least some strong and striking personalities among the dismal preachers. To take only one century, the eighteenth, the two most commanding figures of that age are undoubtedly Swift and Johnson. From the point of view of psychology all the others, and there are many giants among them, seem but as dolls beside these two. Swift has been coarsely judged as a mere savage hater of his fellows, but those who have any understanding of his time know that this verdict is absurd and unjust. For the deeper things of love and friendship Swift's heart was "all as hungry as the sea," but he saw the cheapness, commonness, and vulgarity that familiarity with these things produces. So he turned on them with loathing and scorn. He was contemptuous of religion, and afraid of marriage and friendship, because he saw that all human ideals were debased and vulgarised by the power of circumstance over men and women. He refused to deal in the cant of pulpit and platform and the shallow optimism of those who had vested interests in the false flattery of their fellows. The dragon eyes of that fierce intelligence penetrated everywhere, and saw under the gilt and tinsel of civilisation only greedy, howling Yahoos. Before the strength of that shattering intelligence he stands gloomy and alone amid the chaos which he himself has wrought. He is his own victim

and martyr. It was a frightful price to pay. And he knows it, crying in his agony: "Blessed are the fools and blind." But his martyrdom was an atonement. From this victim, slowly tortured to madness and death, we realise the moral poverty of that time in a way that we never should from its sleek and complacent prophets.

The case of Johnson is different, and yet there is a strange similarity. Johnson disliked Swift for his view of human nature, yet not only was Johnson a pessimist himself, but he preached the gospel of pessimism with a fervour that must have made many optimists envious. He had struggled amid dirt, squalor, and poverty, and toughly preserved the integrity of his heart. By sheer force of heroism he slowly dragged his enormous bulk out of the depths. But he takes no pride in this. There are no superior airs, only fine manly pity for the poor devils who had gone down, not to rise again. If ever any man felt "the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible world," it was Johnson. Unwieldy, pompous, pseudo-classical, he is a romantic in spite of himself, aghast at the power of circumstance in human life, and full of brooding tenderness for its tragedy. During the hard days of struggle he wrote two poems. They may or may not be of any poetic value, but they are certainly two of the most interesting pieces of writing in our language, especially the second—"The Vanity of Human Wishes." Here the Doctor marshals a pageant of great ones—the warrior, the politician, the scholar, and other such. A gloomy procession of broken men treading the way to pompous nothingness. Man has no certain tenure, and so the poem concludes with a noble attempt to comfort us with religion, exhorting us in the last line to "make the happiness we cannot find." Surely this is the first and last word in the practical philosophy of life, and one of the dismal preachers has said it. It is the only advice which squares with the truth of the facts. He has not uttered it glibly, it has been wrung from him, and is the consequence of honestly facing the facts. For he finds no law of poetic justice operating automatically in human affairs, and to preach such a law is simply playing with the world as if it were a doll's house. As long as we persist in pulling down the blinds and, refusing to see the world as it is, are contented to live amongst unrealities, there can be no progress. Like the king of old, we are paying our prophets to say what we want them to. So the dismal preachers educate us more nobly, for they try to show us where we really stand. They will not flatter us. They have not found life a soft job, and they fearlessly tell

us so. We have no command over the past, and little over the future. It has not been promised us that our virtue will be triumphant. As Addison has put it:—

“’Tis not in mortals to command success,
But we’ll do more, Sempronius; we’ll deserve it.”

This noble education is thus the preparation for religion and philosophy. For when we have learned by the discipline of bitter experience, and when we have surrendered our confidence in things external to us, only then are we in a position to understand what religion and philosophy really are. They are not part of a system of sentimental morality, or tags of a scheme of liberalism, or a side issue of municipal reform, or an adjunct of the police court. They do not pretend to solve the riddle of life. They accept a bad world, and bless and encourage those who are good and pure and peaceable in it. They sound the bugle for battle, and summon us to long hours of sentry work. They cannot explain away the difficulties, but they raise us above them. Socrates, the Master Philosopher, spends all his life asking questions, for he wants to know what righteousness and justice are, and will not accept mere words. In his heart he feels the glow of these things themselves, and knows that they are far, far greater than the pedantic definitions of the schools make them out to be. He never did find out. To full intellectual expression he never attained. But their force he felt and obeyed, and in their power he rested secure, and for their sake he died. “Know of a certainty, O judges, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death.” The last experiences of the Master Christian reveal one in doubt. But his words are: “Not as I will, but as Thou wilt.” And he tells his best beloved followers that the rewards of virtue are not at his disposal. All he can offer them is to drink of the same cup. But he too has his secret of strength and security from which he speaks: “In the world ye shall have tribulation, but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world. My peace I leave with you. Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid.”

R. H. U. BLOOR.

BRIGHTON.

PRESBYTERIAN REUNION IN SCOTLAND: THE DRAFT ARTICLES.

THE REV. D. MACMILLAN, D.D.

AFTER ten long years of deliberation the Committee of the Church of Scotland in conference with the United Free Church on the question of reunion has at last issued its Report in a series of articles purporting to be "Declaratory of the Constitution of the Church in Matters Spiritual." The Report was before the last General Assembly, and is now being considered by the Presbyteries for suggestions. Should the negotiations be proceeded with, other five or six years, it is believed, must elapse before Parliamentary sanction can be given and a union consummated. What strikes one, to begin with, is the tardiness of the movement. The Scottish Reformers in 1560 were able, after four days' deliberation, to present the Confession of Faith to Parliament, and it has taken their representatives in the twentieth century ten years to declare what that confession or, more correctly speaking, its successor, that of the Westminster Divines, actually is. It is not surprising, accordingly, that one of the two leading newspapers in Scotland referred quite lately to the movement as "uninspiring." The slowness of its action is taking the heart out of those who are most anxious to see it brought to a speedy and satisfactory completion.

It is undoubted that when the subject of reunion between the two leading Presbyterian Churches in Scotland was first mooted, about twelve years ago, very considerable enthusiasm was manifested in their General Assemblies. But somehow that enthusiasm has cooled down. The subject in its earlier days used to draw together large audiences of ministers and elders to hear the discussion in the chief court of the Church of Scotland, but lately the attendances have dwindled down, and at last Assembly, even in view of the fact that definite

proposals had at last been issued by the Committee, certainly not more than half the members, clerical and lay, were present. The same lack of interest is apparent all over the country. The people of Scotland are not seriously thinking about it. It has never been put before them as a practical question, and a significant sign of the times can be seen in a meeting of the Presbytery of Glasgow held on the 3rd December 1918, specially convened to consider the Draft Articles, when out of a membership of two hundred and ten only twenty-four were present, and the meeting itself had been adjourned again and again, the Presbytery showing great disinclination to face the proposals.

The friends of Presbyterian reunion in Scotland are naturally disappointed at the trend of events; and although there is a small number of men in the Church who are spoken of as its leaders and who are still eager to see the negotiations carried through, even they, one would think, would be compelled to pause and to inquire into the reason why the movement is so uninspiring and tardy and so ineffective in its appeal to the people of Scotland. It would be very unwise to carry any scheme of reunion, not only over the heads of the people, but in face of their apathy and silent hostility; the consequences might be very serious, the Churches would be disrupted afresh and the question made more impossible than ever. If the negotiations are persisted in, the people must be consulted; they must be informed, and their cordial assent must be procured. Knowing the temper of the Scottish people as it has so frequently shown itself in the history of the nation, any attempt to steal a march on them, especially where their Church is concerned, would be disastrous, and the men who at the present moment may be receiving applause when they speak on the abstract question of union, a thing which everyone, it matters not what his ecclesiastical opinions may be, regards as in itself desirable, might find themselves in a very unpopular position. It is to help to clear the air and to account for the apathy, especially of the Church of Scotland, with regard to the question as it now presents itself, that this article is written.

I.

A chief reason for the dissatisfaction that is manifested is the method of procedure adopted by the Committee. This has been laid down in a Memorandum prepared by the then Procurator, or legal adviser of the Church, and submitted to

the General Assembly of 1912. This document, which was hailed at the time as a happy inspiration, but which has in the interval lost a considerable amount of its charm, suggested the following steps in the way of procedure. First, the preparation of Draft Articles declaratory of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland, the submission of these to the Presbyteries for their approval, and the presentation of them to Parliament for ratification; after which they would become the law of the Church. These Articles, being prepared with an eye to satisfy the United Free Church, would become the basis of union. What about the important question of the endowments? They, according to the Memorandum, are to be settled by a "strong and sympathetic Parliamentary Commission," in which settlement the Church, except by moral suasion, would have no hand. Its power in deciding the terms of union is to end once the Draft Articles, which deal with matters spiritual—that is, with doctrine, government, worship, and forms of process,—are determined; but as far as matters temporal are concerned—that is, the teinds, endowments, manse, glebes, and generally speaking the *temporalia* of the Church—the Church itself is to have no voice. Its property is to be handed over to Parliament, which, through a Commission, is to divide it between the two uniting Churches. That is the impression that prevails all over Scotland, and nothing has been said or done by the leaders in the movement to correct the impression should it be false. If, therefore, those who are keen for a Presbyterian reunion deplore the silent opposition to their proposals, is it not their duty to inform the people of the true nature of their intention should these be misunderstood; or if they find that they are correctly apprehended, is it not an equal duty on their part to revise their scheme and make it more acceptable to the members of the Church of Scotland?

This attempt at piecemeal legislation is a blunder. We do not for a moment believe that those who are responsible for it have any intention of stealing a march on the Church, tying its hands, and meeting any opposition to the action of a Parliamentary Commission, if ever appointed, with the reply that its opposition is too late; but it must be admitted that they show but slight appreciation of the intelligence of the people, their interest in their Church, and the well-known stubbornness of the national character if they for a moment imagine that of their own free will the Scottish people would hand over to Parliament the great possessions of the Church without having a voice in their settlement. Parliament would

never dream of legislating in this piecemeal fashion. When a Bill is introduced into the House of Commons it is the whole Bill and not a part of it that is put on the table, and the first reading gives an opportunity for a general discussion of the measure. It is afterwards taken up in sections and considered in detail, but each detail is viewed not only in itself, but in relation to the complete Bill, which is known to every member. In the case, however, of the scheme for the reunion of the two Presbyterian Churches in Scotland, only a part of it has been presented; no one knows what the other parts, and, as some may think, the most important, will propose. And the climax to this legislative ineptitude is reached when the Church is told that in the settlement of these parts it will have no voice; that once the first part, which many may think the least important, is agreed upon, its hands are tied and its property handed over to be dealt with by a secular body, a Parliamentary Commission, in the appointment of which—in the determination of the character, opinions, and religious beliefs of its members—it will have no say. No sane man, therefore, should be surprised that, of the two hundred and ten members of the Presbytery of Glasgow, only twenty-four took the trouble of being present to discuss the Draft Articles.

II.

The chief ground, however, for the indifference and apathy of the Church of Scotland is to be found in the Articles themselves. They are nine in number, and could be printed on a page of this magazine. One can hardly understand how it took ten long years to formulate them; the only explanation is the strong division of opinion in the Committee and the lack of public momentum behind it. I do not intend to deal with these Articles in detail; it will be enough for my purpose to lay my hand upon the two or three that vitally affect the constitution of the Church, and which, if presented to and ratified by Parliament, would absolutely revolutionise it. A word, however, must be said in passing on the title given to the Articles.

It is affirmed that they are "Declaratory of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland in Matters Spiritual." Now, what is a Declaratory Act? The recognised authority on the law of the Church defines it as follows: he says that a "Declaratory Act declares what the law of the Church is"; and this is precisely what the Draft Articles fail to do; in fact, on

the most essential points they contradict the law of the Church and declare it to be what in reality it is not. For example, in Article IV. it is said that the "Church of Scotland has the right and power, subject to no civil authority, to legislate and to adjudicate finally in all matters of doctrine, worship, government, and discipline in the Church, including the right to define the boundaries of the spheres of labour of its ministers and office-bearers." As a matter of fact, it has no such right and power; its relation to the State as an Established Church conditions its right and power, and to say that it is subject to no civil authority is, to put it bluntly, not true. Again, in Article V. it is stated that the "Church has the inherent right, free from interference by civil authority, to modify the forms of expression in its Confession of Faith or to formulate other doctrinal statements." It has no such right. So recently as 1905, when it wished to modify the subscription of ministers to the Confession of Faith, it had to go to Parliament, whose sanction was readily granted; but it had no right or power in itself to make the change. The framers of the Articles know this perfectly well, and it is hard to understand why they should have thus stated as the truth what in reality is only a travesty of it. The explanation is to be found in their desire to make a concession on this point to the United Free Church, and whether they are fully aware of the revolutionary character of the concession, as far as the Church of Scotland is concerned, is unknown; but the fact of it is now beginning to dawn upon the minds of the Scottish people, and forms the chief ground of their objection to the Articles as they stand. This is the point we have now to consider.

The claims thus put forward as belonging to the Church amount to what is known as Absolute Spiritual Independence. "It is an old friend," as Dr Mair, the chief legal authority of the Church, declared in 1901, and an "ill-fated cry," and one is astonished to find him now reversing his position and defending what he then condemned; for in the same speech he declared that he "refused to discuss it, and thought that those who differed from him might have been warned by what came of the former cry for Spiritual Independence." He was no doubt thinking of the fate that befell the movement in 1843 which resulted in the Disruption of the Church, and he probably had also in his mind the historical words of Dr Chalmers that "Spiritual Independence could only be realised at the Millennium." And yet, with all these facts before them, the Committee of the Church of Scotland repeat the cry and

make it the basis for a union with the United Free Church. One might understand their policy if the present constitution of the Church of Scotland pressed hard upon anyone, either minister or office-bearer; but this, it is universally admitted, it does not do. The Church of Scotland is recognised as the freest Church in Christendom, simply because of the nature of its relation to the State as an Established Church; and it is at this very moment the envy of the Church of England, which is striving hard to have its constitution recast so as to make it conform to that of its neighbour across the Border. There is not a single person in the Church of Scotland complains of any hardship to which he is subjected, or of any restriction of his mental or spiritual freedom, because of the constitution of his Church. In fact, it is freely admitted that that constitution protects him in his liberties and gives him that very Spiritual Freedom which would be sacrificed by the concessions to the United Free Church which the Committee of the Church of Scotland would seem willing to grant.

How does the matter stand at the present moment? The ministers of the Church of Scotland are protected in their rights and liberties by the relation of the Church to the State. The law makes them free. There is no power can interfere with them as long as they adhere to the constitution of the Church; their ecclesiastical and civil rights are absolutely secured. But under the new constitution contained in the Articles their rights and liberty would be in constant jeopardy, at any moment they might go. Supposing that this Absolute Spiritual Independence were granted to the Church, the General Assembly would have the power to "modify, add to, or change the doctrines of the Church," and there is a doubt as to whether it might not have the same power over its government. A majority could at any time override a minority, and the minority would have no right of appeal. The State having conceded to the Church a claim that is ultramontanist, the civil authority could not interfere, and the protesting parties would have no redress. This was stated on the floor of last General Assembly, and the then Procurator of the Church, who had been interrogated on the question in Committee, admitted its truth. Any minister or office-bearer would have to conform to the new law carried by a majority of the Assembly, or leave the Church; he could get no redress from the civil courts, and the emoluments of his office would also have to be sacrificed. This would be placing the Church not only independently of, but above, the State, creating an *imperium in imperio*, a condition of matters

which does not exist even in the case of what is known as Free Churches. For when the union took place in 1900 between the Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church in Scotland, the minority of the Free Church, commonly known as the "Wee Frees," contending that certain of the principles and doctrines of their Church had been violated, appealed to the civil authorities and found redress. The majority ousted them from their churches and livings, but the law reinstated them. But under the constitution proposed by the Draft Articles there could be no appeal, either to an ecclesiastical or a civil court, and the protesting minority would be sent naked into the wilderness. This is not only my reading of the Articles, but the interpretation put upon them by their chief framer, the then legal adviser of the Church. It is significant, it may be said in passing, that Parliament refused this claim to the United Free Church, which wished to have it embodied in the Bill of 1905, that gave them back a share of the property which, by acting on the belief that they possessed Absolute Spiritual Independence, they had sacrificed. And the extraordinary position now is that it is taken for granted that Parliament will grant to an Established Church what it refused to give to a Nonconformist body. There is no ground, however, for thinking that the Legislature has in the space of a few years lost its sense of justice and of right, and of the protection which it invariably grants to minorities. It is no abettor of those who would break contracts.

But another result, and even a more important one so far as the Church of Scotland as a whole is concerned, would follow from the adoption of these Articles, and that would be Disestablishment and Disendowment. The claim put forward amounts to a breaking of the Church's contract with the State; it demands not only separation but absolute independence. The words "right" and "power" to do this and that with its constitution and "without any interference" on the part of the "civil authorities" can only have one meaning: the Church would cease to be established. The Articles repudiate all control by the State, and the result would necessarily be Disestablishment and Disendowment. It is interesting in this connection to read what Mr Hallam, the historian, says. In his *Constitutional History of England* there is a chapter "On the Constitution of Scotland" in which there occur the following weighty words: "The Church of Scotland in her General Assemblies preserves the forms and affects the language of the sixteenth century, but the Erastianism against

which she inveighs secretly controls and paralyses her vaunted liberties, and she cannot but acknowledge that the supremacy of the Legislature is like the collar of the watch-dog, the price of food and shelter, and the condition upon which alone a religious society can be established and endowed by any prudent commonwealth."

This, it must be admitted, states the case briefly but accurately. An Established Church cannot have it both ways. It cannot have Absolute Spiritual Independence and the protection of the State, securing it in its endowments and privileges, at one and the same time. That is what the Draft Articles demand, and no self-respecting and prudent Commonwealth can ever grant it. This question has been raised in debate, and the Committee has always evaded it. The present writer put it seriously and solemnly to the men who are leading the Church of Scotland in this matter just before the Articles took their present shape, and, although he pressed for an answer, no answer was given. The ministers of the Church may have hitherto failed to see the importance of the constitutional question which the Articles raise. To the ordinary mind they look very innocent and harmless, and may appeal to the high-flying tendency of a section of Churchmen which Mr Hallam noted when he pointed to their belief in the Church's Spiritual Independence. It is a theory handed down to them from Andrew Melville; it never was believed in by John Knox. But the simile of the watch-dog which Hallam gives, though somewhat startling, is most apt. The food and drink which many of the ministers of the Church of Scotland are enjoying at the present moment form very sumptuous fare indeed. Several of them have £2000 a year, a large number have £1000 a year, and the average stipend cannot be less, including manses and glebes, than £500 a year. They are secured in these large incomes by the State, which is the collar round their necks, and a very honourable collar it is. The State never interferes with them. There is not a single instance on record of any such interference since the Revolution Settlement of 1690, except in the way of granting fresh powers and rights and privileges to the Church; and if ministers clearly understood that if these Articles were ratified the protection of the State would be withdrawn, its relations to the Church broken, and that Disestablishment and Disendowment would follow as a necessary consequence, the tacit support which many of them give would be withheld and the proposals of the Committee would be discarded.

The authors of these Articles would seem to have grave

doubts as to their final acceptance either by the Church or by Parliament. They have tried to conceal these doubts, but without success. To begin with, they admit that "both the great Presbyterian Churches in Scotland" must be "cordially assenting parties." So says the Memorandum. Well, in this matter we have some facts to go by. The Articles are at the present time being discussed by the Presbyteries of the Church of Scotland. They have been more or less drastically dealt with. A number of Presbyteries, such important ones as Dundee, Perth, Greenock, and Irvine, have practically rejected them, and the lack of interest in their discussion by the Glasgow Presbytery is symptomatic of the feeling all over the Church. When we turn to the United Free Church, what do we find? In it there is a large body of Voluntaries who not only repudiate all relations to the State, but who will not accept a farthing from the State, and the promise of a share of the Church of Scotland's endowments, which they regard as national money, they will have nothing to do with. In the discussion which took place in the General Assembly of the United Free Church last May when the Draft Articles were formally presented, the position of this section of the Church was made perfectly clear. A vote was taken, and the number of those who supported the Voluntary leaders was by no means insignificant. There is thus genuine ground for the fear that if the matter be pressed forward on its present basis there might be secessions from both Churches.

Another condition that the Memorandum—which is the *vade-mecum* of the advocates of the movement—lays down is that "antecedent assurances must be given to ensure the assent of Parliament to the necessary measure," and then it is added that "there is reason to believe that there will be no difficulty in obtaining such assurances." A considerable amount of water has flowed under the bridge since this was written. Its date is 1912. Everyone knows what has happened since then. The political world, like every other, has been turned upside down. The complacent leaders of the two chief parties in the House of Commons, Mr Asquith and Mr Balfour, who probably put no difficulty in the way of obtaining such assurances, have ceased to rule. A powerful Labourist and Socialistic party has come or is coming fast to the front. New interests have arisen and fresh demands are being made. The Church in Wales is on the eve of disestablishment, and the times are anything but favourable to a quiet deal on the part of two Churches who may wish to secure the ancient endowments of religion without any responsibility to the State

for their proper use. Truly it is a "leap in the dark" the Church of Scotland is taking, and the warning of Principal Henderson, the leader of the United Free Church, of the great risk that is involved in these proposals should be taken to heart. For the question is: Can Parliament, even though it were willing, stultify itself, violate the Constitution, by allowing two Churches to walk off with and to divide between them something like £10,000,000 of national money without imposing some form of control as to doctrine, government, and worship, and the proper discharge of their religious functions and duties? According to Mr Hallam, no prudent Commonwealth would ever dream of doing this, but the visionaries and Ultramontanists in the Church of Scotland think otherwise. For them the Millennium has evidently come.

Nor has the effect that these proposals would have on English religious bodies ever been considered. How, for example, would the Church of England regard them, and how would the large and influential sections of Nonconformity in that country look upon them? These questions have only to be put to show how revolutionary and dangerous the scheme is, and what an ecclesiastical turmoil it would create all over the land. False expectations would be raised in some quarters, violent opposition stirred up in others, and an apple of discord would be cast into the midst of Churches which are at present living at peace with themselves and each other.

The next few years will undoubtedly be full of grave dangers to the Church of Scotland, and it is unfortunate that it has no leader. As long as it remained true to itself and did its duty faithfully as a National Church it had no ground to fear. But within the last few years it has fallen into the hands of political intriguers, and as a consequence has lost much of its prestige in the eyes of the nation. The great ideals for which it has so often fought have been lost sight of in the meaner interests of ecclesiastical policy. As long as it stood for national service it was safe, and should it fall through political attack it would maintain its self-respect and be held with admiration in the memory of the nation. But should it be disestablished from *within*, it will be bound to go down to history as unworthy of the great trust committed to it.

D. MACMILLAN.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

MATERIALISATION PHENOMENA.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1918, p. 51.)

ONE story is good until another is told. The records of psychical research afford many striking illustrations of the truth of this proverb. One has heard stories set down on the evidence of apparently honest and capable witnesses which appeared absolutely proof against sceptical criticism. Yet inquiry has sometimes placed us at a new angle of view from which the whole affair has turned out to be some curious illusion of memory like Judge Hornby's conviction of having seen the ghost of a newspaper reporter in China (see *S.P.R. Proceedings*, vol. ii. p. 180, and *Journal*, August 1885), or an ingenious imposture like the performances of Messrs Smith and Blackburn, as confessed by the latter, in telepathy. Mr W. G. Braithwaite's article on Dr v. Schrenck-Notzing's experiments with "Eva C." in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* for October last seems as convincing as any narrative could well be. It is easy, nevertheless, to get a point of view from which the phenomena are open to the gravest suspicion.

Mr Braithwaite comments on the very scanty notice which v. Schrenck's ponderous work, *Materialisationsphänomene*, received in this country on its appearance in 1913. He does not seem to have come across Miss H. Verrall's full and damaging account of this book in the *Proceedings* of the Society for Psychical Research, July 1914 (vol. xxvii. pp. 337-369). It appears from this study that the real name of "Eva C." was Marthe Béraud. Dr v. Schrenck knew this, but he gives no hint of it to his readers, which is a rather disturbing feature in his evidence, since Marthe Béraud was a well-known and (on the evidence of a lawyer, M. Marsault) a confessed impostor. No doubt he sincerely believed in the genuineness of the manifestations witnessed by himself, but it was hardly fair to his readers not to let them know anything whatever of the unsatisfactory character of the medium's previous history.

That cheating did go on in some at least of Dr v. Schrenck's experiments is beyond all reasonable doubt. Let us take one remarkable

instance. On p. 367 of *Materialisationsphänomene* will be found a photograph of the medium's head and shoulders, taken just as she had turned her head to the left, thereby partly concealing some object attached to her hair, but showing clearly the curious exudation, the so-called "teleplasma," proceeding from her mouth. But within the cabinet, ready for the flashlight, had been planted another camera which brought this partly concealed object clearly into view. It resembled a piece of paper on which appeared large letters forming part of the words "Le Miroir." Dr v. Schrenck and "Eva's" friend and patroness, Mme. Bisson (in whose house the medium lived), stood quite "ratlos" before this phenomenon when they saw it in the developed photograph. The medium at the next sitting hastened to give a very far-fetched and sentimental explanation of it. Her control, "Berthe," it seemed, wanted to send the circle "her written thought." . . . "Vous êtes pour elle son miroir. Elle se revoit ici. Vous avez une photographie d'une pensée de Berthe." This certainly sounds very thin. Dr v. Schrenck, however, was not staggered even by the revelations which took place when the matter became public, and which showed that the mysterious object which conveyed this touching message from "Berthe" was nothing else than a piece of the title-page of a French illustrated paper, *Le Miroir*. From this journal, also, it turned out that portraits of eminent men such as Poincaré and Woodrow Wilson had been copied or adapted to serve as materialised representations in the dark cabinet. The medium was, of course, supposed to have nothing in the cabinet except the chair she sat on and the single garment she wore—when she wore even that.

The most remarkable and inexplicable of the phenomena recorded in the book depend on the sole testimony of Mme. Bisson, and indeed the value of the evidence in general depends very largely on the assumption of the perfect integrity of this lady. Her character may, to her friends, place her quite beyond suspicion, but the outside inquirer must take into account the possibility that she was a confederate of "Eva's." From this point of view the proceedings are frequently suggestive of fraud. Thus in the case of the "Miroir" incident we learn that the disconcerting appearance, in one of the cameras, of the printed sheet of paper was not communicated to the medium, but that a proof of the photograph was shown to Mme. Bisson shortly before the next performance. Mme. Bisson thereupon hypnotised the medium—this was the usual practice at the beginning of each sitting,—and the ridiculous explanation which unmistakably stamps the whole incident as a piece of humbug immediately followed. Hypnotisation was usually carried out by means involving physical contact, which would make it quite easy to convey a message to the subject, who had no other way of learning what had happened. At most of the sittings, as we learn from Dr v. Schrenck's frank account of the proceedings, Mme. Bisson was constantly in and out of the dark cabinet, holding the medium's hands, encouraging her, stroking her hair, etc. Thus on p. 269 we find "Eva" begging her friend, "Venez, Juliette, me tenir la tête"; whereupon Mme. Bisson entered the cabinet and stroked the hair and neck of the medium for about a minute. "The presence at the sitting," says Dr v. Schrenck, "of her protectress, in whom she has complete confidence, has, perhaps through the training and habit of several years, become a psychic necessity for the production of phenomena."

Mr Braithwaite is inaccurate in stating that Mme. Bisson is the widow

of a sculptor (p. 53). The late M. Bisson was an author. It is Mme. Bisson herself who is the sculptor, and the possible significance of this fact leaps to the eye when we examine some of Dr v. Schrenck's photographs of materialised forms. Of one of these he writes (p. 274), "The whole form of the object reminds one of a sculptor's rough sketch of a face in moist plaster or papier-maché." I repeat that Mme. Bisson may, to those who know her, be entirely above suspicion, but this book challenges the opinion of scientific students in general, and they are bound to take into consideration every possible hypothesis for the production of the phenomena by natural means before they can accept the existence of so remarkable a substance as Dr v. Schrenck's "teleplasma." It is only fair to add that a few manifestations are recorded to have taken place at sittings at which Mme. Bisson was not present.

Miss Verrall suggests an explanation of most of the manifestations produced by "Eva" and Dr v. Schrenck's other mediums. They may have been effected by means of the faculty of "regurgitation" possessed by some people, whereby the contents of the stomach can be brought up into the mouth at will, without effort or vomiting. The medium was careful never to allow an actual piece of the "teleplasma" to be obtained for purposes of analysis, but some of the moisture which dropped from it was once collected in a small vase, and the analysis suggests saliva, chewed-up paper, and particles of food. The medium occasionally vomited a little blood after a sitting.

There remain undoubtedly a number of manifestations of "Eva's" powers for which it is impossible at present to suggest any natural explanation. Still, looking at the evidence as a whole, we must vote the case to be, at best, one for further inquiry. I do not offer these criticisms as a disbeliever in the occult, still less with any desire to discourage research. But we must not go further than the facts will carry us, and Mr Braithwaite in his interesting article goes very far. The performances of Marthe Béraud do not really afford a solid basis for a new theory of the Resurrection.

T. W. ROLLESTON.

HAMPSTEAD.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

THE second volume (*Macedonia to Zion*) of the *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church* (T. & T. Clark), edited by Dr James Hastings, has now been published. Like the *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, to which it is a sequel, this dictionary covers some of the ground already mapped out by the larger *Dictionary of the Bible*; but the topics are freshly handled, and the editor has taken full advantage of this opportunity of bringing various subjects up to date. Thus there is an excellent survey of "The Resurrection of Christ" in the apostolic testimony, by Prof. J. M. Shaw; Mr C. W. Emmet's article on "Romans" is abreast of recent research, in addition to being original; and articles like those on the "Mysteries" and the "Sacraments" supplement each other usefully. It is hardly necessary to say that the volume has been edited with the usual skill and thoroughness of Dr Hastings.

Several articles are admitted on apocryphal and outlying religious books, e.g. "Sirach" (D. S. Margoliouth) and "The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs" (A. L. Davies). The present writer contributes one on "The Sibylline Oracles," and Mr H. N. Bate simultaneously publishes *The Sibylline Oracles, Books III.-V.* (S.P.C.K.), in an English translation, with introduction and brief notes. This will be of service to those who cannot consult the edition by Mr Lanchester in Dr Charles's *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*. On the more general topic of "the influence of Judaism of the Greek period upon the earliest developments of Christianity," Mr Frank Streatfeild's *Preparing the Way* (Macmillan) provides a popular introduction for students. The essay has little or nothing that is fresh, but it sketches the main features of the situation fairly; an appendix contains a list of parallels, reminiscences, and quotations from the older Jewish literature in the New Testament. In its series of translations from early documents, the S.P.C.K. also issues the *Book of Joseph and Asenath*, by Mr E. S. Brooks, who translates from Batiffol's Greek text. This biblical romance appears to be a Christian edition of some Jewish missionary tale, which is not earlier than the first century A.D. and not later than the fifth. Theologically, it is of small importance. More significance attaches to the problem of Clement of Rome and his epistle. Mr E. T. Merrill (*American Journal of Theology*, 426-442) dates the epistle c. 140 A.D.—a sufficiently revolutionary hypothesis. "The

reputed bishop Clement probably never had an actual existence," and he is disposed to connect the author with the Clement mentioned by Hermas as an official of the Roman Church who is to transmit the *Shepherd* to "outside cities." The problem of Gnosticism is also raised afresh by Mr Thomas Whittaker in a welcome second edition of *The Neo-Platonists* (Cambridge University Press). He adds, not only a lucid supplement on the commentaries of Proclus, but a few pages on Gnosticism, which he is now disposed, with Reitzenstein, to regard as a development of Egyptian Theosophy, not of early Christianity; "the Gnostic ideas were not distinctively either Jewish or Christian, but belonged to a wider movement in which the Judæo-Christian tradition was only one current." Among later writers who show Neo-Platonist influence, Mr Whittaker naturally mentions Boethius in the beginning of the sixth century; he translated Porphyry into Latin, and there is as much Neo-Platonism as Christianity, probably more, in his book on the "Consolations of Philosophy." The English reader can now read this essay and the tracts of Boethius in Mr H. F. Stewart's recent edition in the Loeb Classical Library (Heinemann). Boethius has not always fared so well in the hands of his translators. So far as Plotinus is concerned, the Neo-Platonist influence on later Christian dogma is discussed by M. François Picavet in *Hypostases Plotiniennes et Trinité Chrétienne* (Paris), though this essay yields little positive proof of a thesis which is in itself not improbable. Another aspect of mediæval religious philosophy is prominent in M. Maurice de Wulf's pages on "Western Philosophy and Theology in the Thirteenth Century" (*Harvard Theological Review*, October 1918). He sets himself to defend the scholastic philosophy against the charge of subservience to dogmatic theology, and contends that it was genuinely independent, instead of being an apologetic philosophy yoked to the plough of Catholic theology. Mr J. W. Thompson's study of "Church and State in Mediæval Germany," which is now finished (*American Journal of Theology*, October), is a more objective survey of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It re-sets a number of points in the history as well as in the theology of the period, including the famous "Canossa" incident.

In historical theology proper, we have to chronicle one or two important publications. Lord Acton used to say that "no part of modern history has been so searched and sifted as to be without urgent need of new and deeper inquiry, and the touch of a fresh mind," and the same may still be said of some sections in older history. Mr A. B. Scott's *The Pictish Nation, its People and its Church* (Edinburgh, T. N. Foulis) shows what a fresh mind can do for an old subject. The book is handsomely appointed, even judged by pre-war standards, but its main appeal lies in the grasp and scope which it displays. Mr Scott writes out of sympathy and long study. He traces the Pictish Church from the mission of St Ninian to the ninth century; shows them in possession of the Celtic soul resisting Teutonic pressure, and cherishing "culture and civilisation as means to attain moral ends." There are specially interesting chapters on the leaders in the seventh century, and on the forlorn hope of the Culdees who stood out against foreign and Roman influences. Incidentally, Mr Scott declares that "the historical St Patrick's denunciation of the Picts as *apostatae* was either an embittered cleric's wrathful exaggeration, or a reference to a very local declension from orthodox ways." Now this phrase occurs in the Coroticus letter, which M. Esposito (*Journal*

of *Theological Studies*, 342-346) describes as "a complete failure" from the point of view of eloquence, though he argues that Patrick had more literary knowledge than he is sometimes supposed to have possessed, including an acquaintance with Victorinus of Pettau. The Latin writings of St Patrick, *Libri Sancti Patricii*, are now edited by Dr N. J. D. White (S.P.C.K.), who also prints separately a translation of them, in cheap form. Another valuable contribution to the study of the Scottish Church is the posthumous second volume of Dr A. R. MacEwen's *History of the Church in Scotland* (Hodder & Stoughton), which carries the story down to 1560. Lord Morley once said that Scottish theological faction in the sixteenth century "was divided between Puritanism with the chill on and with the chill off." It is a misnomer to speak of "Puritanism" in this connection. But, at any rate, there was very little chill in those turbulent days, when the polity of the Reformed Church was being settled and a stamp being set upon Scottish Christianity by a Confession which, nevertheless, as Professor MacEwen shows, "did not differ in essentials from the accepted and sanctioned beliefs of the Church of England." It is a matter for deep regret that the author was not spared to finish the task to which he brought such a rare combination of historical candour and sympathy. If only he and Dr Gwatkin had lived to complete their histories of the Scottish and English Churches!

In exegetical theology there is less to reap. Sir G. A. Smith, however, has found time to edit *Deuteronomy* for the Cambridge Bible (Cambridge University Press), with a full introduction and first-rate notes; and Mr L. W. King's Schweich Lectures on *Legends of Babylonia and Egypt in relation to Hebrew Tradition* (Milford) appeal to more than archæologists. Mr King draws upon the fresh material published in America since the war began; finds that the source of the flood-legend was Mesopotamian rather than Egyptian, and that the Hebrews may have borrowed, even before the exile, from Sumerian tradition *via* Babylon. The Hebrew traditions are derived from Sumerian, not from Semitic sources; this Mr King regards as certain. He raises the question, "Why is it that the actual myths and legends of Egypt concerning the origin of the world and its civilisation should have failed to impress the Hebrew mind, which, on the other hand, was so responsive to those of Babylon?" The answer he suggests, though he has not space to elaborate it, is that Babylon was more open to Semitic influence than Egypt. Whether this explanation is tenable or not, Mr King's volume will start discussion and provide materials for the fresh elucidation of the primitive Hebrew myths. In the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, Dr Jacob Hoschander has begun a study of "The Book of Esther in the Light of History," in which he evidently proposes to re-establish its historical character. He admits that common sense has played a small part in the interpretation of the book, ever since the rabbis indulged in their homiletic vagaries. In the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature* (pp. 256 f.), Mr Kemper Fullerton discusses the vexed problem of Immanuel in Isaiah vii. 14 f., concluding with the suggestion that Trypho, Justin Martyr's opponent, was really on the right lines, and that the "virgin," or young wife who was not yet a mother, was the bride of Ahaz. In the *Quarterly Review* for July, Mr C. G. Montefiore writes an appreciation of "The Psalter, its Content and Date," in which he thinks that "we shall probably refuse to acquiesce in Davidic authorship for any existing psalm of our present collection; and while we shall

admit that some psalms are pretty certainly pre-exilic, we shall still assign the greater portion of the Psalter to the Persian and Greek periods." Finally, "The Babylonian Conception of the Logos," an essay by Mr S. Langdon (*Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 1918, 433-450), links on to Mr King's lectures. It discusses the term "Mummu," a Sumerian title of the Creator God Marduk, which was an equivalent for form, idea, or reason, water being conceived as the primordial principle. But the essay also provides one of the antecedents for the New Testament idea of the Logos, though Mr Langdon cautiously refrains from pushing speculation too far.

In New Testament theology, Mr S. T. Lowrie (*Princeton Theological Review*, 416 f.) argues that the epistle of James was meant for Jews, not for Christian Jews, as an evangelical appeal to the pious in the diaspora. Professor Vacher Burch (*Expositor*, September) finds the influence of Syrian Ophitism in the allusion to "the wheel of being" in James iii. 6. Professor Peake's lecture on *The Quintessence of Paulinism* (Manchester University Press) is a compressed but lucid statement of the subject. He lays more weight on the Old Testament and Jewish influences than on pagan philosophy and mysteries, in explaining the rise and formation of the Pauline theology, and rejects "the view that for Paul the flesh and the body were identical, and that his doctrine of the flesh embodies the antithesis of matter and spirit borrowed from Greek philosophy." This is practically the position adopted by Dr E. Burton in an exhaustive monograph on *Spirit, Soul, and Flesh* (University of Chicago Press), which collects and surveys the use of these terms in Hebrew and Greek down to 180 A.D. The same press issues Mr Thomas Wearing's *The World-View of the Fourth Gospel*, which endeavours to set the Johannine conceptions in the light of contemporary speculations upon God and the universe, though, as he admits, "the author [of the Fourth Gospel] is not seriously concerned with the purpose of the universe and its relation to man," but, like a mystic, is "obsessed with the unreality, the transitoriness, and the evil character of the environment in which he has found himself." Here the Hellenistic, non-Jewish, factors assume a prominence unknown to Paulinism. Dr J. H. Leckie's volume on *The World to Come and Final Destiny* (T. & T. Clark) includes a survey of the New Testament teaching—indeed, it starts by evaluating Jewish apocalyptic; but Dr Leckie passes forward to offer a dogmatic survey of the three main lines along which Christian speculation has moved—the ordinary dualistic view of heaven and hell, the hypothesis of conditional immortality, and universalism. So far as the New Testament evidence goes, he thinks support may be found for any one of these conditions of the future state. "Which of these views we may incline to adopt as the more probable will depend generally on our method of interpretation, on our philosophical opinion, and above all on the individual temperament that happens to be ours." One merit of this book is its fairness. Dr Leckie has a judicial mind, and he puts before his readers the available evidence with singular and scrupulous impartiality. Against the theory of conditional immortality he thinks it may be urged that such a view involves the denial of the soul's indestructibility and of the organic unity of the race. Neither of these seems quite cogent, however. Jesus told us to fear one who could "destroy both soul and body in Gehenna." The optimistic outlook of universalism is weakened, in his judgment, by a "failure to affirm that there is an ultimate peril in the spiritual life." And he

concludes by showing that "the traditional doctrine of destiny has always shown signs of unstable equilibrium." The whole discussion will help to clarify the minds of many people by its honesty, and it will at least prevent some hasty dogmatism. In this respect, Dr Leckie's book resembles Canon Vernon F. Storr's recent volume on *Christianity and Immortality* (Longmans), which is less comprehensive, but marked by a similar restraint. Both writers presuppose and address an audience more or less within the temple. Both tend to arrive at the same general standpoint, though Canon Storr succeeds in being more persuasive and "philosophical," in a good sense, than his Scottish contemporary.

A valuable pendant to both discussions may be found in Miss E. F. Jourdain's competent article on "Philosophy and Human Immortality" (*The Interpreter*, October), which lays bare several of the determining ideas of the whole problem. The New Testament is more to the front, however, in a posthumous work, *A Not Impossible Religion* (John Lane), in which Professor Silvanus Thompson has pled for faith in the religious intuitions. The book is written for the "outcasts of orthodoxy," men and women who vainly seek a temple for the spirit in creeds and churches. The author would build such a temple on the convictions born in the soul, like the faculty of religious insight, devotion to the needs and service of man in this life, and so forth. "Have any of the Churches risen to the perception that *the foundation which is laid* must be an intuition, not a dogma?" Probably the Churches would regard this as a fall rather than a rise. But Professor Thompson eschews what he calls "the spent pietisms of the past." He endeavours to do justice to the wonderful appeal of Jesus, in evoking duty and unselfishness. The book is impressive in its aspirations, but the critical treatment of the New Testament is not strong. It is not reassuring to come across sentences like this: "The early Church preached a salvation through the life of Christ, not through his death."

In the land of Tiele, it is pleasant to find fresh interest still being devoted to comparative religion. Dr G. Van der Leuw has not only published an incisive little essay on early animism ("God, Macht en Ziel," *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, 1918, 123-153), but an admirable plea for the study of comparative religion, taken in its broadest form, within the theological curriculum (*Plaats en Jaak van de Godsdienstgeschiedenis in de Theologische Wetenschap*: Groningen, 1918); his lecture, delivered on September 25th, deserved this wider circulation. It reiterates what Dr L. H. Jordan has been advocating so persistently in this country. If Dr Van der Leuw will only set himself to show that comparative religion is not to be surrendered to the anthropologists, he will have deserved well of the republic of theological learning. In what may be called another sub-department, that of intensive or applied theology within the Christian religion itself. Mr E. T. Campagnac's *Elements of Religion and Religious Teaching* (Cambridge University Press) and Dr Sophie Bryant's *How to Read the Bible in the Twentieth Century* (Dent) stand out as notable contributions from two experienced educationalists. The Professor of Education in Liverpool University has weighty advice for teachers on the method and significance of religious instruction; and Dr Bryant brings not only experience but ripe knowledge to her task. Dr Henry Sloane Coffin's book, *In a Day of Social Rebuilding* (Yale University Press), contains the Lyman Beecher lectures on preaching; but, although primarily meant for theological students, they have a moral "drive" and ethical perception of

Christianity which will appeal to a wider class of readers; they are alive without being hectic, and their stress upon the world's need of the Church is not more marked than their insistence upon the Church's need of setting her household in order. The underlying conviction of these lectures is restated by Mr C. C. J. Webb in "Christianity as the Climax of Religious Development" (*Constructive Quarterly*, September). His paper urges the need, voiced by Dr Van der Leuw, of recognising a preparation for Christianity in other religions, not simply in pre-Christian Judaism but in paganism. At the same time, he shows effectively that, whatever Christianity drew or has drawn from other religions, it is neither a syncretistic product of early mystery-cults nor one of a number of competing religions, but in possession of a central position. The implications of this, in the teaching and practice of Christianity, are suggestively outlined.

JAMES MOFFATT.

REVIEWS.

The Metaphysical Theory of the State: A Criticism. By L. T. Hobhouse, D.Litt.—London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1918.—Pp. 153.

PROFESSOR HOBHOUSE'S brilliant essay is inspired by his belief that the war was "the visible and tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine," the foundations of which lie in the Hegelian theory of the State. It is a theme on which a good deal has already been written, and—since it is of the very first importance—on which a good deal more will certainly be said. But no attempt to maintain this thesis, so far as my acquaintance with the relevant literature extends, is at all comparable to this present essay. Professor Hobhouse, of course, begins with an overwhelming advantage over many Hegelian critics in that he knows what the Hegelian theory is, as expounded by Hegel himself and by his successors, particularly by Dr Bosanquet. And he reveals here, as elsewhere, a finely realist habit of mind and a power of philosophical analysis; so that his book is certainly the most notable piece of philosophical criticism in recent political literature.

There is, indeed, a sense in which his thesis hardly requires proof. It cannot well be disputed that, as a matter of historic fact, Hegel's doctrine is, or was, an important, even a formative, element in the intellectual apparatus of Prussia. Moreover, there are passages in Hegel which, taken by themselves, can very well stand, as they have been made by Prussian theorists to stand, as the completest possible justification of the "frightfulness" of the god-State. Yet all this does not prove that Hegel's theory can fairly be boiled down to the doctrine that the end of the State is power, and its duty merely the ruthless pursuit of its own aggrandisement. For, after all, Prussianism is neither limited in time to late nineteenth century, nor, unhappily, in space to the German Empire. Nor, on the other hand, even in those comparatively few cases where a philosophical doctrine has been a determinant of political practice, has the practice been based on a complete apprehension of the theory. Dr Bosanquet recently reminded us that great ideas are dangerous weapons in the hands of men who do not understand them: and there is more than a chance that Hegel's theory has suffered corruption at the hands of smaller men.

Professor Hobhouse, therefore, rightly has little concern with the mere history of the Hegelian idea. His contention is much more serious. In effect it seems to amount to this. The Prussian doctrine is manifestly

not only inhuman but self-contradictory. Moral relationships, the only relationships in which there can be any talk of duty or of moral value, hold only between individual personalities, or between groups which are in some way capable of acting as corporate personalities. Consequently, no such group may regard another (whether individual or group) as merely means to its own ends; any group which does so, at once expels itself from the world of moral relationships altogether. But this is precisely what the Prussian god-State does in claiming itself to be the ultimate repository of moral obligation. It rests, therefore, on an immanent contradiction. Professor Hobhouse holds that the Hegelian theory of the State is also infected with contradiction; that the contradiction in it is precisely the contradiction which will work itself down to the contradiction of Prussianism; and, accordingly, that Hegel's theory is not merely as a matter of historic fact, but in principle, the philosophical basis of Prussianism.

The contradiction of the Hegelian theory, Professor Hobhouse thinks, can be revealed by an examination of the three propositions which it implies. These are: "(1) the individual attains his true self and freedom in conformity to his real will; (2) this real will is the general will; and (3) this general will is embodied in the State." All three propositions Professor Hobhouse denies. The first rests on an extremely misleading use of the term "freedom," which compels the Hegelian arbitrarily to distinguish between the individual's "actual" and "real" wills. His "real" will is something which by a kind of logical analysis, or rather logical completion, is found to be implied in his actual will. Professor Hobhouse, on the other hand, holds that, in any intelligible sense of the term, the individual's real will is his actual will, the will which at any moment he knows himself to have, and in the possession of which, however narrow and defective may be the end on which it is set, he conceives himself to be free. The second proposition, again, rests on a further process of logical completion by which this hypothetical real will is shown to be identical with the real wills of others, and, therefore, of the general will of the community to which the individual belongs. But this position conceals two confusions. It confuses the numerical self-identity of the individual will with its qualitative resemblance to other wills; and it involves an ambiguity in the notion of a general will. The general will is conceived as the will of some sort of "common self"; but when one comes to look at it, all that can be said is "that in so far as it is will it is not general, and in so far as it is general it is not will." And, in the third place, it is clear from any survey of the facts of social life that the ends to secure which individuals associate themselves, and which are, therefore, the objects of anything that can be described as a general will, are not fully expressed in the State. "The rational order, which the general will is supposed to maintain, is not confined and may be opposed to the State organisation."

The root of all these contradictions is a special metaphysical prepossession. The Hegelian, holding that the actual world is a manifestation of an Absolute which is perfection, finds himself committed to holding that the actual world is itself, if properly understood, perfect, or at least "as it ought to be." It is the attempt properly to understand, or (as Professor Hobhouse would probably prefer to say) plausibly to construe, the actual world in terms of the ideal, that compels the idealist to initiate all the subtle but fallacious and contradictory transitions in his theory. And it

is the substantial issue of this doctrine—that the actual is as it ought to be, and especially that the State is a “working model” of the perfect Absolute—that is the theoretical basis of the Prussian worship of might.

This is, in very brief outline, what I take to be the essential argument of Professor Hobhouse’s book. With a great deal of it, and with certain elements in the political philosophy which evidently underlies his criticism, there can, I think, be little disagreement. Any suspicion of the conclusiveness of his argument will arise not from the details of his handling of the premises with which he deals, but from a doubt as to whether the omission or underestimation of certain facts or aspects of political organisation has not led to a corresponding abstractness in the statement not of Hegel’s but of the general idealist theory. I can indicate only very summarily the kind of considerations to which I refer.

It is clear that any State which imposes duties on its members, and therefore claims to be a moral institution, cannot without contradiction suppose itself, in its actions, to be “above” or released from moral obligations. And if the Hegelian or any other philosophical account of the State finds itself committed to maintaining such a contradiction, it is quite as certainly wrong in theory as it is bound to be mischievous in practice. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the State, or, if the singular must be abjured, all civilised States do in fact occupy a special position in the organised world of moral institutions. They are authoritative and, as things are, the final organs of the adjustment of moral relations; and it is clear that any possible supranational institution which may be charged with the duty of adjusting authoritatively the relations of States must itself possess the character of a State. In the last analysis, I think, this fact may be shown to point to the conclusion that political organisation is a necessity of social (*i.e.* human) life, not merely in the sense that a contrivance for effecting external adjustments is convenient, but because these adjustments are possible only on the basis of certain (more or less) agreed moral principles which themselves require embodiment in a permanent and authoritative institution. And just because the possibility of co-operation in the pursuit of any human ideals or values depends on a measure of ethical unanimity, the institution expressive of such unanimity is necessarily and in principle—not by convenience, or usurpation, or tradition, but by the very nature of social life—sovereign.

If this contention be sound, there is some reason for maintaining the reality of a general will; and for holding, not of course that the State is the complete embodiment of the ends which men pursue together, but that it is the embodiment of that fundamental common will. Moreover, since in fact there is for the individual no “effective freedom”—to quote the Labour Party’s phrase—without harmony of ideals in his own life and community of ethical aim with others, it is not necessarily mere logical dialectics to maintain that his will, at its best and most effective, must be congruent with and participant in this general will.

And if I may refer to one further point, it does not seem to me clear—perhaps Professor Hobhouse does not mean to suggest it—that an idealist metaphysic necessarily involves a theory of State absolutism. I doubt very much whether Hegel’s political theory, as Professor Hobhouse outlines it, is really consistent with Hegel’s metaphysical position, though no doubt his metaphysics is an appropriate background for it. But whether that is so or not, it seems perfectly possible to have a doctrine of State

absolutism on a non-idealist metaphysic; and to hold, as perhaps Dr McTaggart does, a non-absolutist theory along with an idealist or even an absolutist metaphysic.

These remarks will not, I hope, conceal my very great admiration for, and considerable agreement with, Professor Hobhouse's book. On many points (as, for instance, the negative definition of the functions of the State, and the treatment of international relations), he draws attention to weak points in Dr Bosanquet's great work. But I am still inclined to think that a genuine idealist theory of the State is a justification neither for State absolutism nor for autocracy, nor for an indifference to present evils; and to doubt whether philosophic idealism is not more than a fallacy which can be expressed by saying that "instead of seeking to realise the ideal, it idealises the real."

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Social Purpose: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Civic Society. By H. J. W. Hetherington, M.A., Professor of Logic and Philosophy in the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire, and J. H. Muirhead, LL.D., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Birmingham.—London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1918.

WE do not hesitate to say at the outset that this book by Professors Hetherington and Muirhead is one which it was important should be written. As is everywhere admitted, there is now a new public for serious work upon the larger social issues. A new public needs a new book, were it only to point the way to the old ones. And this one is more than an excellent pointer.

It is written by authors both of whom owe much in their constructive thinking to the classical idealistic tradition in political philosophy; but, on the other hand, they owe much of their immediate inspiration to current writing in the domain of moral and social theory. Arranged in two parts of some half-dozen short chapters each—the one dealing with the general outline of a philosophical theory of society, and the other with specific social institutions,—the work touches largely upon matters of heated current controversy, endeavouring to reveal the important issues by the light of the general principles which are adumbrated in the first part.

As to the distribution of the work, the first part, we are told, fell chiefly to Professor Muirhead, the second to Professor Hetherington. At the same time, a certain responsibility is assumed for the whole by both. The book, in fact, is what it professes to be, a joint undertaking. And this deserves to be noted. There is something distinctly piquant in the evidence it affords of a disposition on the part of men of a view to rank up and agree and try to present a united front to the world. And, we believe, most readers will allow that the thing has been accomplished. The weld between the two authors is remarkably well hidden. There is a certain tradition of style amongst the long line of English philosophers whose work this book carries on, a certain aspiration after classicism of expression, which both of the present authors appear to sustain so equally well that the reader passes out of the work of the one and into the work of the other without the suggestion of a jar. It seems almost a pity that so

much should have been given away in the preface; that the authors should not have abstained from giving the public any confidences whatever, and have simply gone to it saying roundly, "Our point of view!" Is it not the case that the meticulous anxiety of every new writer of a philosophical book to involve no one in responsibility for his views, to insist that he follows nobody, that this is just his own little shop, with his own special wares, can reach a point where it begins a little to pall? We are grateful for this refreshing change. And, seriously, we do not believe that in thus standing out for a tradition the authors have mistaken either the needs of the times or the tastes of their public. At a period like the present, when it almost seems as though not only are religious ideas going into the melting-pot, but social order and moral practice as well—at such a period, amongst the many cries which go up from the hearts of people who never were thinkers until now, a very distinct and urgent one is that which asks to be told how these things stood before, how they have been seen by the men in the past who have found it possible to take an optimistic and sanative and heartening view of them. Something of the character of the apologia would seem to attach to not a few of the serious works of strong appeal at the present time. This book is not an apologia. But it is a piece of social analysis which acknowledges certain traditional principles, and for that reason may very well find itself caught and borne forward in a pretty deep and strong stream.

To touch briefly on some features of the book: in the first or theoretical part the central problem is the relation of the individual to the society around him. In this matter the authors take their stand upon the idealistic view that if we are going to make the relation intelligible to ourselves, we must take as our standard or criterion not the interaction of material particles but the action of one *mind* upon another. When Durkheim, for example, allowing that "individual natures" are the components of society, presses the question whether the nature of the synthesis be mechanical or chemical, the answer our authors would urge is substantially that the relation is neither but is teleological (p. 74). Similarly, this first part of the work maintains other familiar things. It maintains the doctrine of a real general will; in other words, that that to which the individual has to adjust himself (the order of society) is a will, and is real. Not that there is an invisible power distinct from men overruling their actions from above; but that there is demonstrably more in the live social order than so many struggling centres of force whose individual limitation is nothing but their sheer individual loss. There is a reality which prevails by their loss; and that reality is theirs; for it is still will, as they are.

Now, there is no reasonable doubt that these are the grand dogmas, in the sense that they are the things social mankind has lived by its capacity for believing in. The difficulty is that they have been but "myths" to most men so far. The great matter is that men should continue to believe them after they are conscious of them. Only the fewest have been conscious of them hitherto; and they have been of the privileged; and they have lived surrounded by innumerable contemporaries and anteceded by an innumerable ancestry to whom the *myth* that "the" good was their good, was the reality. And the important thing is to rally men round the myth, but bid them see it with open eyes, and even then acknowledge its substantial verity. None but the very greatest, perhaps, are able actually to do this. But it is also an important matter effectively to smite people with a reasonable faith that the thing can be done. To

the latter result this book is a contribution. We can only in the briefest way, by touching on one or two of its discussions of specific institutions, indicate how.

For example, what *raison d'être* still remains for the institution called the family now that "little but the ruins" of its historic foundations are left? is a question raised. And the reason offered, if we may venture to translate it into its baldest formal terms, is simply that the family ought to be, since it has a function—that of turning the forces of natural affection into channels compatible with both the individual member's development and the common weal. A view is taken of modern conditions as they affect the family, in which it remains possible still to see not merely that the family ought to be, but how it can be. As regards, for example, the feared disintegration of the family through public authorities taking over parents' responsibilities, and through the attractions of outside life drawing away into careers those whose horizon was bounded by the home, it is pointed out how both may with care be made to work in another direction: the former becoming "a summons, through the school visitor, the health inspector, the school clinique, even the school meal, under proper regulations, to a higher conception of parental duty"; the latter a process of mobilising the apparently inevitable surplus of womanly powers for the innumerable womanly functions which the salvation of the State and of the families in it alike require. So much as a specimen of the line the book takes, though for an idea of the wisdom displayed in the process the reader must go to the book. Now, in its mode of attack, this sort of work is an entirely different thing from either sitting pessimistically, hands in lap, letting the world go, or advancing to the intricate and delicate problems of social guidance with a charge of theoretical dynamite. It is a much harder thing than either; and it is the thing attempted here with regard to all the similar social institutions of which cognisance is taken—neighbourhood, the industrial system, education, the State and religion.

It is impossible, with regard to each of these, to indicate all the features to which hope is attached; but in, *e.g.*, the treatment of neighbourhood—relatively a subordinate discussion and not the most interesting in the book—we find attention drawn to such things as regionalism, a conspicuous modern "neighbourhood" movement, with its attempt "to restore a vivid and satisfying life in regions" and "to make the spirit of a region operative throughout the whole of its educational enterprise." While the general criticism of the State which underlies this movement is not compatible with what our authors believe about the State, the influence of it in the way of detailed suggestion and criticism is regarded by them as a matter of real weight and promise.

On such themes as religion or the industrial system there is naturally more to say. Recognising the open sores of modern industry and the new movements meant to provide escape from them, and giving full weight to the more ominous side of these things, it is yet found possible to take a survey of the various incipient changes now afoot, a survey from the point of view of the moral values to be possibly compassed by these movements, which goes far to place before the reader a convincingly bright side of something which undeniably has its deep and lowering shades. Although the various movements may be rivals, it is a rivalry of goods which is really on the arena; that is to say, there are real human possibilities in the strongest of them.

And in these movements, it is to be noted, our authors include syndicalism. Including it, they do not hesitate to declare that : " On the main—that is, the ethical—issue, it is clear that these proposals assert a principle the neglect of which was the great failure of the nineteenth century, and is still the source of nearly all our avoidable social misery. That principle is simply that industrial prosperity is not to be measured solely in terms of material wealth ; or, in other words, that industry must be regulated by reference to supra-economic ends. Its profit and loss account must show human as well as material values ; and that industry is neither prosperous nor healthy which shows a great output of material goods at the cost of a great deterioration of the health, the character, and the human capacity of the worker " (p. 191). But, on the other hand, to make the interest of the producer of goods supreme is to go back to the pit again. And this appears to be what the authors regard as the mistake of pure or out-and-out syndicalism. " The ethical values which we hope to win from industry must be sought in relation to all the values of social life . . . any other interpretation is a misunderstanding of the just demand for the civilisation of industry " (p. 194). And here, as so often, we are brought out upon a moral issue which proves to be of the greatest practical moment. If industry is to be the central thing in social life, we shall find ourselves seeking the human values in a chase after the elusive ideal of small-scale production. If industry is only a subordinate part of our whole outlet for ourselves, we should continue to follow the ideal of large-scale industry and look forward to a point where heightened productive efficiency will allow the necessity for labour as such to " lie lighter " on the shoulders of the community. Along the latter course seems to the authors to lie the true way forward.

We have said enough to give an idea, perhaps, of the general drift of the book. In the discussion of education, we find the ancient maxim, " Seek ye first the kingdom of God," translated into an eminently sane and quietly inspiring chapter. A certain sanity and hope is also conspicuous in the treatment of the State and of religion, as indeed, throughout the book. For in these two features, sanity and hope, one has the ground-note and pervasive character of the whole. It is a book, of course, which must expect criticism, were it for nothing but for having dared to stand in the line of a great tradition in a world which worships novelty ; and still more for its treatment of those controverted questions in which it gives a lead. But also it should be said that the amount of positive philosophical theory, freshly and carefully expressed, which the work contains, is calculated to give it a certain permanence of value, apart from current questions, both as a text-book of political philosophy for philosophical students and as an exposition of idealism in politics for the general reader.

J. W. SCOTT.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

Outlines of Social Philosophy. By J. S. Mackenzie, Litt.D., LL.D., Emeritus Professor of Logic and Philosophy in University College, Cardiff.—London : George Allen & Unwin, 1918.—Pp. 280.

PROFESSOR MACKENZIE'S *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, published some twenty-five years ago, has had a wide and a well-deserved popularity. Written in a lucid and attractive style, and exhibiting extensive and

accurate learning, it furnished an admirable basis for the more detailed study of social problems, and large numbers of students owe its author a debt of gratitude. Unfortunately, it is now out of print, and Professor Mackenzie suggests that the present volume may serve as a substitute for it. If the opinion of one teacher has any chance of prevailing with him, I would express the hope that he may yet be induced to prepare a new edition of the earlier work for the press. There is abundant room for both. For, as he himself points out, the plan and scope of the two books are very different, that before us consisting chiefly of an interesting treatment of social institutions which had previously been more summarily handled in a concluding chapter.

Social philosophy, as it is here regarded, is concerned with the social unity of mankind, and its business is to interpret the significance of the special aspects of human life with reference to that unity. The volume naturally falls into three parts, dealing respectively with the foundations of social order, national order, and the world order. Professor Mackenzie acknowledges allegiance to the teaching of T. H. Green and Dr Bosanquet; but his allegiance is no slavish one, and he brings to bear on the topics discussed the ripe judgment of a mind that has thought much and long upon them. Moreover, subjects of a highly controversial kind are touched upon with a commendable freedom from partisanship, and the reader is impartially referred to the writings of experts belonging to diverse schools.

That society rests upon a natural basis is shown by a consideration of the three main aspects of human life, which are described as the vegetative, the animal, and the rational. A society, it is urged, is a living thing and no merely mechanical device, such as the doctrine of a social contract tends to suggest. Yet it is not simply a natural growth. It is a reflective structure. And this twofold character is to some extent brought out, so the author thinks, by the conception of a General Will. I notice, however, that Professor Mackenzie writes rather hesitatingly about the "general will," and it is a pity he had no opportunity of taking into account Professor Hobhouse's severe strictures on that notion that have just seen the light. I confess I am somewhat baffled by his own position as it is here presented. The "general will" differs apparently from a "co-operative will," inasmuch as it involves not merely the concurrence of a number of persons in a single decision, but also that the decision has reference to the good of the whole group and has not been reached by a balancing of individual wishes. But it appears to me like riding roughshod over the whole question to identify will with decision, when by "decision" is obviously meant that which is willed. In his former work, Professor Mackenzie commented upon the absurdity of setting up Will as an end, because "to will is to seek an end." Exactly; if, then, a single end is sought by a number of different wills, can these different wills be intelligibly said to constitute a "general will," even though the end they are seeking is for the good of the whole group? To me, at any rate, Professor Hobhouse's argument appears unanswerable. With Professor Mackenzie's contention that the unity of a human society is best characterised as a spiritual unity most readers will be in accord. Only, one cannot help wishing he had developed the implications of that notion more fully, for it is scarcely a sufficient demarcation of a spiritual unity to say it involves a clear consciousness that the things to be pursued are, in some degree, for the benefit of all.

The treatment of "National Order" begins with a sane and judicial defence of the institution of the family, which Professor Mackenzie regards as having the child for its natural basis. "Anyone," he says, "who will reflect on the valuable work that has been done in recent times by people who were the sons or daughters of clergymen may realise how much the world would have lost by their enforced celibacy." The chapter on "The State" contains much food for reflexion, although one would have liked to have seen more recognition of the reasons which have induced so many able writers of the present day to reject many of the claims made on its behalf. The primary function of the State is held to be that of maintaining a certain form of organisation within itself, while its secondary function is that of defending this organisation. The Hegelian view of the State as "the embodiment of all the best ideals of its individual members" is gently criticised. The higher human activities depend, it is argued, on individual initiative; and even the most ideal of states would be well advised to leave them to that. "It cannot make poets, prophets, or thinkers. It is well if it does not crucify them, or allow others to crucify them; and it is still better if it can give them some positive encouragement."

The consideration of international relations and of the place of religion and culture, as implying modes of unity that have reference to humanity as a whole, is reserved for the third part of the volume. Professor Mackenzie has some wise things to say about a League of Nations. He warns us that such a League might seek to restrict freedom instead of to promote it. At the same time a League of Nations for Peace and Freedom would at least be nominally committed to these objects; and, if its constitution were carefully framed, it would have the wisdom of the whole world behind it. The essence of religion consists, so it is maintained, in the impassioned effort to realise the true, the beautiful, and the good; and all genuine religions aim, more or less consciously, the author thinks, at the apprehension of that which has intrinsic and absolute value. He enumerates the main defects, such as dogmatism, sectarianism, fanaticism, and conventionality, to which religions are subject, and urges that all religions, if they are to retain a truly religious spirit, must be essentially progressive.

A restrained but yet hopeful prediction that, in spite of the rocks ahead, it will, in the not very remote future, be possible to build up a purer and more stable order of society is the note on which the book ends. We lay it down with the feeling that Professor Mackenzie has produced a volume which will prove to be a valuable help to people of very varying equipment, the more thoughtful of whom will certainly be induced to pursue their studies further. And he modestly tells us that, should that be the case, his main purpose in writing it will have been served.

G. DAWES HICKS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

Democracy after the War.—By J. A. Hobson.—London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1917.

DEMOCRACY has recently been given much lip service by those in Western Europe who have not been conspicuous hitherto for any desire to give equal opportunities to all. Democracy has also been the basis of the

experiments in government which have been tried in Russia during the past year; and in the United States it is an accepted axiom that democracy is the best social system. But in spite of this chorus of approval and support, there is little enough agreement as to what democracy means; and much too little effort is directed to the discovery of the value democracy may have. Mr Hobson does not attempt an analysis of the ideal which is called democracy; but he gives substance to it by setting out clearly the chief obstacles which democracy has to encounter. First, there is militarism or the will-to-power—an evil not peculiar to one people or to one age. It gains strength in modern times by alliance with capitalism, and that economic cancer which Mr Hobson has named “impropriety.” That is the centre of the forces allied against democracy. The propertied classes, when there is danger of their property being used for the general good, easily enter into alliance with blind and illegal force. Protectionism and Imperialism are in the same alliance; and with them go the social and political reaction which has had such sinister developments during the war. The analysis of these obstacles to democracy is admirable; and it is worthy of note that in the United States also the same forces are in alliance against progress, as Professor Coar shows in his new book on *Democracy and the War*.

The second part of Mr Hobson's book deals with the defence of democracy. He ought perhaps to have spoken rather of the attack by democracy upon the entrenched forces of private cupidity and stolid conservatism. For, irrespective of the labels of political parties, it is evident that a desperate struggle will occur now the war is ended. Mr Hobson believes that only that force of brain and hand which we call “Labour” will be strong enough to break the vicious circle of economic and political oligarchy. And the method he suggests is the capture of the administrative machine and its use for organised common action between all States. Progressives cannot afford to regard the State with hostility, and they are inevitably internationalists. The weakness, however, of the progressive group is that it tends to separate into small sections, each devoted to one particular application of democratic principles. It is therefore fundamental, as Mr Hobson argues, that all progressive parties or sections should consciously accept and emphasise the common principles of democracy.

The value of Mr Hobson's argument is in its clear indication of the conflict in which we may have a part to play. Reconstruction after the war will be full of danger. We shall not easily succeed in advancing towards a social and economic system in which all men have equal opportunities. Progress is not inevitable; and without deliberate thought to direct our enthusiasm we shall only prepare a future chaos. Mr Hobson has done well for the cause he has at heart, in his courageous and timely book. We may criticise details, but the argument rings true, and we may count it a gain that the enemies of democracy have been so well arraigned. It is obvious that the book implies an acceptance by its readers of the democratic ideal. Mr Hobson speaks chiefly to those who are not afraid to act as democrats; and his assumptions will perhaps offend those who, like Emile Faguet in France, believe democracy to mean mob-rule. It is possible to believe that democracy is not a great ideal, but only another evil opposed to competent administration and exceptional ability; and the opponents of democracy, the supporters of bellicose imperialism, do seriously and conscientiously believe that government should be based upon the

dissimilarity among men. These fundamental issues are not dealt with by Mr Hobson, but he gives those who believe in the democratic ideal further evidence of the need for democratic principles as the only safe basis for social reform and political progress.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

LONDON.

Human Nature and its Remaking. By William Ernest Hocking, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University. Nathaniel William Taylor Lectures delivered at the Yale School of Religion.—New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918.—Pp. xxxvi+434.

"WHAT I have here aimed to do," says Dr Hocking, "is the work rather of the quarryman with his blasting powder than of the sculptor with his chisel." But he is an extraordinarily gentle quarryman, and the blasting is most skilfully arranged to leave no rugged edges or uncouth forms. As you read the book you cannot help picturing a thoroughly comfortable and well-appointed study and a smoothly flowing pen. Considering how frequently sin and struggle, rebellion, and all the rough instincts of human life appear in these pages, singularly little strain and effort are revealed. The book is, in fact, hardly the work of the man who, by the very force of his convictions, *must* burst into speech. Rather is it a graceful and literary discussion of many of the generally recognised problems of life; and save, perhaps, towards the conclusion of the volume, you get the impression that the lecturer's thought of his audience is never very far away.

"Man," it is urged at the beginning, "is the only animal that deliberately undertakes . . . to reshape himself." The contemplation of this fact immediately raises three urgent questions: "What is original human nature? What do we wish to make of it? How far is it possible to make of it what we wish?" To these three questions Dr Hocking addresses his thoughts.

After a certain amount of preliminary discussion he enters upon a somewhat detailed consideration of "the natural man." This at once plunges him into a study of instincts, but the survey is too rapid to be of much service. A more or less new terminology here speaks of "central instincts or necessary interests," those in which both stimulus and response are primarily central in character, depending, as it might be said, rather on the nature of the nervous system than on its specific lines of development. Professor Hocking thinks that all of the most significant of the human tendencies take rise in central reactions of this nature. Clearly their enumeration would occupy a large amount of time, but we are said to possess this sort of instinctive tendency towards appreciation of rhythm, harmony, differentiation, completeness, simplicity, a "will to live," and many other like matters. Such a view hardly tends to introduce greater clearness into the use of an already sufficiently ambiguous term. Proceeding, Professor Hocking discusses the will, and mind and body, but his analysis is not really psychological. Feeling, he asserts, "is a mass of idea at work within us," and will, "in the last analysis *is thought assuming control of reality.*" All of this may seem helpful to a man who has already constructed his frame for the universe.

Part III. consists of a study of conscience, which, while it is intimately related to the instinctive life, is itself considered to be primarily cognitive:

an "awareness of the success or failure of that life in maintaining its status and growth." Conscience chiefly reveals itself in its dealings with sin, and the latter is somewhat intellectually defined as "the deliberate failure to interpret an impulse so that it will confirm or increase the integration of selfhood." An extended discussion of sin completes the survey of man's original nature.

In Part IV. Professor Hocking turns to an account of the manner in which human life is reshaped, considering in particular the parts here played by experience. Then comes a study of the effects of social influences. Very many interesting things are said in this section, which concerns such matters as laws, institutions, education, and punishment. For the most part it is urged that society exercises a dominantly constructive and positive influence upon the individual, although punishment is held to have rather a negative value.

It is in Parts VI. and VII., the concluding sections of the book, that Professor Hocking does by far his best work. Society makes claims which merely human power cannot satisfy. Hence man must depend upon an "agency or agencies beyond [his] own borders." The powers required are, it is claimed, provided in art and religion. But far too often both art and religion seek to transform life by simply denying its original basis. No final solution lies this way. The basic instincts must be transformed, and not simply ignored or overlaid. A triumphant religion must be a force within the very life whose nature it reshapes. To be such a force is, Professor Hocking believes, the central character of Christianity, and he argues his belief in several sincere and interesting chapters. Thus he tries to show what Christianity does with pugnacity, sex love, and ambition, and to make clear the way in which the human individual may come to know those agencies beyond the borders of society by means of which at length each man and all men may be finally transformed.

In these concluding sections Professor Hocking is clearly writing out of his own most deeply seated interests, and he attains often an eloquence and clarity of expression which cannot fail to be arresting. Yet most readers may well close the book still restless and unconvinced. From the literary point of view it is admirable; from the philosophic point of view it is of considerable interest; from the psychological point of view it fails to satisfy; from the point of view of ordinary human life it is intellectual, academic, and incomplete.

F. C. BARTLETT.

ST JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

Evolution in Christian Ethics. By Percy Gardner, Litt.D., F.B.A.—
London: Williams & Norgate, 1918.—Pp. xiv + 274.

PROFESSOR GARDNER completed his book before the sudden rush of events which in November transformed the political world. It will be necessary, therefore, that we should postpone to the end of this review some considerations which offer themselves in the light of what has recently happened.

Professor Gardner has treated the development of Christian ethics not as a whole by reference to the general history of human experience, but rather in relation to some of those phases of human life with which Christian ethics is at present immediately concerned. Anyone who opens

this book expecting to find a genetic treatment of the subject will perhaps receive a slight shock of surprise, even of disappointment. But ethics, in its practical application to human life, always occupies itself with special problems. And the feeling of surprise at once passes away, if we are content to let the author pursue his own path. For Professor Gardner prefers to deal with special problems. "I propose," he says, "to consider in successive chapters whether the root-principles of Christianity—love to God and man, the superiority of the spirit to the flesh, a desire to do the will of God in the world—can be applied outside the field of the inner circle of Christians and the life of the cloister, whether they have sufficient power of expansion to leaven the morality of life in the material world, the relation of the sexes and the family, the relation of individuals to the State and of the States to one another" (p. 18). And again, "There is yet in the underlying principles of the Christian religion a power of growth and self-adaptation which makes them fit to cope even with the newest developments of personal and of international morality" (p. 19). Those who are familiar with previous works of the same writer will welcome again the delicate casuistry, the conscience-lit insight and judgment, with which Dr Gardner pronounces upon the successive phases of the Christian life as they are exhibited either in themselves or in conflict with their rivals. The comparison of Christian with Pagan ethics, with scientific ethics, with the ethics of positivism, which occupies the earlier chapters, is followed by an attempt to vindicate for the Christian laws of charity and forgiveness a continued authority. The series of studies ends with the concrete application of the principles previously disclosed: the relation of Christianity to the body, the family, to women, and to nations. Professor Gardner throughout justifies the title of his book by the historical presentation of the facts under each of these headings.

But the apocalypse which has been enacted before our eyes throws the whole problem of Christian ethics into a new perspective. And for myself I find more help in the attempt to trace the portrait of Jesus from the Synoptic Gospels than in the Pauline colouring which Professor Gardner emphasises. The revolutionary movements, which are scarcely less prominent in the history of the moment than the conflict of nations which has just ended, send us back to those sayings of Jesus which deal with the distribution and use of wealth. Considering the prominence which this topic occupies in the Gospel, we may well be surprised, in the light of recent events, at the little interest which commentators have displayed. And I regret the slightness of the references, beyond which even Professor Gardner fails to go. In the Lucan and earlier form of the Sermon on the Mount the economic application of the Gospel is placed in the foreground. It is economic and not spiritual poverty, bodily and not spiritual hunger, that is first to be satisfied and redressed. For spiritual hunger and poverty are deeper seated and harder to remedy. Yet even this latter hunger and poverty are often healed, as by a miracle, when the attempt is made to communicate not in the heavenly bread and wine, but rather in the earthly elements, which thereupon are transubstantiated into the epiphany of the apocalyptic King: "Inasmuch as you have done this to one of the least of these my brothers, you have done it unto me."

The violent contrast between the spiritual and natural which lay at the foundation of Paul's teaching was corrected in his case by those

rabbinical and indeed national traditions which, throughout the history of the Jewish schools, have emphasised the claims of the poor to an adequate share in the riches of this world. The Pauline doctrine of the spirit is balanced by the material tendencies of Judaism, and this doctrine suffers therefore when it is separated from its application to the things of this world. The Epistle of James was a needed corrective to the one-sided emphasis upon the spirit, which passed in some quarters in the primitive Church, as it passes now, for the whole of the Christian system.

When, in the spirit of the epistle, we examine the current ideas of charity and alms-giving, we shall be much helped by the careful discussion of "The Christian Law of Charity," which occupies Professor Gardner's sixth chapter. But, admirable as this discussion is, it does not probe deep enough.

A remark of Bernard Shaw's in his preface to *Androcles*, "decidedly whether you think Jesus was God or not, you must admit that he was a first-rate political economist," may well be borne in mind by commentators upon the Gospels. And this remark will be better appreciated if we set the career of Jesus against its historical background. The succession of attempts to form a great Jewish world-state, which began with the Maccabees and culminated in the rebellions under Trajan and Hadrian, must be viewed not from the external Roman standpoint but from the inside, if they are to be understood. The episode of Jesus thus presents itself as the most statesmanlike attempt to form a world-empire in accordance with Jewish ideals. Although Jesus himself failed in this attempt, the community which he founded has come very near success. And we may follow the materialist interpretations of the Jewish economist Marx thus far at least: we may affirm that the economic attitude, in this case of Christianity, has counted for much in determining the work which has actually been achieved.

Jesus ignored the static class distinctions which are based upon wealth and descent, and substituted for them a dynamic one based upon efficiency. And the key to efficiency he finds in willingness to serve for service's sake. The parable of the talents must be taken along with the sayings in which service is exalted. I wish that Professor Gardner, in view of the threatened war of the classes, had examined more fully this aspect of contemporary modern life in the light of Christian principles. For every thinking man and woman to-day is putting the interior question: "How do I stand towards this conflict and the reconstitution of society upon an altered economic basis?" The replies to these questions will not be found without difficulty. In especial most socialist solutions are short-cuts which can be only drawn by neglecting precisely those side-issues that, after all, will determine the ultimate solution. If Jewish revolutionaries have helped in forcing these questions upon us, it may be that, by a kind of historical justice, reflection along Christian—which are largely Jewish—lines will be our last and sufficing resort. At any rate there is material for a supplement to the second edition of Professor Gardner's book.

FRANK GRANGER.

NOTTINGHAM.

The Problem of Creation: An Attempt to define the Character and Trend of the Cosmic Process. By the Right Rev. J. E. Mercer, D.D.—Pp. viii + 325.—Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917.

DR MERCER starts from the principle *ex nihilo nihil*, and examines in turn the chief conceptions which have become current in man's attempt to explain the course and tendency of things. He has skilfully marshalled these conceptions in an ascending order, and at each stage has taken note of the main considerations which occur to the thinker who would apply the appropriate explanation to the several problems as they disclose themselves. The exposition is clearly arranged, and takes account, in a summary yet adequate manner, of the leading discussions. It could not have been written without the help of a balanced survey of the authorities, and shows a dialectical readiness to recognise the positive contributions which are made by thinkers with whom the author is not in agreement.

What are we to say when, with such an introduction, we are offered the conclusion of the whole matter: "I hold that there is a real world external to the minds of individuals, but this world must be construed ultimately in terms of mind." The 'reals' I hold to be individual centres of the will-to-live, dependent on a self-existent and supreme Individual God" (214); or again: "The mechanism of the universe must be regarded as a means to achieving the purposes of love" (259)? Dr Mercer really uses the discursive reason wandering up and down the world as a prelude to another and more effective agency, the intuition in which he finds communion with the Being and beings highest in his scale. When the "contemplative" attitude is thus brought up against that of "enjoyment," it can only be to remove the obstacles to the latter. And, after all, that is precisely why the "enjoyment" of truth is a strong motive to the thoroughgoing treatment of problems. In the fairy tale, only the princess is conscious of the pea hidden beneath the heap of feather beds. And Dr Mercer strikes me as unusually urbane and fair to his opponents, just because he is grateful to them for indicating what in the way of disturbance is really set before the traveller who wants a comfortable resting-place. For my own part, I have often wondered why so little justice has been done to Newman's *Essay on Development*, in which he, from another quarter, anticipated Darwin by some years. Newman interprets the earlier stages in a history by what comes later, and furnishes a real contribution to the logic of history quite apart from his special thesis. For my own part, the occasional convergence of circumstances upon an event or a person furnishes that rare but adequate consolation which in these anxious days may even sustain.

FRANK GRANGER.

NOTTINGHAM.

Faith and Freedom. By Rev. Charles H. S. Matthews and Others.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1918.

VIVACIOUS, earnest, frank, courageous, the style and spirit of this book are admirably fitted to its name and theme. It is called a collection of essays. It might be called with almost equal truth a series of addresses; for there is little here of the patient thoroughness, the formal accuracy, and the lingering judgment so often associated with the academical type of essay.

The writers are not primarily theologians, still less philosophers. They are men of action, believing that organised Christianity is hard beset, and anxious to do their bit for the Church they love before it is too late. This sense of urgency constitutes both the strength and weakness of the book. It enlists our sympathy, though it may fail to gain our assent. Of the eight longer essays, four are more directly theological: two by Mr W. Scott Palmer on "Creation and Providence," and on "Atonement"; one by Rev. C. H. Matthews on "The Incarnation," nearly three times the length of the paper on "Atonement" (almost a sufficient indication of the school to which the writers belong); and one by Rev. C. E. Raven on "The Holy Spirit," in which the wisdom of M. Bergson and Mr H. G. Wells is freely used to elucidate the mysteries of the Christian faith. The other four essays are concerned with the institutions and morals of the Church. Of these Rev. Harold Anson contributes two, writing very effectively on "The Basis of Continuity" and "Practical Steps Towards Reunion"; the Rev. Alfred Fawkes republishing an able article on "The Development of Christian Institutions and Beliefs"; and Mr A. Clutton-Brock adding a highly provocative essay on "The Church and Morality." Among the underlying assumptions of the book, becoming explicit and dominant in some of the essays, are the following: The Church of England, as represented by its bishops, has failed even in those duties most commonly recognised as belonging to her province. The "paralysis" was specially noticeable in the inability of this and other Churches to prevent or stop the war. The remedy is for the Churches to unite, and adopt a modernist theology.

In estimating the success or failure of an institution much depends on a clear conception of its design. No human organisation can be expected to do everything; and many things demanded by modern critics of the Churches may be quite outside the original charter, or peculiar genius, or Divine intention of a Church. It is to be regretted, therefore, that this volume contains no well-considered statement of the mission and functions of a Church. There are, however, several duties indicated in the essays, and very commonly assigned to the bishops as the representatives or overseers of the Church, in which the Church has manifestly failed. (a) From the time of Irenæus onwards the bishops have very generally been looked upon as the guardians of orthodoxy. Considering the enormous numbers of heretical bishops there have been, it is extremely difficult for a student of Church history to believe that there is anything specially inimical to heresy in the occupancy of a bishop's throne. And the matter is further complicated by the fact that the standards of orthodoxy have themselves been varied from time to time by majority votes secured by the available bishops and by a variety of means. So that one wonders sometimes what the faith of the Church would have been without the bishops, and is not altogether unprepared for the disquieting assertion that the laity have quite as often kept the bishops from heresy as the bishops have preserved the laity (p. 310). (b) The bishops too have often been regarded, whether justifiably or not, as leaders of Christian thought in times of special doubt and difficulty; and many bishops have nobly demonstrated their care for the flock in this particular way. But at present in the Church of England it would seem that there is only one bishop to whom it would be appropriate to apply the words which Paley once used of a bishop of Carlisle: "Your Lordship's researches have never lost sight of one purpose, namely, to

recover the simplicity of the Gospel from beneath that load of unauthorised additions which the ignorance of some ages and the learning of others . . . have heaped upon it" (p. 44). And another of the essayists says: "The official Church has entirely failed to meet the situation" (p. 14). (c) Again, from very early times the bishops have taken under their special charge the administration of the Lord's Supper, with the result that now, after all these centuries of experience and exclusive control, "the Church cannot decide upon the qualification necessary in the celebrant" (p. 303). (d) Further, the morality of the Church, and sometimes of the world, has been thought to fall within the jurisdiction of the bishops. The bishops have made laws and have enforced them by various means. Mr Clutton-Brock thinks they have been far from happy in the particular laws they have chosen to promulgate; but, what is much more serious, they never had any right to legislate at all: "the Church that utters or enforces commands has ceased to be a Church" (p. 273).

And the failure of the Church of England is also conspicuously shown by the fact that along with the other Churches she was powerless to stop the war. Had they not been "paralysed" they might have prevented it (p. 303). Yet where is the authority or ground for this momentous assertion? And what does it mean? We are accustomed to gratuitous talk such as this outside the volume. "If only the Churches had been truer to the spirit and teaching of their Lord; if only the Churches had been more united; if only the Churches had been . . . the war need not have taken place." But is not this going further than any man, certainly than any Christian, has a right to go? All Christian men, I suppose, would say that Jesus Christ, when on earth, did all He could by word and deed to avert the awful catastrophe which threatened the nation to which He belonged. Did He succeed? According to the evangelist Luke, Jesus prayed upon the cross: "Father, forgive them; they know not what they do." Was that most solemn, most perfect, prayer answered by the removal of the threatening clouds of impending doom? It is the faith of Christians that He who was crucified in weakness was exalted to the right hand of power, and that all authority was given to Him in heaven and upon earth. Was that authority used to stay the armies of Titus, when in less than forty years afterwards they swooped down like vultures upon their prey? There is much that is unconvincing in what is said in this volume regarding the limitations of the Divine omnipotence. There is, however, one thing God cannot do. He cannot lie. The apocalypticist saw that "the Lamb who was in the midst of the throne" was none other than He who had spoken the word: "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." The throne of God is established in righteousness, and the soul that sinneth—whether the soul of a nation, or Church, or individual—shall die. Penitence is ever befitting both Churches and nations, but unreal self-accusations may turn out to be aspersions cast upon the moral governor of the universe. The activities of a Church are conditioned not simply by the purity and faith of its members, but by the eternal moral order of which it forms a part.

One remark on the remedies proposed. Would the corporate reunion of Christendom do what the essayists desire? What, *e.g.*, would be gained by the appropriation of Nonconformity by Episcopacy? If, as the essayists allow, there has been a marked tendency in the occupants of Episcopal seats to become heretical, would the mere increase in the number of bishops by the inclusion of ex-Nonconformists be likely to diminish heresy? If

so, why? Again, if the bishops are now indisposed to give a lead to the Church in the direction of the theology indicated here, what ground is there for supposing that the bishops would move, when they had also to consider the sympathies of ex-Nonconformists? At present it would appear as if the leaders of Nonconformist thought were as little inclined in the desired direction as the bishops themselves. Again, if after eighteen hundred years the bishops have not learnt the qualifications of the celebrant of the Lord's Supper, would they be likely unanimously to accept the views of the ex-Nonconformists or any other? If the bishops' legislation has been an unchristian function from the start, how are we going to improve matters by extending its sway, in persuading the Free Churches to exchange their freer life and submit to a yoke which neither they nor their fathers have been willing to bear? And in regard to international morality and world-righteousness, has the experience of the present war shown that the most "catholic" Church has been able to give any light at all on the moral questions involved? The hope of the Church and of the world is not in attempts to rehabilitate the Catholic ideal of the past, but in reaching forward towards that nobler catholicity defined in the prayer of Jesus that His followers might be one not as legal corporations or earthly states or even human families are one, but "even as we are one."

H. H. SCULLARD.

LONDON.

The Problem of the Fourth Gospel. By H. Latimer Jackson, D.D.—
Cambridge: University Press, 1918.—Pp. xxiv + 170.

SOME twelve years ago Dr Latimer Jackson wrote *The Fourth Gospel and recent German Criticism*, and since then his studies have largely been occupied with the investigation of the Synoptic problem and the question of the eschatology of Jesus; he was not forgetful, however, of his former study, and, on being invited lately to prepare a second edition of his previous book, he took it up again with a mind well equipped for the task. On going through his former work, he tells us, he found that the question had advanced so much during the interval that a second edition was impossible; a new book was needed, and the present volume is the result. Leaving on one side for the moment all questions of date, authorship, and authenticity, there is one salient fact which stares every student at once in the face, and which itself constitutes the "problem," namely, the difference of presentation between the Synoptics and "John," not merely as regards the scene of the ministry of Jesus, but more particularly as regards the tone of the discourses and the portrait of the Lord Himself. This distinction is well stated by the author where he says: "When every allowance has been made for powers of adaptation and varied environment, it is impossible to believe that the historic Jesus was really accustomed to discourse after the manner of the Johannine Christ. The former lives and moves in the Synoptic Gospels; as for the latter, the human lineaments notwithstanding, he is pre-eminently the Christ of experience, the life of the Church." Clement of Alexandria, holding the tradition of the authorship of John the Apostle, the son of Zebedee, stated the effect of this difference of presentation upon the reader's mind once for all when he said, after referring to the three

previous Gospels: "John, last of all perceiving that what had reference to corporeal things in the Gospel of our Saviour was sufficiently related, encouraged by his friends and inspired by the Spirit, wrote a spiritual Gospel." This it is that constitutes "der haupt-problem aller Bibel-kritik," and makes the questions of date, authorship, and authenticity of vital importance.

One cannot but have every sympathy with the Japanese gentleman of whom Dr Dale tells that "the vision of glory which came to him while reading John's account of our Lord's life and teaching was a vision from another and diviner world; he fell at the feet of Christ, exclaiming, 'My Lord and my God.' . . . He saw the Divine grace of Christ; what could he do but worship Him?" One has felt oneself the "tender and unearthly beauty" which pervades the often well-worn pages of the Johannine Gospel; but this does not cancel the necessity of investigating the problem of its origin and contents.

The author comes before us well equipped in every respect for his task. He fulfils the requisite conditions laid down by Professor Gardner in his recent book, *The Ephesian Gospel*, on the same subject: "No one has the right to publish a book about the (Fourth) Gospel who has not in a measure surveyed the mass of literature" called forth by the intricate and delicate subject. His book is almost a cento of citations and references, but this is an added grace and by no means a blemish. He marshals his authorities in a masterly way, and forms his own conclusions on a survey of the whole field. The authorities are, no doubt, to a large extent German, but this was inevitable; and one who, like the present reviewer, owes too large a debt to German scholarship to be ignored cannot blame him even in the sad circumstances of these times. Well does the author say: "Refusing to discard the aid of German scholarship, I am painfully alive to the dark reasons which emphatically forbid me to allude as heretofore to Germany as a second home. Yet even so, I look ahead, and indulge a hope that old friends may hereafter find themselves 'standing together in a brighter dawn.'"

Questions of space forbid us to do more than commend the book to the attention of the earnest student of its all-important problem, and leave it to speak for itself; we may, however, note the conclusions, tentative though they be, to which the author leads up, with a wealth of argument and elaboration of detail which are admirably condensed.

This may be seen by an enumeration of the chapters, which will show the line taken. Commencing with "the Gospel according to St John," he surveys the approximate date and authorship in tradition: he then examines the internal evidence, direct and indirect; from this he passes to a comparison of the Johannine and the Synoptic representation as regards Chronology, the Scene of the Ministry, John the Baptist, Miracle, the Discourses, and the Johannine and Synoptic portraits of Jesus; this brings him to discuss in three chapters the self-dating, the literary structure, and the making of the Fourth Gospel; a final chapter is devoted to the question of its value *then*—when first published—and *now*.

The conclusions are, with a caveat as to possible error, that the Gospel was written at Ephesus with a special view to Greek readers by a Palestinian Jew between the years A.D. 90-125; the internal evidence, as well as tradition, shows that the author claimed to be the mysterious personage designated "the beloved disciple"; it comes to us either directly from

him or with his authority. But it is impossible to decide definitely who this "beloved disciple" was; he has been discovered in such different quarters as the Apostle John—this is the traditional view, but in the light of all the evidence it seems untenable; the young Ruler, of whom we are told that Jesus "looking upon him loved him"; Lazarus of Bethany, Nathaniel, Aristion (mentioned by Papias), the John of Acts iv. 5, and even Judas Iscariot. This is a large choice, supported, even in the last instance, by more or less plausible arguments. The outstanding fact remains that the identity of this "beloved disciple," whose authority underlies the Gospel, is undiscoverable.

But the Gospel exists and must be taken account of in any consideration of Christianity. The Christ of whom it tells, though not the Jesus of history, is the Christ of the experience of the Christian soul; while the thought of the *Parousia*, on which the Synoptics and St Paul in his earlier epistles dwell, is transformed into the thought of the abiding presence of Christ in the believer's heart. In his account of the Logos the writer undoubtedly had in view the purpose of dissipating some false ideas of the budding Gnosticism of his day, and in his message there are lessons which are equally fruitful for ourselves. "Well," says Dr Jackson, "may it be called the Ephesian Gospel." First, the spiritual exaltation which characterises it is precisely what our times need—a vision of a social organism in which right thought is displayed in right action; secondly, this Gospel reminds us that, though form and ceremony are not lightly to be discarded, yet worship "in spirit and in truth" is alone precious in the sight of God; thirdly, it is a continual reminder to a rent and tattered Christendom of the Master's longing for union and unity—though there may be many "folds," yet the "flock" and the "shepherd" are but one; and lastly, in this confessedly transition period this Gospel helps us to distinguish between the obsolete and the permanent. Creeds, quotes our author, "are in the melting pot," and he suggests the possibility of "a modern Christian Creed." This, we think, is, for the present at least, Utopian; rather do we agree with Canon Glazebrook, in *The Faith of a Modern Churchman*, that, seeing that under present conditions it is hopeless to talk of an Ecumenical Council, which alone would be competent to draw up a Creed, we must be content to accept the so-called Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, and adapt their formulas in our own minds to the state of knowledge at which we have arrived. Of the former, indeed, it has been said that "of all the twelve articles of the Apostles' Creed, the only one not contradicted by our Gospel is the 'suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried,' and that even so the 'Pontius' must be eliminated!"

This is a book that must be reckoned with by all who still hold to the traditional authorship—among whom, as Professor Hicks has lately reminded us, must be counted the late Dr Drummond; and though the conclusions arrived at, after truly judicious scrutiny, are perhaps dubious, if not negative, yet the Gospel is shown to be of the very utmost value and importance, and without it Christianity would have been distinctly poorer, if not altogether different from what it is.

H. J. D. ASTLEY.

EAST RUDHAM, NORFOLK.

Virgil and Isaiah: A Study of the "Pollio," with Translations, Notes, and Appendices. By Thomas Fletcher Royds, B.D.—Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1918.—Pp. xiii + 122.

To Virgil has fallen the rare distinction of being recognised as one of the greatest of poets of all times, not only in literary circles but also in popular renown: this arises from three very different circumstances, viz. (1) his works became the fountain-head of all grammatical teaching throughout the Middle Ages; (2) he was supposed to have been a prophet of Christ; (3) he became in popular imagination and folk-tales a powerful magician. How this latter reputation arose and was developed forms one of the most curious instances of human credulity, but to discuss it lies outside the scope of our present purpose.

Readers of Domenico Comparetti's *Virgil in the Middle Ages*—the spelling of the poet's name is the author's—know well the story of his literary fame and of his legendary repute; the most graphic stories are based on Naples, where, on his own authority, the poet is said to have resided, but the legends of Virgil as a magician went far afield, and we are indebted to Mr Charles Godfrey Leland for a collection of some fifty of these legendary stories from the lips of peasants and others in Northern Italy. All these bear the same stamp: Virgil is a kindly and beneficent magician for the most part, but it is never forgotten that he was before all else a poet. Dante, whose love for Virgil was intense and who tells us that he knew the *Æneid* by heart from end to end, makes him his guide in his pilgrimage, led thereto, no doubt, by the example of the adventures of Æneas in the Underworld as described in the sixth book of the *Æneid*.

Virgil's reputation as a prophet of Christ among Christian theologians from Constantine onwards rests upon the Fourth Eclogue, that known as the "Pollio," particularly those well-known lines at the commencement of the poem in which he refers to the return of Saturn's reign, and those others further on where he describes the amenities of the Golden Age in words that might be adapted, if not borrowed, from Isaiah:

"Ultima Cumæi venit jam carminis ætas;
Magnus ab integro sæclorum nascitur ordo.
Jam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna,
Jam nova progenies cælo demittitur alto.
Tu modo nascenti puero, quo ferrea primum
Resinet ac toto surget gens aurea mundo,
Casta fave Lucina: tuus jam regnat Apollo.

Ipsæ lacte domum referent distenta capellæ
Ūbera, nec magnos metuent armenta leones;
Ipsa tibi blandos fundent cunabula flores.
Occidet et serpens, et fallax herba veneni
Occidet; Assyrium vulgo nascetur amomum.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth lines, which I have not quoted, St Augustine saw a distinct prediction of the remission of sins; according to Constantine, "Virgo" becomes the Blessed Virgin Mary, the lions are the persecutors of the Church, and the serpent is our enemy of Gen. iii. 7. St Jerome, however, was sceptical; he throws ridicule on those who maintained that Virgil was a Christian without Christ, and treats the

whole subject as childish and worthy to rank with the centos and similar puerilities. Pope Innocent III. quoted the seventh line, "Iam nova progenies," in a Christmas sermon. Virgil as a prophet of Christ is common in Christian art—for instance, in the stalls of the Cathedral of Zamora in Spain, belonging to the twelfth century, where he appears among Old Testament saints; and Martyn, who wrote less than two centuries ago, says: "The child was without doubt our blessed Saviour."

Leaving on one side for a moment the Christian interpretation, we may note that scholars have been much exercised as to whether the child whose birth was thus heralded by the poet was that of Augustus and Scribonia, who turned out to be a girl—the infamous Julia,—or whether it was the son of Pollio himself to whom the poem was addressed. Sir W. M. Ramsay has made a third suggestion: that the child was no human child at all, but the "new Roman people," which is valuable as bringing Virgil into line with Isaiah xl.-lxvi.

But, as Professor Ridgeway has pointed out in his "Dramatic Dances," "people think first in the concrete before they think in the abstract," and, without "peeping and botanising" on a poet's words, we may be sure that a real human child was in the poet's mind, a child who was at the same time divine, for the distinction between human and divine was very thinly drawn in antiquity, and the Emperor was already held to be a god; and so the author's conclusion is that this child was as a matter of fact looked for in the divine line of the Cæsars.

Virgil's hopes were not fulfilled; the expected boy turned out to be a girl, and developed into a very bad woman; but he let his poem stand. It was much the same with Isaiah; the circumstances of the times were similar, and like causes produce like effects. The time has gone by when the utterances of Isaiah vii., ix., xi., xxxii., and the rest, could be taken as in themselves clear and definite predictions of Jesus Christ. They were messages to, and adapted to, the needs and circumstances of, their own age; but they pointed forward, and bespeak an undying hope in Israel which could only be fulfilled in a still far-distant future. Thus, taking advantage of all the light which modern research has thrown on Hebrew prophecy, Mr Royds arrives at the conclusion that Virgil was as much a prophet of Christ as Isaiah, no more and no less. Each felt to the full the miseries of the times in which they lived, and each looked forward to a coming age which should reproduce in the one case the Golden Age of Saturn, and in the other that of the Paradise of which their early stories told.

The question has been mooted as to whether Virgil was acquainted with Isaiah. It is quite possible that he may have been acquainted with the Septuagint, and the parallel between the Fourth Eclogue and the corresponding passages in the book of Isaiah is so striking that many think, as Dean Merivale thought long ago, that Virgil might have borrowed from the Alexandrian versifiers of the Hebrew prophets. The versification is peculiar, and it has been suggested that Virgil was consciously imitating Hebrew rhythm as well as Hebrew thought. "Toss the lines up in a bag," said Landor, "and they fit anywhere." Mr Royds ably summarises all that can be said for and against the mediæval view, and enters a verdict of "not proven," not forgetting at the same time Tennyson's aphorism that "nothing worthy proving can be proven." Virgil, though not the first, as a beautiful Spanish legend expresses it, to see the star of Bethlehem, yet felt in his soul, and expressed as no other

could, the great need and restless longing of all nations for a Redeemer, and this need he felt sure would one day be satisfied.

So, with the author, we may say: "Virgil, like Isaiah, was a real prophet of Christ; and we may boldly echo the old Christmas salutation—all the more fervently because it was used in Rheims Cathedral: 'O Maro, prophet of the Gentiles, bear thou thy witness unto Christ.'"

A very good translation of the poem into English hexameters is furnished by the author, and another into biblical English, which we cannot think quite so happy. He has also given us the relative passages from the Georgics, with translations into blank verse.

We owe Mr Royds a real debt of gratitude for this scholarly and able contribution to a question which has furnished many learned students with much food for speculation, and to which he has provided a wise and probable solution. He has read much, and has given us the results of his reading in a clear and readable style, and with a sane and sober judgment worthy of all commendation.

H. J. D. ASTLEY.

EAST RUDHAM, NORFOLK.

Suffering and Wrong. The Message of the New Religion. By Rev. Francis Wood.—London: G. Bell & Sons, 1916.

THE writer's purpose in this book is twofold: (1) to show that the responsibility of the suffering and wrong of the world rests solely with man; and (2) to show that Christianity is incapable of inspiring humanity to remove the suffering or to redress the wrong. In the view of the writer, the vast bulk of suffering need not be. "It is not a necessary consequence of the course of creation. It does not issue inevitably from the order of existence. There is no awful and inexplicable mystery about it. Its origin is perfectly plain. It is due to human agency" (p. 8). Hence the author argues there is not really any "problem of evil" as understood by the philosopher or theologian. "Although there is no evil in the world there is much wrong; although there is no suffering arising necessarily out of the order of existence—beyond what consists with the idea of life as a noble discipline—there is a vast amount of suffering arising from human ignorance and error, human selfishness and sin" (p. 49). The subject of suffering is considered under six heads, the suffering caused by Drunkenness, the Subjection and Degradation of Women, War, Poverty, the Prison System, and Flesh-eating. In each case the suffering which arises from these evils is shown to be a "social product." It is in the power of man to remove all these "customal wrongs." Take, for example, the suffering due to poverty. "Poverty is a social wrong. It is an injury inflicted by the stronger portion of the community upon the weaker" (p. 91). The remedy lies in our own hands. We must abolish the individual ownership of land, which puts the mass of men in a position of the utmost disadvantage (p. 92). The argument is similar throughout the book. Let the manufacture of spirits be abolished, and the evils of the drinking custom will pass away. Let the penal system of punishment be abolished and the principle of moral persuasion be adopted, and the criminal class—a "manufactured" class—will disappear. Having set forth at some length the main facts of suffering and wrong as they exist in the world to-day,

Mr Wood proceeds to discuss how far Christianity has helped in the betterment of the race. His conclusion is emphatic. Christianity has failed. Christianity hinders rather than helps us in dealing with the suffering of the world. "Christianity is very much the ally of all these customal wrongs which are at the root of the world's sufferings" (p. 271). Neither as found in individuals, nor as represented in the churches, nor as derived from the Old and New Testaments has Christianity done anything but uphold these wrongs. Indeed, so strongly does the writer express himself about Christianity that we are inclined to think that in the writer's mind the Christian religion represents a seventh head under which the problem of evil might well be considered! Mr Wood concludes that "a new religion" must take the place of our traditional creed. Christianity, he says, is moribund. It is without spiritual power "because it does not call men to self-sacrifice" (p. 365). Can one read this condemnation of our religion without calling to mind the many graves in Flanders and elsewhere marked with rude wooden crosses? It is with curiosity that we turn to the last chapter of the book to learn what the new religion teaches. Among other things it tells us that God is not *a* God. "Being is the grand reality, seen in all we see, heard in all we hear, felt in all we feel, known in all of which we are conscious. And Being, says the new religion, is divine. 'Worship Divine Being,' it commands" (p. 360). Frankly, to us this command is unintelligible. And it is not made more intelligible when we find the writer saying that the Fatherhood of God is the fundamental tenet of "the new religion," although he generally refers to the Divine Being as "It." "The new religion" also explains everything. It knows no problem of evil. "It denies that there is anything evil or even inexplicable in the great divine nature and reality of things" (p. 360). We remember the words of one of the world's wise men, "To explain everything is to explain nothing."

We cannot help feeling that Mr Wood has not fully faced the problem of evil. Theoretically, he has not disposed of it by saying that it is not in the nature of things but is due to man. Man is not outside the world of creation. Practically, Mr Wood seems to have underestimated the forces of evil. Drunkenness, for example, might disappear, as he asserts, were the production of drink prohibited. But has Mr Wood considered the possibility that the man who wants to drink and cannot do so might turn to some other equally injurious habit? Is it not possible that the inclination to do evil as well as "the new religion" has its seat in "the great heart of humanity"?

K. DUNBAR.

COMBER, Co. DOWN.

The Relationship between the Mystical and the Sensible Worlds. By Herbert N. G. Newlyn.—London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1918.—Pp. 128.

MR NEWLYN believes that man is destined to an inconceivably glorious mode of existence. In this suggestive little volume he seeks, first of all, to establish the reality of a higher form of consciousness, or super-phenomenal experience, on various grounds, such as the widespread desire for it, and the profound influence exercised by those in whose lives it has occurred. This experience is open to us here and now. There is no unbridgeable

chasm to negotiate, for there is an intimate relationship between the physical world, which we detect by the senses, and in which we are most at home, and the higher form of reality which we may apprehend by intuition. This immediate contiguity is well expressed by Whittier :

“ So sometimes comes to soul and sense
The feeling that is evidence
That very near about us lies
The realm of spiritual mysteries.
The sphere of the supernal powers
Impinges on this world of ours.”

Beneath all reality there is one single and only essence, which can be best described as experience—experience greater than we can fathom. This supreme essence manifests itself as divine desire. And this divine desire, again, when found in materialised form, is the cosmic need.

The significance of evolution is that it marks the stages in the path already trodden by the cosmic need. Man, at the apex of the structure slowly built up by this process, “has awakened to the impulse that bears along the Universe.” Occasionally, the great need, within the consciousness of man, is borne along, like a mighty wave, to its fulfilment. This is the significance of super-phenomenal experience. For the moment, the consciousness of man reflects the ultimate quality of being. The experience is possible because in spiritually-minded men the materialised form of the cosmic need, which constitutes their individuality, is more and more attenuated, and lost in harmony with the original essence. For matter is only a partial derangement of the elements which constitute the essence, and this derangement can be remedied if only we will it.

Man's highest bliss is attained in allying himself with the cosmic need which inspires him. Supreme amongst all who have realised such experience stands Jesus Christ. His great gift to the human race is complete, perfect, eternal communion with the unseen life. Mr Newlyn is persuaded that “this alone can raise social, national, international intercourse from suspicion and discord concerning trifles, into mutual participation in a reality inconceivably wider and lovelier than the human imagination can fathom.”

The human race has long delayed the acceptance of the gift. There is, however, a deep thirst for it. The widespread unrest in civilisation, superficially regarded, may seem to demand only social and economic satisfaction. The real need, however, is for something far different. Mr Newlyn finds it hard to believe that the nations, in these days of destiny, will be satisfied with mere material welfare as an adequate result of the colossal sacrifice of the war. In a striking passage he says: “The fullness of time must come. And soon. Already the ancient orders and systems are tottering. Events move rapidly to a climax. Men and women everywhere have caught, as it were, the echo of eternity; their eyes have seen visions of a richer, purer world. And they are stirred to action. They wait but for a leader.”

The outstanding quality of this inspiring little book is its practical mysticism, and we would commend it to those especially whose minds instinctively recoil from ecclesiastical religion, but who, nevertheless, are groping along the path from the modern starting-point of natural science towards the higher experiences of the spiritual life.

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THE SICKNESS OF ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY.

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THE right to the free disposal of property and to the exploitation of economic opportunities is conceived by a large part of the modern world, and in particular by the most socially influential part of it, to be absolute, and this volume of interest and opinion rallies instinctively against any attempt to qualify or limit the exercise of these rights by attaching further conditions to them. It is true that measures to prevent their abuse are now tolerated. They are contested in detail, not denounced in principle, for their opponents recognise that the system is strengthened if its extravagances are pruned. But there is a wide difference between the acceptance of such measures in particular cases, and the surrender of the doctrine that, in the normal organisation of society, the enjoyment of property and the direction of industry require no social justification, because they are rights which stand by their own virtue, not functions to be judged by the success with which they contribute to a social purpose.

To-day that doctrine, if intellectually discredited, is still the practical foundation of social organisation. One example of its strength is the reception offered to its partial abandonment during the recent crisis. Consider, for example, the attitude of the leaders of the commercial world to the restrictions upon trade and industry imposed during the war. The control of railways, mines, and shipping, the distribution of raw materials through a public department instead of by competing merchants, the regulation of prices, the attempts to check "profiteering,"—the detailed application of these

restrictions may have been effective or ineffective, wise or injudicious. But it is not against the details of particular restrictions that opposition is directed. What is denounced is the existence of any restrictions at all. What is demanded is that in the future, as in the past, the directors of industry should be free to handle it as an enterprise conducted for their own convenience or advancement, instead of being compelled, as they have been partially compelled during the war, to subordinate it to a social purpose. For to admit that the criterion of commerce and industry is its success in discharging a social purpose, is at once to turn property and economic activity from rights which are absolute to rights which are contingent and derivative, because it is to affirm that they are relative to functions, and that they may justly be revoked when the functions are not performed. It is, in short, to imply that property and economic activity exist to promote the ends of society, whereas hitherto society has been regarded in the world of business as existing to promote them. To those who hold their position, not as functionaries, but by virtue of their success in making industry contribute to their own wealth and social influence, such a reversal of means and ends appears little less than a revolution. For it implies that they must justify before a social tribunal rights which they have hitherto taken for granted as part of an order which is above criticism.

During the greater part of the nineteenth century the significance of the opposition between the two principles of individual rights and social functions was masked by the subsidiary doctrine of the inevitable harmony between private interests and public good. What is remarkable is that to-day, while that subsidiary doctrine has fallen to pieces under criticism, the disposition to regard individual rights as the centre and pivot of social organisation is still the most powerful element in political thought, and the practical foundation of industrial organisation. If anyone doubts such a statement, let him reflect upon the fact that their maintenance is not, in practice, impugned in those cases in which it is evident that no service is discharged, even indirectly, by their exercise. No one supposes that the owner of urban land performs, *qua* owner, any function. He has a right of private taxation, that is all. But the private ownership of urban land is as general to-day as it was a century ago; and Lord Hugh Cecil, in his interesting little book on *Conservatism*, declares that, whether private property is mischievous or not, society cannot interfere with it, because to interfere with it is theft,

and theft is wicked. No one supposes that it is for the public good that several hundred thousand acres should be used for parks and game. But our country gentlemen are still settled heavily upon their villages and still slay their thousands. No one can argue that a monopolist is impelled by "an invisible hand" to serve the public interest. But over a large field of industry competition has been replaced by combination, and combinations have hitherto been allowed the same unfettered freedom as individuals in the exploitation of economic opportunities. No one really believes that the production of coal depends upon the payment of mining royalties, or that ships will not go to and fro unless shipowners can earn fifty per cent. upon their capital. But coal-mines, or rather the coal-miner, still pay royalties, and shipowners still make fortunes and are made peers. At the very moment when everybody is talking about the importance of increasing the output of wealth, the last question, apparently, which it occurs to any statesman to ask is why wealth should be squandered on futile activities, and in expenditure which is either disproportionate to service or made for no service at all. So inveterate, indeed, has become the practice of payment in virtue of property rights, without even the pretence of any function being performed, that when, in a national emergency, it is proposed to extract oil from the ground, the Government actually proposes that every gallon shall pay a tax to landowners who never even suspected its existence, and the ingenuous proprietors are full of pained astonishment at anyone questioning whether the nation is under a moral obligation to endow him further.

The laborious refutation of the doctrine that private and public interests are coincident, and that man's self-love is God's providence, which was the excuse of the last century for its tolerance of economic abuses, has achieved, in fact, surprisingly small results. The abuses are still tolerated; and they are tolerated because that doctrine was not really the centre of the position. It was an outwork, not the citadel; and now that the outwork has been captured, the citadel is still to win. What gives its special quality and character, its toughness and cohesion, to the industrial system built up in the last century and a half, is not its exploded theory of economic harmonies. It is the doctrine that economic rights are anterior to, and independent of, economic functions, that they stand by their own virtue, and need adduce no higher credentials. The practical result of it is that economic rights remain, whether economic functions are performed or not. They remain to-day in a more formidable

form than in the age of early industrialism. For those who control them no longer compete but combine, and the rivalry between property in capital and property in land has long since ended. The basis of the New Conservatism is, in fact, nothing less than a determination so to organise society, both by political and economic action, as to make it secure against every attempt to extinguish payments which are made, not for service, but because the owners possess a legal right to extract them without it. Hence the fusion of the two traditional parties, the proposed "strengthening" of the second chamber, the return to protection, the swift conversion of rival industrialists to the advantages of monopoly, and the attempts to buy off with concessions the more influential sections of the working classes.

A society which aimed at making the acquisition of wealth contingent upon the discharge of social obligations, which sought to proportion remuneration to service and denied it to those by whom no service was performed, which inquired first not what men possess, but what they can make, or create, or achieve, might be called a functional society, because in such a society the main subject of social emphasis would be the performance of functions. But such a society does not exist, even as a remote ideal, in the modern world, though something like it has hung, an unrealised theory, before men's minds in the past. Modern societies aim at protecting economic rights, while leaving economic functions, except in moments of abnormal emergency, to fulfil themselves. The motive which gives colour and quality to their public institutions and policy and political thought is not the attempt to secure the fulfilment of tasks imposed for the public service, but to increase the opportunities open to individuals of attaining the objects which they conceive to be advantageous to themselves. If asked the end or criterion of social organisation, they would give an answer reminiscent of the formula: The greatest happiness of the greatest number. But to say that the end of social institutions is happiness, is to say that they have no common end at all. For happiness is individual, and to make happiness the object of society is to resolve society itself into the ambitions of numberless individuals, each directed towards the attainment of some personal purpose.

Such societies may be called Acquisitive Societies, because their whole tendency and interest and preoccupation is to promote the acquisition of wealth. The appeal of this conception must be powerful, for it has laid the whole modern

world under its spell. Since England first revealed the possibilities of industrialism, it has gone from strength to strength; and as industrial civilisation invades countries hitherto remote from it, as Russia and Japan and India and China are drawn into its orbit, each decade sees a fresh extension of its influence. The secret of its triumph is obvious. It is an invitation to men to use the powers with which they have been endowed by nature or society, by skill or energy or relentless egotism, or mere good fortune, without inquiring whether there is any principle by which their exercise should be limited. It assumes the social organisation which determines the opportunities which different classes shall in fact possess, and concentrates attention upon the right of those who possess or can acquire power to make the fullest use of it for their own self-advancement. By fixing men's minds, not upon the discharge of social obligations, which restricts their energy, because it defines the goal to which it should be directed, but upon the exercise of the right to pursue their own self-interest, it offers unlimited scope for the acquisition of riches, and therefore gives free play to one of the most powerful of human instincts. To the strong it promises unfettered freedom for the exercise of their strength; to the weak, the hope that they too may one day be strong. Before the eyes of both it suspends a golden prize, which not all can attain, but for which each may strive—the enchanting vision of infinite expansion. It assures men that there are no ends other than their ends, no law other than desires, no limit other than that which they think advisable. Thus it makes the individual the centre of his own universe, and dissolves moral principles into a choice of expediencies. And it immensely simplifies the problems of social life in complex communities. For it relieves them of the necessity of discriminating between different types of economic activity and different sources of wealth, between enterprise and avarice, energy and unscrupulous greed, property which is legitimate and property which is theft, the just enjoyment of the fruits of labour and the idle parasitism of birth or fortune, because it treats all economic activities as standing upon the same level, and suggests that excess or defect, waste or superfluity, require no conscious effort of the social will to avert them, but are corrected almost automatically by the mechanical play of economic forces.

Under the impulse of such ideas men do not become religious or wise or artistic; for religion and wisdom and art imply the acceptance of limitations. But they become powerful and rich. They inherit the earth and change the

face of nature, if they do not possess their own souls; and they have that appearance of freedom which consists in the absence of obstacles between opportunities for self-advancement and those whom birth or wealth or talent or good fortune has placed in a position to seize them. It is not difficult either for an individual or for a society to achieve its object, if that object be sufficiently limited and immediate, and if they are not distracted from its pursuit by other considerations. The temper which dedicates itself to the cultivation of opportunities, and leaves obligations to take care of themselves, is set upon an object which is at once simple and practicable. The eighteenth century defined it. The twentieth century has very largely attained it. Or, if it has not attained it, it has at least grasped the conditions of its attainment. The national output of wealth per head of population was approximately £45 in 1914. There is no reason why by 1950 it should not be doubled.

Such happiness is not remote from achievement. In the course of achieving it, however, the world has been confronted by a group of unexpected consequences, which are the cause of its *malaise*, as the obstruction of economic opportunity was the cause of social *malaise* in the eighteenth century. And these consequences are not, as is often suggested, accidental mal-adjustments, but flow naturally from its dominant principle: so that there is a sense in which the cause of its perplexity is not its failure, but the quality of its success, and its light itself a kind of darkness. The will to economic power, if it is sufficiently single-minded, brings riches. But if it is single-minded, it destroys the moral restraints which ought to condition the pursuit of riches, and therefore also makes the pursuit of riches meaningless. For what gives meaning to economic activity, as to any other activity, is the purpose to which it is directed. But the faith upon which our economic civilisation reposes, the faith that riches are not a means but an end, implies that all economic activity is equally estimable whether it is subordinated to a social purpose or not. Hence it divorces gain from service, and justifies rewards for which no function is performed, or which are out of all proportion to it. Wealth in modern societies is distributed according to opportunity; and while opportunity depends partly upon talent and energy, it depends still more upon birth and social position, and access to education and inherited wealth—in a word, upon property. For talent and energy can create opportunity; but property need only wait for it. It is the sleeping partner who draws part of the

dividends which the firm produces, the residuary legatee who always claims his share in the estate.

And because rewards are divorced from services, so that what is prized most is not riches obtained in return for labour, but riches the economic origin of which, being regarded as sordid, is concealed, two results follow. The first is the creation of a class of pensioners upon industry, who levy toll upon its product, but contribute nothing to its increase, and who are not merely tolerated, but applauded and admired and protected with assiduous care, as though the secret of prosperity resided in them. They are admired because, in the absence of any principle of discrimination between incomes which are payment for functions and incomes which are not, all incomes, merely because they represent wealth, stand on the same level of appreciation, and are estimated solely by their magnitude, so that in all societies which have accepted industrialism there is an upper layer which claims the enjoyment of social life, while it repudiates its responsibilities. The *rentier* and his ways, how familiar they were in England before the war! A public school, and then club life in Oxford and Cambridge, and then another club in town; London in June, when London is pleasant; the moors in August and pheasants in October, Cannes in December and hunting in February and March; and a whole world of rising bourgeoisie eager to imitate them, sedulous to make their expensive watches keep time with this preposterous calendar!

The second consequence is the degradation of those who labour, but who do not by their labour command large rewards, that is, of the great majority of mankind. And this degradation follows inevitably from the refusal of men to give the purpose of industry the first place in their thought about it. When they do that, when their minds are set upon the fact that the meaning of industry is the service of man, all who labour appear to them honourable, because all who labour serve; and the distinction which separates those who serve from those who merely spend is so crucial and fundamental as to obliterate all minor distinctions based on differences of income. But when the criterion of function is forgotten, the only criterion which remains is that of wealth, and an Acquisitive Society reverences the possession of wealth, as a Functional Society would honour, even in the person of the humblest and most laborious craftsman, the arts of creation. So wealth becomes the foundation of public esteem, and the mass of men who labour, but who do not acquire wealth, are thought to be vulgar and meaningless and insignificant compared with

the few who acquire wealth by good fortune or by the skilful use of economic opportunities, and come to be regarded, not as the ends for which alone it is worth while to produce wealth at all, but as the instruments of its acquisition by a world that declines to be soiled by contact with what is thought to be the dull and sordid business of labour. They are not happy, for the reward of all but the very mean is not merely money, but the esteem of their fellow-men, and they know they are not esteemed, as soldiers, for example, are esteemed, though it is because they give their lives to making civilisation that there is a civilisation which it is worth while for soldiers to defend. They are not esteemed because their work is not esteemed, because the admiration of society is directed towards those who get, not towards those who give; and, though workmen give much, they get little. And the *rentiers* whom they support are not happy; for, in discarding the idea of function which sets a limit to the acquisition of riches, they have also discarded the principle which alone gives riches their meaning. Hence, unless they can persuade themselves that to be rich is in itself meritorious, they may bask in social admiration, but they are unable to esteem themselves. For they have abolished the principle which makes activity significant, and therefore estimable. They are, indeed, more truly pitiable than some of those who envy them. For, like the spirits in the *Inferno*, they are punished by the attainment of their desires.

A society ruled by these notions is necessarily the victim of inequality. To escape inequality it is necessary to recognise that there is some principle which ought to limit the gains of particular classes and particular individuals, because gains drawn from certain sources or exceeding certain amounts are illegitimate. But such a limitation implies a standard of discrimination which is inconsistent with the assumption that each man has a right to what he can get, irrespective of any service rendered for it. Thus privilege, which was to have been exorcised by the gospel of 1789, returns in a new guise, the creature no longer of unequal legal rights thwarting the natural exercise of equal powers of hand and brain, but of unequal powers springing from the exercise of equal rights in a world where property and inherited wealth and the apparatus of class institutions have made opportunities unequal. Inequality, again, leads to the mis-direction of production. For, since the demand of one income of £50,000 is as powerful a magnet as the demand of five hundred incomes of £100, it diverts energy from the creation of wealth to the multiplication

of luxuries, so that, for example, while one-tenth of the people of England are overcrowded, a considerable proportion of them are engaged, not in supplying that deficiency, but in making rich men's hotels, motor-cars, and yachts. Thus a part of the goods which are annually produced, and which are called wealth, is, strictly speaking, waste, because it consists of articles which, though reckoned as part of the income of the nation, either should not have been produced until other articles had already been produced in sufficient abundance, or should not have been produced at all. And some part of the population is employed in making goods which no man can make with happiness, or indeed without loss of self-respect, because he knows that they had much better not be made, and that his life is wasted in making them. Everybody recognises that the army contractor who, in time of war, set several hundred navvies to dig an artificial lake in his grounds was not adding to, but subtracting from, the wealth of the nation. But in time of peace many hundred thousand workmen, if they are not digging ponds, are doing work which is equally foolish and wasteful, when, in peace as in war, there is important work which is waiting to be done, and which is not done because, while the effective demand of the mass of men is small, there is a small class which wears several men's clothes, eats several men's dinners, and lives several men's lives. Yet this result of inequality, again, is a phenomenon which cannot be prevented, or checked, or even recognised by a society which excludes the idea of purpose from its social arrangements and industrial activity. For to recognise it is to admit that there is a principle superior to the mechanical play of economic forces, which ought to determine the relative importance of different occupations, and thus to abandon the view that all economic riches, however composed, are an end, and that all economic activity is equally justifiable.

The exclusion of the idea of purpose involves another consequence which everyone laments, but which no one can prevent, except by abandoning the belief that the free exercise of rights is the main interest of society, and the discharge of common obligations a secondary and incidental consequence which may be left to take care of itself. It is that social life is turned into a scene of fierce antagonisms and that a considerable part of industry is carried on in the intervals of a disguised social war. The idea that economic peace can be secured merely by the exercise of tact and forbearance is based on the idea that there is a fundamental identity of interest between the different groups engaged in industry, which is occasionally inter-

rupted by regrettable misunderstandings. Both the one idea and the other are an illusion. The disputes which matter are not caused by a misunderstanding of identity of interests, but by a better understanding of diversity of interests. Though a formal declaration of war is an episode, the conditions which issue in a declaration of war are permanent; and what makes them permanent is the conception of industry which also makes inequality and functionless incomes permanent. It is the denial that industry has any end or purpose other than the satisfaction of those engaged in it. That motive produces industrial warfare, not as a regrettable incident, but as an inevitable result. It produces industrial war, because its teaching is that each individual or group has a right to what they can get, and denies that there is any principle, other than the mechanism of the market, which determines what they ought to get. For, since the income available for distribution is limited, and since, therefore, when certain limits have been passed, what one group gains another group must lose, it is evident that, if the relative incomes of different groups are not to be determined by their functions, there is no method other than mutual self-assertion which is left to determine it. Self-interest, indeed, may cause them to refrain from using their full strength to enforce their claims, and, in so far as this happens, peace is secured in industry, as men have attempted to secure it in international affairs, by a balance of power. But the maintenance of such a peace is contingent upon the estimate of the parties to it that they have more to lose than to gain by an overt struggle, and is not the result of their acceptance of any standard of remuneration as an equitable settlement of their claims. Hence it is precarious, insincere, and short. It is without finality, because there can be no finality in the mere addition of increments of income, any more than in the gratification of any other desire for material goods. When demands are conceded, the old struggle recommences upon a new level, and will always recommence as long as men seek to end it merely by increasing remuneration, not by finding a principle upon which all remuneration, whether large or small, should be based.

Such a principle is offered by the idea of function, because its application would eliminate the surpluses which are the subject of contention, and would make it evident that remuneration is based upon service, not upon chance or privilege or the power to use opportunities to drive a hard bargain. But the idea of function is incompatible with the doctrine that

every person and organisation have an unlimited right to exploit their economic opportunities as fully as they please, which is the working faith of modern industry; and, since it is not accepted, men resign themselves to the settlement of the issue by force, or propose that the State should supersede the force of private associations by the use of its force, as though the absence of a principle could be compensated by a new kind of machinery. Yet all the time the true cause of industrial warfare is as simple as the true cause of international warfare. It is that, if men recognise no law superior to their desires, then they must fight when their desires collide. For though groups or nations which are at issue with each other may be willing to submit to a principle which is superior to them both, there is no reason why they should submit to each other. Hence the idea, which is popular with rich men, that industrial disputes would disappear if only the output of wealth were doubled, and everyone twice as well off, not only is refuted by all practical experience, but is in its very nature founded upon an illusion. Increased riches may be as desirable as they are thought by the economists, or as mischievous as they were thought by the saints. But to recommend an increase in productivity as a solution of the industrial problem is like offering spectacles to a man with a broken leg, or trying to atone for putting a bad sixpence in the plate one Sunday by putting a bad shilling in it the next. For the question is one not of amounts but of proportions; and men will fight to be paid £30 a week, instead of £20, as readily as they will fight to be paid £5 instead of £4, as long as there is no reason why they should be paid £20 instead of £30, and as long as other men who do not work are paid anything at all. If miners demanded higher wages when every superfluous charge upon coal-getting had been eliminated, there would be a principle with which to meet their claim—the principle that one group of workers ought not to encroach upon the livelihood of others. But as long as royalty owners extract royalties, and exceptionally productive mines pay 20 per cent. to absentee shareholders, there is no valid answer to a demand for higher wages. For if the community pays anything at all to those who do not work, it can afford to pay more to those who do. The naïve complaint that workmen are never satisfied is, therefore, strictly true. It is true not only of workmen, but of all classes in a society which conducts its affairs on the principle that wealth, instead of being proportioned to function, belongs to those who can get it. They are never satisfied, nor can they be satisfied. For as long as they make that principle

the guide of their individual lives and of their social order, nothing short of infinity could bring them satisfaction.

So here, again, the prevalent insistence upon rights, and prevalent neglect of functions, brings men into a vicious circle which they cannot escape, without escaping from the false philosophy which dominates them. But it does something more. It makes that philosophy itself seem plausible and exhilarating, and a rule not only for industry, in which it had its birth, but for politics and culture and religion and the whole compass of social life. The possibility that one aspect of human life may be so exaggerated as to overshadow, and in time to atrophy, every other, has been made familiar to Englishmen by the example of "Prussian militarism." Militarism is the characteristic, not of an army, but of a society. Its essence is not any particular quality or scale of military preparation, but a state of mind which, in its concentration on one particular element in social life, ends finally by exalting it until it becomes the arbiter of all the rest. The purpose for which military forces exist is forgotten. They are thought to stand by their own right and to need no justification. Instead of being regarded as an instrument which is necessary in an imperfect world, they are elevated into an object of superstitious veneration, as though the world would be a poor, insipid place without them; so that political institutions and social arrangements and intellect and morality and religion are crushed into a mould made to fit one activity, which in a sane society is a subordinate activity, like the police, or the maintenance of prisons, or the cleansing of sewers, but which in a militarist state is a kind of mystical epitome of society itself.

Militarism, as Englishmen see plainly enough, is fetich-worship. It is the prostration of men's souls and the laceration of their bodies to appease an idol. What they do not see is that their reverence for economic activity and industry, and what is called business, is also fetich-worship, and that in their devotion to that idol they torture themselves as needlessly and indulge in the same meaningless antics as Prussians did in their worship of militarism. For what the military tradition and spirit have done for Prussia, with the result of creating militarism, the commercial tradition and spirit have done for England, with the result of creating industrialism. Industrialism is no more a necessary characteristic of an economically developed society, than militarism is a necessary characteristic of a nation which maintains military forces. It is no more the result of applying science to

industry, than militarism is the result of the application of science to war; and the idea that it is something inevitable in a community which uses coal and iron and machinery, so far from being the truth, is itself a product of it. Men may use what mechanical instruments they please, and be none the worse for their use. What kills their souls is when they allow their instruments to use them. The essence of industrialism, in short, is not any particular method of industry, but a particular estimate of the importance of industry, which results in it being thought the only thing that is important at all, so that it is elevated from the subordinate place which it should occupy among human interests and activities, into being the standard by which all other interests and activities are judged. When a cabinet minister declares that the greatness of this country depends upon the volume of its exports, so that France, which exports comparatively little, and Elizabethan England, which exported next to nothing, are presumably to be pitied as altogether inferior civilisations, that is industrialism. It is the confusion of one minor department of life with the whole of life. When manufacturers cry and cut themselves with knives, because it is proposed that boys and girls of fourteen shall attend school for eight hours a week, and the President of the Board of Education is so gravely impressed by their apprehensions that he at once allows the hours to be reduced to seven, that is industrialism. It is fetich-worship. When the Government obtains money for a war which costs £7,000,000 a day, by closing the museums which cost £20,000 a year, that is industrialism. It is a contempt for all interests which do not contribute obviously to economic activity. When the press clamours that the one thing needed to make this island an Arcadia after the war is productivity, and more productivity, and yet more productivity, that is industrialism. It is the confusion of means with ends. Men will always confuse means with ends if they are without any clear conception that it is the ends, not the means, which matter—if they allow their minds to slip from the fact that it is the social purpose of industry which gives it meaning and makes it worth while to carry it on at all. And when they do that, they turn their whole world upside down, because they do not see the poles upon which it ought to move. So when, like England, they are thoroughly industrialised, they behave like Germany, which was thoroughly militarised. They talk as though man existed for industry, instead of industry existing for man, as the Prussians talked of man existing for war. They resent any activity which is not

coloured by the predominant interest, because it seems a rival to it. So they destroy religion and art and morality, which cannot exist unless they are disinterested; and having destroyed these, which are the end, for the sake of industry, which is a means, they make their industry itself what they make their cities, a desert of unnatural dreariness, which only forgetfulness can make endurable, and which only excitement can enable them to forget.

Torn by suspicions and recriminations, avid of power, and oblivious of duties; desiring peace, but unable to seek peace and ensure it, because unwilling to surrender the creed which is the cause of war,—to what can one compare such a society but to the international world, which also has been called a society, and which also is social in nothing but name? And the comparison is more than a play upon words. It is an analogy which has its roots in the facts of history. It is not a chance that the last century and a half, which has seen the growth of a new system of industry, has also seen the growth of a new system of international politics; for both the one and the other are the expression of the same spirit and move in obedience to similar laws. The essence of the former was the repudiation of any authority superior to the individual reason. It left men free to follow their own interests or ambitions or appetites, untrammelled by subordination to any common centre of allegiance. The essence of the latter was the repudiation of any authority superior to the sovereign state, which again was conceived as a compact, self-contained unit—a unit which would lose its very essence if it lost its independence of other states. Just as the one emancipated economic activity from a mesh of antiquated traditions, so the other emancipated nations from arbitrary subordination to alien races or governments, and turned them into nationalities with a right to work out their own destiny. Nationalism is, in fact, the counterpart among nations of what individualism is within them. It has similar origins and tendencies, similar triumphs and defects. For nationalism, like individualism, lays its emphasis on the rights of separate units, not on their subordination to common obligations, though its units are races or nations, not individual men. Like individualism, it appeals to the self-assertive instincts, to which it promises opportunities of unlimited expansion. Like individualism, it is a force of immense explosive power, the just claims of which must be conceded before it is possible to invoke any alternative principle to control its operations. For one cannot impose a

super-national authority upon irritated or discontented or oppressed nationalities, any more than one can subordinate economic motives to the control of society until society has recognised that there is a sphere which they may legitimately occupy. And, like individualism, if pushed to its logical conclusion, it is self-destructive. For as nationalism, in its brilliant youth, begins as a claim that nations, because they are spiritual beings, shall determine themselves, and passes too often into a claim that they shall dominate others, so individualism begins by asserting the right of men to make of their own lives what they can, and ends by condoning the subjection of the majority of men to the few whom good fortune or privilege or special opportunity has enabled most successfully to use their rights.

So the perversion of nationalism is imperialism, as the perversion of individualism is industrialism. And the perversion comes, not through any flaw or vice in human nature, but by the force of the idea, because the principle is defective, and reveals its defects as it reveals its power. For it asserts that the rights of nations and individuals are absolute, which is false, instead of asserting that they are absolute in their own sphere, but that their sphere itself is contingent upon the part which they play in the community of nations and individuals, which is true. Thus it constrains them to a career of indefinite expansion, in which they devour continents and oceans, law, morality and religion, and last of all their own souls, in an attempt to attain infinity by the addition to themselves of all that is finite. In the meantime their rivals, and their subjects, and they themselves are conscious of the danger of opposing forces, and seek to purchase security and to avoid a collision by organising a balance of power. But the balance, whether in international politics or in industry, is unstable, because it reposes not on the common recognition of a principle by which the claims of nations and individuals are limited, but on an attempt to find an equipoise which may avoid a conflict without abjuring the assertion of unlimited claims. No such equipoise can be found, because, in a world where the possibilities of increasing military or industrial power are illimitable, no such equipoise can exist.

Thus, as long as men move on this plane, there is no solution. They can obtain peace only by surrendering the claim to the unfettered exercise of their rights, which is the cause of war. For a right is simply a power which is secured by legal sanctions, "a capacity," as the lawyers define it, "residing in one man of controlling, with the assistance of

the State, the action of others"; and a right should not be absolute for the same reason that a power should not be absolute. No doubt it is better that individuals should have absolute rights than that the State or the Government should have them; and it was the reaction against the abuses of absolute power by the State which led in the eighteenth century to the declaration of the absolute rights of individuals. The most obvious defence against the assertion of one extreme was the assertion of the other. Because governments and the relics of feudalism had encroached upon the property of individuals, it was affirmed that the right of property was absolute; because they had strangled enterprise, it was affirmed that every man had a natural right to conduct his business as he pleased. But, in reality, both the one assertion and the other are false, and, if applied to practice, must lead to disaster. The State has no absolute rights; they are limited by its commission. The individual has no absolute rights; they are relative to the function which he performs in the community of which he is a member, because, unless they are so limited, the consequences must be something in the nature of private war. All rights, in short, are conditional and derivative, because all power should be conditional and derivative. They are derived from the end or purpose of the society in which they exist. They are conditional on being used to contribute to the attainment of that end, not to thwart it. And this means in practice that, if society is to be healthy, men must regard themselves not as the owners of rights, but as trustees for the discharge of functions, and the instruments of a social purpose.

The first condition, then, of the right organisation of industry is the intellectual conversion which, in their distrust of principles, Englishmen are disposed to place last or to omit altogether. It is that emphasis should be transferred from the opportunities which it offers individuals to the social functions which it performs; that they should be clear as to its end and should judge it by reference to that end, not by incidental consequences which are foreign to it, however brilliant or alluring those consequences may be. What gives its meaning to any activity which is not purely automatic is its purpose. It is because the purpose of industry, which is the conquest of nature for the service of man, is neither adequately expressed in its organisation nor present to the minds of those engaged in it, because it is not regarded as a function but as an opportunity for personal gain or

advancement or display, that the economic life of modern societies is in a perpetual state of morbid irritation. If the conditions which produce that unnatural tension are to be removed, the change can only be effected by the growth of a habit of mind which will approach questions of economic organisation from the standpoint of the purpose which it exists to serve, and which will apply to them something of the spirit expressed by Bacon when he said that the work of man ought to be carried on "for the glory of God and the relief of men's estate." Viewed from that angle, issues which are insoluble when treated on the basis of rights may be found more susceptible of reasonable treatment. For a purpose is, in the first place, a principle of limitation. It determines the end for which, and therefore the limits within which, an activity is to be carried on. It divides what is worth doing from what is not, and settles the scale upon which what is worth doing ought to be done. It is, in the second place, a principle of unity, because it supplies a common end to which efforts can be directed, and submits interests which would otherwise conflict to the judgment of an overruling object. It is, in the third place, a principle of apportionment or distribution. It assigns to the different parties or groups engaged in a common undertaking the place which they are to occupy in carrying it out. Thus it establishes order, not upon chance or power, but upon a principle, and bases remuneration, not upon what men can with good fortune snatch for themselves, nor upon what, if unlucky, they can be induced to accept, but upon what is appropriate to their function, no more and no less, so that those who perform no function receive no payment, and those who contribute to the common end receive honourable payment for honourable service.

The practical expression of the idea of purpose would be a change in the prevalent conceptions both of economic activity and of property. The natural result of emphasising rights as the foundation of social organisation is to cause industry to be regarded primarily as a private enterprise in which the interest of the community is indirect, and in which it intervenes only in the case of some special danger or abnormal abuse. The transference of emphasis from rights to functions would result in industry being considered primarily as a social service; and, however the principle that industry is a social service may be interpreted, there are at any rate three implications which are involved in it. The first is that it should be conducted in complete publicity with regard both to costs of production and to profits. The second is that the primary consideration in its

organisation should be that the community should be offered the best service technically possible at the lowest price compatible with adequate payment to those who render it. The third is that, when all charges necessary to the supply of a service have been met, any surplus which remains should pass to the public. Equally radical would be the modification in the prevalent attitude towards property. A sharp distinction would be drawn between property which is used by the owner for the conduct of his profession or the upkeep of his household, and property which yields an income irrespective of any personal service. The former, the holding of the peasant, or the tools of the workman, or the personal possessions necessary to a civilised life, would be regarded as legitimate, for they are the condition of service. The latter, of which the most obvious examples are urban ground rents or mining royalties, would be regarded as illegitimate, since they are merely a pecuniary lien upon the product of someone else's industry, which carries no obligation of service with it. A functional society would extinguish mercilessly those forms of property rights which yield income without service. It would treat all forms of property other than personal possessions as subject to the eminent domain of the State; and though it would not necessarily retain their administration in its own hands, it would reserve its right to resume it whenever the function attached to them was not discharged. It would not seek to establish any visionary communism; for it would realise that the free disposal of a sufficiency of personal possessions is necessary for a healthy individual life, and would distribute them more widely by abolishing the property rights in virtue of which they are concentrated. But there would be no private property in urban land; it would be owned by the authorities of the city which is built upon it, as in many continental towns it is owned to-day, and they would be armed with powers of compulsory acquisition to supply the need for space of a growing population. There would be no question of the right of the owner of agricultural land to use it for sport. There would be private property—subject to the right of compulsory purchase—in industrial capital used by the owners for the purposes of production: the forge of the smith, the workshop of the carpenter, the factory of the man who is at once owner and manager. But there would be an end of the property rights in virtue of which the industries on which the welfare of whole populations depends are administered by the agents and for the profit of absentee shareholders.

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THE PRESENT NEED OF AN ARISTOCRACY.

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I.

FOR something over a hundred years the world, following after the quantitative standard and driven by the desire of power through possession of material things, has pursued certain frank and explicit lines of development. Monarchies have been dissolved or curbed to the point of nullity; aristocracies of blood, of status, of inherited distinction have been disestablished and discredited, or adulterated even to saturation with accessions from castes without tradition, manners, or the standards of "gentle" blood; the organic institutions of religion have been relegated to the region of the unimportant and turned over to the control of what were once called "the middle and lower classes"; many universities have been transformed from seats of learning, culture, and character to feeders for the supreme domains of business, finance, applied science, and (through law) practical politics.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the industrial-financial revolution began. Within the space of a hundred years came all the revelations of the potential inherent in thermo-dynamics and electricity, and the invention of the machines that have changed the world. During the Renaissance and Reformation the old social and economic systems, so laboriously built up on the ruins of Roman tyranny, had been destroyed; autocracy had abolished liberty, licentiousness had wrecked the moral stamina, "freedom of conscience" had obliterated the guiding and restricting power of the old religion. The field was clear for a new dispensation.

What happened was interesting and significant. Coal and iron, and their derivatives—steam and machinery—rapidly

revealed their possibilities. To take advantage of these, it was necessary that labour should be available in large quantities and freely subject to exploitation; that unlimited capital should be forthcoming; that adequate markets should be discovered or created to absorb the surplus product, so enormously greater than the normal demand; and finally it was necessary that directors and organisers and administrators should be ready at the call. The conditions of the time made all these possible. The landholding peasantry of England had been completely dispossessed and largely pauperised under Henry VIII and Elizabeth, while the development of the wool-growing industry had restricted the arable land to a point where it no longer gave employment to the mass of field labourers. The first blast of factory production threw out of work the whole body of cottage weavers, smiths, craftsmen; and the result was a great mass of men, women, and children without defence, void of all rights, and given the alternative of submission to the dominance of the exploiters, or starvation.

Without capital the new industry could neither begin nor continue. The exploits of the "joint-stock companies" invented and perfected in the eighteenth century showed how this capital could easily be obtained, while the paralysing and dismemberment of the Church during the Reformation had resulted in the abrogation of the old ecclesiastical inhibition against usury. The necessary capital was forthcoming, and the foundations were laid for the great system of finance which was one of the triumphant achievements of the last century.

The question of markets was more difficult. It was clear that, through machinery, the exploitation of labour, and the manipulations of finance, the product would be enormously greater than the local or national demand. Until they themselves developed their own industrial system, the other nations of Europe were available, but as this process proceeded other markets had to be found; the result was achieved through advertising, *i.e.* the stimulating in the minds of the general public of a covetousness for something they had not known of and did not want, and the exploiting of barbarous or undeveloped races in Asia, Africa, Oceania. This last task was easily achieved through "peaceful penetration" and the pre-empting of "spheres of influence." In the end (*i.e.* A.D. 1914), the whole world had so been divided, the stimulated markets showed signs of repletion; and since exaggerated profits meant increasing capital demanding investment, and the improvement in "labour-saving" devices continued un-

checked, the contest for others' markets became acute, and world-politic was concentrated in the one problem of markets, lines of communication, and tariffs.

As for the finding or development of competent organisers and directors, the history of the world since the end of mediævalism had curiously provided for this after a fashion that seemed almost miraculous. The type required was different from anything that had been developed before. Whenever the qualitative standard had been operative, it was necessary that the leaders in any form of creative action should be men of highly developed intellect, fine sensibility, wide and penetrating vision, nobility of instinct, passion for righteousness, and a consciousness of the eternal force of charity, honour, and the love of God. During the imperial or decadent stages, courage, dynamic force, the passion for adventure, unscrupulousness in the matter of method, took the place of the qualities that marked the earlier periods. In the first instance the result was the great law-givers, philosophers, prophets, religious leaders, and artists of every sort; in the second, the great conquerors. Something quite different was now demanded—men who possessed some of the qualities needed for the development of imperialism, but who were unhampered by the restrictive influences of those who had sought perfection. To organise and administer the new industrial-financial-commercial regime, the leaders must be shrewd, ingenious, quick-witted, thick-skinned, unscrupulous, hard-headed, and avaricious; yet daring, dominating, and gifted with keen prevision and vivid imagination. These qualifications had not been bred under any of the Mediterranean civilisations, or that of Central Europe in the Middle Ages which had inherited so much therefrom. The pursuit of perfection always implies a definite aristocracy which is as much a goal of effort as a noble philosophy, an exalted religion, or a sublime art. Whether this aristocracy was Athenian, Roman, Saracen, or Christian, it was always the same in principle, it played the same part in society, it exalted the same ideals, and it maintained itself after the same fashion. It was the centre and source of that leadership without which society cannot endure.

Between the years 1455 and 1795 this old aristocracy was largely exterminated. The Wars of the Roses, the massacres of the Reformation, and the Civil Wars in England; the Thirty Years' War in Germany; the Hundred Years' War, the Wars of Religion, and the Revolution in France had decimated the families old in honour, preserving the tradition of culture, jealous of their alliances and their breeding—the

natural and actual leaders in thought and action. England suffered badly enough as the result of war, with the persecutions of Henry VIII and Elizabeth, and the Black Death, included for full measure. France suffered also, but Germany fared worst of all. By the end of the Thirty Years' War the older feudal nobility had largely disappeared, while the class of "gentlemen" had been exterminated. In France, until the fall of Napoleon III, and in Germany and Great Britain up to the present moment, the recruiting of the aristocracy has gone on steadily, but on a different basis and from a different class from anything known before. Demonstrated personal ability to gain and maintain leadership; distinguished service to the nation in war or statecraft; courage, honour, fealty—these, in general, had been the ground for admission to the ranks of the aristocracy. In general also advancement to the ranks of the higher nobility was from the class of "gentlemen," though the Church, the universities, and chivalry gave, during the Middle Ages, wide opportunity for personal merit to achieve the highest honours.

Through the wholesale destruction of the representatives of a class that from the beginning of history had been the directing and creative force in civilisation, a process began which was almost mechanical. As the upper strata of society were planed off by war, pestilence, civil slaughter, and assassination, the pressure on the great mass of men (peasants, serfs, unskilled labourers, the so-called "lower classes") was increasingly relaxed, and very soon the thin film of aristocracy, further weakened by dilution, broke, and through the crumbling veil burst to the surface those who had behind them no tradition but that of servility, no comprehension of the (possibly artificial) "honour" of the gentleman, no stored-up results of education and culture, but only an agelong rage against the agelong dominating class, together with the instincts of craftiness, parsimony, and almost savage self-interest.

As a class, it was very far from being what it was under the Roman Empire; on the other hand, it was equally removed from what it was during the Middle Ages in England, France, and the Rhineland. Under mediævalism chattel slavery had disappeared, and the lot of the peasant was a happier one than he had known before. He had achieved definite status, and the line that separated him from the gentry was very thin and constantly traversed, thanks to the accepted system of land tenure, the guilds, chivalry, the schools and universities, the priesthood and monasticism. The Renaissance had rapidly changed all this, however; absolutism in government, dis-

possession of land, the abolition of the guilds, and the collapse of the moral order and the dominance of the Church were fast pushing the peasant back into the position he had held under the Roman Empire, and from which Christianity had lifted him. By 1790 he had been for nearly three centuries under a progressive oppression that had undone nearly all the beneficent work of the Middle Ages and made the peasant class practically outlaw, while breaking down its character, degrading its morals, increasing its ignorance, and building up a sullen rage and an invincible hatred of all that stood visible as law and order in the persons of the ruling class.

Filtering through the impoverished and diluted crust of a dissolving aristocracy, came this irruption from below. In their own persons these people possessed the qualities and the will which were imperative for the organisation of the industry, the trade, and the finance that were to control the world for four generations, and produce that industrial civilisation which is the basis and the energising force of modernism. Immediately, and with conspicuous ability, they took hold of the problem, solved its difficulties, developed its possibilities, and by the end of the nineteenth century had made it master of the world. What civilisation was on the first day of August 1914, is what they had made it; modernism is the work of their hands.

Simultaneously they were engaged in creating democracy; that is to say, while certain of the more shrewd and ingenious were organising manufacture, trade, and finance, and developing its imperialistic and autocratic possibilities, others of the same social antecedents were devising a new theory, and experimenting in new schemes, of government, which would take all power away from the class that had hitherto exercised it, and fix it for ever in the hands of the emancipated common people. In *The Nemesis of Mediocrity* I have tried to distinguish between democracy of theory and democracy of method. The former is as old as man, and is part of the "passion for perfection" that characterises all crescent society, and is indeed the chief difference between brute and human nature; it means the guaranteeing of justice, and may be described as consisting of abolition of privilege, equality of opportunity, and utilisation of ability. Democracy of method consists in a variable and uncertain sequence of devices which are supposed to achieve the democracy of ideal, but as a matter of fact have thus far usually worked in the opposite direction. The activity of this movement synchronises with the pressing upward of "the masses" through the dissolving

crust of "the classes," and represents their contribution to the science of political philosophy, as the contribution of the latter is current "political economy."

It will be perceived that the reaction of the new social force in the case of industrial organisation is fundamentally opposed to that which occurred in the political sphere. The one is working steadily towards an autocratic imperialism and the "Servile State," the other towards the fluctuating, incoherent control of the making and administering of laws by the untrained, the uncultivated, and the generally unfit, the issue of which is anarchy. The industrial-commercial-financial oligarchy that controlled society during the first fourteen years of the present century is the result of the first; Russia, to-day, an exemplar of the second. The working out of these two great devices of the new force released by the destructive processes of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, simultaneously though in deadly opposition, explains why, when the war broke out, imperialism and democracy synchronised so exactly: on the one hand, imperial states, industry, commerce, and finance; on the other, a swiftly accelerating democratic system that was at the same time the effective means whereby the dominant imperialism worked, and the omnipresent and increasing threat to its further continuance.

Now these two remarkable products of the new mentality of a new social force were facts, but they needed an intellectual or philosophical justification, just as a low-born profiteer, when he has acquired a certain amount of money, needs an expensive club or a coat of arms to regularise his status. Protestantism and materialistic philosophy were joint nursing-mothers to modernism, but when, by the middle of the last century, it had reached man's estate, they proved inadequate; something else was necessary, and this was furnished to admiration by evolutionism. Through its doctrine of the survival of the fittest, it appeared to justify in the fullest degree the gospel of force as the *ultima ratio*, and "enlightened self-interest" as the new moral law; through its lucid demonstration of the strictly physical basis of life, the "descent of man" from primordial slime by way of the lemur or the ape, and the non-existence of any supernatural power that had devised, or could determine, a code of morality in which certain things were eternal and other than the variable reactions of very highly developed animals to experience and environment, it had given weighty support to the increasingly popular movement towards democracy in theory and in act.

Its greatest contribution, however, was its argument that, since the invariable law of life was one of progressive evolution, therefore the acquired characteristics which formed the material of evolution, and were heritable, could be mechanically increased in number by education; hence the body of inheritance (which unfortunately varied as between man and man because of past discrepancies in environment, opportunities, and education) could be equalised by a system of teaching that aimed to furnish that mental and physical training hitherto absent.

Whether the case was ever so stated in set terms does not matter; very shortly this became the firm conviction of the great mass of men, and the modern democracy of method is based on the belief that all men are equal because they are men, and that free, compulsory, secularised, state-controlled education can and does remove the last difference that made possible any discrimination in rights and privileges as between one man and another.

When, therefore, modernism achieved its grand climacteric in July 1914, we had on the one hand an imperialism of force, in industry, commerce, and finance, expressing itself through highly developed specialists, and dictating the policies and practices of government, society, and education; on the other, a democracy of form which denied, combated, and destroyed distinction in personality and authority in thought, and eliminated constructive leadership in the intellectual, spiritual, and artistic spheres of activity. The opposition was absolute, the results catastrophic. The almost complete lack of competent leadership in every category of life finds a sufficient explanation in the two opposed forces, in their origin and nature, and in the fact of their opposition.

II.

The absolute and unescapable inequality that exists between men, in character, intelligence, and capacity, is fundamental. It cannot be obviated by education and environment, or by the inheritance of characteristics so acquired, because it is due to certain values that inhere in race, whether the word applies to the ethnic group, or to the family as this is permanently determined through the male line of descent.

Let us take the most obvious concrete examples. There are certain ethnic units or races which for periods ranging from five hundred to two thousand years have produced *character*, and through character the great contributions that

have been made to human culture and have been expressed through men of distinction, dynamic force, and vivid personality. Such, amongst many, are the Greeks, the Jews, the Romans, the Normans, the Franks, the "Anglo-Saxons," and the Celts. There are others that in all history have produced nothing. There are certain family names which are a guarantee of distinction, dynamic force, and vivid personality; almost at random I will take Lee, Adams, Walsh, Cecil, de Hauteville, but as samples only. There are thousands of these names, and they are to be found amongst all the races that have contributed towards the development of culture and civilisation. On the other hand, there are far more patronymics that have produced nothing distinctive, and probably never will; for obvious reasons, examples are not quoted.

What is the reason for this? Is it the result of blind chance, of accidents that have left certain races and families isolated in stagnant eddies from which some sudden current of a whimsical tide might sweep them out into the full flood of progress, until they then overtook and passed their hitherto successful rivals, who, in their turn, would drift off into progressive incompetence and degeneracy? Not at all; it is by precisely this process that life advances, in man as well as in other forms of existence. By no association with man, or through any other formative influence, would the hippopotamus, the hog, or the hen develop along the lines that have characterised the evolution of the deer, the dog, or the horse. In my garden the pigweed, the burdock, the purslane (blessed with notable vital force and prolific powers of reproduction) have, I am persuaded, made no notable advance towards an ultimate perfection during the thousands of years of their existence, nor, I am equally convinced, would any fostering on my part produce any appreciable acceleration. On the other hand, rose and gladiolus, lily, pæony, iris, seem always striving towards further perfection—a condition that is none too easily achieved, and is unstable at best, since only carefully guarding can resist the steady pull of reversion to type. In the wet ground by the brook, fringed gentian and skunk's cabbage grow side by side—the one sensitive, continent, difficult of propagation; the other gross, primitive, indestructible. Are their race-values the same?

It is both unsafe and unwise to press too far analogies between the brute and the plant on the one hand and man on the other, for in the latter case a new factor enters—or rather two, mind and soul—which must modify all deductions; but to a certain definite extent the parallel is exact. There are

certain races, such as the Hottentot, the Malay, the American Indian; and mixed bloods, as the Mexican peons and the Mongol-Slavs of a portion of South-Eastern Europe, that, so far as recorded history is concerned, are either static or retrogressive. There are family units, poverty-stricken and incompetent, in Naples, Canton, East Side New York; or opulent and aggressive in West Side New York, in Birmingham, Westphalia, Pittsburgh, that are no more subject to the cultural and character-creating influences of education and environment—beyond a certain definite point—than are the amphibians of Africa or the rampant weeds of my garden.

This is a hard saying and a provocative. The entire course of democratic theory, of humanitarian thought, and of the popular type of scientific speculation stands against it, and the Christian religion as well, unless the statement itself is guarded by exact definitions. If the contention of the scientific materialist were correct, and the thing that makes man, and that Christians call the immortal soul, were but the result of physical processes of growth and differentiation, then slavery would be justifiable, and exploitation a reasonable and inevitable process. Since, however, this assumption of materialism is untenable, and since all men are possessed of immortal souls between which is no distinction in the sight of God, the situation, regrettable if you like, is one which at the same time calls for the exercise of a higher humanitarianism than that so popular during the last generation, and for a very drastic revision of contemporary political and social and educational methods.

The soul of man is the localisation of divinity; in a sense each man is a manifestation of the Incarnation. Black or white, conspicuous or obscure, intelligent or stupid, offspring of a creative race or bound by the limitations of one that is static or in process of decay, there is no difference in the universal claim to justice, charity, and opportunity. The soul of a Cantonese river-man, of a Congo slave, of an East Side Jew, is in itself as essentially precious and worth saving as the soul of a bishop, of a descendant of a Norman viking or an Irish king, or as that of a volunteer soldier in the armies of France or Great Britain or the United States.

Here lies absolute and final equality, and the State, the Law, the Church are bound to guard this equality in the one case and the other with equal force; indeed, those of the lower racial and family types claim even more faithful guardianship than those of the higher, for they can accomplish less for themselves and by themselves. But the fundamental

and inseparable inequality, in intellect, in character, and in capacity, which I insist is one of the conditioning factors in life, was vociferously denied but ruthlessly enforced by the very people that will be the first to denounce any re-statement of what is after all no more than a patent fact.

A little less enthusiasm for shibboleths, and a little more intelligent regard for history and palpable conditions, will show that the assumed equality between men "on the strength of their manhood alone," the sufficiency of education for correcting the accidental differences that show themselves, and the scheme of life that is worked out along democratic lines on the basis of this essential (or potential) equality, are "fond things vainly imagined," not unconnected with the origin of the war, which must be radically modified before the world can begin a sane and wholesome building-up after the great purgation.

That equality between men which exists by virtue of the presence in each of an immortal soul, involves an even distribution of justice and the protection of law, without distinction of persons, but it does not involve the admission of a claim to equality of action, or the denial of varied status, since race-values, both of the *gens* and of blood, invariably enter in to establish differences in character, in intelligence, and in capacity, which cannot be permanently changed by education, environment, or heredity.

Disregard of these race-values is one of the gross follies of the epoch of modernism. Until very recent times they were as instinctively recognised as they were universal in their operation. The doctrine of a "chosen people" was sound. The Jews were such for a time; so were the Greeks, the Romans, the Franks, the Normans, the English, each in turn. So, we believe, are not the Prussians, and the war is being fought to prove whether or no they are right in their arrogant claim. Precisely the same thing is true in the case of primary units of race, *i.e.* those continuous streams of tendency that are called "families." Until these special and very intensified exponents of the *élan vital* are recognised and availed of, society will continue along the present line of mediocrity, constantly tending to ever lower and lower stages of retrogression.

III.

I offer the following suggestions as to the process that is very possibly followed in the creation and maintaining of these special race-values, whether in the family or the *gens*.

It will be generally admitted that de Vries has disproved the original Darwinian theory of the origin of species through the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest, *i.e.* "natural selection." Weismann has conclusively shown that acquired characteristics are not transmitted, and are not heritable. In the light of these two revolutions in scientific thought there seems little left of the Darwinian theory of the *method* of evolution, and of the popular evolutionary philosophy. However this may be, it now seems clear that new species arise through "mutation," that is to say, suddenly, without transitional forms, regardless of environment, and as the result of the action of some unexplained energy or impulse. This unpredictable variation is thereafter constant, breeding true to seed, for it is germinal and not merely somatic. These new species are constant because the germ-plasm (or race-value) is powerful and of a high order, although, as Professor Walter says, "of course actual characters are never inherited, but only the determiners or potentialities which regulate the way in which the organism reacts to its environment or training with respect to the characters in question." Professor Conklin has expressed this more briefly when he says: "Wooden legs are not inherited, but wooden heads are."

Now, man forms the genus, races are the species, and in each race distinct families of marked character are sub-species. In the midst of a completely undifferentiated race (which we will describe in Chesterton's phrase of "Hudge and Gudge") suddenly appears a man of novel quality, in character, intelligence, and capacity; he establishes what we may call the "Lee type" (or Adams, or Walsh, for that matter), and from that moment there is a new and constant species, the tendency of which is to "come true to seed." No amount of persistent intermarrying, no vicissitudes in fortune or change in environment, can transform the species "Adams" into the quite different species Cabot or Codman, Edwards or Sanborn, to take for example a few very highly differentiated New England families. The variations that occur, the sports, are incessant, but they are sporadic and do not persist; after one generation the return to type is regular and obvious.

It would appear that the reason is this. According to Galton's "Law of Regression," like produces like, *i.e.* parents of high race value produce *plus* children, of low race-value *minus* children, of average value average children; but only mediocrity can be absolutely counted on, the children of *plus* or *minus* parents tending towards the average unless in each generation there is an influx of germ-plasm, strong or weak as

the case may be, which serves to arrest the constant tendency towards mediocrity. Now, in the case of man, at least, the species is determined through the male line; the father fixes the persistent type, but the mother may, in accordance with her own race-value, arrest the tendency towards the average, or accelerate it, while she contributes an influence to her own offspring frequently stronger than that of the father, but without persistence, and liable to die out in the second generation. For example, if a man of highly developed racial or family type marries a woman of much lower degree, the children she bears may show a preponderance of her own family characteristics. In the next generation the paternal character will tend to reassert itself, but vigorously only if mating has been with individuals of high race-value; if with a low type it may not show at all, if with an average type then only feebly. As between male and female children, the paternal type is most persistent in the former. Through a succession of matings with women of a lower type this may be almost completely submerged for several generations, only to show itself again in all its original force the moment a high race-value enters to make it operative again. Conversely, if a woman of high race-value marries a man of low grade, she may by the very force of her own racial inheritance negative the influence of the father and produce children of her own paternal type. Here also in the next generation, while the low values of the father will tend to reassert themselves, they may be impeded by alliances with high types, though with equal, or lower, they are sure to reappear, with a general tendency to the average.

Precisely the same thing holds in the *gens*, the race as a whole. Suddenly, in a generation or two, out of a general condition of barbarism or backwardness appears a vivid manifestation of the *élan vital* in the shape of an irresistible movement forward and upward that transforms the race and sets it on the highway of constructive leadership. New species appear, marked by character, intelligence, and capacity, who found and fix families that persist in producing a succession of men after their own kind. A new civilisation has begun. Now it is possible for the men of this race to take to themselves wives from peoples of a low race-value without permanently endangering the continuity of their own distinct quality; but if, on the other hand, this crescent civilisation is conquered and engulfed by barbarians who kill off many of the males and intermarry with the women of the subjugated nation, then the civilisation perishes through conquest, and the

generations born of conquering barbarians and conquered women will rapidly take on the paternal quality, and the race-value will become that of the victorious males.

Race characteristics are, then, fixed and persistent in the male line, and variations brought about through alliances, though marked and even radical, outlast not two generations. Race-values are of the widest variety, ranging from bad or degenerate, through the mediocre and static, to the highest levels of character, intelligence, and capacity man can possibly attain. Denial of race-values, refusal to profit by them in the organisation and development of society, or action carried out on the theory that education, environment, and cumulative heredity will automatically and quickly wipe out all differences or disparity, will, any one of them, bring civilisation to an end in dishonour and disaster wherever it is attempted.

The existence of a general law does not exclude exceptions. The fact that in the case of human beings we have to consider a powerful factor that does not come into play in the domains of zoology and botany, the immortal soul, makes impossible the drawing of exact deductions from precedents therein established. This determining touch of the Divine, which is no result of biological processes, but stands outside the limitations of heredity and environment and education, may manifest itself quite as well in one class as in another, for "God is no respecter of persons." As has been said above, there is no difference in degree as between immortal souls. The point is, however, that each is linked to a specific congeries of tendencies, limitations, effective or defective agencies, that are what they have been made by the parents of the race. These may be such as enable the soul to triumph in its earthly experience and in its bodily housing; they may be such as will bring about failure and defeat. It is not that the soul builds itself "more stately mansions"; it is that these are provided for it by the physical processes of life, and it is almost the first duty of man to see that they are well built.

Again, the soul is single and personal; as it is not a plexus of inherited tendencies, so it is not heritable, and a great soul showing suddenly in the dusk of a dull race contributes nothing of its essential quality to the issue of the body it had made its house. The stews of a mill town may suddenly be illuminated by the radiance of a Divine soul, to the amazement of profligate parents and the confusion of eugenists; but unless the unsolvable mystery of life has determined on a new species, and so by a sudden influx of the *élan vital* cuts off the line of physical succession and establishes one that is wholly new,

then the brightness dies away with the passing of the splendid soul, and the established race-values resume their sway.

The bearing of this theory on the actions of society is immediate. Through the complete disregard of race-values that has obtained during the last two or three centuries, and the emergence and complete supremacy in all categories of life of human groups of low race-values, civilisation has been brought down to a level where it is threatened with extinction. If recovery is to be effected and a second era of dark ages avoided, there must be an entirely new evaluation of things, a new estimate of the principles and methods that obtained under modernism, and a fearless adventure into new fields that may prove to be not so unfamiliar as at first they would appear.

All the civilisation of man, up to the middle of the seventeenth century, was the result of a scheme of life that, however it may have varied from age to age, took full account of race-values. Preservation of the identity of blood through the male line, primogeniture, the system of aristocracy and class distinctions with definitely fixed status, the rigid and agelong proscription of adultery, all are evidences of the instinctive consciousness that the variation in race-values was very real and equally wide, that the purity of stock must be preserved and its continuance provided for, and finally that character, intelligence, and capacity were in themselves sufficient reason for giving to those who showed these qualities in a high degree, power and acknowledged leadership withheld from the general mass of people. For more than two hundred and fifty years this has all been cast to one side; we have tried to build up a society on what was supposed to be the democratic basis of equality in kind, in potential ability, and in political, social, intellectual, and spiritual rights and privileges.

IV.

If race-values are as real and vital as I assert history and experience prove them to be, what are the most salient reversals of judgment and practice that we are bound to undertake? It would appear that they are as follows:—

First. Every people must jealously guard the purity of its stock by stringent regulations restricting the immigration of those of low race-values. There are blends that produce only good, as the Norman and the "Anglo-Saxon," the Celt and the Frank, but even these cannot be permitted to the point where there is no one dominant racial quality. As for certain other combinations, as the westerner and the oriental, the

black and the white, they are intolerable and should under no circumstances be permitted. When reason comes again to the world, the course followed by the United States in permitting free immigration of low stocks and the free mating of alien bloods and of high and low race-values, will be looked on as a folly approaching the magnitude of a historic crime.

Second. Families of high race-values must consciously guard their heritage and contend for its preservation. Even if it is true that race follows the name, and that an alliance with a lower type tends only towards a temporary degeneration, reversion to type being constant, it is probably also true that a long-continued series of such alliances will in the end break down the vigour of the paternal stock and, if carried far enough, extinguish it altogether. Change of name, by legal process, is a thing that cannot be permitted in a community that has due regard to its own welfare. This process, whereby, during the last generation, every civilised country has been overrun by aliens masquerading under names old in honour and high in quality, names to which they have no shadow of right, and the bearing of which deceives the public and injures those whose names have been borrowed, is one for which no excuse exists. England and America have suffered particularly from this form of adulteration, and Russia as well. If the Bolsheviki had worked under their real names rather than in the deceitful light of the Slavic cognomens they had assumed, their nature would have been more obvious and their tolerance on the part of well-meaning but ill-advised enthusiasts somewhat less marked. If Jukes is to become Edwards, if Goldstein is to become Endicott, if Miklosich is to become Randolph, if Trotsky is to change again and become Fitzgerald, if (after the war) von Tirpitz is to become Dana, then, apart from certain not always conspicuous physical differentiations on which Nature wisely insists, we have no guarantee against the adulteration that has gone so far towards substituting the mongrel in place of the pure racial type.

Third. Radical difference in character, intelligence, and capacity, as between races, families, and individuals—a difference that cannot be altered by education, environment, or experience—must be accepted as a basis of social organisation, and recognised in the distribution of rights, privileges, and duties. The many inventions of doctrinaire “democrats,” that have made a wonder of political and social theory and practice during the last generation, must be abandoned. One man can *not* do a thing as well as another. A legislator is quite

as highly specialised a personality as the president of a railway, or an opera singer, or a professor of mathematics. Leadership in government, in religion, in philosophy, in society, in art, is for the special few just as it is in the army, or at the Bar, or in the case of a symphony orchestra. It is not that we want highly trained experts, for these (under our present system) are only too often an indifferent type of silk purse. It is that man needs, society demands, and civilisation perishes without competent leadership; and competent leadership means character, intelligence, capacity. Leaders are born, not made. Life demands that they shall be born, and that when born they shall be given opportunity for service, and not relegated to ineffectiveness through the interference of a false and foolish philosophy.

He who ventures the word "aristocracy" is *ipso facto* under the ban, but it is a real aristocracy that we must have if we are to be saved—such an aristocracy as made Athens a living force in history, and every succeeding people that has produced great things, great lives, great ideals. Not an aristocracy of intellect, as some have surmised, for in snobbery and futility this would be second only to the aristocracy of cash. Not an aristocracy of material force, either military or civil, nor an aristocracy of artificial caste. All these substitutes have been tried from time to time, in Rome, China, India, Great Britain, the United States, for man demands an aristocracy just as he demands leadership. All have completely failed, for all have disregarded the fact of radical variation in race-values. There is no sound basis for aristocracy except this, and the condition is recognised in all human history, except at those recurrent periods when a high civilisation had achieved its climacteric and had begun to coast down the swift glissade of devolution. We have now as arrant an "aristocracy" as ever existed; we had to have this, for such is the method of Nature. When the old aristocracy was largely extinguished, and when the inclinations, instincts, and theories of the new racial force in the world forbade a restoration along the old lines, we built up a new aristocracy of power, the ingredients of which were wealth, sharpness, assurance, and unscrupulousness. It has been as insolent, oppressive, and tyrannical as the elder aristocracy at its worst, but it has possessed none of the constructive and civilising qualities of the elder aristocracy at its best.

RALPH ADAMS CRAM.

BOSTON.

A WORKER ON HIS HOME.

G. BUTCHER.

WE are born under the one sky, we enjoy and suffer the same winds, the grass has the same greenness for all, the water flows as readily for one as the other, the sun shines for the just and the unjust, the seasons come and go, and we all enjoy or grumble in common. The conditions of birth cannot be changed for anyone. Yet humanity has to undergo astonishing differences.

The importance of the housing question cannot too often be called to mind. It is now becoming recognised that a drastic change in the comfort of the people is necessary. We have got compulsion in many things, even to compel a man to risk his life. But there is no compulsion to house a man properly, and thus save him from agony of the mind and body. The builder of houses is tied to a building line in regard to projections, and presumably to some minimum of sanitation; the sanity of the human mind, however, is not dealt with till the individual's mind is gone. Several families in one small house, one street door (ever open), one common staircase, other things in common, never-ending strife and the jostling of the throng,—such facts as these are forgotten or taken for granted. The wealthy man has a town house to himself, and perhaps one in the country too; he often feels the need to get away to obtain peace of mind and seclusion from the madding crowd. The worker, however, is confined to his too humble lodging, surrounded by restless humanity; there is no harbour of refuge for him, no real rest of the mind or body. Apart from having the enjoyment of a whole house, the rich man has his den, where it is understood he must not be disturbed. Very little respect does the poor man receive; he has a difficulty in respecting himself. Coarseness, crowding, and noise are his portion. Unrest, so often spoken of at the present time, is largely

due to the want of proper housing; unrest, indeed, is due to the impossibility of resting. Attention is often called to the popularity of the cinema, but, apart from its attraction, the distraction of the house is often responsible for many going to such places. The people need something to lull the mind; the fullness of life is denied them. They have practically no possessions, no privacy, no mooring-stage where they can pull up and refit for the morrow. Like "Poor Joe," they are ever on the move. Many think that if the people are given better conditions they will misuse them. How are they to be trained into decency if they do not get the proper requirements? The war has brought about many things. It has forced the worker to think and to awake to his deprivations. In addition he has been given something, an allotment, his own for the time being, where he can produce and have the pleasure of possessing, and is thus brought face to face with the joy of expansion and the love of life. We are even now compelled to do many things: it should be compulsory for the worker to be housed in a complete and sensible habitation; it should be compulsory that a decent working man should be able to obtain the means of living as a man. That we have progressed is true, but too slowly; private enterprise has done something, but not with sufficient completeness. We must credit some with having tried to overcome the evil; the failure in many instances has been the want of direction. Houses outwardly pleasing are inwardly shams and makeshifts—very little cupboard room, little or no accommodation for coal, and domestic building-economy carried too far, producing irritation of the mind and body. The man who is anxious to use his spare time in useful occupation is doomed to disappointment. Houses that have outlived their original purpose should not be turned into human warrens. It is a pitiable sight to see children running out of such buildings, preferring the liberty of the gutter to the oppression of the house. Comfort and beauty both in surroundings and mind must be secured, and the soul-sickness stopped. The people must have some of the real things of life. Many houses no longer suiting the times are to be seen empty in even crowded districts, yet thousands of worthy citizens are made weary seeking for honest shelter. The harsh voice and corrupt language of the poor dweller are the outcome of hard living and constant bodily compression, and the never-ending bickerings, making the composure of the mind and tongue a difficulty.

The good the children derive from their schooling is much undermined by their home surroundings. The poor man is often told that he can move out to the suburbs (and there also the houses leave something to wish for); but why not absorb some of the wasted space occupied by empty houses that will never find the tenants desired by the owners? Why penalise the man too much who can ill afford the time and money for travelling?

The Housing and Town Planning Act was passed in 1900. Under it local authorities are empowered to provide well-built and sanitary houses. Very comforting to read, but it would be still more so if one could read that they had been designed to provide the interior domestic requirements of a house. Something more is required than the ideal-exterior house, which often reminds the thinker of the "spider and the fly" story, which the tenants are soon aware of when they find themselves in the web of makeshift. Too much has been left to chance. Definite house-planning and not deadly profiteering must provide for the people. To preserve the mother and the child the home must be improved. The surgeon does not lose the patient in order to save the limb; the limb has to go. Paltry property must cease; to keep it means stifling the natural and spiritual growth of men and women.

Something must be done for the buffeted souls who want to live rightly in the sight of Heaven and man. We have many things that are beneficial. Public libraries—they might be more airy and less adapted for those suffering from insomnia. Public washhouses are in most cases too much of a casual-ward type and frowsy, and often superintended by bumbledom, as are too many places. Thus those who respect themselves are shut out from what they contribute to. We now have the allotments, which it is hoped peace will extend rather than destroy. Is it too much to expect local workshops where the budding home could be built up by articles made in spare time? The idea may cause resentment in the trades, but there is no doubt that the individual workman would benefit. The fertile mind would produce useful and beautiful articles, much superior to the trashy pieces sold at a ridiculously high price, and turned out like sausages. The now dormant minds would introduce a variety of ideas for tradesmen to carry out, lessening the soulless machinery which is so destructive to initiative. That the people can invent and carry out when they get the opportunity is obvious. The recent encouragement to use the land has produced a variety of useful home-made articles quite interesting to see. And where men have been able to obtain decent dwellings, an increase in the fertility of the mind can

be noted. The people should be encouraged to live, and not to waste their time fretting behind bars. Indeed, they are so hemmed in that for them there is only a monotonous pacing round of the cell. Individuals at war with themselves and others do not recognise the fact that the cause is often in their home surroundings.

To be able to live in peace means the solving of many evils. When working people are in a position to deal with such underlying causes, then many other changes will be brought about. One is greater self-respect; and, could we get that firmly established, we need not trouble about the welfare of the country; the foundation for the building up of the nation will be laid. For many, to be able to think means waiting for the lulls in daily battles, and the lulls are not too frequent. The establishment for the worker should be entirely complete, enabling the man to feel that he is in possession. As is well known, many individuals cannot live in harmony with others, and this proves the necessity of separate dwellings. The man who can keep his door closed at his will is more apt to become a good citizen. Allowing that the pressure of circumstances adds to the difficulties of surmounting evils, at least let us recognise what are the real things, so that we know our objective; and even if we halt, let it be with our faces towards the objective.

Education, housing, and other social liberties seem only to progress when the groaning, squirming weight of the masses gets sufficient movement. Then an attempt is made to shepherd the people, not always in the direction they should go, but by a slight incline. This perhaps just stops an explosion, but not the bubbling. Little seems to be done for the people except by their own boring, which, owing to their inadequate means, lengthens the process of evolution. Instead of evolution being assisted, it is retarded as much as possible by many who could help, but are held back by selfish motives. It should not be left so much to the people to have to force progress. The requirements of the times should be openly acknowledged by those on the so-called vantage-ground, and the co-operation of the people asked, thus bringing about a mutual self-help movement and encouraging respect and trust. The beaming recognition that the people exist should always be ready; they should not be forgotten until they are required. People kept back by darkness and suppression are ever ready to sweep away the walls; and this means waste of time, owing to the necessary rebuilding.

G. BUTCHER.

THE ETHICS OF INTERCOURSE.

WILLIAM KINGSLEY TARPEY.

[THIS article, the author of which is no longer living, was written before the outbreak of the War. The following estimate of Mr Tarpey is from the pen of Dr Greville Macdonald :—

“I had not known W. Kingsley Tarpey for many years, but it took only a few hours of this time to discover a deep love for him—a love that stood unshakable, though our meetings were neither frequent nor of length. He was of that clarity of nature whereby no one to whom he opened his doors would find any dark place in his habitation. Never have I known a man of more entire honesty, so fearless, moreover, that those who understood him best knew it to be quite heroic. He set this Truth high above him, and worshipped all that was beautiful. Again and again did he refuse the kingdoms of this world, because to accept them would be to deny the Truth he worshipped. Indeed, such was the brilliance of his intellectual gifts that the world lay at his feet for him to take if he would. He was, nevertheless, a man of the world ; he moved in it, used it for what it was worth, scorned it for what it pretended its worth to be ; he read its book through and through, needing no other light than that of his own clear eyes ; and the world called him a dreamer. Though he made no claim to religious conviction, his whole life—and I knew it better than he would have thought possible—was essentially spiritual in tone and thought and action. It is because the mad world does hold a few men and women as finely sane as Kingsley Tarpey that those who are fortunate in such friendship cannot but believe the True and Beautiful to be essential and eternal.

“I met my friend oftenest at a small fortnightly gathering of kindred minds—all different in work, politics, religion, and outlook, yet all more or less intent upon somehow getting at the truth of things. Tarpey was, in his gentle, simple way, great among us. His beauty of style, his choice of word, his delicacy of perception, stood forth conspicuously whenever he joined in the debate. He saw instantly and clearly where lay the crux of a disagreement, and so could bring opponents together upon a common ground. None of us will readily forget an address he gave us on “The Ethics of Intercourse.”

“I do not remember, in these meetings, that he gave us any clue to the really mystic quality of his mind—a quality that rather fortifies than weakens a fearless outlook upon affairs. Yet in this quality he was like his country ; and a fine capacity for using sorrow as an illuminant of truth gave him at times that power of understanding which is felt in the twilight rather than revealed in the midday. It is well to remember also how strenuous a politician was Tarpey—Home Ruler and Radical, yet individualist in his fine belief in the rights of the man as integral in the national spirit. His command of fact, his

unflinching faith in his creed, and his argumentative gifts had brought him to the fore in the political world had he been so minded. But, if Kingsley Tarpey had a fault, it will be found in this, that it did not interest him greatly to use his gifts for his own advancement. The interest of his life lay in his worship of the Truth and his craftsmanship in giving it expression.”]

IT is only in our private personal intercourse with our fellow-beings that we can practise what I may call the lesser moralities. By virtue of the very institution of English—or I may say civilised—society, the greater moralities are necessarily a dead letter. Our whole political, economic, and social system excludes us from the practice, and restricts us severely to the pious profession, of them. To be moral in any large sense is beyond our individual power, parts as we are of a huge un-moral, or *immoral*, machine. In the few and rare oases where those of us who can enjoy any appreciable amount of leisure and detachment from the competitive business of life may from time to time repose, we may beguile the hour by playing at the practice of the miniature moralities, somewhat after the fashion of children who revel in military campaigning with fortifications and toy soldiers on the sands. So far removed are we by the conditions of our daily life from moral conceptions of any amplitude, that I for one should find some difficulty in stating with anything like scientific accuracy what exactly the greater moralities are. A rough catalogue, sufficient for one's purpose, may perhaps be found within the terms of an ancient code, now popularly known as “the Ten Commandments,” which is, I believe, recited in our churches on at least one day in every week. Religion, of some kind, is there inculcated—that is to say, the worship of a God. And religion, of some kind, we do indeed as a nation profess; we even go so far as to endow it. But “religion” is a word of many meanings; and perhaps its least worthy, certainly its least living and practical, meaning is that of a belief in supernatural powers, and a hope of a super-terrestrial existence. To some such vague belief and hope as this, the “religion” of the vast majority of our fellows is confined. Now, speculation as to a God or Gods, as to supernatural intelligences, future existences, and so forth—essays, in fact, by beings of three dimensions to express themselves in terms of problematical beings of four dimensions—must strike many thinking people as, at the least, waste of time. I say “at the least”; for it may be even worse than waste of time. The withdrawal of our minds from the tangible, the visible, the intelligible, to the consideration of the vague, the unseen, the incomprehensible, the possibly non-

existent, may well result in a warping of our mental vision in its outlook upon things which undoubtedly are.

Of religion in the sense of a philosophy of life, or a rule of conduct, one cannot, I think, find any trace either in our churches, our homes, or our market-places. The particular set of maxims and precepts which we profess to follow are those of Christ. Now, Christ himself was a moral and religious enthusiast, in no way a constructive philosopher. Had he been such—had he, in fact, been less unworldly, less *other-worldly*—he might have founded a religion that would have been at the same time something of a social system. In that case, it is possible that history would not have had to record the strangest anomaly that Western civilisation presents: the spectacle of the most aggressively military, predatory, and keenly commercial peoples the world has ever known claiming Christ as their spiritual guide. A community that should in reality base its conduct upon the teachings of Christ is not absolutely inconceivable, but the authors of such attempts as have been made in that direction have invariably been branded by Christendom as maniacs. One of the greatest men of our own generation strives hard to form his life, and to induce others to form their lives, on the Christian model, with this result, among others—that he is excommunicated by the so-called Church of Christ. I daresay many of us have known *some* men or women who really endeavoured in some degree to put Christ's principles into practice in their daily lives. If they have been saved from starvation, it has only been by the forcible intervention of their personal friends. Despite some trifling contradictions in the imperfect versions at our command, Christ's utterances are not ambiguous on the whole; their spirit is remarkably clear and unmistakable. The Western world at large professes to be guided by his principles, uses them as mottoes, solemnly listens to their reverent enunciation on Sundays, and then with calm self-approval pursues a life which in its every aim and detail is the explicit and absolute denial of them. Custom cannot stale one's amazement.

Such being, roughly, the condition of religion in this country, let us glance at some other aspects of morality. There is one department of it that with us is regarded as of such paramount importance that it is even allowed, in common speech, to arrogate to its exclusive use the general title. The ordinary man, when he speaks of morals, means one thing, and one thing only. The importance we assign to morality in this sense is in direct proportion to, and is probably the result

of, our own opinion of our high standard in the matter. I think it is fair to say that nine out of ten English men and women will maintain that we are a highly moral nation. I do not feel particularly interested in an international comparison, which would seem to me to resemble a foot-race in which all the competitors should be more or less cripples. It is, perhaps, more pertinent to consider the width of the gulf that separates our conventions, our professions, our decorous appearances, from our practice. Whether our professed standard of morality in this sense be or be not a high one, do we, or do we not, act up to it? If laws, or conventions, or the accident of circumstance, to any extent compel us, at least externally, to *act* up to it, do we *live* up to it in will and intention? Are we not in effect, more than half of us, just as immoral as we dare to be? Is not the most compelling force that keeps us outwardly moral the fear of begetting children? And, when all causes have been analysed, what is the ultimate basis of that fear but an artificial, congested social and economic condition that warns us to limit the increase of population in a land already over-peopled? And is a moral order so based the proper object of a high respect? Look, then, at the obverse of our boasted marriage law—for one thing, the excesses committed within the respectable pale of that law: a lack of self-control no less reprehensible than if it were to exhibit itself in the wildest promiscuity. For another, look at our streets, and see how the virtue of our moral women is purchased at the price of their sisters' shame and degradation. And if I were asked for a simple test that would indicate, as in a flash, how far our society yet lags behind any worthy ideal of civilisation in this matter of the relation of the sexes, I would find it in the attitude of mind in which the majority of us stand towards the act of generation, the process of birth. Here, surely, is Nature's most wonderful mystery; here is the most momentous occurrence in the sequence of natural events; here is Nature, and we may well conceive of her striving ever to produce the progressively more perfect; here are we dedicated, if we are worthy children of hers, to her service—weighted, as every responsible thinking being must be, with the one task proper to humanity: each in his own small place and degree to make and leave the world ever so little better than he found it;—and how do most of us look on this process, which, if anything ever was, is worthy to be called a sacrament? Between the sexes, as something darkly wicked, told furtively, alluded to as sin, forbidden fruit, at which one stealthily nibbles; in the boon companionship of casual intercourse, as

the appropriate subject of coarse jests, grins, and all kinds of mocking allusions and indecent anecdotes.

“Thou shalt not kill—thou shalt not steal.” These precepts would perhaps be more in consonance with our practice if they were read: “Thou shalt not do these things—unless thou wilt do them on a sufficiently large scale.” It is an amazing thing, the extent to which public and conventional opinion reverences mere magnitude, irrespective of, or even in spite of, quality and essence. Take the familiar social instances. A shopkeeper owning fifteen shops in a row is not therefore fifteen times a shopkeeper; on the contrary, he is probably a baronet and a legislator, and may be a lord—if he is careful and generous enough. The petty grocer is a socially despised being; the monster grocer hobnobs with our aristocracy on more than equal terms. The innkeeper, retailing beer and spirits, is a social nonentity, clearly of the servile class; our peerage reeks of the brewer and the distiller. And so on, through innumerable others. But these are mere society matters, and comparatively unimportant. Unfortunately, it is very much the same in all the regions of serious morality, as it is generally understood. I may not with impunity, as an individual, proceed by direct assault to slaughter my neighbour. Neither may I forcibly seize on his property, even though I should prove to my own and others’ satisfaction that I should manage it very much better than he does. But collectively, as a nation, such things are still thought to be our laudable enterprises. Our individual is admittedly far ahead of our collective morality. We have abolished duelling in this country; private feud, private vengeance, are abhorrent to us; individuals have learnt that their disputes must be brought for settlement to impartial tribunals. Yet we cling to war with a passionate fervour worthy of a sacred cult; and, as a nation, acknowledge as yet no arbiter save our own will and convenience, no restraint save that of superior might.

My reference to the Commandments concerning killing and stealing is made with a view of pointing out the sad fact that, though in one way we, as individuals, neither kill nor steal, yet by the very structure of our society every man and woman of us is compelled, in a sense unhappily only too real, to do little else all day long. I allude, of course, to the competitive system, in the meshes of which every one of us is entangled. I remember being, some years ago, one of a party that was discussing American Trusts, and such things; one of the leading millionaires had just died, and that had set us talking on the subject. I cannot pretend to discriminate very

finely between one manipulator of the markets and another, but I understand that this particular financier was not quite respectable, even according to the easy code of his own class. Some of us were deploring the fact that such a man had wielded immense power. Another of the party said to me: "It's perfectly right, on your own principles. It's evolution, natural selection, survival of the fittest." The *naïveté* of that point of view seemed to me charming and instructive. What, I thought, must be the condition of that society, what must the rest of us be like, if the *fittest* really *was* this millionaire? Many cases, past and present, will readily occur to us, and aid us in forming an estimate of the value to the world of the system that brings such men to the top, and makes them, as it undoubtedly does make them, powers, the strongest powers, in the land. And though the prominent men of the world are *not yet* exclusively millionaires, still the absolute and inevitable prominence and influence of the inordinately moneyed man may well make us doubt whether, under this system, we do really get much of the leading of the fittest in any department, and whether, if there be on earth one ideally best-fitted man for leadership, under the same system his present place of residence must not, for a logical certainty, be the workhouse.

I say this, fully conscious of the existence of those millionaires who may be regarded as individual exceptions, and having in mind that munificent contribution that was made the other day in aid of the cause of peace. That does not really touch the matter at all. A gift such as that goes no further towards solving the question of peace and war than the giving of alms goes to the solution of the problem of poverty. "Whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance; but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that which he hath"! Think of the power of abundance, snowball-like, by mere motion to grow more abundant—of money, as things are, of itself to beget and gather more money. A nod of the head, a stroke of the pen, a word through the telephone, and fabulous sums pass over the green cloth between one and another of the mammoth *gamblers* of the world; while by the same act the livelihood, the very lives, of millions of human beings, the *workers*, are for the moment secured or imperilled. Think then of the hopelessness of poverty, of that hand-to-mouth struggle for mere existence, a struggle that by its very essence is doomed to perpetuity, with no hope for the struggler save an outside accident, a gambling chance that may come, perhaps, to one in a hundred thousand. When we reflect that

for every coin we jingle in our pocket some other man, somewhere, is ruefully contemplating a deficit, that for every morsel of food we eat some other human being is the nearer to starvation, we may get some little idea of how many hundred thousands of wretched lives must be the inevitable obverse of every millionaire. This is what the competitive system means, in plain English—that we live by stealing from one another, outwitting one another; and the best of us are powerless to live otherwise. Personal generosity will not avail, even in a small degree, to rectify the viciousness of the circle in which we move: not if we were to fulfil the Gospel counsel of perfection, to sell all we have, and give to the poor. We should only rob Peter to pay Paul. We cannot endow any other human being with money without at the same time making him, in his degree, and however much against his will, a tyrant over, an arbiter of the destinies of, those who have less than he. In every economic and commercial relation of life, the advantage in dealing is to the longest purse, the largest credit; nor can the possessor of these forgo his advantage so long as he continues in possession. If he is bent on Quixotism, he may renounce the whole thing, thereby handing it over to another who will not scruple to use the advantage, and he may elect himself to become a burden on the State. That is, I think, the utmost that could be done by the virtuously inclined who should desire at present to make a personal protest. The inhabitants of distant countries, members of civilisations vastly different, may ask in wonder—I believe they do—why our so-called civilisation tolerates this madly feverish competition, at once so iniquitous and fraught with such misery to the overwhelming majority of the competitors. The resources of the earth are not exhausted. Man is not yet reduced to the *necessity* of preying on his kind. With a rational system of co-operation and distribution, there is enough for all. No one need want, and no one need hoard. Why does not the down-trodden majority revolt? Partly, no doubt, because of habit, inertia, the sheep-like quality of being content to do their duty, as their more fortunate fellows exhort them to do, in that state of life in which it has pleased Providence to place them. But I fear that a large part of the answer also is that the gambling is an attractive feature. Every man, however poor, is free to think that he may some day attain to great wealth, not realising that by the very fact of his environment; his poverty, his place among the exploited workers, the chances against it are about what I put them at just now—a hundred thousand to one, if indeed that be not an over-sanguine

estimate. For that remote chance, he will endure present misery. Some day, he thinks, it may be *his* to grind the faces of the poor. Perhaps, poor fool, he believes the lying phrase of those who would keep things as they are, that in our system there is an equal chance for all. Napoleon said that every soldier carried a field-marshal's baton in his knapsack. It was certainly to his interest that every soldier should think so, that they might be the more easily cajoled into giving their lives to further his ambitions. And so, I suppose, we may say that every beggar carries a millionaire's cheque-book in his wallet.

It would seem to follow that a man may be entitled to be pronounced a blameless citizen without possessing a single rag of what is really worthy to be called virtue; and that it is only in our capacity of private individual that we can hope, as things are at present, to give any healthy play to our moral energies. The world offers certain pleasures as opiates whereby we may for a time forget the dreariness, the ugliness, the unseemly jostling and scrambling, the cannibalism, of our social economy. Leaving out merely vicious pleasures as barren and unworthy of notice, we find relaxations to suit all tastes. Without pretending to make an exhaustive catalogue, we may say that we have politics, art, literature, science, learning, philanthropy, travel, and sport. Here are hobbies for the million, and, in their different ways, beneficent hobbies—altogether beneficent, unless one is compelled to prostitute any of them to the use of a means of livelihood. But it is of something that is more in the nature of a common possession than any of these can claim to be that I wish to speak. The worthiest and the most universal sweetener of life is, I think, our personal intercourse one with another.

I think that almost every man, when he is approaching the end of life, reviewing it with the clearer eyes of age and experience, asking himself what things in it have been gold and what mere dross to him, will count up his soul's riches very largely in the terms of his friendships; that alike his joyous memories and his regrets will circle strangely and pathetically round the acts and omissions, that seemed so trivial at the time, with which those byways of friendly intercourse were strewn. The peculiar charm of these byways is that here are no fixed, rigid moral laws; here we are free from the curse that attends all definite precepts, that sooner or later they fall to be worshipped and observed in the letter only—the letter that killeth. We can bring to laws no test of their observance save an outward, visible, tangible, and superficial test; for their sanction they must rely on force; and when

we have established the policeman, we have thereby to some extent set aside the higher tribunal of an approving or condemning conscience. By his conformity to external laws, we can test the good or bad man accurately, as by a foot-rule, but always with a doubt whether we have gone to the heart of the matter. In the realms of friendship our tests are at once more vague and more real. Hence, in the affairs of friendship, we hesitate to speak with certainty of good or bad; we use a homelier and more modest term, but one to which we attach a deeper and more genuine meaning. If any of us were asked to choose between two epitaphs, I think the choice would be clear and instantaneous: "He was a good man," or "He was a decent fellow."

To hint at the ethics of personal intercourse is to enter on a field of considerable range and variety; far be it from me to attempt what should pretend to be an adequate survey of it; enough if I offer a few criticisms upon our method of cultivation of the land. I believe that, even to many of the most commonplace, materialistic, and prosaic of us, it is the most dearly cherished plot in the whole expanse of life; and yet I think it is obvious that to the development of its resources we somehow bring a strangely meagre outfit of intelligence, care, and labour. Take, in the first place, our choice of friends. The man who should invariably choose his friends purely on the ground of intellectual, æsthetic, or moral affinity would for a certainty be regarded as eccentric; and yet no other basis of choice is really quite defensible. Shelley, I believe, when he met anyone whom he seemed to recognise as a kindred soul, was in the habit of exclaiming: "Come and live with me for ever!"—a slightly sanguine forecast, perhaps. I would hesitate to apply that supreme test. But let us say a week. Two people, with that mutual magnetism that would unlock their tongues, and enable them to relieve that terrible congested condition of half-articulated thought, to break for a while those conventional bonds of speech by which our thoughts are shackled—enable them, in Meredith's words, to "drink the pure daylight of honest speech,"—might, at any rate, have a delightful week of concentrated companionship. And what a chance for mind-expansion! A man might easily add a cubit to his mental stature. However, very few of us have the pluck to act upon our impulses in this way. If we meet the ideal person one day, on a railway journey, or up a mountain in Switzerland, we don't very often enter on any effective rebellion against the order of things which makes it extremely unlikely that we shall meet him again. We collect

that miscellaneous crowd known as our friends and acquaintances on totally different principles, with the frequent result that we find half of them hostile to us, and three-fourths unmitigated bores. Indeed, for the most part we do not choose them at all, but allow chance, or inheritance, or environment to choose them for us. How many of us spend years in getting rid of the incubus of that collection of estimable people known as "friends of the family"!—people with whom, perhaps, we have not a single thought in common, a lack that is scarcely compensated by the interesting fact that they knew our grandfather. Some of us never get rid of them at all. Then, we allow the mere accident of neighbourhood to affect us in our intimate concerns. Mrs Jones called when we went to live at Clapham; we had hoped she wouldn't, but she did; and so we were let in for the whole tribe of Joneses. Then, we cultivate another set for business reasons, and what we get from them is chiefly good advice, which makes us very angry. Or, we make acquaintances for society reasons, with that laudable instinct for self-improvement which drives us to seek the company of our social superiors; and what a charming, restful, sympathetic, kindly intercourse results from that! And all the while, what has become of the friend we would have chosen on his personal merits, and because of his congeniality to us? "Do you ever see So-and-so now?" "Oh, hardly ever. Since I went to my new office we don't meet at lunch. I see him at MacDonald's evenings sometimes. But I can't get there till half-past eight, and most likely a dull man is reading an interminable paper, and then the other fellows, in an unnecessarily roundabout way, tell him he's an ass. The thing goes on and on, and I have to catch the 10.40, and so as a rule I don't get a word with him." I think this is a very fair sample of the amount of trouble the average man will take about what is, did he know his own mind, one of the most important things in the world to him. I do not wish to be understood as saying that either the choice of friends or the conduct of friendship is a simple matter, or that it is equally easy for all. In the first place, there are some people who are not greatly attracted to personal intercourse, who have, in fact, no intimacy in them, and do not even wish to have it. These are not necessarily hard-hearted people, by any means; on the contrary, many of them are exceptionally kindly and benevolent, often, moreover, converting their kindness and benevolence into action and tangible result. Only, they are perfectly satisfied with the merest conventionalities and superficialities of intercourse, and probably unaware

of the possibility of anything deeper. Pity would be, in one sense, wasted on them, for they are conscious of no loss. We may leave them out of consideration, the more easily because, as I think, they are very few in number. Again, in the matter of choice of friends, there are many who almost passionately desire intimacy, and yet are unhappily not gifted with that spark of intuition which would enable them to recognise at once in what quarters they might look to find, or not to find, congenial companionship. Indeed, very often they cannot achieve this even after long and ardent searching. To those who have anything of the passion for intimate friendship, this intuition is a gift of infinite value. Some people are so fortunate as to possess it in almost dog-like manner and degree—the instinct of liking and that of disliking. If I have learnt thoroughly any one lesson of life, it is this: that those who have this instinct should thank God, and trust it blindly. Very often the light is so clear that one might as well argue against the sun at noonday; and the man who, having such a guide as this, will elect to walk, in Carlyle's phrase, by his own farthing rushlight of reason, will deserve the failure that will probably attend his footsteps. This intuition does not, so far as I am aware, necessarily go along with any exceptionally deep heart-quality in its possessor. I have known good-hearted people, genuinely desirous of friendships, who were quite devoid of it, and others, not to be compared with them in heart-quality, who had it in a marked degree.

Among the forces that militate against friendship is, of course, mankind's perverse habit of mutual suspicion, which operates chiefly at the beginning of a friendship, that is to say, prevents its beginning at all, and sometimes wrecks a friendship already flourishing. This unfortunate habit of mind is, I take it, the direct result of those social evils of which I have already spoken at quite sufficient length. It is almost impossible for us utterly to cleanse ourselves from the stains of the world-struggle, where our hand is against every man, and every man's hand against us. For my part, so far from wondering that we are suspicious of each other's motives, I think it is far more wonderful, in the circumstances, that any scrap of trust or affection can survive among us. And yet this habit of attributing sinister motives is, when we come to think of it, a strange one. We all know perfectly well that half the things we ourselves say and do are said and done with the simplest and most direct and innocent motives, and that nearly all of the other half have no motive at all, but are just dropped out or done accidentally, on the spur of

the moment, without any deliberate or conscious intention whatever. About once a fortnight, perhaps, or once a month, we say or do something that represents anything like a deep-laid scheme. Yet we go about suspecting deep-laid schemes in every third word or act of our neighbour. We really need to exercise the very widest and largest charity of interpretation, if we would even begin to do justice to our neighbours' motives, which are, just like our own, ninety-nine times out of a hundred either perfectly simple and friendly, or utterly non-existent. I have known one or two men, with brains fit to be put to a far better use, who occupied themselves in spelling out character in this appalling way, putting every possible and impossible construction on this or that word or phrase, while the plain fact was that the unfortunate speaker, like most of us, was at the worst maladroit in his choice of language—not that the very nicest discrimination in the choice of one's language could ever quite save one from the toils of the motive-hunter. The fact is, we all do and say at times, by accident, things quite unrepresentative of us, and if our friends had no better light to read us by, we should often fare badly indeed. This habit of logical deduction from things said and done is the deadliest enemy to friendship; it is the more insidious because it poses, often successfully, as just and reasonable; it is highly specious; and, what fascinates the man who is addicted to it, it is often damnably clever. The motive-hunter is, of all men, the most irrelevant and destructive intruder in this fair domain.

Of course the motive most commonly ascribed by one man to another is the vulgarly mercenary. It is astonishing to what an extent it is taken as a matter of course that everyone else's motives may be mercenary, while we ourselves, *for* ourselves, would scout such a supposition. Indeed, we affect to think that, for another, there is no discredit in it. That seems a pity, for, if we frankly thought it discreditable, perhaps we should not so easily impute it. The mere fact of glaring inequality of means often operates to make a friendship between two people antecedently impossible. It seems strangely difficult for some people to get rid of the conviction that a poor man *must* be mercenary, in spite of the obvious consideration that if he *were* mercenary, he would probably not have remained a poor man. The poor man, of course, feels keenly this atmosphere of suspicion; he exaggerates its density, and wraps himself, therefore, in a double coating of pride. The very rich man, unless he is so fortunate as to possess that magical intuition I have referred to, is necessarily

suspicious of the motives of everyone who approaches him. I fancy that, even if he does possess the intuition, he trusts it more rarely than other people do. I remember a play being produced, the title of which was *The Lonely Millionaires*. I do not know whether or not, for the play in question, the title was a happy one, for I did not see it; but it struck me as happy in one way. I do not know personally a large number of millionaires, but most of those I do know *are* lonely, cut off as they are by this haunting suspicion from easy, unembarrassed communication with their fellows. Meanwhile, the unprejudiced, impartial observer of life will wonder why on earth a money service should be placed on a different footing from any other office of friendship. We will undertake long journeys for a friend's sake; we will spend hours and days using influence on his behalf; if he is ill, we will do his work for him in addition to our own; we will spend nights by his bedside, if that may be of any use; we will give him presents—in kind. Services such as these will be freely offered and frankly taken. But should his need be merely pecuniary, awkwardness, false shame, embarrassment even, sudden or gradual estrangement, may very well be the result of the passing from one to another of a paltry five-pound note. So deeply and widely rooted is this silly superstition about money, that I fancy there is scarcely one of us that has not known of cases of men who have preferred suicide to the solicitation of the smallest favours of this kind, though they may have had troops of friends to whom the service would have been a mere trifle, and a joy to them to render. I confess that, as things are, I do not greatly blame the poor man. I think both attitudes of mind unreasonable and deplorable, but I must say I find myself more in sympathy with the poor man's pride than the rich man's suspicion.

There is another potent influence that stands in the way of intercourse, and makes friendship difficult. It is a peculiarly British product, or at least it is so much more carefully cultivated in this country than in any other that it may fairly be called a national property. I allude to the vice of shyness. I am aware that shyness is not generally regarded as a vice; I have often heard it described as a virtue. But, then, we must remember that we have a pleasant way of regarding all our qualities as virtues. When we wish to claim honour and credit for this one, we call it, in a reverential tone that rebukes the levity and shallowness of other nations, English reserve. We are very proud of it. There is supposed to be something very noble, very manly, very thorough and sincere about this

reserve. I take the liberty of thinking that it has its origin partly at least in slowness of apprehension, dull-wittedness. The average Englishman is not sufficiently quick of perception to be quick of response ; he therefore makes a virtue of necessity, and wraps himself in a dignified superiority and aloofness. He is contemptuous of all people who wear their hearts upon their sleeves or have quick and nimble wits. The extravagant demonstrations of emotion indulged in by the Frenchman, the geniality and ready humour of the Irishman, he regards as somewhat in the nature of monkey tricks, and the people who play them are to him more or less mountebanks. He is firm in the notion that no solidity of character can go along with such manifestations, and that they are a palpable proof of insincerity. It never seems to strike him that his own concealment of his feelings may quite as justly be held to be insincerity. And, even if his view of the demonstrative peoples were right, insincerity for insincerity, which is the least blameworthy—that which springs from the desire to get into sympathy with one's fellows, to be genial, to make the occasion pleasant, or that which is the result of a morbid fear of coming into touch with another personality, and prefers, on the whole, to make the occasion gloomy? Not without reason is it said of us that we take our pleasures sadly. Who would ever imagine, from witnessing the demeanour of two average Englishmen who were supposed to be friends, that they found the smallest delight in each other's society? This island is full, appallingly full, of men of whom one hears it said that they are splendid fellows when you get to know them. "They're all right when you know them, but you've got to know them first." Unfortunately, life is too short for many people to get to know them, even if the ultimate result of that attainment were sufficient compensation for the difficulties of the quest. I don't want to get to know them ; I don't believe the game would always be worth the candle, or, rather, the innumerable pounds of candles. And I am particularly tired of hearing tell of the superiority of those people whose sterling qualities are carefully hidden away, so that it takes years of assiduous digging to reveal them, over those who carry their good-heartedness frankly and pleasantly on the surface. What on earth is the value of a man's good heart to other people if, externally, and for the first twenty, or fifty, times of meeting him, he is an ungenial, ill-tempered, cross-grained, contradicting brute? His sterling qualities may be known to his intimate friends, but he can't have very many of these, the work of exploration being so difficult and tedious. He may do good

by stealth; I think it would be better if he radiated a little goodness. However, I don't see why I should lose my temper over him, for I think he is on the decline; he used to be almost the typical Englishman; there are signs that he is already softening and expanding a bit. Still, shyness, reserve, remains quite sufficiently a national characteristic. Shyness in this connection may perhaps be fairly described as a hesitation, a fear, that assails us when we are threatened with anything like intimate contact with another personality. One of our satirists has made us familiar, in *Punch*, with different effects of shyness; and they are legion. One effect of it may be seen in our current conception of conversation. I should say that nine Englishmen out of ten regard conversation as practically synonymous with argument. If two, or more, people are talking on a subject, the Englishman's idea is to seize on every point of difference between one and another, and make the most of it. This may lead to an excellent debate, and will perhaps afford the best debater the barren luxury of a dialectic victory; but it is a poor kind of conversation; and as for illuminating the subject in hand, it is comparatively useless. If we really want to get any illumination out of talking to each other, we must, on the contrary, seize with avidity on the points of agreement, and develop from these. That involves putting oneself in sympathy with the other man's point of view, and that is exactly what, instinctively, an Englishman will not, as a rule, do. He will stand face to face with his interlocutor, but not side by side with him. When he feels himself so weak as to be in agreement with you, he carefully conceals the fact. A good many people pride themselves on their frankness, when, to my thinking, they have a very imperfect and partial conception of frankness. Their idea of frankness consists in saying every disagreeable and adverse thing that occurs to them; or, at best, they say pleasant things grudgingly, and with a shamefaced manner, unpleasant things with apparent relish. And I have not invariably found that those people who think it their duty to give you frankly all the unfavourable criticism that may occur to them concerning you, or anything that is yours, are equally ready to listen to the same kind of frankness applied to themselves. People say: "I want your honest opinion." But they don't, unless it is a favourable one. Why on earth should they? Nobody wants judgment given dead against him, unless he has such a contempt for his judges that he thinks the better of himself for having earned their censure. I think it is important to remember that people cannot help exaggerating the force of

the adverse comment they receive, just as they invariably discount the praise. If we would *convey* the truth, then, let us praise emphatically, and blame in the very mildest form. Not only the cause of mutual charity, but that of *essential* truth of intercourse, will be best served by our pronouncing lenient judgments, and even it may be at times by a little kindly lying. Most of us have no very high opinion of ourselves; we are quite diffident enough. We need all the friendly encouragement we can get. So, if any of us feels the sentiment of approval, of liking for another, he cannot do better than translate it into frank, direct, articulate speech. Speech such as that will bless both him who gives and him who takes.

Just one word more on the matter of shyness; for nothing is more relevant than shyness to any discussion on friendship. I have had my little fling at some English characteristics—not, I hope, unfairly. But I should be very sorry to be taken as maintaining that the Englishman is not endowed with just as much heart, feeling, affection, as the members of any other nation under the sun. I am even prepared to be persuaded that he has more. I find these qualities somewhat pathetically revealed in his attitude towards children and animals; and I find there too, incidentally, evidence of his shyness. I have no doubt whatever that an Englishman's kindness to animals is exceptional among nations; and I think almost the same may be said of his tenderness towards the child. But children and animals have this in common: that their lives and interests lie far away from ours. They cannot really converse with us; for material things they may be dependent on us, but we never come into touch with their souls. By and by these children grow up, and then they find that the world which once played with them companionably has become shy. The growth of mind in them has frightened their former playmates away. Yet now, and not till now, is the time of their great need. It is adolescence, not childhood, that is the lonely and the difficult period of life. Questions and doubts throng quickly upon them. But those who should now be their natural helpers and friends shrink away from the embarrassment of the personal contact; from the revelation of another human soul seeking companionship and help they turn away in shyness.

Well, it is easy to cavil, to find fault with our imperfect conduct of friendly intercourse. But one proffers one's little criticisms half-heartedly, after all. It is pleasanter, and perhaps saner and wiser, to look at the other side of the shield, to dwell not so much on our very natural failures as on our delightful and surprising successes in friendship; to look around and see

what immense stores of good-will and generosity and comradeship there are among us, not enrolled or disciplined, but doing purely volunteer work, striving hard and striving constantly to find scope and expression, in the face of difficulties that might well have overwhelmed them long ago. It is there, and perhaps there only, that one finds ground of hope for the future of our civilisation. To the casual observer from another planet, this world of ours would surely seem to be frankly cruel and immoral, aiming, with apparent deliberateness, at compassing the greatest misery of the greatest number for the sake of the unprecedented, wanton luxury of a very few. For every mile of Park Lane we must have our square mile of the East End. We boast of the riches, the progress, the culture, of this country that contains more poverty, unhappiness, squalor, degradation of mankind than could have been found among any so-called savage people at any period of the world's history. Our social reformers, our prophets, have their nostrums and their forecasts. "Each sufferer says his say, his scheme of the weal and the woe." To what extent any of them has given us a trustworthy survey of the Promised Land it is impossible to determine. But this much I think is certain: that the primary force that shall enable us to journey towards that land, and, finally, to enter in, must be a moral rather than an economic force; that first of all the hearts of all men must be stirred to realise the soul-destroying nature of the struggle we now have to wage, to contemplate the issues that confront the race in its attempt to fulfil any worthy ideal of human intercourse. When that universal awakening shall have come about, such things as economic details of reform may be found to be the merest child's-play. It may be that the moral enthusiast's dream will be realised, that mankind will ultimately recognise not only individual but collective obligation, responsibility, and fellowship, that such a thing will be evolved as a national conscience, even a *world*-conscience. If that shall be so, it will be largely, I may say solely, because, even in our darkest hours, we did not altogether forget, each in his individual sphere, to worship and to follow the sane and saving virtues of generosity, self-sacrifice, mutual kindness; because all through our competitive warfare we held firm by the sense of comradeship, of brotherhood one with another; because we spent such leisure moments as the battle for existence allowed us in cultivating, each in his little private patch of garden, those plants and flowers that are destined, let us hope, one day to cover the face of the earth, to make the desert blossom as the rose.

W. KINGSLEY TARPEY.

RELIGION THROUGH PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP.

H. M. ANDREWS,

Late prisoner in Ruhleben.

THE word "mysticism" has come into men's thoughts and into their speech more frequently than in former years, and, while many have pointed to the likelihood of various esoteric sects establishing themselves, the word itself has excited the scorn of men whose experience is of practical affairs. The fact seems to be that in our Western languages we have no word of purely spiritual connotation, such as the word *tao* implies in Chinese thought, and the word *Karma* among Indian thinkers. Mysticism in our speech may be used to imply an effort to attach one's self to the "spiritual" with a disregard for the material, or to describe the attempt to bring into life, to realise in its fullness a vision of the potentialities of the present which the purest feeling and most self-effacing thought have revealed. Mysticism in the former sense, in which it is customarily understood, lends itself to the palliating and excusing of recklessness, roguery, and the exploitation of life, and is repudiated with aversion by men who give their allegiance to the exactitude and precision of science. Mysticism in the latter sense, maintaining itself by a fervent attachment to the actual, is the inspiration of artistic creation and social work.

To any man who after a period of doubt and inner conflict has reached convictions which win the love of all his being, and who is then impelled by the very happiness that he has gained to make the effort of attracting the devotion of others to these same convictions and of enabling others to share his own happiness, an effort which for him constitutes a voluntary choice of pain spiritualised by the vision within—

to any such man, I say, it is clear that literary formulæ can give no effective help to the reformer, and that his only aid is to be sought in detailed and intricate application to the conditions before him, and in a passionate devotion to reality.

It has been claimed by men of affairs that the future belongs not to philosophy and science, but to action and experience; that indeed no help is to be sought from writing. But there are times when silence may be an action, there are times when the pronouncement of a speech may be an action, there are times when the writing of a book may be an action:

"Il far un libro meno è che niente
Se il libro fatto non rifa la gente. . . ."¹

The life of thought may be an adventure and a passion, and indeed only then is it truly vital and genuinely productive, only then does science merge itself in philosophy, philosophy in religious thought, and religious thought in turn in social action. There is, then, no ground for fear that mysticism in its true meaning will corrode the will or subvert our moral life.

As far as the problem treated in this paper is concerned, the most important fact in our present-day social life is the hardening of the walls of the ego, and the consequent lack of affectivity, sympathetic imagination, and a vigorously expansive life of the individual. This incrustation of men within the boundaries of their own selves is the outcome of a long enforced suppression of real needs, which has prevented the achievement of an inner harmony of their lives, and has been determined in a large measure by institutions which have outlasted that attitude of reverence for authority to which they owe their origin. Only when a man has created a spiritual harmony within himself can he be said to have found a self with organic boundaries, an individuality capable of expanding while recognising with respect and reverence the boundaries of other individualities, a self subject to a supple morality that is more exacting than the morality of rigid principles.

Not long before his death on the field of battle Charles Péguy wrote: "Ce sont les morales souples et non pas les morales raides qui exercent les contraintes les plus implacablement dures. Les seules qui ne s'absentent jamais. Les seules qui ne pardonnent pas. Ce sont les morales souples, les

¹ "To make a book is less than nothing unless the book, when made, makes people anew."

méthodes souples, les logiques souples qui exercent les astreintes impeccables. C'est pour cela que le plus honnête homme n'est pas celui qui entre dans les règles apparentes. C'est celui qui reste à sa place, travaille, souffre, se tait. . . ."

"He who remains at his post works, suffers, and keeps his peace." The word "suffering" itself, however, is another of those words that on account of the conditions of our life are habitually understood in their material sense. "Suffering" is regarded as synonymous with "devitalising." But there is another kind of suffering—suffering that springs from love and pity, the agony of knowing that help is required and of not yet knowing how to furnish it; and there is the profounder suffering voluntarily embraced at the outset of obedience to the behests of a vision, to the impulse of a religious experience. Without love and without a vision there can be no purifying suffering to stimulate the imagination and disclose the actual in terms of its future. In the life of society that is passing away the disproportion existing between men's impulses and needs and the opportunities for their expression and fulfilment has been so great that men had become devitalised, and thousands upon thousands had gone to join the ranks of those who dwell in the vestibule of Hell because they could do no evil and no good. They were dead and not eligible for the life of Purgatory. They had not the capacity of being great sinners.

The experience of this war has made many men into solitaries. Many tottering pillars of faith have been uprooted, and "the eyes of chaos are shining through the veil of order." But this chaos itself is the formation of a new order, and the spiritual movement of the present has not been born overnight. It has swept over Europe in different forms and varied expressions of the local genius: in Russia in the novels of Dostoievsky and the writings of Wolynski, in Germany in the aphorisms of Nietzsche and the poems of Mombert, in France perhaps most conspicuously in the profound and noble thought of Emile Boutroux, in England most apparently in the increased attention to the writings of Eastern poets such as Sir Rabin-dranath Tagore and Kabir; it is in the new interest in Mohammedan Sufic writers, and in the attraction exercised by the art of the Byzantine Church rather than the art of the Italian Renaissance. The feeling of loneliness and utter desolation which has come over many has roused them to the realisation of the need for men of strong vital impulses, the libertine and the saint, and of a change in institutions that may enable the growth of such men to be fostered. For

no man approximates more closely to the saint, none is more capable of conversion, than the libertine.

“ But shall I go mourn for that, my dear ?
The pale moon shines by night :
And when I wander here and there,
I then do most go right.”

Autolycus, the rogue and cut-purse, awed by the beauty of nature and convinced of the purity of his instincts ! We see the relationship of libertine, artist, and saint in the heart-rending sobs of Verlaine. Shelley may serve as an exemplary inhabitant of the halfway house ; and as an illustration of the life of the saint we may instance with all reverence Christ of Nazareth, who bade men be as the flowers of the field, living from within outwards, grasping the present, taking no heed for their own material needs of the morrow, and at whose feet the rich man and the poor, the leper, the sinner, and the harlot, could sit and be themselves.

But while there is isolation, it must be remembered that the only fruitful isolation is voluntary, a withdrawal that has its *raison d'être* in the desire to come closer to others, to enter their lives more deeply, and that just as the language of poetry has its roots in the spoken and not in the written word, so the profoundest experiences take their rise from the attitude created by those personal relationships in which men “give without counting and receive without robbery.” Experience is never individual ; it is always common. The mingling of two personalities bears the impress of the traditions and the social life which have contributed to mould the development of each. Thus, if we are complaining that we have no word of purely spiritual connotation, it is for us to create an atmosphere in which such a word may be born. Such an atmosphere lives in a group of men each fighting his own battle, each individual and free, each in matters material very differently conditioned to the others and maybe living far apart from them, but each sharing what goes beyond himself, the common effort of other seekers and thinkers. The growth of such groups is an absolute necessity if that spiritual atmosphere is to be developed in which an honest solution of our social problems is to be found.

To mention but one example of the interaction of law and personality : it is acknowledged on all sides that the present marriage laws are hopelessly inadequate. But no suggestion of a different method of exercising the relationship of marriage has as yet been made that might satisfy the fundamental needs of men and women. The reason for this failure is that

the atmosphere in which we live, the condition both spiritual and material which is the setting of our actions, has not yet reached that harmony and common level from which alone a full solution of the present difficulty can spring.

It is necessary to refer to the question with which religion is faced at the present day. The philosophy of religion has until recently been elaborated mainly by psychologists, and the essence of religion has in consequence often been claimed to lie in the relationship between a man and the god that is facing him, in the acts of prayer and ritual by which this relationship maintains itself, and in those qualities of a feeling of dependence joined to assurance of salvation, as well as that harmony and consistency of life which we note in the religious man. But the essence of the religiously endowed man lies below the psychological stratum, and is rather that which produces those outer tendencies, qualities, and modes of action to which we have referred. It is not any particular content of thought subject to criticism, but rather an existence, a being, beyond the pale of the critical faculty, so that feeling, thought, and action are from the outset religious, and hope and fear, exaltation and despair, are from the first step, yea, as it were before the taking of the first step, religious. The man of whom we are speaking does not require external assurances in the figure of a revealed god or the tradition of a formal observance to enable him to be certain of the value of life; he only needs to be sure of himself; he has his God within; he is often unimpressed by the differences of cults, and often stands outside all religious communities. But those who are thus endowed, though but slightly, have an imperative need of the external expressions produced by great religious personalities and developed by tradition.

A very incomplete analogy might be drawn between the position in which men of slighter religious endowment find themselves and the position of a man who has hitherto been a member of a circle of friends, some of whom were greatly his intellectual superiors. He has come to depend for the fullness of his intellectual life upon the level of conversation maintained in this circle, in which he might well participate but which he cannot himself produce; and now those who set the standard have departed.

It is, however, precisely in the case of all those of whom we are speaking as essentially religious men that religion is never static, but manifests itself in effort and battling without a pause, and as M. Emile Boutroux has written: "No certitude, not even a religious certitude, is complete

and truly satisfying, as long as it is merely subjective and individual." Religious thought appears as the genuinely harmonious thought about man and the world, but the religious thinker is for ever seeking union with his kind, and requires the presence, known or felt, of comrades in the field, comrades who perhaps will only be, truly speaking, fellow-travellers in future days. Such knowledge and feeling, such union of effort, raise his own life to heights he could not have climbed without their aid, and alone enables religious thought to reach the plane in which it expresses itself in poetic creation, in ritual, and in dogma.

Here lies in its fuller sense the imperative need for the formation of such groups as we have mentioned above, for such a group will be able to evolve that atmosphere in which alone those external symbols of experience can be created, without the support of which most men are completely debarred from a share in the life of religion.

Spiritual freedom can come to life and grow in only its own atmosphere, embracing infinite diversity and manifold contents of action. It is developed in the process of reciprocal interaction through the imagination, the strength, and the faith that can regard with reverence the liberating forces that are brought to light in the vital experience of personal fellowship; just as the growth of the expansive harmony of a culture is preceded by the break-up of an undeveloped, unexpansive unity, just as we must pass through many intellectual struggles before we can rid ourselves of prejudice, just as finally in the pursuit of the original vision the difficult and exhilarating effort of expression must be completed before the full vision is formed.

The purpose of such intensive groups as have been mentioned would be the purpose of a church, not to save men's souls nor to create good citizens, but to create saints. And if the growth of such groups springs from the present situation, without flourish or ostentation, without pretentiousness or pretence, with simply the bond of instinctive attraction and a common search, they will produce an atmosphere in which men, in the words of Pascal, "offer themselves by humiliations to inspirations." Then the wind of the Spirit will blow, the cobwebs of rigid and stifling ethical theories will be dispersed, and the Word will become flesh "and dwell among us full of grace and truth."

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THE DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTION OF EDUCATION.

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DURING the past year two important and far-reaching Acts dealing with Education have been placed on the Statute-book of this country—one concerned with the reform of Education in England and Wales; the other, with the reorganisation of Education in Scotland. In some quarters, these measures have been hailed with enthusiasm, as embodying in their various enactments the principles of democracy, and as furnishing a Magna Charta of freedom, and of equality of opportunity for all the children of all the nation. But, before we can assert that this is so, and before we can test how far these two Acts embody the principles of a true democracy, we shall have to come to a more or less clear and definite understanding as to what is involved in the democratic conception of Education. Moreover, as an American writer has recently pointed out, “the conception of Education as a social process or function has no definite meaning until we define the kind of society we have in mind.”¹ *I.e.* Education is a process which has for its object, on the one hand, the furthering of the welfare of particular individuals; and on the other, the advancement and furtherance of the welfare of the society to which these particular individuals belong. And these two standpoints are correlative, and are, or ought to be, mutually interchangeable. But everything depends on our starting-point, and upon which side we lay emphasis in our schemes for the reorganisation of society, and in our plans for the betterment of Education.

For if, *e.g.*, we begin by considering the welfare of the particular State, especially as a unit contending and competing with other similarly placed units, as of supreme importance, then our

¹ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 95 *et seq.*

schemes of Education will inevitably tend to subordinate the welfare of the individual to the welfare of the society, and to look upon men, and even women, as merely "cogs to roll along the great machines of war and trade." History furnishes us with many examples of this tendency. In ancient Sparta, *e.g.*, the development and education of the individual was wholly subordinated to the welfare and the good of the State. As a consequence, the educational schemes of that State were devised with the sole object in view of training the youth for the military service of the country. Hence, skill in warfare, and strict obedience to military superiors, were the two essential objects aimed at in the training of the youth of Sparta. And to some extent, and under changed circumstances, this, within the past forty years or so, has also been the aim of Germany. How to organise her educational system so that, by its means, her pre-eminence in industry and in military defence and offence should be established and made supreme, has been the more or less conscious aim of all her statesmen and educational leaders, from the time of Bismarck down to the day of her downfall.

And here let me interpolate a question: Behind and beneath all our recent endeavours to better the education of the youth of the country, by raising the leaving-school age, and by the enactment of compulsory attendance at day continuation schools, what are the underlying motives at work? Is the chief object in view to increase the technical efficiency of the workers, so that thereby the total productivity of the nation shall be increased, and as a consequence the resources of the State for offence and defence strengthened? Or, is the object to develop and to further the intelligence of the worker, so that, by becoming a more efficient and capable individual, he shall thereby be enabled to secure and to maintain a higher standard of living, and also, in the words of one of our greatest British democrats, James Mill, secure by his superior intelligence a source of happiness within himself? For, as we shall see later, and in the sequel, one test of a sound democratic organisation of society is how far it enables each and every individual to have opportunity for rational recreation; just as one test of the democratic organisation of Education is how far it educates the individual to use this opportunity rightly, for his own good, and for the furtherance of the ideal interests of human life.

But, we err no less when we over-emphasise the claims of the individual, when we consider solely and of chief importance the education which enables him best to further his own self-

interest ; as, *e.g.*, when we consider Education as a means mainly to climb the so-called social ladder, or to enable an individual to obtain the advantage over others, less intelligent or less scrupulous than himself. Education, so conceived, aims at fitting the individual for the so-called struggle for existence, in whatsoever form it may appear. As a consequence, it tends to develop and to strengthen the antagonism of individual against individual, and of class against class ; and, when pushed to an extreme, this tendency becomes the solvent of all order, of all stability, and of all security, within any given society. In short, when we over-emphasise the good of the State in subordination to that of the individual, we are preparing the way, sooner or later, for the revolt of the individual against society, whether the society be organised as a supreme Church or a supreme State. On the other hand, when we exalt the claims of the *mere* individual against the common interests of society, we are no less paving the way for revolution and anarchy within the particular State.

Now, in our own country, in our distribution of political power, in our economic policy, and in our educational reconstruction we have, as a nation, largely been individualistic. Many reasons might be adduced to account for this. It is due partly to our insular position ; partly to the fact that we are a so-called practical people, who dislike theoretical speculation, and are prone to allow evils to arise and to continue to exist, and to remedy them only when they threaten danger to the Commonwealth. The whole history of the development of political power within the country is an example of this characteristic of introducing reform, not so much upon reasoned conviction, as from the need of pacifying some discordant group, or of removing some source of disorder which has arisen within the State, and now demands remedy. Above all, Great Britain has never produced any great constructive philosopher. She has never had a thinker of the character and genius of Rousseau, and so has never had the type of extreme individualism preached and adopted that issued in the French Revolution. She has thus never adopted any individualistic theory of the extreme type. On the other hand, she has never possessed such extreme upholders of the doctrine of State supremacy as Germany possessed in Fichte and Hegel at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and so she has been saved from the evils which result from a strongly centralised government. And perhaps the practical tendency of our political policy, combined with our dislike of theoretical speculation, has been a not unmixed

blessing. It may have saved us from revolution, yet it no less has prevented us from getting at the root of many evils, and has resulted in all our legislative efforts partaking of the character of expediency.

This is true in great measure of our educational policy. It has been a policy of expediency, rather than that of considering the educational problem as a whole, and reconstructing it as a whole, to meet the new needs and conditions of society. We, *e.g.*, to take the case of Scotland, introduced in 1872 a measure to provide the means of Elementary Education for all the children, years after it was plainly manifest that the Churches were unable to provide the necessary education. But, although schools multiplied, and the demand for well-qualified teachers greatly increased, we still left the training of the teachers of Scotland in the hands of the two great Presbyterian Churches. They were able to accommodate but a moiety of the pupil-teachers demanding admission, and, as a consequence, a large part of the training of the children of the country was undertaken by untrained and partly educated men and women. Not until 1905, thirty-three years after the passing of the Act, did we realise this defect, and begin to make provision for the training of all the teachers of all the children. This is but one instance, out of many, of our sectional and partial treatment of the educational problem. Nevertheless, if we are really to undertake the thorough and efficient organisation of our educational agencies, we must consider the problem as a whole, must get out of the habit of reforming now one part of Education and now another, and look at the question in the light of the whole problem of what is necessary for the social reorganisation of the State. For, however much at the present time we may decry all German institutions, there is no doubt that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the thinkers of Germany looked at the problem of Education as a whole, and organised a system of instruction which, in all its parts, from the Elementary School up to the new Technical Universities, was designed to increase the might and the efficiency of the German State.

Now, as we have already pointed out, before we can give an intelligent answer to the question as to what is necessary to realise the democratic conception of Education, we must come to some general understanding as to what is involved in the democratic organisation of society; for, manifestly, there is no use in laying down a democratic scheme of Education until we are in a position to answer the prior question as to

the principles which ought to operate in the democratic reorganisation of society. This is an extremely difficult question, and all that I can hope to do here is to sketch out some general principles which, in my opinion, are basal to each and every form of democracy.

We may begin this investigation by considering two prevailing misconceptions of democracy: one of which is due to a natural perversion of the etymological meaning of the term; the other due to the sheer error of mistaking the means to democratic rule with the end or purpose of democracy. In the first case, democracy is taken to mean the rule of the masses as against the so-called classes. This is a natural perversion of the term, for in the past the landed and manufacturing classes have too often used their power to gain their own ends at the expense of the labourers; and, as a consequence, we think, or at least are led to think, of the rule of democracy as the rule of the masses against their despoilers. Nor can we blame the workers over-much, if, for a time, they follow in the footsteps of their betters, and enter upon a crusade to improve their position at the expense of the well-to-do and hitherto privileged classes. But, sooner or later, any and every country which follows this principle, which adopts this interpretation of democratic rule, must face the question as to whether a society so based can ever attain to a position of stability and security. For a real democracy implies the rule of all, not of this or that particular section of the community. And, what we must endeavour to secure is, that whilst there are and must always be distinctions between men and women, due to differences in natural ability, and in the respective services which they are fitted to discharge, there shall cease to be "classes" in the sense in which the term is at present used.

This was the mistake that Plato made in his sketch of an ideal Republic. He rightly laid down two fundamental principles of democracy, viz. that in a just and stable society the place of the individual should be determined, *not* by birth, or by wealth, or by any conventional status, but by his own nature as discovered in the process of education; and that, in a society so organised, merit or ability should be the sole test of fitness to discharge a duty. But Plato wrote when slavery or serfdom was a generally recognised institution, and so he thought that the inferior class of workers required little or no education, and, at any rate, they were not fitted to profit by a liberal education, by

the education suited to free men, to those destined to take their part and share in the government of the city-state. And, down through the centuries, this conception that there is a class naturally servile, and fitted only for mechanical employment, has dominated the thoughts of men. But modern democracy teaches otherwise: no man of high intelligence, declares an American writer,¹ would deliberately elect to live in a social environment of which the distinction of "inferiors" was an essential and permanent part of the idea. Moreover, modern democracy, in its educational outlook, recognises no such distinction as an education which is liberal, as contrasted with an education which is merely vocational. It recognises no such splitting up of Education. It declares that such distinctions arise out of the prevailing class distinctions, and that, to quote a recent work on Education, "any scheme for vocational education which takes its point of departure from the industrial regime that now exists, is likely to assume and to perpetuate its divisions and its weaknesses, and thus to become an instrument in accomplishing the feudal dogma of social predestination."² It declares that every scheme of Education should be vocational in the sense that it is designed to fit the individual to perform some service of worth to the community. It declares, on the other hand, that every scheme of Education should be liberal in the sense that it aims at freeing the intelligence of the individual and in enabling him to acquire a knowledge and understanding both of the natural and the social world in which his lot is cast.

But modern democracy, in its educational outlook, differs in one important respect from its earlier prototype, as found in the writings of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. To these early reformers education appeared to be the chief agent in the determination of the differences found amongst the adult portion of the community. Starting from the conception of mind as a *tabula rasa*, or clean slate at birth, they postulated the initial equality of all, and thus accounted for the differences between men in adult life as due entirely to education, using that term in the widest possible sense, so as to include all the environmental influences at work in shaping and moulding the mind and character of the individual. But modern psychology teaches otherwise. It teaches that men are not born initially equal, but with differing innate capacities for intelligence and with diverse aptitudes. It is

¹ Professor Fite in *Individualism*.

² Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, p. 371.

the business of Education to discover these capacities and aptitudes, as it is the business of society to furnish, if needs be, means for their due and adequate development.

These distinctions, or rather differences, in intellectual capacity and in natural gifts are found, of course, in and throughout every section of the community. They determine both the lower and the upper limits of the possibilities of Education: they must, moreover, be taken into account in any future and projected reorganisation of society, whether economic, social, or political. And whilst these facts may tend to damp the enthusiasm of some social reformers, nevertheless these in-born differences are basal facts, which every democrat neglects at the peril of the failure of his scheme for the sane and sound reorganisation of society.

From this discussion *three* principles emerge: democracy means not the rule of this or that particular section of the community, but the rule of all for the benefit of all. And a nation is moving in the direction of democracy just in so far as sectional or class interests cease to be supreme, and tend to be subordinated to the general good of all. Moreover, it must not be assumed that under any form of government sectional interests will vanish and never come into antagonism the one with the other. For, if this were to happen, then we should have reached the land of Rephan, and passed beyond this earth. But the democratic reorganisation of the State does imply that within itself the State must find the means for the settlement of all such disputes as they arise. And, generally, the characteristic of the democratic State is that by intelligent foresight and mutual sympathy it must find within itself remedies for the inevitable hindrances to the welfare of its members, both as individuals and as members of a group. To take but one example in illustration: one of the greatest hindrances to the development and welfare of the young arises through the death or disablement of the breadwinner of the family. This hindrance is one which it is in the power of the community to remove, or at least to mitigate.

Above all, democracy is not merely a form of government, but a mode of association, of living together. Through the spread of intelligence and sympathetic understanding the crass distinctions between classes should tend to be broken down. And one of the effects of the great European War has been to lessen the distinctions and to remove the barriers between one so-called class and another. Moreover, in any society in which such class or sectional distinctions exist, no individual can fully

realise even his own nature. For, when you or I have failed, either through defective intelligence or through lack of sympathy, to come to terms with our fellows—*i.e.* have failed to co-operate and work along with them,—then, in so far as we have failed, our selves are incomplete, and as a consequence and to that extent our selves remain unrealised and unexpressed.¹ Mutual understanding and co-operation tend to the enrichment of human life and of social welfare. Mutual misunderstanding and distrust tend to the impoverishment of both.

From this follows our second principle. In the democratic conception of Education, no such distinction exists as between a technical and a liberal education—between an education which is merely vocational and an education which aims at culture. These are distinctions, artificial in character, which have their roots in the prevailing distinction of classes. Plato long ago established the distinction: it has remained current since, but has, or ought to have, no meaning in the world of to-day. Every individual boy and girl has the right to be educated, so that in after life he or she shall become socially efficient; he or she has no less the right to the education which fits them to become acquainted with those other ends or interests of human life which stretch beyond the mere confines of earning their daily bread. The democratic conception of Education, therefore, includes as one of its essential aims the education which fits a man or woman to employ his leisure rightly. And it adds that, if this is to be attained, then the individual must be secured the time and the energy for rational recreation. Much of the craze, at the present time, for mere amusement, for mere relaxation, is due to two causes. On the one hand, our faulty and one-sided education affords no preparation, other than for “bread-and-butter” studies; on the other, the conditions of work, in many cases, leave the individual with insufficient energy save to live, in his so-called leisure, the life of mere amusement.

The third principle which emerges is that the democratic conception of education clearly recognises that there are limits to the possibilities of education; that whilst much may be done by a wise system of education to remove the initial inequalities of individuals, yet these remain, and determine to a large extent the place in society and the nature of the service which individuals are fitted to perform. It asserts that, so far as possible, all artificial or customary hindrances to the development ought to be removed, yet at the same time acknowledges these natural inequalities, and refuses to

¹ Cf. Professor Fite in *Individualism*, p. 292 *et seq.*

assent to the proposition of the earlier democrats, that by education every man can be made perfect and fitted for the discharge of any and every duty to the community.

This second error arises from the identification or confusion of democracy with the principle of representation. Sometimes people write and speak as if political liberty, political freedom, the right to have a voice and say in the selection of one's political and municipal rulers, were an end in itself; and even the American President, at times, seems to confuse the democratisation of society with the principle of representation. Give the people political liberty, introduce the principle of representative government, he seems to say, and all else will follow. But, apart from the many defects of our own and every known system of representative government, political liberty is a means towards an end, and not an end in itself. Moreover, the principle of representative government, of the right of every intelligent and normal adult to have a voice in the election of his rulers and in the determination of the laws of the country to which he belongs, is not an unmixed blessing, and the sudden or premature introduction of the principle is fraught with many dangers. For, it is a fallacy to believe or to assume that, given this privilege, all will be well with the State and with society, that the mere advent of the self-governing principle will cure the evils of the world. King Demos, as witness the horrors which accompanied the French Revolution, may reign more autocratically, more despotically, and more unjustly than the most absolute of Emperors. To take another instance: the intellectuals of China, some few years ago, believed that all the evils of that country could be traced to the autocracy of the Manchu dynasty. Remove and destroy this autocratic power, they taught, and replace it by a republic, and order and progress will be the fruit. But, if recent reports can be trusted, the republic has not yet been able to establish order and justice. And the reason is obvious: political liberty, granted to a people who are ignorant or passive or intellectually inert, is bound to fail, simply because both an individual and a nation must be educated for freedom before they can be safely trusted to use it rightly.

Nor again is the principle of self-government—direct or representative—a new thing in the world's history. It was tried in Athens of old, and because the worst rather than the best were chosen to rule, failed to secure that stability and order within society which is an indispensable condition of all human

progress. Nor again in France, and in the United States of America, where it has existed in a more pronounced form than it has as yet in this country, has it proved an unmixed blessing. A few years ago, a distinguished member of the French Academy, M. Faguet, in a work called the *Cult of Incompetence*, drew attention to the many evils which in that country had resulted from the adoption of the representative principle. For, political liberty in the past has too often been followed, and accompanied, by jobbery of all kinds; by the increasing incompetence of both rulers and officials, by those in power being more anxious to secure "cushy" jobs for their friends than in single-hearted devotion to the public good, in the choice of officials, able and competent to carry out the duties entrusted to them.

Nor is this evil altogether unknown in our own country. Everyone who has had experience in the work of our corporations or other public bodies, knows only too well that promotion often goes by favour rather than by merit. Again, often—too often—a democratic people, through ignorance, through selfishness, and through "graft," have handed over their rights to a "caucus"; and in America this has been common experience. Now, if representative government is to succeed, if a real democracy is to be established, then this spirit must be supplanted by establishing, and by whole-heartedly carrying out, the principle that merit and ability shall be the sole criterion in the selection of our rulers, in the filling up of public appointments, and in the promotion from one grade of public service to another. Political liberty, representative government, is a means to an end. What is this end? What are to be the ideals in the future of modern democracy? This question at the present is of pressing and predominant importance. For the world, and especially our European world, seems about to embark upon the vastest experiment in representative government that has ever taken place in the history of civilisation; and it therefore behoves us to ask: To what end or purpose is, or ought, the principle of self-government to be directed? What kind of community do we hope to establish by means of political liberty? Is the aim to establish by this means a juster and more stable order within any and every society? To bring about a community of interests between the nations of the world, and so securely to establish the reign of international amity and peace? For, without ideals, this new movement in our European world will fail, just as the nationalism of the past has lamentably failed.

But, leaving aside this wider question meanwhile, certain educational consequences follow. From the position that, under a truly democratic regime, ability and merit should be the sole criterion of fitness for office and employment, it follows that the democratic conception of Education involves that it is the business of Education to discover the individuals possessed of innate capacities and natural aptitudes, and progressively to train them for social service, and that this can only be effected in so far as there is offered to each equality of opportunity in Education. Moreover, this equality of opportunity must be real, and not, *e.g.*, impose inequality of sacrifice upon the parents of the child or youth fitted for education, especially for higher education. If, on the other hand, we reconstruct society so that, in the words of James Mill, "interest with the man above" is the only sure means to the next step in wealth, or power, or consideration, then the arts of flattery, intrigue, and backbiting will be the fruitful offspring of such a system. And a society so constructed soon rots to the core.

The second aim in the democratic reorganisation of Education must be to secure that all are brought up to the level of political responsibility. In contrast with the Platonic ideal which sets forth that certain classes of the community are unable to become politically responsible, we must, while taking into account that there may be individual exceptions, secure that all are educated so as to be capable of self-government, so as to be able to select intelligently both their rulers and their officials.

In the third place, if, in the new democracy, the rulers are to be chosen from all classes, if ability is to be the sole test of fitness to govern, then our whole system of Education must be reconstructed so as to train for leadership as well as for service. Our primary and day secondary schools at present offer few opportunities in this direction; they do not provide opportunities by which the youths of marked ability for leadership may be discovered and educated. And so likewise our universities, especially the Scottish and newer English universities, are mainly teaching institutions; they give little scope for individual initiative, and consequently do little to secure a practical training for public life. They also stand in need of reform, if they are to be effective agents of a true democratic regime.

In the fourth place, throughout the entire period of school and college training, we must ever keep in mind that the ultimate aim of all our efforts is to fit the individual for

freedom, for personal self-determination: that a really democratic education must issue in the production of persons able to direct intelligently their own lives. If this end is to be attained, then our schools and colleges must ever set before them that their main aim is to secure that the individual, after their guidance and direction is withdrawn, shall be capable of carrying on his own education: shall be intelligently alive not merely to the fresh problems that arise in the carrying on of his profession or trade, but also to the ever-recurring problems, political and social, which arise from the difficulties and defects of community organisation. John Stuart Mill long ago pointed out that representative government might be made a means by which the individual carried on his own education, and so might attain to the attitude of taking a large, a sound, and a comprehensive view of the various questions affecting the common weal. What is insisted upon here is that our school organisation and our methods of teaching must be so arranged as to foster in the young the desire in after life to carry on their further education, and so to attain to a comprehension of the problems of their time. Any education which fails to attain this end—which leads to the early fossilisation of mental activity—cannot subserve a democratic organisation of society, and must pave the way for the return, sooner or later, of autocratic or bureaucratic government.

Lastly and briefly, a few words on the general position. The democracy here advocated is not State socialism in any form, for such socialism tends to the subordination of the good of the individual to the welfare of the whole. It rather is frankly individualistic; it wishes to establish a society in which as large a number as possible of its adult population shall be morally responsible and self-reliant and self-disciplined men and women. It is, again, frankly humanistic, in the sense that it aims not at the good of some hypostasised State, or the welfare of some mythical social organism, but at securing the human good, *here and now*, of every individual. Moreover, it places in the forefront, and as all-important, the need of intelligence, of sympathetic intelligence, as the most desirable of all human goods, and as the only real agent in the furtherance of society. It declares that, if co-operation is to replace competition, this can only be effected by the spread of a sympathetic understanding between employer and employee. It declares that every obstacle which divides one nation from another, one class from another, can be removed only by the diffusion of mutual

understanding and mutual sympathy—*and that there is no other remedy.* It is against all wishy-washy schemes of social reform, of reforms that apply a plaster to this social evil, or some quack specific to that social disease. It lays down and asserts that, before you can cure any social disease or evil, you must intelligently understand the causes at work in producing it; that, thereafter you must carefully think out the means for its cure or mitigation; and, most important of all, that you must take into account how the persons affected will react to your proposed legislation. It is averse to compulsion in the cure of social evil, and asserts that it is only to be employed, even in individual cases, when it is clear that a person is so unintelligent or so unsympathetic that compulsion is the only remedy. And, above all, it claims as the right of rights, the only supreme right, that every man and woman, in so far as he or she is intelligent or capable of becoming intelligent, should be treated as a person whose life is of inestimable value to himself or herself, and that no human life ought to be used as a mere means in the furtherance of the gain or the interest of another—whether that other be an individual, or a group, or a State.

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EDUCATION: A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR THE CHURCHES.

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THE Sunday schools have proved themselves of great service to the Churches, in building up the young as prospective members, and carrying on the great succession of witnesses to the Christian faith. But, over and above this value of providing denominational methods for the continuity of congregational vitality, they have been, in the past, of considerable general, if humble, educational value. Two generations ago, it was no unusual testimony to the worth of Sunday schools, from some man who "had worked his way in life," that the only "education" he had ever received had been afforded him by the Sunday school. In the scarcity and unequal distribution of day-school supply in the first half of the nineteenth century, Sunday schools, in their teaching of reading, writing, and sometimes of the arithmetic at least for dealing with Scriptural numbers, filled a general educational gap, as well as prepared a reservoir of future Church members. If we go to pre-Reformation days, the closeness of the connection of the Church with general education (as distinguished from specialised Christian instruction) is best typified by the fact that the day-school was held within the church itself, or at least within the precincts. Thomas Wright says: "From Anglo-Saxon times every parish church had been a public school"; and Thorpe, in his *Ecclesiastical Institutions of Anglo-Saxons*, quotes: "Mass-priests ought always to have at their houses a school of disciples; and if anyone should be desirous of committing his little ones (*lytlingas*) to them for instruction, they ought very gladly to receive them and kindly teach them." This absorption of the day-school in the Church, begun as a necessity in the days of early Christianity, pre-

served, it is true, the idea of the spiritual unity of the individual's life, but became a prison-house for the individual's thought, in the days of mediæval scholasticism.

Both these movements—the mediæval day-school in the Church and the nineteenth-century Sunday school—stood for the great idea of the spiritual unity of life in the human being, all the days of his life. They presented, too, however unconsciously, aspects of Erasmus' great aim, to break down the line of separation between the sacred and the profane. All life is, or can be made, sacred, not by retirement to the cloistral cell, but by bringing the transfiguration of the religious life into the individual aims, into the relations of family life and of social comradeship, *i.e.* in daily life in the world. The mediæval view of the relation of religion and education (and, be it noted, the eighteenth-century view, when Sunday schools began to flourish as established institutions) was that of the transcendence of religion, which suggested the necessity of the absorption of educational institutions in the Church. The view of Erasmus, however, was rather that of the ideal of the immanence of religion in all the affairs of life, especially in studies and in education. As Swedenborg afterwards said: "All religion has relation to life."

There can be no doubt that the world-war has tended to emphasise Erasmus' view that the division between sacred and secular must break down, that all human life in the individual and in the race is a spiritual unity, that we are living in a world in which our souls not merely register the experiences received from the outer world, but also absolutely and irresistibly demand interpretation of the experiences, in the light of the spiritual implications which shine through the phenomenal concrete. Men are drawn to believe more and more that such interpretation only reveals itself clearly or vividly to those who live habitually in the spiritual atmosphere. Let me illustrate. There is a phenomenal "Works of Shakespeare" which I can buy for, say, three shillings and sixpence. I may read the phenomenal "Works of Shakespeare," or I may so far "enter into" the reading of the plays, that I get near, spirit to spirit with, the writer. All will depend upon the spiritual atmosphere (in which I live) which I can bring into my reading.

It is precisely this educational vitalising of our ideas, our experiences, and our studies into a spiritual atmosphere, so as to make us eagerly responsive to truth and to the reality of things, that really breaks down the world of insignificance and converts it into the world of significance, and infuses the sense

of sacredness into what we had accounted secular in life. 'This effort is, emphatically, the work of education (either of self-education, or of that which is consciously directed from without, or of both). So, too, with regard to religion. If we break down the artificial barrier between sacred and secular, education and religion again come into union, but with a much deeper underlying unity than ever before, because it is by no compulsion, but by a common perception of a common aim. Both seek the True, the Good, and the Beautiful.

Both to religion and to education a new awakening has come from the war, almost like the crack of doom. As an Anglican clergyman said to me: "We have got now to speak to men and women about the things *that really matter*. To me this means that three-quarters of all the books of theology in my library are now *useless*, and all my pre-war sermons can now go into the waste-paper basket."

At first sight, it appears as if education were now dynamic whilst organised religion appears to remain static. The most comprehensive of Education Acts has been passed. The age limit has been raised, and continuation schools are to be arranged so that all persons up to eighteen years of age are to be under educational direction and influence. Every type of educational activity is to be intensified. The Workers' Educational Association, the Home Reading Union, adult schools, university extension organisations, are making redoubled efforts. The Y.M.C.A. with its multitudinous huts, which have been the spiritual (and educational) homes of our soldiers, are to be literally "reconstructed," and to become a permanent institution in England itself. Sir Arthur Yapp, a general in the army of social science, proposes to bring "light, colour, and uplift into human existence in our villages and dense industrial centres, by erecting, perhaps on the village green, one of the thousand Y.M.C.A. huts available after the war. Libraries and lecture-centres, together with recreation grounds and organised sports, are to be established in and by the hut. The hut itself is to be a village institute, with separate common rooms for women and for men. Every opportunity is to be given for tuition." Lord Gorell has described the thoroughgoing preparations for transforming an army of soldiers abroad into an army of students at home. An interim report has been issued by the Committee on Adult Education, bringing forward suggestions how the industrial and social conditions of labour may be made consistent with the claims of continued and general adult education.

The Royal Commission on the Welsh University has shown

the generous spirit in which the State authorities are prepared to meet, both by general facilities and by increased apportionment of finance, the legitimate aspirations for higher education in the principality; and we may assume that other universities, old and new, will also receive generous treatment, according to their needs. Thus, already there are projects for a new university with university colleges in Devonshire and Cornwall, and an East Midland University for Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire, Rutland, Leicestershire, and Northamptonshire. Let us remember that under Mr Balfour's Act of 1902 some nine hundred secondary schools have sprung up, almost like mushrooms. These schools have the making of a new educational spirit within their power, if they rise to their opportunities. This enumeration of the agencies of a revival of higher education is representative rather than exhaustive. One point must not be overlooked, even in the most general recital. Women and girls are considered equally in all new educational arrangements, with a completeness unexampled in this country or in any country, and at any time in the history of the world.

In face of this educational revolution—for it bids, in aim, to be nothing less—where stand the Churches and their old-time Sunday schools? Mainly, one seems to gather, either in a state of rapt amazement at the new, or in a mark-time trance, in the old. They must realise that things are not going to be as before. Elementary schools now teach the reading and writing of the old-world Sunday school, from the coign of vantage of compulsion, and therefore of universality. Every child must, by law, receive instruction. It may be said, not necessarily Christian instruction. The demand for Biblical instruction in the day-schools is perfectly reasonable, and an irresistible claim in a land of any aspirations to literary knowledge and taste—let alone the claim of a Christian population, cannot be ignored. (Of course, one recognises that parents may, from the point of view of political rights, claim withdrawal from such instruction. Theoretically, I suppose, they could claim the withdrawal of children from the reading of Shakespeare on the ground of Shakespeare's coolness towards democracy.) It is interesting to note that in the Welsh County (*i.e.* secondary) Schools the Bible is generally regarded as part of the course as far as the reading and understanding of the English text—*i.e.*, on the whole, as literature. But, on the other hand, the fact must be faced that the Bible has lost ground in English secondary boys' schools. Mrs Bryant has stepped forward as a pronounced advocate of its systematic

study in girls' schools, writing an interesting and valuable book on *How to Read the Bible*. But it is somewhat ominous that, in the recent collection of stirring essays on *The New Teaching*, the Bible is not included as a subject of the curriculum, either on its own special account, or under the treatment of the teaching of literature. Nevertheless, the Higher Criticism, so far from crowding out the Bible, really makes the school teaching of the Scriptures still more urgent, and, educationally, still more profitable. Every effort should be made, *in the cause of humanism*, that in the confusion of questions arising in the "reconstruction" of education the Bible is not allowed to slip out of consideration, in the education of a country whose civilisation, in some phases, is so largely the outcome of the puritanic permeation of the Scriptures, and whose literature has so deeply rooted a basis in them. The unique intrinsic literary and historical value of the Bible, in its authorised rendering, cannot be overlooked by a nation with a love of culture.

If the Bible, as a subject of serious study, is to be ousted from day-schools, elementary and secondary, the Churches, undoubtedly, will have a huge task *to make good the omission*, by means of Sunday schools of a new type—a type of higher education, *i.e.* of the college type rather than the school type. But in an age in which the teaching of Erasmus of the unity of the sacred and the secular is now so ripe for acceptance, subsuming both under the higher class of the spiritual in life, the separation of curriculum studies in the week-days, and the Bible on the Sundays, would be a loss, a great loss, which we hardly think the country will permit, both for the sake of the religious basis and of the literary basis.

It may indeed be that, for the elementary school scholars entering the continuation schools at fourteen years and remaining till eighteen years of age, the spiritual aspect of education (in its broadest sense) may be made to transfigure the materialistic aspect—or tend to do so. But this humanist spirit is needed throughout the educational system. *The Challenge*, an organ of the progressive movement in the Anglican Church, writing on the report of the committee of the National Society to consider the provision by the Church of England of religious instruction for adolescents, is evidently alive to the possibilities of the new continuation schools to be introduced by Mr Fisher's far-reaching Act. "Here is a chance," says *The Challenge*, "of getting away from the denominational squabbles which have made the religious bodies a hindrance where they ought to have been a help in the development of education

generally. 'There will be an opportunity for giving education to adolescents in such a way as shall show the spiritual basis of all real development of character; and it must not be supposed that the advantage to the Church or other religious bodies of the new system is confined to the admittedly enormous gain of knowing where young people will be at certain times of the week. The Act recognises voluntary agencies as capable of supplying the education required. Here is a great opportunity. . . . Even though in the few hours allowed no space is found for specific religious instruction, an immense influence may be exerted which will make religion seem to be not a sub-department, but a main concern of life, and the inspiration of all the rest.'

This is clearly an important aim, and one which can hardly be confined to the Anglican Church. The Free Churches cannot but take the same view. The best of the capable teachers of the Sunday schools of the present time will find new and larger openings of educational service than in the past, and the danger to the Sunday schools will become not only one of withdrawal of the best teachers for wider service elsewhere, but also the intensifying of the narrowness of denominational aims in those who remain behind, and the concentration of the teachers on the reactionary methods in the intra-denominational building up of pupils and occasional extra-denominational propaganda. Yet, in the long run, the Sunday school must be a lost cause as against the elementary and continuation schools on the one hand, and the secondary schools on the other, *if a noble, humanist aim should be established and persist in the nation's new schools*. At any rate, this large national outlook in our education should receive a large-minded welcome—and from none more heartily than from the religious people of all the churches. It is worthy even of the altruistic goodwill of Sunday-school teachers themselves. At their best the latter have indeed been harbingers of a spiritual aspect which we must now look for (and, what is more important, one which professional teachers must demand of themselves) in the whole noble army of education. Our new teachers in day-schools must be, as Cromwell said of the army of soldiers he gathered together, "men of a spirit."

What then? Should the Sunday school be dissolved? Has it served its purpose, and is it about to become obsolete?

Let us rather urge that it should be transformed. 'There will always be need, I take it, for classes for preparation for "confirmation," or for "membership of the Church," but

such instruction is specialised. But for the rest, it appears to me that the Sunday school needs to be transformed towards substantially different aims from those of the past.

When the new Education Act gets into full working, when the new movements in education to which I have referred make themselves effective, there will be provision for all types of education, available for all people, irrespective of age, desirous of the ordinary subjects of instruction—higher as well as elementary and secondary. In higher education, for adults (after continuation-school age) engaged in their daily wage-earning occupations, university extension lectures will be able to be secured, in any district, in history, literature, philosophy, psychology, political science, economics and economic history, natural and sociological science, and education, geography, architecture, archæology, history of painting, eugenics, citizenship, and certain branches of natural science. Nor will there be any insurmountable difficulties in obtaining laboratory instruction in both the natural and the applied sciences. We need not be afraid lest there should not be ample provision for technical and applied sciences.

Where, then, can the Churches find their special educational scope of service? Probably much can be done, and should be done, to popularise the instruction (hitherto so limited in any reasonable extent of provision and of interest) in ecclesiastical history, in the higher Biblical criticism, in the philosophy of religion, and in the various departments of theology. This direction of study by laymen (who have no other opportunity for meeting lecturers) might be arranged appropriately for Sunday, and might well be included in what I venture to call Sunday colleges, rather than schools, to differentiate the aim of higher education from that of the old elementary instruction of the Sunday school. But such facilities could only be of a limited extent for a considerable time to come, because only a limited number of lecturers probably would be available; and, moreover, the demand would not, perhaps, at first be very wide. That is not a sufficient reason for deprecating the introduction of this direction of teaching in Church organisation. In this connection there is one most important consideration, viz. the opportunity for the development of an interest in religious philosophy and theological history, as a means of automatic discovery by the Church of the prospective supply of ministers, and of self-revelation to suitable individuals themselves, of a desire to consecrate themselves to the work of the ministry. University extension is as reasonable a method for the Churches in the local study of theology as for town com-

mittees, in the same localities, for general subjects of study. The chief religious denominations now prepare their theologians in university centres, and there might well be more lay men and women students attracted to theological studies undertaken in a broad, humanist spirit both in university and non-university centres.

The importance of the *teaching* office of the individual church or congregation has been, in recent centuries, not only overshadowed, but also often overwhelmed, by its preaching function. The pre-Reformation Church recognised in its cathedrals and in collegiate churches, and in chantries, the duty of training its flock, both in theological and in general knowledge. The Church looked at human life as a whole, and, in its education, endeavoured to transfigure the whole spirit of studies by interesting itself in all the varied "universes" of thought. John Ruskin, in his interpretation of Taddeo Memmi's "Vaulted Book" of the Spanish Chapel in the Church of Santa Novella Maria at Florence, shows the spiritual unity (in the Church's outlook) of the whole of education. Without the cardinal virtues, there is no worthy science. The seven earthly sciences prepare for the ascent to the seven heavenly sciences (of law and theology), and all sciences, intellectual and moral, are under the direct influence of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. The late Archbishop Benson was a warm advocate of the resumption by cathedrals of the old teaching office of theology. He also urged that the body of the clergy in connection with a cathedral should become, as it were, a college, and establish *open* lectures, including late evening lectures on subjects not purely theological. "If formerly the construction of vaulted roofs, the thrust of walls, the balance of buttresses—nay, the construction of bridges, the formation and repair of highways, were not unworthy studies in the most religious ages of the cathedral churches of the old and new foundation—will history, or physiology, or mathematics be beneath their teaching now? *Minds furrowed with some intellectual plough best receive the seed of revealed Truth.*" "What a field here," adds the Archbishop enthusiastically, "for association of clergy with able laymen in the actual instruction! What a μαθήτευσις of young laymen to be the very strength of the Church in its most important ranks! Let the cathedral body take a lead here. Its affiliations would overspread the diocese, and its associations would have an effect *which the higher spirit even in commerce would gladly recognise and promote.*"

Thus wrote Archbishop Benson in 1878, forty years ago,

in oneness of spirit with the early bishops, and with the wide aims of cathedral founders. He is impressed by the unity of all knowledge; he follows (without naming him) Erasmus in wishing to break down the barrier between the sacred and secular. The same implication is equally in the best of Non-conformists as in the best of Anglicans. That great man, Richard Baxter, said: "He that can see God in all things, and hath all his life sanctified by the love of God, *will, above all men, value each particle of knowledge*, of which such holy use may be made, as we value every grain of gold. . . . Every degree of knowledge tendeth to more, *and every known truth befriendeth others and, like fire, tendeth to the spreading of our knowledge to all neighbour truths that are intelligible.*"

The relation, then, of religion, and so of the Churches, in this great Renaissance of Education, should be that of the realisation of the vast spiritual significance of the sense of unity of the whole gigantic inpouring of empirical and scientific sense-knowledge of the last century—and the perception and unmistakable pronouncement on the moral distinction between the infinitely bad (as in the suicidal perversion of scientific knowledge to the destruction and slaying of men, by methods of unexampled cruelty and barbarism) and the good uses to which such knowledge can be put. The days of the old antagonism between religion and science *per se* are gone. Both religion and science have come under a renewed inspiration of the highest impulses, the spiritual in human life. Both factors, working at their highest level, are needed for the progress of civilisation to-day and for the future.

Let me not be misunderstood. The Church need not, ought not (in its essential aim), to duplicate the educational work of any institutional agency. Thus, the whole range of education in the natural and applied sciences is better done than ever it could be done by the Churches, even if they wished to do it. So too with all work done in the technically scientific spirit. All subjects of analytic study are specialised, and these studies are separative rather than unifying influences, absolutely necessary in the modern organisations of mankind, but not necessarily helpful to the humanist spirit, which it is, and should be, part of the particular work of the Church to cherish. This objection to the Church undertaking the teaching of science, if not balanced by *per contra* considerations, might apply readily enough to "scientific" theology. The real aim of the educational activities of the Church should be towards helpfulness in forming spiritual perspectives in education and in "the educated" as well as the half-educated. It

is with the synthetic unities of knowledge the Churches are strictly concerned.

Dr B. F. Westcott spoke of theology as "the crown and complement of all sciences." If we may substitute "spiritual perspectives" for theology, we may accept his view of the Church educationist. He says: (in theology) "there must be students who will concentrate their attention on the wider relation in which it stands to other subjects of inquiry. Through them we may hope to gain, as the result of patient and truthful study, glimpses of the vital harmony of the Cosmos, which is the first corollary of our faith. To them *the teachings of nature and history will be alike sacred*; and thus the greatest of problems will fall within their direct path, for this is to restore the science of life, which deals with the whole experience of men, to its proper place between the science of experiment which deals with matter and the science of revelation¹—which deals with God." The Church, then, in its education, I venture to urge, following Dean Westcott, should deal with knowledge as a synthesis, as spiritual perspective, as a unity of the sacred and the secular. Now, on the whole, we may thus say, the attitude of the Church is that of the philosopher, not that of the scientist. But my contention is, that the time has arrived for the Church to come out of its tent, to declare unto all men its belief in the sacred unity of religion and science, and endeavour to study and teach the principles of spiritual life—in short, to directly promote the study of the philosophy which asserts, justifies, and expounds the spiritual basis of all life and knowledge. This is the complement which is needed to balance and transmute into moral energy the knowledge which will be disseminated in the new educational Renaissance. Unless the body of school and college teachers are suddenly going to take over the whole guidance of the spiritual issues arising in education, and with it the synthetic unifying of knowledge, as well as their own special subject-teaching work, how is this side of educational philosophy going to achieve itself on any large scale? I see no solution, unless the Churches rise to the occasion and join sympathetic forces with the teachers: or, let us say, unless each large church (conformist and nonconformist) acknowledges the new responsibility, and transforms itself into a cathedral (to give a name to the organisation I have in mind) with a staff of teachers, like a small college, ready to emphasise the unity of spiritual and

¹ If there is any difficulty about this term, for the moment let us substitute "the spiritual factor."

material knowledge and to direct the various philosophical studies which centre round this unifying process of knowledge, and to help intellectual inquirers of every kind in the common search for knowledge, truth, and reality—in a truly philosophical spirit, *i.e.* without the insistence upon acceptance of any preconceived articles, creeds, or dogmas.

This change would be the return to the idea of collegiate churches, with the reality of conviction in the intellectual and moral and spiritual teaching function, which they have never hitherto effectively achieved, at any rate to any great extent.

It will be asked, where could such teachers and lecturers be obtained?

I believe that, already, in the old and the new universities, many young men and women study philosophy, history, and literature for the degrees, and after graduation return to their professional avocations, very often quietly reading for their own satisfaction, but at present without utilising their great gifts for any public service, unless indeed they belong to the special profession of teachers. Particularly it is said that philosophical studies have been much less pursued than they should have been, because they “led nowhere”—*i.e.* to no direct human service (individual or general). If it became recognised that philosophically (and, if you will, theologically) trained men were of special service for the voluntary forces of Church teaching, a freshness and spontaneity of intellect and a great accession of moral force would be brought into the atmosphere of active Church service, which would be of untold value. The individual church in which the minister is substantially the one and only responsible intellectual official, is likely to be put to a strain altogether beyond its strength in the coming days of democracy and social effort. The minister or clergyman will need an intellectual brotherhood to work with him—comrades who will have equal energy of intellect and soul with their leader, though they cannot place their entire time at disposal for voluntary educational work. My suggestion is, that every minister-in-chief or rector should have, besides any curates the church can afford to bring to his help, laymen well trained in philosophy, to help to secure that each larger church is not without a permanent or occasional staff of philosophical teachers or lecturers, on the level of university extension lecturers in the ordinary academic subjects; but that the aim of the lecturers specially associated with the church should be to present and discuss the larger, more final and ultimate questions of human inquiry—those questions which connect themselves

more distinctively with the humanist and spiritual issues, with the study of the mind—historically in Greek and modern philosophy, critically and expositively in metaphysics, comparative religion, the origin and development of Christianity, the philosophical basis of Christianity, and the whole sphere of ethics and sociology—in short, in the spiritual aspects of humanism.

I would call the organisation a Church College rather than a Sunday school, whether it met on a Sunday or week-day or both; because the most effective educational institutions permeate from the top downwards, and for this reason this type of work should not be neglected by the Church, whatever else has to be omitted. I would hope that work might eventually be so developed in such church colleges as to bring them into touch with the local universities, so long as they were admitted to association on terms of equality with any other institutions, *e.g.* (as is likely to happen in the future) with W.E.A. classes or university extension classes. Nothing could be better for both churches and the universities than to be brought into closer alliance of common work, though with due respect to differentiation of special aims.

Whilst suggesting philosophical services of the highest educational type which the church, in my opinion, might specially contribute, there are others on the same lines which are more restricted in scope, though also connected with the development of a spiritual atmosphere. No doubt many churches do organise classes for the study of special books of a spiritual nature. But through lack of having a definite choice before them, many others let go the opportunity. I have just been reading again Professor Josiah Royce's *Philosophy of Loyalty*. This is a book which would do unspeakable good, studied under a capable leader, in church classes throughout the length and breadth of the land; for it is founded on the closest sympathy and touch with all social life, and yet leads the student by the close application of thought (which is at once a model of method and a training in mental discipline) to a realisation of the spiritual issues in the ordinary experience of loyalty to the causes to which one is attracted. The choice of this book for study well illustrates what I think could be done.

Nor need the intellectual factor always be one of profound strain, to accomplish clearly valuable influence. The following instance of the possible usefulness of the church in an untried direction, but on the educational lines I am suggesting, is not my own. It was urged by a candidate in an examination recently held in the subject of education.

The candidate stated that her parents had resisted her desire to become a teacher of young children on the ground that it is "a sheer waste of time to mind a class of babies." To try to remove her mother's objections, eventually she gave her a book to read—Froebel's *Education of Man*. "My mother happens to be a great lover of nature, and, as I hoped, the spirit of the book worked wonders. It transformed her whole outlook on infant education." It is perhaps ironical to suggest that a daughter should teach the mother on the upbringing of infants. But the daughter-teacher was not to be denied. She goes on: "I am convinced that the same book would transform many other people's outlook, could they be given the chance to read the book."

"I would advocate" (I am still quoting this enthusiastic teacher) "*Pleasant Study Evenings* instead of 'Pleasant Sunday Afternoons' for mothers, when the whole spiritual, mystical, and yet practical value of the book might be shown to the mothers, to be followed by discussion. Much useful help for the purposes of the school might thus be obtained." Everyone is perhaps not fully aware how writers like Froebel and Montessori become school "gospels"—writers, as a teacher said, of "a moving and mighty spirit."

Such an example as that just quoted shows how the best enthusiasm of the church could be brought *en rapport* with parents, and recognition could be given to the religious significance of whole-hearted education, and, once more, the removal of the barrier between the sacred and the secular could be effectually helped by bringing both into the spiritual atmosphere. For, in seeking out the basis of human worth, the thinker constantly finds himself involved in the thought of the relation of the human and divine.

Unless the Churches realise and adapt themselves to the appreciation of, and emphasis upon, this point of contact between the spiritual implications of the educational activities of the age outside their individual narrow environments, and unless the Churches associate themselves with the spiritual forces in education, a unique opportunity of profound service to humanity will be lost by them.

FOSTER WATSON.

LONDON.

REUNION.

BISHOP HAMILTON BAYNES.

MAY I be pardoned the apparent egotism of a few autobiographical notes showing how I have had special opportunities of regarding denominational questions from many points of view, and special privileges in seeing and knowing saintly lives from the inside of many religious circles, and, in consequence, why I have felt all through my life a peculiar and personal obligation to work towards the goal of Reunion—a goal which has often seemed beyond the visible horizon, but which at last, thank God, seems coming within reach? There is a story, attributed, I believe, to Charles Lamb, that when a friend proposed to introduce him to a man for whom he had a preconceived dislike, he said: “I don’t know him; I don’t want to know him; I can never hate a man I know.” I am quite sure that half the prejudices and half the bitter things that have been said in religious controversy would have been impossible if opponents had known each other in their non-controversial moments, in their inner and higher lives of faith and love and devotion. This has been my special privilege.

My father and my grandfather were Baptist ministers. My father I never knew, except through the glowing tributes of all classes and denominations in Nottingham; my grandfather was a true saint, living in an atmosphere of intense devotion, and so bringing up his seven sons on his meagre stipend of a country minister that they all rose to positions of high responsibility, and some of them to renown. My earliest education was undertaken by the maiden aunts of a small orphan neighbour. These ladies belonged to the Independents (as the Congregationalists then called themselves) and were severe Puritans. They regarded the theatre with such horror that we were not even allowed to look at pictures of plays in the *Illustrated London News*. For four years after I left school, I was in a solicitor’s office where the principal and

most of the clerks and clients were Wesleyan Methodists. I then went to the University of St Andrews (to prepare for Oxford), where I was surrounded by a Presbyterian atmosphere, and where I made the acquaintance of such leaders of the Kirk as Principal Tulloch and A. K. H. B. And later on I had considerable intercourse with the Moravians, and many friends among both "Friends" and Unitarians.

It is this intimate acquaintance with Nonconformists of all sorts that makes the attitude of aloofness and suspicion which men on both sides so often adopt seem to me absurd and impossible, and which presents our divisions as not only unhappy but unnecessary and out of date.

There was a time, no doubt, when those divisions did represent a difference of view which was fundamental and irreconcilable. Nonconformity—at least the Nonconformity of the Independents and Baptists—stood for individualism in politics. That individualism was based on a philosophy which is now held by hardly any. It is worth while to dwell on the change that has taken place, so that we may see how fundamentally that change affects the problem of Reunion and requires and justifies a restatement of what the Christian Church is on the part of those who have passed away from the principles of their denominational ancestors.

Political philosophers as widely sundered as Hobbes and Rousseau started with a common preconception. This preconception was that originally all men are free and independent; that in a state of nature men come into the world clothed with certain natural rights—rights to whatever they can lay their hands on. In the course of time these "natural rights" come into conflict with each other, until at last a "state of nature" becomes a "state of war," so that no man's life or property is safe. In order to remedy this inconvenient and uncomfortable condition, men come to terms with each other and make a mutual compact to limit their natural rights so far as is necessary to live together in peace. And so these philosophers arrive at the doctrine that the State is based upon a "social contract." This contract may be necessary to secure a *modus vivendi*, but obviously it is a second best, a decline from the unfettered freedom of the state of nature. It is a limitation of one's natural rights, and therefore, while one submits to the State, one may insist on limiting its interference to the very minimum required to prevent a relapse into warfare. The inevitable result of such a theory is that the State is a mere policeman, and hence the maxim *Laissez faire*—"Let people alone, give utmost freedom of contract, and the beneficent

laws of supply and demand will adjust the relations between individuals, classes, and nations." That is the individualistic philosophy. It was only when the doctrine of *Laissez faire* was put into practice and produced the state of things which existed in England in the middle of the last century—one echo of which is heard in Mrs Browning's "Cry of the Children"—that men began to insist on a re-examination of the premises on which the theory was based; and in the meantime Lord Shaftesbury rose up like a man in wrath and said: "Theory or no theory, this state of things is intolerable, and the State must take control." And so the Factory Acts were passed—the beginning of a whole volume of legislation which its enemies sought to ridicule by calling it "grandmotherly"; its friends, however, said, "Why add in contempt the syllable 'grand'? Call it motherly legislation, and that is what legislation ought to be. The State ought to be a mother, not a policeman." So re-examination was needed of a theory which had worked such dire results. And re-examination revealed the fallacy of the primary assumption, viz. that men come into the world free and independent and clothed with natural rights. It is obvious, as soon as you think of it, that men come into the world not free and independent, but very weak and very dependent and clothed with nothing at all—dependent on their parents for food and clothing, dependent on their bigger mother—the State—for the laws which protect their infant lives, dependent on their race for the very language in which those laws are written, and under obligations to the generations behind which have slowly and laboriously worked out the civilisation which they find ready made to their hand. They are born, then, with duties rather than with rights, or with rights only correlative to the recognition of preceding duties.

Such is the new and truer view which even the sons of the Manchester School politicians now accept. And the new orientation profoundly affects religious theory. The religious view which was correlative to the Manchester School was that religion was a purely personal matter—a matter between the individual soul and God; that a religious man was one who had made his individual peace with God, was converted and redeemed, and started on his solitary journey to Heaven. Such exactly is the Puritan allegory of the *Pilgrim's Progress*. If that conception of religion is true and adequate, then it is obvious that the conception of a Church is not of primary importance. It may, indeed, be a matter of convenience that an individual so converted should find others who have had

a similar experience and associate himself with them for purposes of common worship or common work, just as Christian in the *Pilgrim's Progress* finds it happy and comforting to have a companion—now Faithful, now Hopeful. But that association of “co-religionists” is a mere matter of convenience and expediency, and the Church so formed is a purely human arrangement; and it is of no great consequence how many such Churches there are, or which of them you join.

But such a conception of the Christian life is a singularly poor and unattractive one, and if it were not for certain incidents of a larger and more glowing kind in the *Pilgrim's Progress*, such as the visit to the House of the Interpreter or the Palace Beautiful (which suggest a more adequate view of the Church), the life of Christian would be a very dull and negative affair—engaged in escaping dangers, refuting the perverse, and finally getting out of the world as quickly and safely as he can.

Here again, then, we are led to re-examine our premises, and when we do so it occurs to us that we have begun wrongly in starting with the conception of the Christian as a man bent on saving his own individual and solitary soul. We begin to realise that you cannot save your own soul, you cannot make your peace with God, you cannot find the life of the redeemed, except in the very act by which you come out from your own little separate, self-contained, selfish life into the big, rich life of membership for which you were made. Just as men are born into families—and you cannot even conceive a full human life apart from the happy and gracious relations of sonship and brotherhood—so the new birth of religious life must be a birth into a family. So the life of the Christian is represented in the New Testament as the return of the son to the Father's house, or the life of the branch in the tree, or of the limb in the body. In this case the Church is not an afterthought, a matter of convenience, a secondary consideration. It is of the very essence of religion. And, further, the Church cannot be a man-made thing. You cannot make a Church any more than you can make the family into which you are born. And if the Church is sacramental—the outward and visible sign of this true relationship of man to God, and man to man—then there can be but one Church—one family as there is one Father, one kingdom as there is but one King.

We start, then, at the point to which Canon Lacey has brought us in his *Unity and Schism*, that all Christians are one family, all belong to one Church. There may be

divisions in the Church, just as members of a family may live apart, but that does not alter the fact that they are one family.

But this does not carry us far unless we can find out how to present to the world the witness of a family living, working, and speaking together. And many on all sides feel that the forces which are sweeping us together are urgent and insistent.

First, the War has brought home to us the enfeebled witness of a divided Church—that our divisions so glaringly contradict what we profess to teach as to make that teaching seem negligible.

Secondly, the War has brought home to us with a new thrill the joy of a united nation—the joy of being so obviously at one in heart and purpose and endeavour that we cannot any longer waste time in mutual criticism and suspicion and recrimination. And after that happy experience it seems intolerable to revert to the old controversies.

And thirdly, in the light of bigger world-issues and in the realisation of the new orientation of modern thought of which I have spoken, our divisions seem so silly and so unnecessary. The Church of England has proved the possibility of comprehensiveness, of unity along with diversity—of combining in a common life and united work differences of view quite as marked as any that separate Churchmen and Nonconformists. And if anyone says that this unity is artificial and unreal, and jeers at our internal dissensions, he undervalues the real gain of co-operation within a visible order, of unity without uniformity, and he has not had the actual experience (as many of us have) of extreme High Churchmen and extreme Low Churchmen working cordially and sincerely together in missionary campaigns and diocesan organisations of all sorts. If, then, such diversity of operations is not incompatible with the unity of “one Body and one Spirit,” there is no need for the exclusions of brethren which at present prevail.

So the centripetal forces of this epoch are overwhelming, the opportunity is unique, and the duty not to be dull and blind to the day of our visitation is solemn and immense.

But it is necessary that we should go on to define what sort of unity it is that we want. Do we mean—are we content with—some loose kind of federation which is to recognise and perpetuate our visible disunion, and to throw over it the transparent veil of pious phrases, such as “our common Christianity,” “unity of spirit,” “interdenominationalism,” and the like, and leave us free to go out from our professions and profusions of brotherly love to our old bitter

controversies about religious education and disestablishment, and to the chaos of overlapping, of redundant places of worship, and to our ill-disguised and straining efforts to proselytise for our own little cause?

Or do we honestly mean unity in a visible and organised body? If so, then we must face the implications which this purpose involves. And here I want to ask my Nonconformist friends to tell me if I am wrong in discerning a certain logical inconsistency in the present position. I seem to see a process something of this sort spread over the last three centuries:—(1) The individualistic view of religion, such as I have described; (2) following from this, the view that outward unity is not essential; (3) the rejection of such outward bonds of unity as episcopacy and a continuous ministerial commission; (4) the growing disorders of controversy and overlapping; (5) the sense of shame at this chaos and the demand for reunion; (6) the claim that those who have maintained the aforesaid bonds of union should abandon them to make reunion easy.

This summary is crude and brutal; but it does seem to describe the attitude of some. There are those who say: "We want to get rid of this scandal of a divided Christendom, but why insist on your outward rules?" So there seems to be a need to define our terms. What do we mean by unity? Do we mean a vague sentiment of brotherhood without unity of organisation—with a continuance of our present overlapping and disorder? Or do we mean an outward and visible unity with definite rules of ministry and co-ordinated plans of work?

If we mean the latter, then as we look out on Christendom as a whole and ecclesiastical history as a whole one thing is plain, that the vast majority of Christians through the long continuity of nineteen Christian centuries have held together by that form of Church government which is called Episcopacy. It is not necessary to reopen the old controversies about the history of Episcopacy in the first two centuries, of which the evidence is scanty and during which organisation was still fluid. Putting aside the question of origins, the fact remains that the greater part of Christendom, whether we measure by time or space, has agreed in this form of Church government, and that ultimate and world-wide reunion, remote as this may be on any conditions, is practically hopeless except on an episcopal basis.

But here the Archbishops' Committee's Report comes to our aid. Such representative men as the Bishops of Win-

chester and Oxford, Dr Selbie, Dr Garvie, Dr Scott Lidgett, and Mr Shakespeare have agreed on the one hand that Episcopacy must be the basis of reunion, and on the other hand that it is the fact of Episcopacy, not any theory about it, which is essential.

If this is the case, then there is a further implication. If non-Episcopal Churchmen decide that, for the sake of unity, they are prepared to accept episcopal ordination, they are pronouncing no judgment as to validity or invalidity of other ministries. They accept it because it is the rule of those branches of the Church which have been at pains to maintain historic continuity with the past. And he who accepts it does not say: "My previous ministry was invalid." It was valid according to the rules of his denomination, but he now wants something more than a separate denomination, and therefore he accepts the rules as to ministry of the larger and more comprehensive society.

But this would be made more obvious, and difficulties might be lessened, if there were some mutuality of recognition on the part of religious bodies coming together. Here again the Report of the Archbishops' Committee prepares the way. It frankly admits that each denomination has a spiritual heritage of real value—that each has emphasised and preserved some special element of truth—that each bears in its history some marks of the Lord Jesus and some signs of the grace and blessing of the Holy Spirit. This being so, I, for one, would have no hesitation in saying (let us say) to a Congregationalist church in my parish which was anxious for reunion: "I desire to be made a member of your society—a sharer in the corporate life and the special heritage of grace which you have preserved and handed down. I should be glad to be admitted to membership and ministry in your body—by the outward rites which are customary in your community; if, at the same time, you were desirous to be admitted to membership in the Church of England by the usual method (*i.e.* confirmation), and your minister were desirous to be admitted to its ministry by episcopal ordination. And I should advise any members of my congregation who wished to pass freely from one place of worship to the other to follow my example and to ask for the right hand of fellowship as a member of your society." There would then be real unity in this parish, but without a rigid uniformity. Just as we have had mission churches working alongside of the parish church, but with wide freedom as to forms of service, so there would be no need to change

the present form of service in the allied chapel. A general permission from the Bishop would suffice to meet the case, though, with regard to the administration of the Holy Communion, he would probably ask for some outline of the form in use, to satisfy himself that it was in general accordance with liturgical precedent.

There would be difficulties, of course. Difficulties are inevitable in times of transition. But the gains of reunion are so enormous that these difficulties are worth facing. And where there was real brotherly goodwill and real enthusiasm for the new sense of fellowship, and a reasonable amount of tact and sense of proportion, those difficulties would be overcome. The question might arise, for instance, who is to be the head of the united parish; but where the goodwill I have spoken of existed, the clergyman and the minister would agree to act together on the principle of precedence laid down by our Lord—"the greatest is he who serves"—and the personal equation of age and character would have its due weight.

A more serious question would be what would be the position of the Congregational minister (now an ordained priest of the Church of England) with regard to other ministers who had not adopted the same plan. Would he minister in their churches, and would he still be free to invite them to minister to his? Here again it is necessary to allow a certain latitude to meet the special exigencies of the transition period. I try to put myself in the position of such a minister, and I think the line I should be inclined to adopt would be that I should feel quite free to preach in other Congregational churches, and to invite other Congregational ministers, on occasion, to preach in mine; but with regard to the Holy Communion, I should be inclined to mark my sense of the value of outward order as a basis of reunion by seeking help in the administration of the Sacrament only from episcopally ordained brethren.

I have selected a Congregationalist for my example because of the principle still held by them, viz. that each congregation forms an independent Church, and is therefore free to act without waiting for the whole denomination to legislate. I know that in practice this principle has been modified by the very existence of the Congregational Union. But if the plan sketched were at all generally adopted, I do not see why room should not be found within the Church for a body still retaining a corporate character, just as the Roman Church has found room within its pale for the Religious Orders. We

adopted this principle in South Africa when the "Ethiopian Church" became the "Ethiopian Order" within the Church of the province. And we drew up a number of canons regulating the relations of the "Order" with its "Provincial" and its Chapter to the Archbishop of Cape Town, the bishop of the diocese, the incumbent of the parish, and the synods of the Church. But these are questions which may well be left for the moment. If the initial difficulty of the first experiment in a single parish were successfully surmounted, they would not prove at all insuperable.

The one thing we have to keep before us is that the War has changed everything; that we are going forward to a new world; that the opportunity is unique, and if neglected may never recur; that such times demand faith and courage and a large sense of proportion; and that, to meet transitions so vast and so splendid, we must be ready to give and take, and to accept temporary arrangements which are necessarily lacking in perfect symmetry and orthodox correctness. We cannot build a great cathedral without some confusion of scaffolding, or have the new and the old at the same moment, like the Irish School Board which passed three resolutions:—1st, That a new school be built; 2nd, That it be built on the site of the old school; 3rd, That the old school continue *in statu quo* until the new one be ready for use.

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PRESBYTERIAN REUNION IN SCOTLAND.

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THE question of Presbyterian Reunion in Scotland is so momentous as regards the higher interests of the nation that it ought to be considered without controversy—certainly without controversy of the merely controversial order. Even if the present movement were to come to nothing—which, happily, is far from likely to be the case—the negotiations ought to be laid aside without bitterness or recrimination, leaving the way open for another generation to succeed where the present has failed.

There is one important respect in which the article by Dr Macmillan in the January number of the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* will command the hearty assent of his readers. It is high time that the question of Union were brought from the atmosphere of the committee room into the light of day and to the wider space of the public platform. A committee room is something of a chill room. The time has come to deliver the Union question from cold storage and to realise that it is pre-eminently a people's question. The people of Scotland have always been deeply involved in the various religious readjustments and settlements. That is an outstanding characteristic of Scottish history. Religious questions have been questions of the home and the shop and the market-place. No doubt this may have led at times to their being discussed with imperfect knowledge and even with acrimony. But it kept them alive. And it tended also to keep the great practical interests in the foreground. The layman naturally takes a more pragmatic attitude than the churchman. Even if he addresses himself to the more "business" side of the matter, that is all to the good. There

need be no lack of spirituality or decline in fervour through insistence on the more practical aspects.

It is of the greatest moment, then, that the question of Union be submitted to the judgment of the people. If the Union movement is to succeed, it must appeal to the imagination and faith of the people. It must be a popular movement and not an ecclesiastical arrangement. We can only reach the goal we aim at on a wave of popular enthusiasm and interest. It must be felt that this is part of the nation's reconstructive effort after the War. If we are to have industrial and other kinds of reconstruction, it will be difficult to justify the omission of the religious side of the nation's life from the great movement. Men will ask: Is there, then, a sphere where no changes are called for? Are matters so satisfactory here that no improvement suggests itself? And they will turn to certain of our Scottish newspapers, whose columns have been crowded, within recent weeks, with all sorts of criticism and suggestion regarding the Churches, their organisation, spirit, and methods.

These remarks are not meant to imply that there is no intention of bringing the matter before the people, nor yet that the work of the committee has been without value. A great deal of most careful and able work has been done, of which the Draft Articles stand as the most notable outcome. Dr Macmillan complains of the delay. It is true that ten years have passed since the Church of Scotland approached the United Free Church with the proposal to negotiate. But ecclesiastical arrangements in Scotland do not make for speed. The Church Parliaments, the Assemblies, meet only once a year, and that for some ten days. The consultation of the various presbyteries is a tedious yet necessary process. Tardiness must be a feature of Church readjustment in Scotland so long as the present arrangements obtain. No one is to blame for this. But, in commenting on the delay and the consequent decline in interest in the Union movement, Dr Macmillan makes no mention of the war. It was the war that dwarfed and finally suspended the negotiations. In 1913-14 good progress was being made. The Draft Articles had been issued and had aroused much interest throughout the country. Their significance was quickly and amply recognised in United Free Church circles. The United Free Church committee was engaged in their consideration and in preparing the suggestions which the Church of Scotland Assembly had invited. An effort was made to continue the work in 1915, until events compelled

its abandonment. The tragic interest of the war became so absorbing that men's thoughts could not be directed to lesser matters. It is necessary to mention and emphasise this. The war explains the delay. Perhaps also it explains a certain apathy apparent in the attitude of some toward the reopened negotiations. We have just emerged from unprecedented experiences. For very many, in their private relations, the whole aspect of life has been tragically changed. With all our joy in victory, it is inevitable that there should be something of spiritual depression and even exhaustion. It may well be that even with those who recognise the importance of the Union movement there is felt the pressure of a mood that tells against active interest. But while a certain amount of apathy is intelligible in present circumstances, it is surely premature to speak of "the silent hostility" of the people of Scotland to the Union proposals, before these have been fairly and fully submitted to them. It is a hazardous business to speak for a whole nation. If it were affirmed that the attitude of the people of Scotland were one of interested expectancy rather than of hostility, many would support the affirmation. It can at least be said that on the only occasion on which the Union question was submitted to a public meeting during the war there was a striking display of interest and sympathy. The occasion referred to was the recent meeting in Glasgow of laymen of both Churches, at which resolutions in favour of Union were adopted with enthusiasm. There is no reason to doubt that what happened in Glasgow will happen elsewhere.

When Dr Macmillan proceeds to give reasons for the hostility of the Scottish people, he mentions first of all the question of endowments. This is a matter with which, obviously, a writer hailing from the United Free Church side of the negotiations cannot deal very profitably. It has never been before the United Free Church committee. Indeed, it may be said with literal truth that that committee has never shown the least interest in it. Their attention so far has been directed to the Draft Articles, and they have been content to leave the question of endowments as a domestic question for the Church of Scotland. It has always been assumed that the Union would not affect the Church's enjoyment of, and effective control over, her ancient patrimony. It may be, of course, that it will be found necessary for the Church to change, so to speak, the form of her investment, always with due regard to the equitable conserving of life-interests. Whether this would take the shape of a capitalising of the teinds and the formation of a great Central

Fund for the Church of the future remains to be seen. One supposes that some new arrangement would be unavoidable, in view of the territorial readjustments that would require to be made, as time went on, to meet the changing and growing needs of the population. But it hardly gives a correct representation of the case to say that "the impression prevailing over Scotland" is that the endowments are to be handed over to a Parliamentary Commission in order that they may "be divided between the two uniting Churches." The impression is rather that some new arrangement will fall to be made; and an arrangement that will give the Church a more effective control over her resources will appeal, one fancies, to the common-sense and business instincts of the Scottish people. The Union would be a National Settlement of Presbyterianism. It would bring the Church into a new relation to the State, in view of the principles set forth in the Draft Articles—a relation of the highest historic interest and importance, in which, it is firmly believed on the United Free Church side, the Church would be enabled to fulfil more effectively than ever her national duty and discharge her national functions; and part of the national settlement would be the securing of the Church in the effective control of her resources. In view of such a settlement, it would surely be reasonable to rely on the good-will of Parliament. The idea of Parliament opposing a national settlement may be dismissed. The settlement of Presbyterianism in Scotland would be a matter of such national and historical significance that all parties might be expected to share in its furtherance. It is not to be assumed as beyond dispute that the Scottish people's interest in the endowments extends to an approval of all the features of the present arrangement. We live in days when arrangements of all sorts are being revised and modified with little regard to the past, and the process is likely to continue. The Union would give occasion for such a revision of the whole relation of the endowments to the work of the Church and the actual needs of the country as would appeal to public sentiment. The Church has often been criticised in regard to the exercise of her spiritual functions. It looks as if we were coming to a time when her relation to her temporalities will be subjected to like criticism. In view of such possibilities, could there be any wiser policy than that of seeking by some great scheme of Reunion and National Settlement to give the country the assurance that the Church was alive to the need for reconstruction? Many readers of Dr Macmillan's article will learn with interest, not unmixed with astonishment, of the parish ministers who are enjoying stipends of £1000 and even £2000 a year.

The matter was recently referred to in a Church of Scotland presbytery, not with the object of congratulating these favoured brethren on their "sumptuous fare," but in order to call attention to a state of things that the Church might well deal with if she is to stand well with the nation in the critical days that are coming. Surely the men who realise this are the wise leaders of the Church. It would be difficult to imagine a more unfortunate proceeding, from the point of view of the Church of Scotland, than to allow the impression to get abroad that the Draft Articles are opposed because they threaten the continuance of an arrangement so satisfactory financially to a certain class of ministers. It may be taken for granted that very many, both within the Church and beyond her borders, will regard such a plea with complete coldness. Indeed, a motion has just been tabled in a Church of Scotland presbytery overturing the Assembly to take steps to have the teinds pooled, so that her resources may become a more elastic instrument in her hand. It looks as if some such arrangement will soon be regarded as unavoidable.

When Dr Macmillan comes to deal more specifically with the Draft Articles, he criticises that document both as to its designation and substance. The Articles are defined as "Declaratory of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland in Matters Spiritual." Dr Macmillan objects to the use of the term "Declaratory" on the ground that "a Declaratory Act declares what the law of the Church is," whereas the Draft Articles declare "it to be what in reality it is not." But whatever the dictionary meaning of the word "Declaratory" may be, there is precedent for its use in connection with the Draft Articles. In 1879 and 1892 the United Presbyterian and Free Churches respectively passed Declaratory Acts, defining their attitude to the Confession of Faith. These Acts were declaratory of something new, of a new temper and attitude of the Churches to the Confession—something new, found to have become implicit in the mind of the Churches, which it was necessary to make explicit. The Declaratory Acts, in short, indicated a change in the Church's point of view. It is following this well-known usage that the term is employed in connection with the Draft Articles. They make explicit what it must be concluded was implicit in the mind of the Church of Scotland when she opened negotiations with the United Free Church ten years ago, viz., that if the Reunion of Scottish Presbyterianism was to be effected, the Church of Scotland was prepared to seek a readjustment in some important respects of her relation to the State. The most important element in this readjustment

is to be the State's recognition of the Church's inherent right to autonomous government in matters spiritual. That is the new thing which the Draft Articles declare. They are not put forward as declaratory of the present relation of Church and State, and therefore do not declare anything "to be what it really is not." They are declaratory of a new claim which the Church feels impelled to make in the interest of Presbyterian Reunion. And as such they ought, on Dr Macmillan's own showing, to give him satisfaction. For, as he surveys the history of the Church since 1690, he finds that it is a record of "the fresh powers and rights and privileges" granted to the Church by the State. But why contemplate with satisfaction the granting of such powers and rights to the Church, unless on the assumption that the Church was deprived of something she ought to have possessed from the beginning? The Draft Articles propose to carry to its logical and inevitable issue the very process which Dr Macmillan views with such commendation. Further, Dr Macmillan shows that the process of liberating the Church may go on without interfering with the endowments, for, as he points out, through all the years of partial and progressive liberation there never was a hint of limiting the temporalities. And, still further, it was quite possible during these years of progressive liberation for Church of Scotland ministers to wear "the State collar of the watch-dog" round their necks. "And a very honourable collar it is." The Draft Articles simply propose to improve on that metaphor of Hallam's which Dr Macmillan finds so apt. They aim at the completion of the liberating process so far as "powers and rights" are concerned. They declare that that completion lies inherent in the history of the Church. And the demand involves a relation of Church and State which Hallam's figure of speech rather pitiably fails to illustrate. The idea of the Church as the watch-dog of the State may be in accord with the meagre rationalism of a past age; it is quite inadequate to satisfy the demands of to-day. This demand, as embodied in the Draft Articles, presents a very much nobler conception of a truly National Church, autonomous and self-determining, recognised by the State as the guardian of the great spiritual interests of the nation, and secured in all the resources required to make that guardianship effective. That is the ideal at which the Draft Articles aim, and which has appealed so strongly to thousands of men in Scotland who desire to see the divergent streams of Scottish Presbyterianism flowing together again in one broad river.

When Dr Macmillan tells us that the adoption of the

Draft Articles would "result necessarily" in Disestablishment and Disendowment, he assumes the mantle of the prophet and indulges in prediction. There is no effort made to bring out the necessary connection between the Draft Articles and Disestablishment and Disendowment, to show the logical relation between the adoption of the one and the completion of the other. All we have is the assertion that Parliament would not permit a Church enjoying spiritual freedom to function as a National Church. Evidently it would prefer an "established" Church, even if it were not truly national, to a National Church if it were not "established" on the old model. But, apart from the fact that it is rash to dogmatise as to what Parliament may or may not do in the unprecedented circumstances in which we find ourselves, is it not the case that neither Church nor State is the institution it was, say, in the eighteenth or even in the nineteenth century? Both feel themselves on the verge of a new time. Nor are we entitled to assume that Church and State relationship can only exist in the form in which we know it. There is a sense in which we may admit the force of Dr Macmillan's statement: "An Established Church cannot have it both ways. It cannot have absolute spiritual independence and the protection of the State securing it in its endowments." Certainly an "established" Church, say, in the eighteenth century could not have had it both ways at the hands of an eighteenth-century State. But what a State of the old type would not grant to an "established" Church, the State of to-day may grant to a truly National Church. At any rate, the Reunion policy aims at bringing about this fresh readjustment of State and Church relations. That is what gives it such high interest. It is not a case of a "prudent commonwealth" permitting, in a moment of aberration, two Churches to make a "quiet deal" and to "walk off" with £10,000,000 of national money. It is the case of a State securing to a nation in its religious aspect and reference, and to the Church that represents that aspect of the nation's life, the means of ministering to the nation's religious needs. To grant to such a Church complete freedom to deal with its doctrine, worship and government, would be no surrender of prerogative on the part of the State. It would be State recognition of the sacred rights that inhere in a nation in its religious capacity. Such a relation of Church and State would be honourable to both, a relation of mutual trust and confidence. They would be, indeed, high contracting parties for certain of the greatest purposes of life.

In Dr Macmillan's article we have an affecting, not to

say alarmist, picture of the evil case in which minorities would find themselves if the "ultramontane" claims of the Draft Articles were admitted. Minorities could be driven "naked into the wilderness." In the case of each member of such minorities "the emoluments of his office would have to be sacrificed." But is it not the case that minorities have gone out "naked into the wilderness"—to maintain the picturesque form of expression—from the Church of which Dr Macmillan is a member? What of the Seceders in the eighteenth century and the Disruption men of 1843? It is true that these men might have remained in the Church. But, impelled by some inner loyalty and necessity, they went out into the wilderness. It is evident, then, that in the case of some fundamental dispute with the Church of Scotland, a dispute involving conscience, there is no escape from the wilderness, with its consequent loss of emoluments. The case of the "Wee Frees" was so peculiar that it hardly affords ground for argument. Their contention was that the Free Church, in uniting with the United Presbyterians, had done an illegal thing. They sought redress and failed to find it in the Scottish law courts. How they ultimately found it, to the world's surprise, in the House of Lords we all know. But mark what followed. To prevent what can hardly be otherwise characterised than the Gilbertian situation which would have arisen in Scotland consequent on the Lords' decision, the sovereign will of the people intervened. That was the real explanation of the appointment of the Royal Commission. The setting up of that tribunal enabled the Government to escape under form of law from the impasse created by the decision. But it was really the symbol of the national will resolutely bent on an equitable settlement. And the case stands thus, that, according to the judgment of the Scottish courts, the Free Church was within her right in promoting the Union of 1900. That the "Wee Frees" were provided with comfortable tabernacles for their wilderness sojourn was due to circumstances not likely to recur. Otherwise, it would be necessary to inaugurate a movement for the protection of minorities.

In Dr Macmillan's article there are some observations on Church of Scotland leaders which, it must be confessed, make painful reading. The comment they call for here may be summed up by saying that not a syllable of the strictures will gain sympathetic response in the United Free Church, which has never wavered in its belief in the purity of motive and nobility of aim that prompted and have sustained the negotia-

tions. It may be true, as we are told, that the Reunion proposals are not finding in the presbyteries of the Church of Scotland that hearty support which the promoters of the movement hoped for and expected, and, also, that there are elements of antagonism in the United Free Church. These are serious facts. For the presbyteries of Scotland constitute a very powerful body of opinion. They are composed of men of culture and social standing, of influence and public spirit, and who are in touch with public sentiment. Yet even the presbyteries of Scotland, powerful as they are, are not the people of Scotland; and it is to the people we must look for the force that is to reunite Scottish Presbyterianism, if that happy event is ever to take place.

It would be well for Scotland if, during the coming mission of National Rededication, there were such a rising of the spiritual fervour of the people as would weld the two great Churches together. Scottish men have stood shoulder to shoulder along the battle fronts, bound by a comradeship too deep and sacred to be affected by ecclesiastical differences. They were victorious because they closed their ranks and stood fast. Scotland owes it to these men to close her ranks and to set herself, in like comradeship, under her King and Head, to the blessed tasks of peace.

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THE SCANDAL OF NON-ESSENTIALS.

PROF. W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE, F.R.S., F.B.A.

IN whatever age of religious history we may look, the relations between alleged causes of difference and the actual effects seem absurdly disproportionate. In most cases the ostensible reason for a difference, the *σκανδᾶλον* which hindered unity, seems to other ages quite incredible. It is so far from being essential, that in many cases it looks to the perceptions of a later age like an open question, or a point of entire indifference. In speaking thus, we are not considering what is desirable, but what is essential. There are many things desirable to a complete unity of feeling and co-operation; but our concern here is with what is essential, without which a fellow-Christian is held to be excommunicate.

In order to see things from a wider point of view, it may help to clear our vision if we look over the causes of dissension in the past. In each case we may see, more or less evidently, that the real cause was a difference of feeling and outlook which could not be defined in words, or the definition of which by either party would be necessarily in terms offensive to the other. A comparatively slight incident of difference therefore became a badge, like the red and white roses, or the roundhead and lovelocks, which served to label a much deeper and less definable antagonism. To see this form of the case is the road to analyse our present differences. While we talk of some label, let us ponder whether there is a real antagonism of nature lower down. If there be a deeper cause, let us hold our peace about the label; if there is no under cause, then drop the label. Either way, discussion of the label never did lead to unity, and never will.

The first great disruption in the Church was that of the Athanasian controversy, and that depended fundamentally on whether there could have been an order of events before time and matter existed. To the modern mind such a question

seems entirely in the air, if we are concerned with the unity of the Church. To the mind of Arius a Father must necessarily precede a Son; to that of Athanasius there could be no precedence when there was yet no matter, and no time yet existed. The bitterness, the persecutions, the martyrdoms that raged beneath this label were not originated by it; they belonged to opposed factions who for over two centuries rent the Roman world. To trace the differences of standpoints, of nationality, and of motives which belonged to these factions is a much-needed historical study. It is all the more difficult because of the destruction of most of the writings on one side, and we are reduced to gleaning a few lucid fragments of Arius by their being selected for denunciation in the *Orations* of Athanasius.

After that came the Homo-ousion and the Homoi-ousion division, which was the outcome of the previous parties. Here the vagueness of defining the undefinable was necessarily so wide that the definition of the two sides overlapped. Yet this cry was enough to label the two parties that rent the Church.

Now let us look nearer home, where we can see more behind the scenes. What was the open label of division between the British and Saxon Churches? The date of Easter, and the form of the tonsure! The keeping of any Easter, however reasonable and laudable, is not named in the New Testament; the tonsure is much later, entering directly from outside of Christianity. Yet for these—nominally—the Churches were at feud. We know well enough that these were but labels of a deep antagonism, of the plundered and the plunderer, of two centuries of bitter, savage, warfare. That was what kept the Churches apart; the intriguing of Wilfrid and his party against the Celtic missions, which had done the real work in the North, pressed this bitterness home. Yet the labels sufficed to mark the question of submission of one Church to the other.

Turn again to the East, and we see it furiously divided over the Monothelite controversy. Would any congregation now think of breaking up over a matter which is purely a point of theological theory? Do we not realise that we each have many wills in our own minds, warring against each other? And who are we, to dogmatise about the precise nature of a Divine will? Is not the question of the *Filioque* another such scandal-stumbling block? It is impossible for minds bound in matter to comprehend the nature of the immaterial; as well might a Botacudo define electricity. At least the more dogmatic side of the Anglican Church finds the clause no

hindrance to fraternising with the Greek Church. Who can doubt that the political rivalry and jealousy of patriarchs was the real cause of division, and that the *Filioque* was but the outward sign? To take a more individual cause of excommunication, the celibacy of the clergy. Unheard of in the first three centuries, it was gradually forced on, until rendered compulsory by Hildebrand. The label was the sanctity of clerical life; but the facts prove the real requirement to have been the claim of the Church to the entire life of its votaries. So long as they would form only temporary connections, the Church in various ages made little objection to their following the vices too often found in their superiors in office.

A great rending of the Church arose on the Iconoclast question. Here the ostensible cause was obvious, and more genuine than most labels. Yet, behind this, it was Leo the Isaurian, the founder of a new dynasty, who wrought this reformation; with it went the attempt to reconcile the Civil and Canon Law, to refuse right of asylum to Churches, to relax the death penalty, to relax the *patria potestas*, and to make equal laws for rich and poor. The whole movement was probably influenced by the example of Islam, not far east of Isauria; and it was Basil the Macedonian, under western influence, who countered this legislation in the next century. It is obvious that different ideas of race, of politics, and of connections were all rolled up beneath the ecclesiastical label of Iconoclasm.

Even in the great division of the Reformation, though the labels were real causes, yet they covered a wider and more fundamental cause, which was less seen and mentioned. The greatest matter was the reduction of the *sacerdos* to the elder or presbyter, the repudiation of the power of a celebrant, and the replacing him by the ministrant, who counselled but did not command. With this fell the whole doctrines of Transubstantiation, Confession, Penance, Absolution, Masses for the Soul, and other priestly functions, which men have ever since recognised as baseless if a supernatural priesthood is not conceded.

Still later, in our struggles of the seventeenth century, the labels of Church government and forms of worship were but the externals of a basic difference between Cavaliers and Roundheads. The Celtic and the Danish wars of a thousand years before are echoed in the struggles of their descendants in the last three centuries.

Now, come to our own day. What are the labels of division? Ordination and Episcopal succession by physical

contact. But are these the real differences? Are there not much larger, but undefined, differences yawning beneath, gulfs which cannot be filled or bridged by anything obvious and definite? The clash of the Stuart age was not ended by Toleration; its causes lived on in the eighteenth-century opposition of Conformity and Nonconformity. The abolition of all civil disabilities has not ended the difference. As a Nonconformist remarked to me, on seeing two equally well-to-do congregations streaming out of church and chapel side by side, "One can see at a glance which is which." There is a physical difference which goes with the mental difference, probably both an ancestral inheritance from different stocks. The most typical mental difference is that of preferring a liturgy, or else an extemporary form of worship. Let us look closer at that.

Each type appeals to its own form of religious feeling. The seat of inherited religious sense is specially the unconscious mind, with its intuitions, deeper even than personal experience. This is perhaps the essential seat of all religion, the nearest contact with the Father of Spirits. It is to this that a liturgy appeals; no physical strain of attention is needed; a word or two is enough to start the devotional thought of each passage, so that the material makes the least inroad on the spiritual. It is parallel to the highest forms of literature or conversation, where allusions indirectly expand the train of thought far beyond the words. But the higher a process the more terrible may be its failures, and the deadly peril of a liturgy is formality. As most people will not think if they need not do so, any form tends to mechanical repetition, which is carried to its logical extreme by the Buddhist prayer-wheel. Judging by the test of audibility, many rapid reciters of liturgy now might well give place to a dignified gramophone.

It is against this failure that the extemporary system protests, while retaining the value of associations in the Bible and modern hymns. It appeals directly to the conscious intellect and emotions; it is obviously in the field of action. However the quality may vary, the product claims to be really alive and genuine in its expression. It prefers new corduroy to rotten velvet. It treats the great intuitional religious existence with fresh douches of conscious expression, which may either invigorate or chill.

Here are two entirely opposite avenues to the unseen, the intuitional and the intellectual, thoroughly typical of the natures of two different classes of mind. Neither can claim to be intrinsically better than the other, for they belong to

different ancestries, different outlooks, different perceptions, different frames of thought, different values in life. We know well enough in ordinary converse how different the various religious types are in perceptions. The dead-walls from which the ball of conversation will not rebound are in entirely diverse parts of the mind when talking to a Non-conformist, an Evangelical, a Ritualist, or a Romanist, not to mention an Agnostic. Apart from the forbidden grounds where the ball must not go, there are large regions in each type of mind in which it will not rebound. The minds cannot be treated alike, their very natures differ, as one star differs from another in glory.

Now, what is the use of settling details of ordination when the types are so fundamentally apart? Any joint system of give and take would only make half a congregation wince at the omissions, and the other half wince at the commissions. If I prefer one dish at a feast, or one kind of music, and my neighbour prefers another, why make both unhappy by an official mixture?

Is, then, unity nothing? We reply, Why seek for unity in forms instead of in the spirit? Some formal expression of unity may be necessary, but it should be of the simplest kind. Many have objected to the Creeds because they are neither praise nor prayer; and with the modern dislike of tests, creeds are perhaps not the most heartfelt reconcilers. But we have the noblest of all the writings outside of the New Testament in the great Hymn of Praise, which, in part, has been the heritage of the Church ever since the days of paganism. The *Te Deum* embodies the Creed in a less dogmatic form in its expression, but surely no one could refuse to see a fellow-Christian in the man or woman who joins in that hymn.

What course, then, might be followed? Let the Anglican Church say, "Any body of Christians which officially adopts, generally or occasionally, the *Te Deum* in its public services may then be corporately in communion with the Church of England for the voluntary interchange of worshippers and the invited co-operation of ministers." Each body would hold to its own organisation and forms, no one need be scandalised by attending any service which is not helpful to him, anyone belonging to an associated body might fully join in any of the allied services. There would be no bar of church or chapel, Conformity or Nonconformity, in the united "Church of Praise."

W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.

WE WOMEN.

CONSTANCE L. MAYNARD,

First Principal of Westfield College, University of London.

Now that six million of us have been gifted with the Imperial Vote, we are more conscious than we have been before of being a compact body. We have now a collective as well as an individual standing, and the change is a real one.

The business of public life goes on, and always has gone on, without us. Not only war, but exploration and commerce, the Church and the universities, the decision and application of the law, the newspapers, the mechanical inventions that further the production and distribution of wealth, and a host of other responsibilities tread their accustomed round ignoring us as co-operators. Of all the currents of the wide world's energy, one stream alone has never been able to do without us, and that is Art. Century and country make no difference; we are always there—not as maker but as object, for we are passive in the hand of the contriver, man. We dance in strange attitudes on Greek vases, we take mincing steps (and are never seen in profile) on Japanese fans, we look out from Mona Lisa's inscrutable smile, we lead to destruction like the Lorelei, we defend the man we love like Portia, and we lead him safely through many perils up to the highest heights like Beatrice. The imaginative creations of the world seem to be fastened to us, and whether they are poetry, tales, songs, music, the drama, or the plastic and pictorial arts, all are full of our praises. Men are never weary of us. Every generation as it arises turns toward us with fresh ardour, till, as a French writer has said, you might think there was only one story in the world, and the summary of it was this: "She was beautiful, and he loved her." Very little transpires in history of our relation to the nobler world of the spirit, but we may safely say that, whether for good or ill, we have

“borne all things, believed all things, hoped all things, endured all things.”

Great as our power may have been, it was pre-eminently an individual and not a collective power. Looking at the position in a somewhat superficial manner, we should unhesitatingly decide that the influence was that of one woman over one man—a power intense enough to work wonders here and there, but limited to the narrow space of a single heart on the side of both giver and receiver. Now this is partly true and partly a mistake, and it is on this point I want to speak.

Before going further, let me turn for a moment to the historical past, and express our appreciation of the almost boundless honour that has been paid to us singly. Believe me, we are grateful! For the portraits of Antigone and of Viola, and of Agnes; for the *Vita Nuova*, and for Rossetti's sonnets, for the Princess and Pompilia; for the Gorgon's head cut off, and for the many fiery dragons slain in our defence; for beautiful pictures of the Virgin Mary, and for the disorderly rout of Comus put to flight; for all the Queens of the Tournay and the Queens of the May, for all the gloves worn as favours or thrown down in challenge, and all the fine cloaks made muddy in our honour,—we render thanks for them all. “But oh, it is not always May,” says the old song, and, alas! it is not. Such is the order of the world in which we live. We are all young, and all attractive, for youth in itself is attractive, and some are beautiful and have a wide range; but in a few years youth and beauty are past, and the power we possess must lie in deeper regions, or it will be as nothing in the world. We are grateful, we are a thousand times more grateful, to man when he discovers and values this underlying region; when the blossom has fallen and the burden and heat of the day make the leaves faint, then is his love our hope and our stay. For pulling in the collar year after year against the incline, for sweet deference to an aged mother, for tender consideration to an ailing wife, for toiling at some monotonous employment for the sake of the education of his children,—for these pictures of the beauty and courage of the soul, we do not know how to give thanks enough.

Once again be it observed, we are dealing with the individual and not with the race. Supremely beautiful may be the sacrifice on either side, and there may be hundreds of thousands of such cases in our happy country, and yet they are all founded on the love of the single heart and not on a

principle, and collectively nothing, or almost nothing, has been done for us till the last fifty years.

Turn to the reverse side of the picture and see how this absence of principle tells, and how sorely we have collectively been mishandled. Looking back over history, we find that as a race or community we have been cramped and baffled and thwarted, and confined to the lowest position; some of us have been stifled and dwarfed in harems and zenanas, some of us have had our feet so contracted as to be almost useless, others made into mere beasts of burden, and practically all but a few of us valued only as temporary playthings or as permanent slaves. Behind the outward show there are, moreover, secret doors leading into black chambers, where the very steam of the abyss rises up and blots out the shining of the sun for those who know what there goes on. But it is not my part to wail over agelong woes, nor to preach rebellion. My track in life has lain in the open daylight, and I know too little of these things to speak of them wisely, so let me take Mr Kidd's words in *The Science of Power* rather than my own, and say that no race and no animal "has been so thoroughly exploited by man, as has woman." This is a severe indictment, and I rather fear it is true. The part that I do know something of, is that the effect on the character of women has been wretched. "The angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection," and tyranny finds its exact counterpart in the vices of slaves. Brute force can be matched by cunning, and we have lost the perception of our high calling, and have been paltry, jealous, and unfair; it is a matter for tears.

Let us now turn our minds away from the historical position with its honours and degradations, and look for a few minutes into the dim and innocent world that lies thousands of years behind history, and see if Creation will teach us what we were intended to be. We must stoop to lowly forms of life, but if we look to "the hole of the pit whence we were digged," we may find some enlightenment.

The lowest of all animals, corals, sponges, and infusoria, have various strange ways of multiplying their kind, and have no sex; and where there is no division of labour there is little possibility of advance. The duty of the fish is to lay eggs by the thousand, but not to cherish or protect them; therefore the fish has no character. The reptile works on somewhat the same plan, and therefore, ethically considered, he is dull beyond words. The insect is no better, except the few communal insects, such as the bee and the ant; these take laborious

care of their young, a standard of right and wrong is developed among themselves, and they are highly to be respected. With the birds we enter a higher world, for the parents work themselves thin in feeding their ravenous young, and the father co-operates nobly, affording us almost the only example of true paternity in the animal world. There is a glimpse here and there of the same sharing of toil and sacrifice—as I believe is to be seen among the communal beavers—but among the creatures we know intimately and treat as friends, the father is morally non-existent. He has his own work to do in the world, and it is other than this. It is better that the two sexes should invest their capital of energy in two separate enterprises, and the male shall have the struggle for life as his portion, and the female the struggle for the life of another; this plan results in a very wonderful development of affection, memory, perseverance, fidelity to a task undertaken, and indeed in a first sketch or outline of the most precious thing in the world, character. In the cases we are considering the whole weight of the future, and the weight of the beginning of ethics, fall on the mother. She not only bears and feeds, but guides, teaches, protects, and avenges her family. Look at the mother cat, dog, rabbit, horse, sheep—look where you will, and in their obscure lives you will see marvels of patience and unfailing remembrance.

When all is said, however, the parallel between the animal lives and our own is incomplete. The work is hard but it is short, for, with the physical independence of the offspring, the love of the mother ceases; she becomes always indifferent, and in some cases hostile, a new task of maternity easily supplanting the old. Man is the only creature on the earth that can have six or eight children, all of different ages, and all totally unable to support themselves. Without the co-operation of the father the position is wholly untenable, and he is dragged away from his free life to defend from enemies and to provide food. Thus is he too educated into altruism; but in all mankind, whether savage or civilised, it is the mother who reigns supreme during the earliest and most plastic years.

Can we guess why this immensely long period of immaturity is given to man alone? Our Creator is wise, and there must be a good reason for putting a quarter of the span of our precious and all-too-short life into the stages of dependence. The pheasant runs about the day it is hatched, and the kitten at a year old is ready to become a mother herself; but we are left behind in a condition of almost inconceivable weakness and incapacity. The reasons appear to be two:—

First and obviously, because we have so very much to learn

that the period of plasticity must be long. The brain of the chicken is almost completed in the shell, and in a few weeks or months the cerebral arrangements of the cat or the sheep are sufficiently matured to fulfil all the duties of the narrow circle of life which lies before them. But we are born with our great mass of brain smooth and unsolidified, we have a language to acquire, and to learn the multiplication table, and how to behave nicely, and a hundred other things ; and all these, as they are impressed on the memory and the will, make furrows or convolutions on the surface of the brain, and thereby constantly augment its power. New furrows can, I believe, be made until we are sixty-three ; so there is hope for us all.

Secondly—and this has never been sufficiently dwelt upon—the long childhood produces the mother's love, that ancestral, deep-rooted, and unconquerable love from which all other kinds of affection and loyalty spring. The long appeal of helplessness calls it forth. This love is the foundation of what we term "character" as opposed to mere impulse ; and patience, foresight, sympathy, protective courage, and altruism in general all arise from this one root. Each generation has strengthened the germs of these beautiful qualities till they guide the actions and alter the conditions, and then they are gradually inherited by the offspring, by the male, of course, as well as the female. The dog and the cat have a true infancy of inert blindness, and then a true childhood of vivid play, and it is mainly the modification of disposition produced by the care of these stages that makes both of these animals such sympathetic companions. Throughout the animal world (ourselves included), while the mother is educating the child individually, the child is educating the mother racially.

Thus it is we come to be what we are. Such has been our education from the hand of our Creator, and we now see with greater clearness that we women, we who constitute slightly more than half the human race, are told off to look after the future of the world. The prolonged period of immaturity lies in our hands, and we are meant to be the makers, teachers, and guardians of the next generation, those in whom lie slumbering the vast responsibilities and weighty decisions of the next thirty or forty years. Men have chiefly to do with what *is*, and they must make the best of the material which lies before them ; but women have chiefly to do with *what will be*, or rather (if we have eyes to see it) *what ought to be*. Our thoughts and aims lie a little beyond the blue horizon that encircles the present decade. Men have hard struggles, but they also have fruition, and we have not. The lot that falls to us is nothing

but endless hope that the future world will be better than the one we know. "She stays the fair young planet in her hands," sings Tennyson, and so she does indeed; for to her vision the planet is always fair and young, because the possibilities are as sweet to her and as full of promise as are the clear eyes of her children.

We women do not invent or discover things. We are marvellously stupid in these directions. Not the steam-engine, and the electric light, and the aeroplane, and the wireless telegraphy—of course not, for these help forward the work of men;—but not even things that are of the utmost use to ourselves, like the sewing-machine; not chloroform, or the anti-septic treatment of wounds, though in our capacity as nurse these things touch us so nearly. I doubt if even the least thing, from the safety-pin of the Celtic barrows to the fountain pen of to-day, has ever been invented by a woman. It may be urged that she has not had the right education for such work, and so has missed the opportunity; but I think this argument is at least partially invalidated by the fact that, where men and women have had an equal chance, "a fair field and no favour," she has done no better. Think of music; many more thousand girls than boys have been forced into learning music, and yet there are no great composers. Think of poetry; here we enter a region undoubtedly congenial and entirely open, and yet surely it is a far cry from Sappho to Mrs Browning. As an explanation of this last defect, a generous man once suggested it arose from a lack of material, we not having our own selves to write about; but the cause lies deeper than that. Go lower in the scale, go to our inheritance of drudgery, cooking, and sewing. Millions of us have spent our lives in these domestic occupations, yet the better *chef de cuisine* and the better tailor is to this day a man. We learn, we popularise, we teach superlatively well, but we hardly ever originate. That side of our brain seems to be left out, and we cannot make a new thing.

Pause here and think. "We cannot make a new thing." Is this true? Why do we toil and suffer? Because we are making the best and highest of all possible things, man. We are *making the makers* of everything else. We are making the whole moral life of our nation in the immediate future. This is more like the creative work of God than any other effort can be, for the result is not inanimate structures which moth and rust corrupt, and which Time, the great thief, breaks through and steals, but centres of new life, new productive power, new scope, new aims. When we send out into the

world a firm, self-controlled, generous character, whether man or woman, we have created a whole new thing, for no one can tell where the radiance of such a life will end its shining. We have originated an originator.

Here then we stand to-day, and it is the children who are our glorious inheritance. We have an immensely long immaturity to deal with, and there is no need to hurry over the stages. We are equipped for our task by the love of children having been permanently aroused in us—thanks to the mothers of by-past ages,—and this is not only the instinct which awakes with almost intoxicating joy in the individual mother when her babe is laid in her arms, but the permanent and more sober endowment of every woman worthy the name. The savage mother confines her attention to her own children, just as the cat does (and I fear many civilised mothers do the same); but we collectively can have the wider view and love them all, for no better reason than that they are children. We are the mothers of the whole nation, and there it stands at our knee.

The nearly twenty years of immaturity may roughly be divided into four stages:—First, the Age of Passivity, which, if the mother knows the laws of physical well-being, is better left to her charge. There is something here beyond me, and I stand aside and look on with profound admiration. There is nothing to be seen on the surface but helpless contentment or a wailing appeal for a change; and the broken nights endured without complaint, the endless sacrifice so cheerfully borne that it will not admit that it is a sacrifice,—these are beautiful things, and they are gifts to our race from above. Next in order comes the Age of Self-will, when sometimes the only words a child will say are “No,” and “I won’t.” This stage needs careful handling, but we need not fear. Nothing is wrong, but the little being has grown unevenly, and the driving power of the will has been born within when as yet there is not enough reason to guide, or affection to concede the point at issue; with right treatment, the character will smooth out between four and five years old.

Then comes the happy time, the Age of Chatter, with its unconquerable question, “Why?” At this stage we gather our treasures into flocks, and every week, every day, is of value. Now the imagination wakes in full tide; now the affections are strong and courage is born; now there are violent likes and dislikes, ambitions and despairs, and there are curious little deceits and honesties, ficklenesses and fidelities, and everything crowds to the surface to have its scope.

Central childhood has a charm so vivid that some of us greet it with a feeling akin to rapture. A happy home and happy tuition, and there is nothing to hide, and the whole being is like a clear-running stream that shows the pebbles in its bed. First conceptions about everything have now to be given—Nature and fellow-man, science, history, language, and geography—and we must allow of nothing that has subsequently to be unlearned. Also—oh, joy and honour to be allotted the task!—there are the first real ideas of both ethics and religion to be given. The branching this way and that of these, the highest thoughts of which the human mind is capable; the conceptions of patriotism and philanthropy, of justice and generosity, of liberty and order; and then, when these things have had a little practice, and the deadly opposition both from within and without begins to be recognised, there is the bringing all rays to a focus in the thought of Him “whose we are and whom we serve.” Here are foundations that will need no reconstructing in adult life, lights that no new source can overpower; here we can, as we look at our living and growing plants, quote Goethe’s words in a way he did not intend: “Grau ist alle Theorie, und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.”

But, lastly, the most difficult stage comes on, the Age of Silence. Till now the child has been racial rather than individual, and we are bewildered when the new ego comes forward, for much of our tuition has sunk out of sight. The brook is still there, but it has got into a ravine deep amid rocks and overhanging bushes, and cannot be seen. Tall, shy, awkward, the whole being has withdrawn into a sheath of self-protection while the permanent man or woman is being formed within. It is marked by a new timidity and a close reserve, and yet there is evidence of strong self-assertion, as who should say, “I am myself, and you shall not touch me. The generation above me is good, but I will not be arbitrarily controlled by its judgment. That is not fair. I have a newer world than theirs to live and work in, and I can only adopt the principles that seem to me to be right.” Affection and deference may extort many concessions, and the sweetest and soundest natures grant them cheerfully; but something of this tough obstinacy underlies every character that is strong and born to be a leader of men. Love and tact can do wonders, and there is a wise non-interference; remember too that “impression is strongest where the power of expression is weakest,” and nothing is too good for these lads and girls who are the true children of the nation. We are the mothers of the nation,

and we bear with their difficult ways with that elate feeling with which the physical mother bears with the wails of the Age of Passivity. Now is the time when the stores of the spirit gathered throughout childhood can be vitalised, when the pollen so gently carried by innumerable bees changes the sweet flower into a living force that will gather to itself all good, and in time will face the world with the solid fruit of mature life. Then is the soul brought into the Divine presence, then is the choice made for the kingdom of God and His righteousness; and generally the change takes place in profoundest silence, and never without a struggle.

When we touch on our favourite themes, we are apt to take the bit in our teeth and run, and I must not go into detail. The great question that remains with us is, How shall we educate the women who are to do this great work? Not only the mother and the teacher and the writer are of value, but the sister and the cousin, and above all the possible bride who stands unseen among the host of girls. She, indeed, "may set what price she will upon her own sweet self," and if bride and wife require a high standard men will live up to it; but my experience is that men sink if women will allow it. Few sights are more grievous than that of the girl making herself cheap, thus undervaluing and spoiling the beautiful reverence with which man is naturally endowed toward her. Then indeed she is a miserable being, and ruins not only her own inheritance, but that of all others.

Even early in life I saw glimpses of what a good education might do in fostering the qualities of judgment and self-restraint we tend so sorely to lack. I was one of the first students at Girton, and entered the new world with nearly everything to learn. One long vacation I insisted on attending a meeting in the Town Hall at Llandudno, to hear Miss Lydia Becker on the desirability of the vote for women. Then and there I was convinced, and held to my conviction amid a mild amount of laughter from a conservative country home. But even from the first day I saw that very few of us indeed were to be trusted with the vote, and I gladly threw the energy of my whole life into the cause of education. We are by nature slight, and ill-balanced, and impulsive, and a real training is needed before we can enter on the noble duties life lays before us. If "Education" suggests Latin and algebra, then it is the wrong word to use; such studies foster an accuracy and a decisiveness that prove an excellent groundwork, but the aim in view is not primarily intellectual, but is that maturing of "body, soul, and spirit," that develop-

ment of the whole character, leading it toward justice, beneficence, order, and liberty, that is the necessary preliminary to supporting responsibility. Eagerly have I watched the attempts toward this true education so long neglected, and seen it spread out into wider and ever wider circles. Some attempts have been unwise, but most have been excellent, and never was there a fire lighted that has made less smoke. The main success of our endeavours is to be seen in our answer to the sudden demand of the War. Prompt as an echo was our response. The women of Napoleon's day sat at home and wept, but we have worked, and our work has proved trustworthy. The gift of the long-deferred vote was the result, and we are conscious of being more clearly a corporate body than we were before; we can now work together for the suppression of vice, drunkenness, and other enemies of our race. But to me this fact is a side-issue in comparison with our position, permanent, sacred, God-given, immutable. Man is the executive of the whole world, but we determine whither his labour shall lead. Man rows, but woman steers. Man is not only the best general in war, but the best imperial legislator in time of peace. Judge, professor, artist, merchant, what you will, it is my belief that he beats us at every point but one; that, however, is the supremely important point of the direction of effort. Whither is man's immense industry leading the world? We hold the rudder, and we have our eyes fixed on the vague but bright ideal that lies not far beyond the horizon's limit. We fight for "right and not for rights," for the highest well-being of our country. Let us be content, and more than content. Let us be silent in view of the greatness of our vocation. "The prize is noble and the hope is great."

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SHAKESPEARE AND THE WORLD-ORDER.

T. WHITTAKER,

Author of *The Neo-Platonists*.

THE idea of Reconciliation in Shakespearean tragedy has been stated by Professor A. C. Bradley in this form: that the only real thing in the world is the soul. For the soul's inward good the order of the world works. "And nothing outward can touch that."

This idea, he tells us (*Shakespearean Tragedy*, p. 326), he has stated, to bring it out, in a form both exaggerated and much too explicit. The same necessary reserve in any explicit statement is aptly put by Mr J. M. Robertson when he says that in Shakespeare's later plays "we never seem to touch bottom in his thought" (*Montaigne and Shakespeare*, p. 217). One especially important qualification of too simple a view is that, as Professor Bradley observes, the evil which the moral order expels seems to be a part of it and produced by it. This may to some appear pessimistic or a concession to pessimism: it would nevertheless have been entirely accepted by a teleological optimist like Plotinus, who could have taken over without the smallest alteration the passage that follows as a description of the order of the world on one side: "Let it be granted that the system or order which shows itself omnipotent against individuals is, in the sense explained, moral. Still—at any rate for the eye of sight—the evil against which it asserts itself, and the persons whom this evil inhabits, are not really something outside the order, so that they can attack it or fail to conform to it; they are within it and a part of it. It itself produces them,—produces Iago as well as Desdemona, Iago's cruelty as well as Iago's courage. It is not poisoned, it poisons itself. Doubtless it shows by its violent reaction that the poison *is* poison, and that its health lies in good. But one

significant fact cannot remove another, and the spectacle we witness scarcely warrants the assertion that the order is responsible for the good in Desdemona, but Iago for the evil in Iago. If we make this assertion, we make it on grounds other than the facts as presented in Shakespeare's tragedies" (*Shakespearean Tragedy*, pp. 36, 37). In short, the apparent order by itself neither proves nor excludes the reconciliation.

As a further aid to the understanding of Shakespeare's thought, I proceed to discuss briefly Mr Robertson's view as set forth in the book just referred to. To be able to take up a definite attitude to his contentions, which are of great interest, I have made a special study of Montaigne's *Essays* with a view to them. The result is that I agree that Shakespeare's thought was touched at innumerable points by Montaigne, but not that Montaigne's thought as a whole had quite the deep-going influence contended for by Mr Robertson.

It is not that I underrate Montaigne's fruitfulness in suggestion, which may be compared for inexhaustibleness with Shakespeare's own. For example, in taking a few notes, I have put down things so modern as to seem contemporary or of the most recent past. Here we find the maxim for the pragmatists, that Nature is "plus jalouse de nostre action que de nostre science" (livre i. chap. 3). And here is a thought which in the latter part of the nineteenth century did duty in a hundred variations to annihilate or politely dismiss the metaphysicians: "Et certes, la philosophie n'est qu'une poësie sophistiquee. D'où tirent ses auteurs anciens toutes leurs auctoritez, que des poëtes? et les premiers feurent poëtes eulx mesmes, et la traicterent en leur art. Platon n'est qu'un poëte descousu: Timon l'appelle, par injure, grand forgeur de miracles" (livre ii. chap. 12).¹ One saying, taken out of its context, might seem to have been written expressly for the suffragists: "Les femmes n'ont pas tort du tout, quand elles refusent les regles de vie qui sont introduictes au monde; d'autant que ce sont les hommes qui les ont faictes sans elles" (livre iii. chap. 5).² Again, the self-criticism applied to his own age could scarcely be bettered by the acutest reflection after the centuries that have passed since: Simplicity, as in the

¹ "And certainly, philosophy is but a sophisticated poetry. Whence do its ancient founders draw all their authorities, but from the poets? And the earliest were poets themselves, and treated of philosophy within their art. Plato is only a disconnected poet: Timon calls him, by way of abuse, great forger of miracles."

² "Women are not wrong at all when they refuse to accept the rules of life that have been introduced into the world; inasmuch as it is men that have made those rules without consulting them."

discourses of Socrates, if it had appeared as a new thing in that age, would not have been admired (livre iii. chap. 12). Matthew Arnold could not have formulated more clearly the difference between the Attic spirit and that of the Renaissance.

One thing in particular I have noted as especially favourable to Mr Robertson's contention. It seems to me that the idea for Shakespeare's modern Hamlet, as distinguished from the Hamlet of the saga, may have been suggested by the problem raised in Montaigne's *Essay* (livre ii. chap. 20): "Nous ne goustons rien de pur." At the end appears the idea that too keen an intelligence may be a cause of inefficiency for action—a thought to which he recurs later (livre iii. chap. 8). And it is put plainly that this is a superiority, and that the superiority itself, not some resultant weakness of will, is actually, in some circumstances, the cause of the failure. "Quoy, si les plus plattes raisons sont les mieulx assises; les plus basses et lasches, et les plus battues, se couchent mieulx aux affaires?"¹ Did Shakespeare, we may reasonably ask, take from such passages the hint to give the problem a concrete embodiment? Is the proof to be seen in Hamlet's own reflections about his "thinking too precisely on the event," accompanied by self-blame which the reader feels to miss the mark? For in reality Hamlet was too great, and not too small, for the duty of blood-revenge imposed on him; which nevertheless, I agree with Professor Bradley, is postulated all through the drama as a duty. Of course there were other conditions of the long hesitation, as Professor Bradley shows; but he recognises that Hamlet's innate intellectuality co-operated.

Many more details could be brought forward in support of Mr Robertson's thesis; but, after all, it seems to me that the total influence is that of many particular thoughts, and not of a way of looking at the world. Montaigne with Plutarch meant a considerable portion of the intellectual atmosphere in which Shakespeare lived. Only one distinct individual influence, however, seems traceable, and that is the artistic influence of Marlowe. It is a point definitely made out in literary history that Shakespeare was for a time a pupil of Marlowe in poetic style. Of course the whole form of the Shakespearean drama had been prepared by Shakespeare's predecessors generally. As Mr Robertson has insisted, Shakespeare was not, besides being supreme as poet, thinker, dramatist,

¹ "What if the most flatly obvious reasons are the best suited for practice; the lowest and meanest, and the most in the beaten track, those that go best with business?"

and artist, also a great inventor of plots; nor did he invent such modern novelties as the mixture of comedy and tragedy, the freedom in changing the place and extending the time of action, and so forth. All this belongs to a preparation that can be called social. Still, one epoch-marking individual influence is perceptible, namely, that of Marlowe on Shakespeare's early blank verse; and it is quite conceivable that there might have been some similar individual influence on his thought. I can only say, as a summary of my own impressions, that I do not find exactly this. Shakespeare's thought, as distinguished from the form of his verse, Marlowe affected only by a particular idea and not by his general inspiration. The impassioned pursuit of tangible ends—

“That perfect bliss and sole felicity,
The sweet fruition of an earthly crown”—

interested Shakespeare not in itself but as starting problems in the complex and mysterious order upon which it acts, and which reacts upon it. The type of character that embodies this impulse to power does not interest him psychologically more than many other types. Is there a more decided influence from Montaigne's thought? No doubt there is in detail; but, as I have said, I cannot find that Shakespeare passed through a phase in which he was for a time reproducing Montaigne's way of looking at things, even (as Mr Robertson both admits and contends) to go on to something more profound afterwards.

This brings me to a difference of opinion as regards the thought of Montaigne himself; which, however, Mr Robertson allows that Shakespeare never definitely took up in this form. “Montaigne,” he says (*Montaigne and Shakespeare*, p. 170; cf. p. 195), “disparaging the powers of reason by the use of that very reason, used his ‘doubt’ to defend himself alike against the atheists and the orthodox Christians, Catholic or Protestant, himself standing simply to the classic theism of antiquity.” I was quite open to see this in Montaigne; I do, in fact, see in Rabelais a sincere theist and spiritualist; but Montaigne, in spite of his devotion to the theists Seneca and Plutarch, seems to me to reproduce with modifications, not the type of the ancient theist, but of the sceptic as represented by Sextus Empiricus. Of course the modifications make a considerable difference, and his position is an individual one. He seems generally to float between a pure naturalism very decidedly touched by the thought of Lucretius, and formal acceptance of Catholic theology as something not to be judged by reason

—human reason being so weak; yet this acceptance, as he distinctly indicates, has ultimately in its favour only custom in an especially powerful form, and custom for him has no probative force. One stroke there is indeed on the ground of ethical theism, which could only, I think, have been delivered by one finally convinced that, whatever may be the truth of things, that principle of ecclesiastical orthodoxy which makes faith in a traditional story or dogma fundamental, and morality secondary or derivative, is false and pernicious: “Ruineuse instruction à toute police, et bien plus dommageable qu’ingenieuse et subtile, qui persuade aux peuples la religieuse croyance suffire seule, et sans les mœurs, à contenter la divine justice! l’usage nous faict veoir une distinction enorme entre la devotion et la conscience” (livre iii. chap. 12).¹ But the theism in this may be hypothetical; and on the whole I do not find the notion of divine justice as a ruling power in the world to be a constant thought with Montaigne: here it is simply an ethical ideal. The nearest thing to an ever-present conviction behind his scepticism seems rather to be the belief in an eternal nature, impassible, superior, and indifferent to man. This certainly leads to the notion of a dream-like illusiveness in man’s life (*Montaigne and Shakespeare*, p. 225); but it is precisely here that Shakespeare represents a mode of thinking that diverges at the root. Let us take as an illustration, in a passage cited by Mr Robertson (livre iii. chap. 4), some words that are unintelligible in the English translation from which he quotes,² but are too characteristic to omit in trying to generalise Montaigne’s view: “Is there anything save us in nature to which nullity gives substance, over which it hath power?” (“est il rien, sauf nous, en nature, que l’inanité substante, sur quoy elle puisse?”). This undoubtedly is a constant thought with Montaigne; in the same essay there occurs also the strong expression: “C’est priser sa vie justement ce qu’elle est, de l’abandonner pour un songe.”³ I do not deny that something like this occurs in Shakespeare also (compare *Hamlet*, iv. 4); but there is the remarkable difference that the common form of contrasting the stability of nature with the transitori-

¹ “A ruinous piece of instruction to every kind of polity, and far more injurious than ingenious and subtle, is that which persuades the peoples that religious belief suffices alone, and without morality, to satisfy divine justice! Experience of life brings before our eyes an enormous distinction between religious devotion and moral conscience.”

² The English translation is cited by Mr Robertson as being that which Shakespeare himself used.

³ “To throw away one’s life for a dream is to value it at exactly what it is worth.”

ness of man has gone out. For Montaigne's underlying thought, nature, conceived predominantly under the influence of revived Epicureanism, as a mechanical order, will outlast man and his works : it is in contrast with the world of nature that they are illusory. For Shakespeare, on the contrary, nature far more than man is the type of illusoriness. Lear in decay is a "ruined piece of nature." The body is the soul's "fading mansion" (Sonnet cxlvi.). When Antony declares that he cannot "hold this visible shape" (*Antony and Cleopatra*, iv. 14), he illustrates his own transitoriness by the pageantry of nature. In the famous passage in *The Tempest* (iv. 1), it is nature that will "leave not a rack behind." The poet cannot even introduce a line on "Nature, sovereign mistress over wrack" (Sonnet cxxvi.) without predicting—if somewhat obscurely and by way of hyperbole—nature's own quietus. The "great creating nature" (*Winter's Tale*, iv. 4) which produces human art itself, is not the external order in contrast with man, but, I think we may say without carrying the thought beyond what is implied, the metaphysical whole of things. By the rising mechanicism, whether coming through Montaigne or anyone else, Shakespeare does not seem to have been at all affected. So far as the external order is presented as indifferent, it is not deified for its nullification of man's purposes, but rather protested against. Shakespeare's thought on the relation of Nature in the larger sense to Art, whether influenced by Bruno's or not, may be brought into parallel with it: here nature becomes again divine because living with a life that includes the life of man. The origin of his own most distinctive thought, however, remains untraceable; unless we take it in an extremely general way to be part of that passing over of Platonism into the modern world which was the source of the new qualities that intermittently appear in modern as contrasted with ancient imaginative literature. By Plato's idealism, though he knew it, if only in translation, more closely than Shakespeare can have done, Montaigne was totally uninfluenced. The real interest of Plato for him was as a Greek moralist of the Socratic school. For the idealist metaphysician he felt and expressed only indifference. In Shakespeare, on the other hand, however it may have come about, the idealist drift of thought which was one part of the atmosphere of the age, as naturalism was another, has been transmuted into a kind of Indian illusionism.

Probably there will be no difference between Mr Robertson and myself in holding that to Shakespeare as a thinker the scheme of Christian dogma was so completely nothing that

he did not even need to say to himself that it was nothing. Readers of the *Merchant of Venice* have noticed that he could tolerate even the intolerant. Comte was right in speaking of him simply as "ce libre penseur." But, as Professor Bradley says, he cannot have been a very simple-minded freethinker, and I certainly do not find in him a settled acquiescence in the knowledge that we can know nothing but what appears. I return to Professor Bradley's view that Shakespearean tragedy is not fundamentally pessimistic, but that, though no definite reconciliation is pointed to, we are allowed to think of a reconciliation as possible. There is no underlying certitude that the visible world is all that really is. The suggestion—or conviction—is rather that it is pervaded with unreality. If Shakespeare had been a dogmatic naturalist, then undoubtedly the effect of *King Lear* would be, as Swinburne puts it, that nature herself is revealed as unnatural. The total effect, however, in this as in other tragedies, is, as Professor Bradley points out in reply, that heroic character is more real than the external order of things. Certainly, as he also admits, no answer is even suggested to the question raised by the apparent crushing of good and evil alike. For the possibility of an answer, I think we must appeal to those glimpses into the illusoriness of the tangible that find too frequent utterance to be a mere accident of dramatic expression. What can then be said is that the apparently darker and harder fatalism, as Swinburne calls it, of the greatest of modern as compared with the greatest of ancient poetic minds, is relieved by a profounder illusionism; suggesting even that the "blind hopes" with which Æschylus made Prometheus mitigate the fear of death for mortals¹ may have more reality than that apparent order of things which to the incipient science of the Greek naturalistic schools had seemed to stamp those hopes for ever as illusions. We are left free to think that perhaps in the end the soul will say of nature, like Prometheus of Zeus—

Πάντως ἐμέ γ' οὐ θανατώσει.²

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LONDON.

¹ *Prom. Vinct.*, 250.

² *Ibid.*, 1053. Paraphrased by Swinburne, in *Athens: an Ode*—"He may smite me, yet he shall not do to death."

GLIMPSES OF IMMORTALITY.

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I.

(1) THE Christian hope of immortality is rooted in, and draws its nourishment from, the Christian faith. This connection in the broadest sense, so as not to limit it to Christianity alone, is included in the description of the function of faith given in the Epistle to the Hebrews xi. 1. A faith that has *assurance* and shows *confidence* (for both these words render the secondary meaning of hypostasis) is nothing else or less than hope. The whole statement might be paraphrased thus: *Faith makes the future as real as the present, and the unseen as certain as the seen.* In spite of the domination of his thought and life by sense and time, the material and the present, man has always and everywhere, by a necessity of his nature, exercised that faith which raises him above these limitations into the wider realm of the spiritual and the future.

(2) Much more slowly than we should have expected, in view of the progressive revelation of God to the Hebrew nation, did a hope of immortality, a future life worth having and so wishing for, emerge in dependence on faith in God. On the one hand the interest of the religion was focussed on the covenant relation of Jehovah with the nation, and on the other the belief in an adequate retribution for the character and conduct of individuals in this life maintained itself, so as to exclude the tendency to bring in God's righteous dealings with men in the future life to redress the balance of their unequal lot in this.

(a) It is in the writing which wrestles with the problem of the sufferings of the righteous—the Book of Job—that the faint wish for, and then the firm hope of, some relation of the soul to God after death emerge (compare xiv. 13–15 and

xix. 25-27). It is the moral interest that the righteous should be vindicated which, allied with the religious assurance that God can and will be the vindicator, gives *substance* to the thing here hoped for. It is the same association of ideas that we find in the explanation given in the Epistle to the Hebrews of Enoch's translation (xi. 5).

(b) The religious interests alone—the saint's communion with God, and the confidence that God will not suffer it to be interrupted by death—inspire the Psalmist's hope (lxxiii. 24-26). It is on this argument for immortality that our Lord Himself sets the seal of His authority in the answer He gave to the question of the Sadducees: "He is not the God of the dead, but of the living" (Mark xii. 27). The personal relationship of God to men is the guarantee of their immortality. Whom God has chosen as His companions, death cannot make its victims. This development of belief by itself would yield us little more, except its religious setting, than the Hellenic belief in immortality. But the question to which Christ gave this answer was about the nature of the resurrection, the reality of which He affirmed in correcting the error of the popular view of its nature. "When they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry nor are given in marriage; but are as angels in heaven" (verse 25). What does the conception of the resurrection add to the idea of immortality?

(3) The interest of the Hebrew religion in the covenant relation of Yahweh with the nation, which has already been mentioned as one of the reasons for the delay of the development of the hope of immortality, is the root from which the conception of the resurrection springs.

(a) The righteous dead will be raised to share in the joys of the Messianic Kingdom (Isaiah xxvi. 19-20). And since the Messianic Kingdom is on earth, it follows necessarily that the resurrection must be bodily, and even material. As the Messianic Kingdom is conceived, so must be the resurrection of those who share it. In the expectation of the resurrection a postponed social and material good is offered; in the hope of immortality, an immediate individual and spiritual good. When the two conceptions are combined, there must be a modification of each. The resurrection in the sense of the possession of the complete human personality must be conceived as following immediately upon death; but the consummation of the future life must be conceived as reached only when the community of the saved is completely constituted in the fulfilment of God's purpose of salvation for mankind. This synthesis was not made within the limits of the Old

Testament, and only partially in the Apocryphal and Apocalyptic literature.

(b) The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, who has this development behind him as well as the Christian contribution to the problem, reinterprets the hope of the faithful of the Old Covenant. He represents them as seeking not an earthly but a heavenly good (xi. 16). That heavenly good they have not yet attained (verses 39-40). They are thus personally interested in the continued progress of the Kingdom of God in the Christian community. It is tempting to think of them as *spectators* of the Christian race, as Hebrews xii. 1-2 at first sight suggests; but such an interpretation is precarious.

(4) This reinterpretation of the hope of the Old Testament has been mentioned at this stage of the discussion as an illustration of a principle which must be recognised as determining the consideration of this subject in all its phases, and this principle must now be completely stated. The language man uses about the divine and the eternal must be borrowed from the human and the temporal, and must consequently be to a greater extent *symbolical*. He must represent Spirit to himself as breath or wind. He must conceive God's relation to man as that of Father. The future life of the individual or the future history of the race he must describe in terms borrowed from the present conditions. No prophecy can anticipate with literal exactness what the future holds: it can only show an *image*, it cannot give an *idea* of what will be, but as yet is not. Divine revelation does not free its agents from this human limitation. We must recognise, therefore, that the teaching of Scripture in eschatology must be *symbolical*. The inadequacy of the symbols is being constantly discovered, and so there has been, and must still be, a continuous process of reinterpretation. The symbols are not *delusive*, giving error instead of truth, but they are *illusive* (to use the term in the sense which I think Robertson of Brighton gave to it), inadequate representations of the truth, needing constant correction. This process can be observed in the Old Testament and the Apocryphal and Apocalyptic literature; it is no less present in the New Testament. The old representation is not abandoned; it is maintained alongside of the new; and only gradually does the inconsistency of the one with the other, the correction of the one by the other, gain recognition. We need not assume that the process of reinterpretation is completed in the New Testament. Just as the Jewish eschatology is reinterpreted in the New Testament, and the husk is preserved even when the kernel has been extracted

from it, so it is the right and the duty of the Christian Church to examine the New Testament eschatology, not only to free itself entirely from that Jewish husk, but even to find out if all is kernel for the permanent and universal Christian faith in the New Testament reinterpretation. This is the bold and rash adventure in which I invite you to join me.

II.

(1) In this essay at reinterpretation we can claim the sanction of our Lord's example, who translated apocalyptic ideas into terms of moral and spiritual reality, as has been very admirably explained by the Rev. W. Manson in his book on *Christ's View of the Kingdom of God*. An instance of this reinterpretation of Jewish eschatology may at once be given.

(a) The Sadducees assumed the popular view of the resurrection as a complete restoration of the material body and of earthly relationships in stating the case of the woman with seven husbands in order to expose the absurdity of the doctrine. Jesus removes the difficulty by restating the doctrine (Mark xii. 24-25). The natural relationship and the social institution of marriage, as conceived in the Sadducees' statement, is declared as excluded from the angelic life in heaven; and that is all the occasion required Jesus to say. But can we rest content with so negative a conclusion? Must we assume that all human relationships lose their significance and all human affections their value in the future life?

(b) If the belief in immortality for individuals has, as we have seen, its roots in man's communion with God, and the confidence that inspires that death cannot end all, can human love make no claim for continuance? Sophocles puts on the lips of Antigone the hope of reunion with her father, mother, and brother. Robert Browning, in his *Prospice*, faces death with the expectation of recovering again the wife he so worthily loved. It may be that this aspiration is not entirely Christian, as Christian faith would give the first place to the vision of Christ in His glory; and on that vision depends the resemblance to the perfection of Christ which is the goal of the Christian race (1 John iii. 2).

(2) Nevertheless, as in this earthly life the devotion of the soul to Christ does not exclude human affections, and these affections even are purified and transfigured by that devotion, so surely Christian love of parent and child, husband and wife, friend and friend, will have a place in the angelic life of Heaven. A love like that which Mrs Browning describes in

her *Sonnets from the Portuguese*, for instance, has the promise and pledge of continuance. The natural relationship and the social institution may cease to be, but the human affection which has been developed within them by the grace of God and the goodness of man will go on—and still be.

(3) But reunion implies recognition. Whatever the resurrection body may be (a topic to which we must soon return) as an organ of self-expression and self-communication, it must preserve a personal continuity adequate for mutual recognition.

(a) The sense of this necessity leads in the *Apocalypse of Baruch* to the quaint notion that at the resurrection the dead must be raised in the same body, and that only after recognition will there be any transformation. "For the earth will then assuredly restore the dead, which it now receives, in order to preserve them, making no change in their form, but as it has received, so will it restore them, and as I delivered them unto it, so also will it raise them. For then it will be necessary to show to the living that the dead have come to life again, and that those who departed have returned (again)" (quoted by Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 280). It is certain that material identity is not necessary to personal continuity.

(b) Although we must draw inferences with great caution from the records of the appearances of Jesus after the resurrection, yet we may at least note the fact that His body was no longer subject to the former physical conditions, and was so changed that Mary Magdalene and the two on the way to Emmaus did not at once recognise Him; and yet Mary knew Him by the tones of His voice when He uttered her name (John xx. 16), and the two knew Him when He brake the bread (Luke xxiv. 30). What expresses characteristics of the unchanged personality will serve as tokens for recognition.

(4) We may pass over the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke xvi. 19–31) as simply reproducing current ideas about Hades, unless we do find, as some expositors have found, in the rich man's solicitude for his brethren an indication of improvement of character—a rather forced inference.

(a) While in using the term *Paradise* in His assurance to the penitent thief (Luke xxiii. 43) Jesus is borrowing the language of Jewish eschatology also, which applied the term either to the division of Hades in which the righteous dwell or even to Heaven, yet the assurance itself, "To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise," justifies our conclusion that it was no remote but an immediate good in the unseen world that Jesus assured, and so Christian hope may claim. A similar assurance is conveyed by Jesus' words regarding the

many mansions, or abodes in the Father's house (John xiv. 2). His own companionship there is promised (verse 3; *cf.* xvii. 24). Is it necessary, as some expositors insist on doing, to refer the return to the Second Advent? Is it not more consistent with the tenor of the whole passage to assume that, as His death now brings separation, so their death will bring to the disciples reunion, unless (a qualification we must make) Jesus anticipated His Second Advent as imminent? For Christian faith to-day, Christ's presence is anticipated even in the valley of the shadow. Whatever be the historical exegesis of the two passages in the Psalms (xxiii. 4 and xvii. 15), Christian faith is entitled to use their language as expressing its confident anticipation. Is it only fond fancy to suppose that the manner of dying of many whose Christian faith gains assurance as death draws nearer, is an evidence that the presence of the Conqueror of death also makes them more than conquerors?

(5) While the Christian hope of a blessed and glorious immortality as an immediate good may claim such confirmation from Christ Himself, we cannot be forgetful of those who have not the hope which is rooted in faith in Him as Saviour and Lord. While we may not press any details in a parable such as that already mentioned—the request of the rich man on behalf of his brothers,—since we should also be in honesty bound to lay stress on that other detail—“the great gulf fixed,”—yet there is one saying which does qualify the common Jewish tradition of everlasting punishment. The assertion that there is only one sin—the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost—which cannot be forgiven in this world or the next, does bear the inference that for other, less persistent and defiant, sin there may be forgiveness hereafter. It is, however, the revelation in Christ of God as Father which offers the fullest assurance that God will do His best for everyone, and not His worst for any. To this question we must afterwards return.

III.

(1) It cannot be doubted or denied that towards the close of His earthly ministry Jesus foretold not only the resurrection, but His own Second Advent, and at times at least anticipated that the generation then living would witness it (Mark viii. 38, xii. 1). The emphatic assertion: “Verily I say unto you, this generation shall not pass away until all these things be accomplished” (xiii. 30), refers, as the context shows, to the fall of Jerusalem, with which the Second Advent is not identified by Jesus Himself. At other times the expectation

is not so confident. "Of that day and of that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father" (verse 32). The call to watchfulness rests on this uncertainty (verse 35). Not only do the parables which unfold the mystery of the Kingdom—the sower, the mustard seed, and the leaven, the tares and the wheat—suggest a historical process, for which time must be allowed, but the great commission (Matt. xxviii. 18–20) to preach the Gospel to the nations implicitly postpones the Second Advent, and promises the constant presence and the supreme authority of the risen and ascended Lord to the disciples in the discharge of their task. If these be not the *ipsissima verba* of Christ Himself, they express the consciousness of the Church at the time when this Gospel was completed. How much is the historical horizon expanded—all the nations—and yet the same prospect—the consummation of the age!

(2) The constant presence and the supreme power in the present order of human history does not satisfy the Church; the expectation of the consummation of the age in the Second Advent remains. We find the same combination in the Fourth Gospel, which teaches a constant inward spiritual presence of Christ, and also in consequence a present spiritual judgment and resurrection. (a) The promise of Jesus to His disciples is not that He will at some future time return in power and glory, but that at once He will be with them (John xiv. 18–19). If the words in xiv. 2–3 must refer, and cannot but refer, to the Second Advent, as Dr Charles insists, then the older standpoint remains alongside of the newer; but I cannot find his argument conclusive. It is only in the *Appendix*, which is probably from another hand than the evangelist's, that there is an unequivocal statement about the Second Advent. While Peter's martyrdom before that event is foretold (vv. 18–19), it is suggested that the other disciple may survive till then (xxi. 22).

(b) Judgment also is present, and each man carries out his own sentence in his attitude to Christ as the light and the truth (John iii. 19–21). Jesus quite frankly declares Himself to be Judge (ix. 39). This declaration is, however, qualified by the statement that the primary object of the Incarnation was salvation, and condemnation was only its secondary result, when men refused that salvation (iii. 17).

(c) In view of the general unambiguous teaching of the Gospel on this subject, it is impossible to believe that the saying in v. 28–29 is authentic. It is inconsistent with its immediate context as well as the general teaching of the

Gospel. It is only in Daniel that a resurrection of the wicked (the apostates) as well as the righteous (the martyrs) is taught in the Old Testament (xii. 2). In the New Testament, St Luke places on the lips of Paul the declaration that "there shall be a resurrection both of the just and the unjust" (Acts xxiv. 15), but we cannot treat the passage as a verbatim report, and where in his letters does Paul teach anything but a resurrection of the righteous only? The restoration of complete personality after death is a hope for the good, and not a threat for the bad, as it is due to the personal relationship to God. The clause, "at the last day," in vi. 39, 40, 44, 54; xii. 48, must also be regarded as an interpolation by an editor who clung to the old view, and did not understand the new. Martha's statement of the current conception (xi. 24) is set aside by Christ, and the conception dominant in the Gospel is expressed. "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he die, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die" (xi. 25-26).

A present spiritual resurrection is the result of the present spiritual judgment, if the salvation offered in Christ is accepted and not rejected. It is nothing less or else than eternal life which is at once possessed, over which death has no power, which not only has the promise and potency of the resurrection life in heaven (vi. 40), but is already the resurrection life begun, which has its inevitable consummation in the heavenly blessedness, when believers shall be with Christ, where He is, beholding His glory, and being changed into His likeness (John xvii. 24; 1 John iii. 2).

IV.

(1) The truth presented in the Fourth Gospel, that the presence of Christ is spiritual, and so consequently also the judgment and resurrection, and that as spiritual it is an inward process and not an outward event, can be applied within a wider range than the gospel gives to it.

(a) If Christ be the truth of God by which, and the light of God in which, all men shall be judged; if this judgment be primarily an offer of salvation, and only secondarily a sentence of condemnation when the offer is rejected; if God wills not the death of any, and only the life of all, and it is men who must will to die or to live,—can we limit this process to this earthly life? It was the survival of Semitic heathenism, and not the progressive divine revelation in the Hebrew

nation, that led to the hopeless view that Sheol was beyond the realm of Yahweh to save and bless; and it is surely only a surviving paganism or Judaism that would place Hades—the unseen world, the abode of the dead—beyond the redeeming ministry of Christ.

(b) There are those who have received the truth and grace of Christ in this life, and their hope in death to be with Christ in glory and blessedness is sure. There may be those who have deliberately and decisively resisted and rejected Christ as Saviour and Lord; theirs is the eternal sin which hath never forgiveness. What multitudes there are, however, who have not had full opportunity in this earthly life to decide this issue, or who have never really faced it! Must we not believe that the process of judgment goes on in the next life, that Christ is spiritually present with them, and that they may there experience the resurrection unto eternal life? A physical event, such as death, cannot surely suddenly arrest the process of judgment, and bring it to a conclusion before, on the one hand, God has done His best, in offering His salvation, and, on the other, man has done his worst in incurring condemnation. That painful and severe discipline may be a factor in this continued process of judgment, who can doubt? That the loss of the glory and blessedness into which believers at once enter is itself incalculable penalty, who deny? Whatever qualifications may be necessary in recognising the moral and religious consequences of sin and unbelief, yet let us cling to the hope that God's mercy is not done with any soul until that soul makes it impossible even for God to do any more. God cannot do more than He has done in Christ; but who can say that in this earthly life every man has become fully aware of what Christ is, and has finally determined his relation to Him?

(c) While there is and must be moral and religious continuity between this life and the next, that does not exclude the possibility that death is itself a crisis—it may be of self-discovery and self-recovery, as when Jesus looked upon Peter (Luke xxii. 61).

The penitent thief upon the cross passed out of darkness into God's marvellous light in the presence of Christ upon the Cross. Dare we limit the efficacy of that presence in the valley of the shadow or in the unknown world beyond? It is on such broad moral and religious considerations, based on the revelation of God in Christ, the absolute value of Christ for man as God's final and perfect gift, that we may dare to rest "the larger hope."

V.

(1) Returning now to the hope of the righteous in death, we must strive to define more exactly what the heavenly blessedness is.

(a) Paul no less than John taught a present spiritual resurrection, with special emphasis on the moral transformation involved (Rom. vi. 4-5). While John connects the resurrection of the believer with the presence and influence of the Incarnate Son of God, for Paul the crucifixion and resurrection are both the pattern and the power of the inward change.

(b) Yet Paul retains the old eschatology of the Second Advent of Christ in power and glory, followed by the general resurrection and the final judgment. This he never abandoned altogether, for it is found in so late an epistle as Philippians (iii. 20-21). In 1 Corinthians he writes as one expecting to survive to the general resurrection. "We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed" (xv. 51).

(c) The description he gives, however, of the manner of the body in which the dead are raised would point us away rather from the general resurrection, and indicate that it is at death that the natural body is laid aside and the spiritual assumed. It is not in the grave, but in this earthly life, that the body is sown in corruption, dishonour, weakness; it is in the heavenly life that it is raised in incorruption, glory, power (vv. 42-44). This at least is Charles's interpretation.

(d) If Paul had always thought consistently, this is what he ought to have thought; but we know he was not always consistent in his thinking. As Paul expected at the time when 1 Corinthians was written to survive till the Second Advent, it is probable that he did not trouble himself to think what happened at death, or to form any distinct conception of an intermediate state between death and the general resurrection he so soon anticipated. It would be folly to find a doctrine of unconscious or semi-conscious existence between death and resurrection in his use of the figure of *sleep* for death (vv. 18 and 51). Whether Paul so early held the thought or not, it is one we may welcome as true, that within the natural body we are already shaping the spiritual body as a result of our experience and character. It is no contradiction of this thought that Paul should regard the resurrection body as a gift of God (xv. 38), for this as every other process in God's world is of God.

(2) When 2 Corinthians was written, Paul had been forced to face the possibility of his own death before the Second Advent.

(a) That he had not yet reached the conviction that the resurrection body is assumed at death when 1 Corinthians was written, is a conclusion confirmed by the mood in which the passage in 2 Corinthians seems to have been written (v. 1-4). The conviction of the first verse did not precede but succeeded the wistful longing, the painful foreboding of verses 2-4. Not for Paul as for the Greek thinkers was the body the grave of the soul, from which death brought deliverance. He shrank from the prospect of becoming a disembodied soul, for he was a Hebrew in his thinking, and for him the living soul was the body into which God had breathed His spirit (Gen. ii. 7). Having reached this conviction that "we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens," Paul, although he still shrinks from the dissolution of the present body, is content to depart, if it be God's will (2 Cor. v. 6-8). As the conviction gains certainty, the tone becomes even more confident: "To me to live is Christ, and to die is gain" (Phil. i. 21).

(3) But it may be asked, is not the Greek view as reasonable as the Hebrew? Is not the belief in the resurrection a remnant of Jewish eschatology we may now discard? I have shown no hesitation in "letting the dead past bury its dead," in abandoning ideas that have no significance or value for us to-day; but what the belief in the resurrection stands for is this, the survival of the complete human personality with an adequate organ of self-expression and self-communication in manifold relations to others.

(a) In early Christian eschatology as in Jewish the resurrection is not connected with the death of each individual, but with the Second Advent as the necessary condition of the final judgment. Is there no counterpart to this connection in the view which we are now led to adopt. The process of Christ's judgment on earth and in the unseen world cannot go on indefinitely; it must have a conclusion. The progress of believers in blessedness and glory is towards a consummation. The individual and the race cannot be detached from one another; the seen and the unseen world are the realm of one God fulfilling the same purpose for both. It may well be that, when God's purpose on earth in Christ Jesus as Saviour and Lord is fulfilled, then also believers in Christ will in the redeemed family of God attain their final good, and the opportunity of deciding for or against Christ for all the dead will close. As in His earthly life He judged men in offering them salvation, it may be there will be such a manifestation of His truth and grace

in human history as will make that offer decisive as it never had been.

(b) In the earlier epistles, Paul looks for the eternal destruction of the wicked. He closes his theodicy in Romans ix.-xi. with the triumphant conviction: "For God hath shut up all unto disobedience, that he might have mercy upon all" (xi. 32); and it is no surprise that his argument then passes into adoration (33-36). In the epistles to the Captivity he gives to Christ a cosmic significance, and to His redemption a universal scope (Col. i. 19-20). A dogmatic universalism is unjustified, as we cannot affirm that none shall resist God's will to the uttermost, and that God can compel any man to be saved against his will. But the latest thoughts of the Apostle bid us hope for all and despair of none.

(c) It is the most fully developed thought of each writer, and of the New Testament as a whole, that we should take, and then we find a reinterpretation of the Jewish and even the early Christian eschatology which gives us a reasonable, holy, and gracious hope for ourselves and all mankind. When we have done our utmost to express what we have apprehended, we must end with the confession, that is also an expectation: "Now we see in a mirror darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I have been known. But now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; and the greatest of these is love."

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THE IMMORTAL SOUL.

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It may be taken for granted that sooner or later an exact definition of "the soul of man" will be forthcoming. The term is generally accepted, but its meaning is so vague and ragged that probably, even in a little company of half a dozen intimates, not two would write down exactly the same designation. Whence came the soul, whither it goes, its nature here or hereafter, are questions on which there is as great doubt and disputation to-day as existed one, two, or three thousand years ago. War has naturally added interest and poignancy to the discussion, and many a heartbroken parent and lover have fallen on their knees during these terrible years and besought a vision from heaven. But no direct answer has been given. An unaccountable peace has doubtless been vouchsafed to many, so that they now rest content to work and wait until they themselves pass behind the veil; others appear to have found relief in the broken utterances of mediums, and even in the unaccountable behaviour of certain material objects.

What is the soul of man? If it exists truly, then surely it must be discoverable and definable? It seems as though hitherto we have been so busy exploring the surface of the planet on which we dwell, in the leisure years between quarrels among ourselves, that we have found neither time nor opportunity to explore our personalities and to tabulate our experiences, as we should were we dealing with a dark continent or a pernicious microbe. But that stage is passing.

It will not be disputed that *Homo sapiens* is part of the animal world. In conception, in birth, in life, in reproduction of species, and in death he has everything in common with other animals, and much in common with vegetables. This

being so, the first fact to be established is how it came about that this one small sub-species of anthropoids separated itself from the rest of animal creation, and has been able to advance mentally at a rate of progress which is miraculous compared with the processes of physical evolution. It is a curious fact that, directly modern man begins to talk of the soul, he rarely goes further backward than the legend of Mesopotamia, and more often than not is content to stop at Plato. This is the more amazing in that tribes still exist on earth in whom we may detect almost every stage of the religious, mental, and physical advance that has been made since man ceased to be arboreal and walked erect. It is true the missing link has not been discovered, but aboriginals of Australia, pygmies of Central Africa, certain naked and backward folk of remote Asiatic jungles and islands, to quote no others, stand much nearer to the ape in their customs, habits, and conduct of life than they do, say, to Oxford dons or to female graduates of inferior universities.

Now, if we accept the truth, which I understand is scientifically proved beyond question, that man has evolved from the amoeba, then it must be honestly admitted that, if a soul exists, at some stage or other this soul—this immortal essence—must have been evolved or created. I do not see any way out of the difficulty except by confronting it boldly. At what period of evolution did man put on immortality, and in what manner?

Here one may pause and draw attention to two ideas interwoven in the belief and disbelief in immortality. With those who hold to the Christian faith in the persistence of personality—the continuance of individual consciousness—there is almost invariably associated a conviction that after death there will be an extraordinary exaggeration of the *ego*—that is to say that, when the individual wears the crown of eternal life, he will attain to some far greater power and place than has been permitted to him in this world. If we examine this assumption rationally, it appears absurd. Here at most a man has had to contend with one, two, or, in part, three generations, whereas in the world to come, if the faith be proven, he will find himself a part of all the generations of men since the world began. It would seem to follow that, instead of his ego being magnified, it must be diminished. This exaggeration is distinctly traceable to the Apocalypse, to the vision of the New Jerusalem as a city of gold. It is overlooked that in the dream of the exile of Patmos “the city was of pure gold *like unto clear glass*”; and the power

which minted gold, handled scantily, has been able to bestow on earth is deemed to be a thousandfold multiplied in heaven, inasmuch as it will be freely possessed.

This illusion of an exaggerated ego, which is at the base of no little of the Christian belief in a personal immortality, is a small thing compared with the other fallacy that a man must either accept the persistence of personality or deny immortality. The two ideas, as they present themselves to me, are separable. The point I wish to establish here is that it may be conceivable that, without persistence of personality, man still has part in the Eternal. So far as my experience goes, this belief in the persistence of a living and breathing human personality is essentially of Christian origin. And to-day I wonder how many clerics of my Church, the Church of England, who have subscribed to the Thirty-nine Articles, are prepared to stand at the altar before a congregation of faithful men, and with their hand on the consecrated elements to swear: "So surely as my eyes behold this congregation and this stone fabric around me, so surely I believe that at a later period of my existence my eyes will behold the crucified Galilean, 'with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature,' and also the throned Presence of Him whom I worship now in the flesh as the Father of the Galilean."

"Deny God, deny the immortality of the soul, and man denies the two essential elements of human progress, the two great truths for which the master-minds of humanity have struggled since the earliest dawn. Listen to the cry: 'God is God. Man is immortal.' It ascends from grove and grotto, from temple and church, from every altar—ay! even from altars raised to the unknown God or to a half-suspected Devil." This was my view a dozen years ago; to-day, in a blood-drenched world, with the air still heavy with the smoke of battle and the death-agonies of the noblest youth of civilisation, I find no reason to write differently.

Only one great religion has attempted to define God adequately by earthly symbols—the Hindu religion; thereby it has made itself the laughing-stock of the foolish. Yet the ten thousand gods of Hindu pantheism are but an effort of very subtle minds to portray the infinity of God's power and presence in human affairs. The Hebrew, with his more accurate discernment, refused to attempt the impossible. God to him was a Presence, all-pervading but ever the same, which he recognised and worshipped, but declined to name. After many generations it has been realised that the Jew is right.

Directly an attempt is made to define God in human terms, failure ensues. "God is God"—"I am that I am"—there the riddle, so far as human understanding is concerned, begins and ends. Yet the whole family of man accepts God, and through this acceptance withdraws itself from the rest of the animal creation. But whether the Godhead presents Himself to individual man as a Power, a Presence, an Essence, a Rhythm, a Principle, or a Personality, the implication is always present that there is in man some quality or thing which corresponds to this Eternal Being. This is what we know as the soul, which in its very essence is God-like, differing altogether from animal tissues and carnal passions, though in a manner subject to them. Endless have been the attempts to define the soul, and the mere fact that these still continue and will continue in the mystical writings of all creeds and peoples is overwhelming evidence that mankind is personally assured that some part of his nature is of the Eternal.

There are those who deny the existence of the soul. We need not trouble about those who only attempt to realise themselves through fleshly appetites and physical sensations, but confine our view to those others who deny this belief sorrowfully, yet lead such self-denying lives that their disbelief strengthens in their neighbours the very faith that is withheld from themselves. To me it is inconceivable that through all the ages a belief in God and in an after-life should have been clung to so obstinately by all branches of the human family directly they passed beyond primal savagery, and should still be so pertinaciously held, notwithstanding the advances of science, if the two were empty conceptions.

Here the wheel turns full circle. Accept the reality of God and faith in the soul's immortality: when did God declare himself to man, and when did the soul enter man? Is it not possible that these two realities—for so I accept them—may be distinctly traceable to man's segregation from the animal world? Is it not possible that this segregation was due to the possession by the anthropoid, *Homo sapiens*, of certain physical powers peculiar to his species? If this be not so, we continue to be faced by the riddle why the great ape, man, has so outdistanced the rest of creation. We know that man's development is predominantly cerebral; bone and muscle have varied slightly through hundreds of generations, but the power of the brain has strengthened and increased enormously. And so, someone may exclaim, you would advance the old theory that brain and soul are identical! Not so. But I do believe that in the brain there are certain cells peculiar to man, which

constitute the soul. You retort: The brain perishes at death, and, if these cells be the soul, they too die; so how, if the soul be a brain cell, can it be immortal? That is so. But though the cells perish, the special work which has been accomplished by them during life will not perish but endure. It is the work that is immortal, not the mechanism that produces it. But the mechanism is only able to produce the work adequately when it recognises and adapts itself to the work's immortal character. To state my contention in as simple language as possible: I believe that the human brain, through certain cells peculiar to itself, actually does receive from the ether and does communicate to the ether vibrations which never wholly cease, and which exert physical influence on other human brains through an indefinite period of time. It is this power which has endued man with immortality, and has convinced him rightly that he has part in the Eternal Principle which moulds the universe.

Much has been heard lately about spiritualism. It has occasioned acute controversy; there are those who appear to be convinced that communication with man's disembodied spirit has been established; there are others who frankly and absolutely deny it, ridiculing these pretensions. Apart from these extremists, there are two other well-defined schools of thought: one which detests spiritualism because it conflicts with its most cherished beliefs; they ask why, if the dead can communicate with the living, they do not hold direct intercourse with those whom they loved most dearly on earth, but conduct their communications through alien human mediums, communications which are often trivial. The other school also dislikes spiritualism, and is by nature sceptical; but as life advances it has had experiences, sometimes personal experiences, which, when every rational explanation has been carefully sifted and winnowed away, have left behind the uneasy feeling that intercommunication between brain and brain without bodily presence does exist, in some inexplicable, uncontrolled, and irresponsible manner. These regard spiritualism much as our forefathers looked on the North-West Passage; they think that if the search be conducted honestly and scientifically (so far as this word can be employed in this connection), while it is more than probable that the passage between the living and the dead, in the sense it is now understood, may be found finally to be non-existent, yet that the search will lead to the discovery of mental regions and currents at present unknown or at most suspected.

One has only in these days to talk to a doctor engaged

in a shell-shock hospital to understand how great is the darkness in which those work who minister to a mind diseased; even distinguished alienists do not agree on the dividing line between sanity and insanity. So when we regard the immensity of the field in which the brain action takes place, the vastness of its powers, the minuteness of its tabulations, it is surely nothing remarkable to hold that we are only at the beginning of the knowledge of this organ, which in its marvellous development is peculiar to man.

In talking of spiritualism, one has also to bear in mind those other mental manifestations known as second sight, etheric memories, mystic experience. It is impossible to dismiss all of them as hallucinations. And if they are not hallucinations, what can they be, unless we concede to the brain powers hitherto denied it? There is no occasion here to follow further this line of reasoning. It cannot be denied that, when all the known facts and assumptions about the human brain and its workings are collected together, we are confronted with a black veil of nescience which hitherto man has been unable to penetrate, but which, as surely as he has sailed the seas, soared the skies, and given a voice to the void, he will one day rend in twain.

All religions, even the most primitive, have for their main object the segregation of man from the rest of the animal world. Their aim is to strengthen and heighten man's self-respect, to compel him to realise that he is the peculiar object of the love or hate of an all-pervading power or powers that encompass him throughout his life, and also that at death the individual life does not necessarily cease but may continue, either suffering or rejoicing, in so far as certain religious rules or rites have or have not been conformed to. The great religions of the world have been slowly built up on these foundations.

An extraordinary similarity exists between those two potent religions, Buddhism and Christianity, in so far as they strive to educate the soul. These two appear to constitute the negative and the positive of an identical system. The sincere Buddhist seeks immortality by overcoming the self through its withdrawal from the temptations and evils of the world; the sincere Christian seeks immortality by overcoming the self through a constant struggle with the temptations and evils of the world. For each, the self, as it finds expression through its mere animal attributes and qualities, is deemed the hindrance to the full measure of the development of the Eternal that is within man. The Buddhist regards the animal self as

illusion; the Christian, as a ghostly enemy ever ready and eager to assault and hurt the soul; for each, life is a continuous warfare between the eternal and the transitory, and in so far as it is permitted during mortal existence to bring the animal into subjection to the spiritual, in so far as each is satisfied he has prepared himself in some degree for immortality, and together they laud and magnify those of their fellows who by an act of great renunciation, it may be the sacrifice of life or worldly power or pleasure, have, as it were, met eternal life half-way.

Christianity is here referred to in its broadest sense. Except for Mahomedanism, it is the youngest of religions, and probably the most misunderstood and the most abused of them all. Several reasonable causes for this may be advanced, but this is not the place for their discussion. In my opinion, the only fair test by which to judge the influence and power of a religion is by the elevation or degradation in the mass of the tribes or nations who profess it, over several generations. Christianity as a whole, judged in this manner, comes out well.

Personal experience has taught me that Christianity, in so far as it is content to find expression through mere rites and ceremonies and outward observances, after the manner of other religions, is the feeblest of them all; it altogether lacks the necessary machinery, and no Church or other human institution has been able to supply it. On the other hand, Christianity which primarily devotes its energies to the active help of mankind, and finds its highest expression in following the practice of Jesus of Nazareth and rendering service and performing kindly acts to the men and women with whom it comes into contact, is the most triumphant force the world possesses. "The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, to the poor the Gospel is preached." This is even truer—not only metaphorically but literally truer—of Christianity to-day than when these words were first spoken. In saying this, let it not be thought that the writer is against religious observances *per se*. A temple for prayer, and a lonely mountain for meditation, are as much necessary now as ever for the soul's well-being. For a Christian to protest he cannot meditate or pray unless the God of his belief be envisaged, is only to raise in another form Philip's saying: "Show us the Father and it sufficeth us."

Man has a soul; it has reached a certain stage of development, wherefore it follows that whatever has helped towards its right development continues to be needful, whether

the soul be a physical fact or an indefinable essence. And as the soul is that one part of man that is of the nature of God, of the Eternal, it follows that the worship of God is essential if the soul of man is to prosper.

Here again the Great War has cleared the air. Years ago I lived for some weeks in a house on the edge of a hill-range in India. I looked over the plains, glowing under perpetual sunshine; I watched dust-storms career over arid fields; I traced the track of dying rivers; I discerned vaguely palm-grove, temple, and village; I seemed to see a great distance, and I doubted when told that on a clear day another range of hills was visible on the empty horizon. One night a terrific thunderstorm raged; the flood-gates of heaven were opened. At dawn I stood on my threshold and beheld a new earth! Outlined on the horizon was a purple mass of everlasting hills, invisible before. The landscape beneath me, new-washed in that terrible storm, shone forth vividly in the sunshine of early morning. Dying rivers were in flood; dusty fields were good brown earth; temples glittered, and every palm and living shred of green about the villages glistened in the clear light. The Great War, it seems to me, is serving the same purpose as that storm. The everlasting, yesterday invisible and denied, is manifest to-day. Rivers of refreshment, derided as mere perishing pools and stagnant puddles, are in full flood. New life, new goodness is revealed in the common ways of men, and those who doubted honestly the excellence of human nature are astounded and rejoiced at the revelation.

This also we are learning anew—that in good are the seeds of life, and in evil the seeds of death. Light, liberty, and love are good; cruelty, slavery, and darkness are evil. There is no need at this time to use another word to define these two ever-opposing principles. But we have learnt for certain that neither intellectual strength, nor skill of mind, nor energy of will, nor cunning speech can make evil good or good evil. So we are forced to strive once more to disentangle the incorruptible from the corruptible, the immortal from mortality.

The clue surely lies in service to one's fellow-man. It is an aim we find in some form common to all religions. "To do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God," was the noble ideal of a Hebrew poet. Splendid nobility was there in the life of an Indian prince who renounced power and wealth and ease to meditate on the eternal, and to open for his fellow-men an escape from the meannesses, the

wickednesses, and the illusions of the flesh. But the Galilean showed a yet truer way when He denounced, at the risk of His life, hypocrisy and insincerity, and went silent to death, lest He should weaken by a syllable His life's message, and when He taught that life eternal was to be won by acts of the most simple kindness and sympathy. Seeing how such self-sacrifice has worked for man's well-being through the centuries, and how it is actively at work at this hour, and recognising that the whole future of mankind to-day hinges on the survival of lowly loving-kindness between man and man, which Jesus taught secured life eternal for whosoever practised it, it were no wonder that devout persons discern God in the Son of Man, and worship and adore Him as the Son of God. Religion, based on the conduct of Christ, is as essential for the growth and health of the soul in the individual as fresh air and exercise are for the growth and health of the body.

The war has furthermore demonstrated that to speak of all men being equal in the sight of God is not mere rhetoric, a pleasant phrase, signifying nothing, but that it is an actual truth. Man-made conditions constitute the vital differences between man and man, people and people, nation and nation. The highest civilisation, as we of this generation understand the word, is the one under which a people has emerged the most completely from slavery. No people is entirely free, but we comprehend that liberty, once gained, must be primarily employed in winning liberty for others; for liberty, disciplined liberty, is the very breath of the soul. Indeed, we may go a step further and declare that every fight man has ever waged for freedom has been in order to safeguard for himself the right to live not for himself but for others, and that when we speak of progress we imply increased security for the individual so to develop the highest part of his being, that by living more worthily to himself he *ipso facto* advances the good of his neighbour.

Man begins to realise that the vision of a new heaven and a new earth in the Apocalypse is not a beautiful idle dream. As a matter of fact, he has toiled and fought for generations, usually without knowing it, that "the tabernacle of God may be with men." In one sense a new earth has never appeared more remote than during the last four years, in another sense it has never seemed nearer. Death has been re-sanctified; we have learnt how much pain and sorrow is preventible, and are determined to prevent it; we have come to believe universal peace to be possible, and are resolute to work for that end; "the fearful and the unbelieving and the abominable" are

still with us, but we perceive that they have no part in the inheritance of the Spirit, but that they prepare for themselves a second death. They live for the animal, and they shall die with the animal. They who live for the spirit shall never die.

What is the immortal life which the soul inherits, if it be indeed of the flesh? The constant and perplexing clash between flesh and spirit is not denied, but how does it exist if each be a part of the other? May not this very clash arise from a misunderstanding of the true nature of the soul, and from too high a demand being made upon it?

The subject is a difficult one to discuss, in that its terminology is circumscribed by old ideas and deep-rooted meanings. All of man is mortal, but a fragment of him is immortal in the sense that during mortal life, by means of this part of his physical being, man can both live in unison with the Eternal and impart to the Eternal his higher self, which persists when the mechanism which produced it has perished. It was the possession of this power—this intercommunication of brain and brain without the presence of the body—which enabled *Homo sapiens* to break away from the rest of brute creation. In his earliest stages man, without realising its possession, was yet vaguely conscious of it; it was to facilitate and as it were to solidify these cerebral currents that language was evolved. The limitations of human speech, even at this comparatively late stage of its development, point to this fact. Words are superfluous for the commoner needs of animal existence; words are obscene for its grosser necessities; words are worthless or ridiculous when employed to express emotions common to brute creation. Notice the primitive sounds a man utters when carried away by anger. And in the ecstasy of love, though a man be blest with the gift of poesy, the sweetest melody he makes is poor compared with the song of the nest-ing thrush. Words, when used for the animal side of man, are feeble channels of communication; but apply them to the needs of the soul, and how could the soul have reached its present development without their use? Here I use the term "soul" to designate distinctly those cells, brain cells as I believe them to be, through which a man is able to draw unto his self the good that abides in human life, and to give it forth again with greater strength for the benefit of his fellow-men. It was the soul that evoked language, not language that furnished forth the soul.

I write on the assumption that the spiritual instinct is not a mere symptom of a certain stage of mental development or

of a state of civilisation, but that it goes back to the beginning of things, and is as real and concrete as the sexual instinct; in a word, that the former, like the latter, has its origin in a vital physical fact. Let such a theory as the one I here set down be established scientifically, and man will enter on a newer and higher region than any he has occupied hitherto. The abstract virtues, as they are broadly understood, will then be recognised to be just as essential for his right existence as well-ventilated habitations. Religion will be to the soul what food and exercise are to the body; but it will be a religion of conduct, not of rites and ceremonials, and man shall praise God and worship Him by rendering willing and joyful service to his neighbour. For generations this has been the practice of sincere and godly men and women, but hitherto, so far at least as Christianity is concerned, it has been conditioned by the promise of reward hereafter or by the threat of future punishment. Henceforth it will be accepted that man only fulfils the highest law of his being, that he only obtains the best out of life, when he acts after this fashion. That will be his reward, but could the individual desire a higher one?

Hitherto selfishness has been denounced as a trait unworthy of man. Though the qualifying epithet "enlightened" be added, yet a taint of feebleness and wrong-doing still clings even to "enlightened selfishness." But if the soul be a physical part of the self, as much man as body or mind, then to live for the self is most worthy, and "he that findeth his *self* shall lose it; and he that loseth his *self* for my sake shall find it." We have only to read into the words "for my sake" the conduct of Jesus, to comprehend the lively significance and truth of this saying.

Man is immortal in life, not after death. It is his acts that persist, not his animal simulacrum. These acts need not of themselves be heroic. He has only to wage war on hypocrisy, insincerity, and deceit; he has only by self-discipline and self-restraint to make life a little wider and cleaner and more joyful for those around him; he has only to give a crumb of comfort to the starving soul and to ease the throb of the aching heart, to find himself at one with God, and in communion with the souls of all good men.

Life eternal encompasses him in this world, and he has the power to partake of that life if he so wills it; in truth he does not live healthily unless he exerts this power. Living healthily, he will presently find better delight in the things that appertain unto the eternal, and will scorn the dictates of his perishable nature when they are opposed to the higher impulses.

He will be a brave man. As the years proceed they shall not condemn but provide recompense for the weakening of the body, for the failing of desire. There shall reach him through the portal of the soul the eternal gladness of youth—youth which rejoices in a good fight, and whose gladness pain, sorrow, and disappointment can only cloud but not kill—and he shall know most surely that his life is not bounded by death.

Thrice, at the warning of the doctors, I have made ready for death. The first time I had thought myself convinced of the resurrection of the body; I desired it ardently, I hoped for it. But when the faith was brought to the test, it failed. I could discern no individuality beyond the grave, nothing but darkness—a gentle darkness and a great calm. Heaven and hell appeared to be on earth; life eternal and everlasting death in the deeds done and left undone here. Twice again the same conviction flooded my being and brought peace at the point of death. There was no sense of egoism save the thought that, notwithstanding frequent failure, I had tried to do my duty. This duty in the main, as it then presented itself, was—to quote my own words written at the time—“to render the world a little happier, a little brighter, and a little healthier for those who come after.” In this work lay immortality, and in so far as I had striven to this end there had gone forth from my being an energy which endures. This energy, conjoined to a vast volume of effluence, a stream of living power, the outflowing of the actions of all unselfish men and women of all time, inspires, strengthens, and compels humanity to the same purpose for ever.

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MEN AND ARMS : A STUDY OF INSTINCT.

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I.

OUR experiences in relation to the great world-conflict have led to the very general appreciation of the fact that war is not initiated, and cannot be effectively controlled, by reason ; that it is initiated, and largely controlled, by man's emotional nature. It is a real service, therefore, to have the evidences of this brought to light by one who views the subject as a trained psychologist. This has been done by Dr L. P. Jacks in his article, "Arms and Men : A Study of Habit," published in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* for October 1918.

We are wont, however, to forget that our emotions are the correspondents in consciousness of instinctive reactions, and that these instinctive reactions are dependent upon the existence within us of capacities inherited with our structure ; and thus it happens that those idealists of our time who look forward to the near approach of enduring peace too often overlook entirely the fact that man is by nature a fighting animal.

Dr Jacks does not, in fact, deal alone with such human behaviour as is determined by acquired habit, as the title of his essay might seem to indicate. Many of the modes of this behaviour to which he refers have indeed been given their distinctive form by modifications of capacity resulting from the life-experience of the individuals in which they appear ; but their "drive" is more fundamental ; it is determined by racial rather than individual experience ; it is due to the existence in man of capacities and tendencies to action that have been impressed upon his physical and mental structure by the

experience of his far-distant forefathers through countless generations—capacities and tendencies that are inherited, not acquired. In the far-distant day when he was but little removed from the savage beasts, he displayed the fighting instincts; and, as Dr Jacks has clearly shown, his growth in intelligence, with its ever-increasing ability to recall and make record of the past, has but served to give strength to the stimuli which yield the instinctive response of war.

Modern warfare may seem at times, upon a superficial view, to be the outcome of forces that are purely rational, as distinct from instinctive; for it often appears to be initiated by political leaders who look forward to the accomplishment of clearly defined ends. But these leaders dare not lead a nation into war unless they feel assured that great masses of the people will support them. To this end national pride and covetousness, and suspicion, and hatred are encouraged; but these group-emotions are no more than the emotions of individual men. They, to be sure, become nationalised; but they then gain the force they display merely in the fact that they are continuously stimulated in the individual by social contact with others of his kind. The “drive” remains in the individual who wills to fight, as is shown clearly in the acknowledged necessity of maintaining what we, by a strange twist of language, call the *morale* of the common soldier. This *morale* is sustained by the joy of success; by the prospect of material advantage; by the recognition that failure will mean ruin. *Morale* gives way where defeat seems certain, and when the pain and distress that war entails are pressed upon the combatant’s attention.

This recognition of the evil effects of war in relation to the individual not only tends to bring surrender of one party to the combat, and peace, but acts to prevent the breaking of this peace. The horrors of war, its emphasis of the bestial capacities of mankind, have since the beginnings of history been vividly felt as well by those who have triumphed as by those who have suffered defeat; and this has led to the avoidance of fighting during brief periods. We are to-day seeing the efficiency of this influence in the demand that the war just ended shall be known in history as “a war to end war.”

But this influence has not sufficed in the past to prevent the recurrence of wars; nor can we hope that it alone can be effective to this end in the future; and for this simple reason.

Revivals of painful experiences, in their very nature, tend to disappear; and this tendency is emphasised by the fact, as Herbert Spencer puts it, that “pain is a feeling we try to get

out of consciousness and to keep out." On the other hand, revivals of pleasant experiences, also in their very nature, tend to persist; and this tendency is emphasised by the fact that "pleasure is a feeling which we try to bring into consciousness and to retain there." Thus it happens that a newer generation that has known no war loses sight of the significance of the tales of woe told by their fathers; and the very fathers themselves minimise it. Thus it happens also that the pleasures of triumphant victory on the one hand, and of stern bravery in defeat on the other, are imaginatively pictured by the younger generation; the very fathers who have deeply suffered magnifying their significance.

The result of all this is seen in the rise of the sentiments which attach nobility to war. The average man delights in recalling the deeds of the great soldier; Wellington and Nelson are idols in England to-day, even as she mourns for her dead in battle; and Napoleon who treated war as a game invented for his personal gratification, is equally the idol of war-devastated France. And these sentiments, naturally arising, are fixed in the minds of children by the current teachings of history, which in general is written as though its principal function was fulfilled when it had made accurate record of wars, and of war's heroes. It is all too true, as Dr Jacks says, "that arms, like clothes, are a normal part of the human equipment," as matters now stand. It is true also that "arms, like clothes, in general have played a notable part in moulding history, changing human character, and creating habits of thought. Philosophy itself is largely conducted in language borrowed from their use"; and "the very form of our minds in their 'highest' as well as in their 'lowest' activities has been influenced from this source."

Under conditions as they exist, each generation that has no clear grounds for the initiation of war will naturally reach a stage where a large majority of its members will have had no experience of the horrors of war. Their fighting capacities, being developed through inheritance, will then tend to gain expression whenever any stimulus to the appropriate reaction is given; so that one might expect to find that, if not subjected to disturbing influences, each race would tend to enter into destructive war about once in a generation. And reference to historical record of modern times seems to indicate that this expectation is, broadly speaking, realised. To be sure, certain races may exist under conditions of sleepy stability which prevent the appearance of stimuli to the expression of their warlike capacities; and these conditions may last through

a number of generations, so that the artificial stimuli of sentiments emphasising the nobility of war will cease to be influential. But history indicates that instances of this kind are relatively rare; and in any event such conditions do not apply to the races that have been involved in the great war that has just come to an end.

II.

The emphasis thus given to the facts above considered is, however, likely to yield support to a view which we certainly must assume Dr Jacks would not wish to sustain. For the argument he presents, if taken in itself, must certainly strengthen the position of those who declare that it is altogether visionary to look forward to the abandonment of war.

This position is strengthened, indeed, by the further fact that we have no evidence to justify us in holding that instincts, of one of which fighting is the expression, are ever lost. The bodily reactions which lead us to recognise their existence are due to forms of physical structure which are inherited from generation to generation, and are of the very essence of the nature of the animals in which they appear. They may, to be sure, be modified, with an alteration of their functioning, in the course of the life-experience of the individual; but for all that they remain existent and cannot be obliterated so long as the inherited structure remains intact.

If, then, the facts thus brought to our attention are taken to stand alone, they certainly give us no warrant for hope that any effective steps can be taken to eliminate war. Why, one may ask, waste our time in discussing the establishment of peace tribunals, and leagues to enforce peace? Why consider for a moment so useless a question as to whether or no national disarmament is possible or desirable? Let us rather give our strength, during the brief intervals of peace following the exhaustion of conflicts, to the establishment of what we call prosperity, of commercial dominance, of momentary comfort and happiness.

But of course it is clear that these facts cannot be made to stand alone; they must be viewed in relation with other facts which necessarily modify the conclusions to which the former, if thus isolated, would lead. For, after all, notwithstanding this fixity of instincts which would involve a fixity of functioning, changes of structure, and corresponding changes of functioning, have appeared in many a race of

which we have certain record. Hence it is not impossible to look forward to a time when man can no longer be properly described as a fighting animal, and when wars will automatically cease. It is worth our while, therefore, to consider the manner in which these changes have been brought about by Nature in the past.

The modifications of structure and of functioning have resulted, not from the obliteration of instincts, but from alterations of the ends they subserve, or from their atrophy through disuse.

First. They have occurred through the building up of new instincts on top of those already existing, the old instincts being then used as instruments to further the ends to be gained by the new. The maternal instinct of the animal thus employs its individualistic flight instincts, or its fighting instincts, to gain its racial end in the protection of the young.

Second. They have occurred through the use of the instinct to attain ends different from those that led to its establishment. The structures of the forelegs of the crawling animal, with the instincts involved, have been transformed to give wings to the bird, and arms to the man, with corresponding radical changes of instinctive capacity, and loss of capacity to function in the ancestral form.

Third. They have occurred through the cessation of the stimuli necessary to the functioning of their behaviour expression. The wings of the ostrich remain to tell of the instinctive activities of its remote ancestors, which have been displaced by those which yield the leg-actions involved in running.

All this means adaptation. And this leads us to note that our instincts are what they are because of conditions existing in the past, while adaptation points to efforts to meet new conditions, and to accommodate our actions to conditions in the future. These adaptive efforts, moreover, are always experimental and hazardous. The palæontologist points to many a case where the adaptation has failed to meet the needs of the future and has led to the extinction of the race. Nevertheless, it is evident that these adaptive experiments have been, and must now be, of the very essence of advance in the accommodation of the animal to the situations found in its environment.

Adaptation to meet new conditions is in us accompanied by what we call intelligence. Adaptation as observed by the biologist involves objective creativeness, the appearance in Nature of what is new. Correspondingly, intelligence involves

subjective creativeness, the appreciation that we ourselves are aiming to change the order of Nature as it exists. When our acts of intelligence are analysed, we find first a recognition of a situation that is painful and disturbing, and then the creation of an ideal course of action which we picture to ourselves as tending to remove the pain and disturbance. Thus it is that the ideal of enduring peace has arisen.

This ideal has been rejected by many as visionary, and has been opposed by not a few who have held that war is not only necessary but salutary. Those who have defended this latter view are, however, notably silent to-day. Recent experience has quenched their ardour; and it may be truly said that, for the time being at least, intelligent men have at last come to a very general agreement that war is an evil. This being firmly fixed in our minds, we have created the ideal of enduring peace in our struggle to eliminate this evil. The very existence of the ideal is therefore an indication that a large and important proportion of mankind is now engaged in an adaptive experiment looking to a change in our nature.

That our effort in this direction is experimental must not be overlooked. Our proposed adaptation may fail to meet the exigencies of life in the future. But for all that it surely would be the sign of deterioration did we not make the adaptive effort; and a clear case of arrant cowardice were we to remain unwilling to undertake the experimental adjustments that occur to us as possible, merely because we fear failure or loss.

As we look back at the futile efforts of our ancestors to realise this ideal of enduring peace, and then contemplate the great war, we are indeed tempted to despair. But we must recall the fact that the wide prevalence of the sentiment upholding this ideal is new to the race, as time is reckoned by the biologist and anthropologist. We are actually in touch, through historical record, with the day when it does not even seem to have appeared in the mind of man. And we must remember also that eras, rather than centuries, are usually required for the establishment of habits of action looking to significant adaptations of behaviour.

Moreover, each special and definite attitude of mind corresponds with a given and equally special and definite form of behaviour; so that, as the ideal of enduring peace has gained strength, the tendency to make war must have diminished. And since this attitude of mind is now more prevalent than ever before, now is the time to do all in our power to strengthen it.

III.

What then, are the methods to be adopted to further the adaptation of conduct we would have prevail? And here we at once see the significance of the fact that this conduct is based upon instinctive tendencies. War is the outcome of co-operative effort; but, as we have noted, its "drive" is found primarily in the instinctive tendencies of individuals. Hence the means we adopt to eliminate war must have relation to the individual man, and must follow the methods Nature has in general employed to reach such adaptations of instincts as are matters of record.

First, we may attempt to build up a new set of instincts that shall employ the fighting instincts to a peaceful purpose. Such an effort we have before us to-day in the propositions of the League to Enforce Peace which would retain our armies and navies to act as international policemen to keep the peace. If such a League came into existence, and worked successfully for many centuries, it would necessarily carry with it a very general change in the attitude of mankind in relation to war, and this would involve a change of habitual behaviour. Peace might thus be maintained for so long that the risk of war would disappear among powerful civilised nations; and then the international police force might be reduced to a minimum, being needed only to keep order among small and inferior peoples. There would be difficulties to be met. The procedure suggested would be, by acknowledgment, in the nature of an experiment; and the experiment might fail. But it surely is worth trying. Even if it did fail to meet the end we have in view, it would certainly act to prevent some minor wars, and to stop major wars temporarily. The result could not be worse than a relapse into the situation as it exists to-day; while the mere cessation of wars for some considerable time would certainly emphasise the determination to devise more effective means to ensure the permanence of peace. Even if but partially successful, from the beginning it would tend to displace international competition in favour of interracial co-operative endeavour, which might eventually become sufficiently powerful to eliminate all thought of war.

The experiment is worth trying; for by chance it might succeed. Difficulties which the timid make much of are wont to vanish into thin air when faced by men of courage. To enlarge upon them here would be but to support those who habitually fear to initiate what is new, and are ever ready to create in imagination grounds to justify their fears.

We may, however, note that, if we limit ourselves to this one of Nature's methods of adaptation, we must face the fact that it would leave the fighting instinct itself unmodified in a large class of men; and this carries with it the danger that certain influential leaders among these might yield to the temptation to express their well-sustained tendencies, and that in so doing they would find a wide following among those in whom these tendencies had become merely dormant.

We are thus led to ask whether this special difficulty may not be met if we adopt the second of Nature's methods mentioned above, and aim to make use of the instinctive warlike tendencies to other ends than those they originally subserved. We may perhaps be able to turn the "drive" in the individual that carries us into war in new directions of effort that are incompatible with war. We may search for, and perchance may find, what William James spoke of as "the moral equivalents of war." It is, however, as tough a problem as man could set for himself to determine what such equivalents might be; and how the average man could be taught to appreciate their value, and induced to accept them as guides to action.

And here again we must agree that we should be dealing with experiments, many of which might well fail to be of value, before we happened upon the one that was destined to prove successful. This fact, indeed, should not lead us to abandon effort; but it is one that must be faced.

And the same must be said if, turning to Nature's third mode of adaptation through organic atrophy, we consider the possibility of elimination of those potent though indirect stimuli to warlike action given in the emphasis of the glory and nobility of war which become predominant when its horrors and evil results no longer press upon us. Efforts to eliminate this source of stimuli to war may indeed be made with some hope of final success. We may, for instance, induce our writers of history to lay more stress upon the loss of physical and mental vigour observed in races that have engaged in destructive wars; upon the poverty and disease attributable to it; upon the manner in which it has curtailed scientific research and philosophical thought. We may, in the guidance of youth, avoid those pursuits which turn his attention to combat, and strive to lead him in paths that will preclude the very thought of war. But, as Dr Jacks has so well shown, our ideals of patriotism and of national progress are so bound up with tales of victory in war, that it is difficult to picture the process by which such an end could

be reached without loss of incentives to endeavour in evidently worthy directions.

Is there no better way to attain this end? Cannot we devise some means that will in itself tend to prevent war, and that will indirectly be effective in crushing out the sentiments favourable to war which now act as stimuli to its realisation?

We have spoken above of the fact, now a psychological commonplace, that each special and definite attitude of mind corresponds with an equally special and definite form of behaviour. It is of equal importance to note that the reverse of this is also true, viz. that each special and definite form of behaviour involves an equally special and definite attitude of mind. Evidently, then, if we could in any manner prevent the occurrence of wars for a period running over a relatively large number of generations, we should not only get rid of war's evils for the time being, but should go far to banish the attitude of mind that, in ennobling the life of the fighter, serves to encourage the recurrence of war. The war-bringing instincts would remain in us, to be sure, but they would tend to become atrophied through failure of functioning. Let us ask whether any effective means to this end can be suggested.

IV.

Man is indeed a fighting animal; but as one among the beasts of the earth he, as primarily equipped, was a weakling. Only as he gained intelligence did he become an effective fighter through his inventiveness, which enabled him to design weapons.

His first efforts in this direction made him a powerful fighter as an individual; but this did not mean war. War became possible only when men had begun to act co-operatively, and agreed to fight together to a common end. Then the existence of the fighting instincts of the individual came to yield quite new results looking to advantage to his tribe directly, and therefore indirectly to himself.

As the social life of man has developed, the nature of his weapons has changed, always looking to more complete subordination of the behaviour of the individual to the activities of the group. The savage mob, armed with clubs or bows and arrows, could not withstand the trained body of troops obeying the commands of a leader and carrying superior weapons. Gradually these weapons have been elaborated, and always in directions which have involved greater co-operation. Thus there came into existence a class of

armourers who made weapons, but who did not themselves fight. And this process has continued up to our time, when the forger of weapons does little more than make some special part of some great engine of destruction; and the soldier who does most effective work obeys orders to use instruments of precision at given times and in definite manners—for instance, to aim his cannon at a special angle, and to discharge his projectile without knowledge of the object it is to reach. So complicated has the process become that finally great masses of individual men have ceased to arm themselves for war. As Dr Jacks says, “the individual in modern times has escaped the necessity of wearing arms by arming the State in his behalf.”

The result of all this is that for generations past wars that are in any full degree dependent for success upon the personally initiated fighting of individuals have ceased to occur among formidable nations. The behaviour of the individuals of the nations involved has changed. An ever-increasing proportion of the men of a given race are now utterly incompetent as fighters; and those who enter the combat must base their ability to fight upon the activities of the incompetent, and upon the complex instruments of war they manufacture, from machine-guns to Dreadnoughts.

If, then, we could by magic destroy all fighting weapons to-day, war would necessarily cease. The fighting instincts of the individual might lead to occasional fights in which the individuals used man's natural weapons—tooth, and fist, and strength of arm. But even such fights would be infrequent, for the modern man has for so long depended upon co-operation with others in the use of highly complex weapons, owned not by individuals but by the State, that he has lost the habit of fighting with his natural weapons alone, and in fact has in large measure lost the capacity to fight after this manner.

If, then, we could thoroughly and completely disarm, we should find ourselves unable to wage war. We have but to destroy the highly complex weapons now made by the broadest of co-operative effort, and wars would instantly cease. And having perforce become peaceful individuals, we should then automatically find ourselves for the time being attaining an attitude of mind that would in fact be utterly opposed to war.

Moreover, wars could not be resumed unless this broad co-operative effort was again concentrated upon the construction of similar weapons, nor until such time as man had reached a point where he felt it worth his while to build them anew. As this would surely carry him over a number of

generations without war, it seems extremely unlikely that he would ever again be content to devote so much of his energy as he does to-day to the construction of its necessary instruments.

It is true that the war-directing class would remain in existence for a time, and would tend to urge the common people to revert to war; even as the ruined gambler, who after his losses hates gambling, tends soon to return to his trade. But if the gambler finds the casino where his game has been played destroyed, with all its instruments and accompaniments, and none of his companions easy to reach, he cannot revert to his old practice; and he also must tend to reach an altered condition of mind which may perchance lead to reform.

As Dr Jacks says, "there can be no denying the truth that the mere existence of highly perfected armaments, representing an immense cost in effort and treasure, is of and by itself a strong incentive to their use." If we could persuade ourselves to destroy them, this incentive would be lost. And before the world could again reach a point where it would think it worth while to construct them anew, there might well come into being a sentiment in opposition sufficiently strong to prevent such a misfortune. The nationalised aggressiveness, covetousness, suspicion, hatred which now are the immediate causes of war would thus lose the "drive" in the individual man upon which they must ultimately depend.

The enunciation of such a permanent policy by the Allied victors, *coupled with a striking and effective step in the direction of the fruition of such a policy*, would certainly carry with it immense momentary gains, even if these proved to have little lasting effect.

HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.

NEW YORK.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

CHRISTIAN FAITH.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1919, p. 229.)

THE Rev. J. M. Thompson's article recalls his utterances, published five years ago, on the question "Are Miracles an aid to Faith"? The position defended in a sermon under that title, published by the *Christian Commonwealth* in October 1913, is that a study of the biographies of Jesus yields the conception of "a very wonderful man," and cannot give us anything more than this. Christian faith, however, is the outcome, not of criticism, but of experience; it puts a certain construction on the facts, and so the Jesus of history becomes the Christ of faith. But, besides this "philosophy of faith," there is the better way of the ordinary Christian, who *has* his faith in Christ, and hardly knows how it came. He cannot philosophise, but he believes it to be real, and it tells him what to do, and is neither built on, nor helped by, a reasoned opinion regarding the miraculous. Modern Knowledge therefore may demand the surrender of belief in miracles, without destroying the essential Christian experience which is independent of them.

On the same lines Mr Thompson, in his article on "Christian Faith," says that "the claim that Jesus is Christ cannot be evaded, because it stands at the centre of Christianity." But Christian faith is not a circle with one centre, but an ellipse with two foci, one of which we may call historical and the other mystical, and the symbol of the one is "Jesus," and of the other "Christ." "We have to deal therefore with the 'Jesus of history,' as distinct from the 'Christ of Faith.'" Mr Thompson holds that in studying the Jesus of history we must "isolate the historical evidence," and that "when studied with all the help that historical science can give, and by those who are most competent to judge it, the Gospel history is found to be the record of a completely human life and human experience . . . a true picture of a character whose religious insight and moral goodness have no equal in history; but the Church is not, and never was, in possession of historical evidence sufficient to prove that this character was miraculous or superhuman." Now, this verdict raises

the questions whether you *can* so "isolate the historical evidence": and if you can, whether you can claim that "a character whose religious insight and moral goodness have no equal in history" is neither miraculous nor superhuman. A considerable section of the article is devoted to criticism of those who, having given up the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection, claim that there still remains what is called "the moral miracle" of the sinless Jesus, the retention of which, they claim, conserves the miraculous or superhuman element in Christian faith. This, according to Mr Thompson, is a halfway house; for, on the one hand, the evidence of moral perfection is not forthcoming: and, on the other, if it were, the central miracle of a flawless Person would guarantee the miraculous circumstances of his birth. But Mr Thompson evades the task of examining the historical evidence for "the moral miracle," and says "it would be a long and delicate matter to weigh the meaning of every passage which might bear on the point at issue." But on his own showing the criticism of the history must be thoroughgoing, however long and delicate the task it involves may be. And if Mr Thompson were to undertake it, as Bushnell did long ago (in *Nature and the Supernatural*, chap. x.), he would find the implications of the narratives as to the sinlessness of Jesus much more significant than he thinks. The flaw in his admirable paper is the too hasty dismissal of the historical evidence as deficient in accuracy. The historical evidence is that which, he says, we must "isolate," but instead of this he gives us the unproved assertion that we remain "far from any proof of our Lord's sinlessness." His verdict regarding "the moral miracle" is "not proven"; our criticism is that he has not tried either to prove or disprove it. Until he can reach a more decisive verdict, he has not adequately disposed of those who claim that, in the words of the late A. B. Bruce, a past-master in Apologetic, "if we receive Him as the great Moral Miracle, we shall receive much more for His sake." Mr Thompson, in our view, has not proved his point that the same arguments which have overturned the historicity of the Virgin Birth may oblige us to abandon the belief of the sinlessness of Jesus. The writer's bias against the miraculous element in the Gospels overbears his claim to be regarded as an impartial historian.

What of his treatment of "the Christ of faith"? Must we identify the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith? Have we a right to keep them apart? The article is very suggestive at this point. One of its most striking passages is this: "The real problem is, what I mean by 'Christ.' The word is a title, not a name: it stood originally for an office, a work, an ideal, and only secondarily for the person who might assume the office, do the work, and realise the ideal. Our idea of God's purpose for the world and man is not what theirs was who first dreamed of the coming of Christ. But we have our dream, our ideal of a perfect humanity, a Son of God, a Saviour; the love of it ennobles our lives, the worship of it reveals God; it is our religion. Why do we call it 'Christ'? Because that was the symbol under which this dream was summed up when Jesus dreamed it, and when others dreamed it of him; and because the best of that which European religion has added to the ideal has been marked by that symbol, and derived from that dream. Why do we identify this 'Christ' ideal with Jesus of Nazareth? Not because he perfectly expressed all that is in it; but because his life explained and illustrated and enriched it as no other ever did." Mr

Thompson at once anticipates the objection that this method of identifying "Jesus" and "Christ" is too loose and subjective, and that in professing to identify, it really divides. To this he replies that "the centre of Christian faith and the secret of its permanence lie in the act of faith by which it identifies God and man in Christ." He adds that "the claim that Jesus is Christ cannot be evaded, because it stands at the very centre of Christianity." So far we are on sure ground, which no Christian, ancient or modern, will dispute. The Pauline Christology is bound up with the union of God and man in Christ. The very centre of Christian faith is the claim that Jesus is Christ. But in the hands of this modernist the Incarnation is made to include two things—the life of Jesus, and the Church's belief about it. The one, he holds, is an historical fact, the other an act of religious faith. And "Christian faith is never merely receptive, but also creative; it makes what it finds." That is to say, the Christian faith in the divinity of Jesus was something which the Church *gave to him*, not something they *found in him*. But they were justified in crowning him with this aureole, because, though history does not prove that everything which faith asserts was literally true of Jesus, history does show that "there is nothing accidental, or illusory, or improper in the identification of the divine Christ—ideal with the historical and wholly human figure of Jesus of Nazareth." Mr Thompson should further develop and elucidate this undoubtedly suggestive idea of Christian faith as *creative* and not only *receptive*; but, as he throws it out in his closing page, it amounts to this: that the true authors of Christianity were the apostles, and not Jesus. They were receptive of the wholly human figure of Jesus of Nazareth, and they attached to him, and identified him with, the divine Christ-ideal. To use the title of another article in this number, "Again, what *is* Christianity?" Does it consist in the teachings *of* Christ, or do we derive it from an historical analysis of the Church's doctrines *about* Christ? Can we use the phrase "the Christianity of Christ"? According to Mr Thompson we cannot. Christianity is a creation of the first and second centuries, and, as their ideas are largely Hellenic and Hebrew, it is hard to see how we can interpret and commend them in the twentieth century, unless we can trace their origin in the teachings of Jesus Himself. The Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, the responsibility of the individual, the endless life of the human soul, are essentially Christian beliefs, and the springs of these beliefs are to be found in the words of Jesus. Can we assert that He added to these no message concerning himself? Was Jesus, as Harnack insists, no part of his own Gospel? It is surely an accomplishment of almost superhuman ingenuity for a man to lay himself open to the history of Jesus, apart from proof texts, and resist the conclusion that he made an unique claim regarding himself. Indeed, it may be said—again apart from the study of single texts—that "there is no Catholic dogma of the first order which was not held in solution in Jesus' teaching, and so insinuated into the mind in the most effectual and persuasive manner. . . . No doctrine which belongs to the living body of the Catholic faith, though there may be some which are rather of its dress, are untouched by Jesus. They lie as seeds in the Gospels, however they may have grown and flowered elsewhere" (*The Mind of the Master*, pp. xxiii–xxiv). And one of these doctrines which lies in seed form in the words of Jesus is that which we are told Christian faith "created" rather

than "received," the belief expressed in the "Credo" of Peter, though he spoke better than he knew when he said it: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God."

DAVID PURVES.

BELFAST.

CANON WILSON ON THE ARCHBISHOPS' COMMITTEES.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1919, p. 214.)

IN his article in the January number of the *Hibbert Journal*, Canon J. W. Wilson suggests that a similar Conference of representative laymen, not necessarily Churchmen, should be appointed, men who, while "loyal in spirit and love to Christ, and also to the ancient Church," would also "express the message of the Church in the thought and language of the time, and in the light of advancing knowledge."

May I be allowed to emphasise this point of Canon Wilson, that the Church, in the Archbishops' Report lately published, utterly failed "to express the message of the Church in the thought and language of the time, and in the light of advancing knowledge."

To a large and increasing number the Church's doctrine, conveyed (not in its pulpits but) in its creeds and dogmas, is altogether out of touch with modern thought.

The candid admissions of the Church in this regard are really remarkable. Canon Wilson, in his article, speaks of "the admitted failure of the established Church to win for itself an intellectual leadership; its marked failure, in spite of its efforts and ability to win . . . more than a mere fringe either of the more highly educated or of the industrial class. Its teaching is plainly unacceptable to the one, and it takes no root in, and is at once forgotten by, the other."

Again, as showing the extraordinary admissions of the Church's abnegation of its duty as leader and guide of thought, take the following: "Again and again it has been the enlightenment and conscience of the age which has forced a reluctant Church to reform itself, when its teaching was corrupted or had deteriorated" (p. 18 of *Archbishops' Report on the Teaching Office of the Church*). And on p. 47 of the *Report on Christianity and Industrial Problems* we have: "In the fifty years which laid the foundation of modern England, the influence of the Church as a witness to social righteousness was, it is hardly an exaggeration to say, almost negligible." Again, "The Church, like the rest of the upper classes, turned for guidance to the economists, who themselves possess, indeed, a kind of religion."

But perhaps the most striking and novel feature of Canon Wilson's paper is the expression he gives to a forward phase of religious thought and feeling which is growing—slowly, silently, but very forcibly. It is involved in the question, "What is our conception of God?" This transcendent subject, Canon Wilson points out, is, like all else, subject to the law of evolution, of change. He says: "The end of revelation, and change in man's conception of God, is not yet. An appeal to the past bids us expect change. Revelation never ceases." And the change here indicated is described by the Canon as "the depersonalisation of theological conception and doctrine of God."

The question of the "Personality" of God is one that a large and in-

creasing number of religious people find to be a matter of grave difficulty and doubt. To think of God as a Person is to limit the conception of the Deity in a way that many cannot sanction. The boundless extent of the universe revealed by modern science, the infinite complexity of the mechanism of the universe of our own world, and the life that exists upon it, render impossible the belief of such a personal control as can justify appeals to meet individual needs, much less the personal regard of the fall of every sparrow and the numbering of the hairs of our heads.

Of this advanced phase of religious thought the Church makes no recognition, nor does it make any provision for meeting it. It ought to do so; for it is a religious and not an anti-religious phase. The old and still largely current thought of God is fairly well expressed by Matthew Arnold as of "a magnified and non-natural man." The modern thought finds expression in Shelley's "Adonais":

"The Power

That wields the world with never wearied love,
Sustains it from beneath and kindles it above."

But the crux of the matter lies here: How is the new thought to be embodied? If in the religion of the future there is to be a "Church"; if a cult is to survive; if worship is to continue—how can we formulate the new religious thought and emotion? That is the crucial question. The current forms will not do at all. The Church forms are absolutely hopeless; the Chapel forms, though less hopeless, would need drastic revision.

One of the most striking facts connected with this controversy is the failure of the Church, and even of such advanced leaders as Bishop Henson and Canon Wilson, to grapple with this matter of the "forms" in which religion is expressed; the "vesture" in which it is clothed; the "bottles" that hold the wine of the spirit. The new wine is still forced into the old bottles. Any attempts to manufacture new bottles (in spite of the words of Jesus) are scouted as heresy and irreligion. Meanwhile, what happens? The Church is becoming weaker and weaker, both as regards the intellectual character of its members and the number of its worshippers. How does the Church (including Nonconformity) regard the startling fact that nearly eighty per cent. of the population are outside its pale? The bishops make appeals to the nation to observe a "National Thanksgiving," or they organise a "Mission of Repentance and Hope." These are duly advertised and addressed to the nation at large. But it seems to be forgotten that only some twenty per cent. of the nation pay any regard to all this; that eighty per cent. pay no heed to it.

The crying want of to-day in the religious sphere is, I repeat, a drastic change in the forms for the expression—the embodiment of spiritual religion. A "reinterpretation" of the old forms will not do. Broad Churchmen practise it, but the laity will have none of it. They will not declare that black means white, and that "I believe" means "I do not believe." To refer again to the metaphor of Jesus, new bottles must be constructed; to patch up or reconvert the old ones will not do. Why do not such leaders as the Bishop of Hereford and Canon Wilson attempt the reform? It will be worth while. If the change came—and not till then—large numbers of us who are now outside the Churches, but who have a firm belief in religion and really love the Church, would return to the fold.

P. E. VIZARD.

ETHER, MATTER, AND THE SOUL.

(Hibbert Journal, January 1919, p. 252.)

SIR OLIVER LODGE's interesting article under this title seems to lose somewhat through lack of precision in the use of terms. It is important, for example, in discussions of this kind to know what connotation a writer attaches to the name "matter." Strictly speaking matter is the stuff, or $\nu\lambda\eta$, of which known things are made. Sir Oliver Lodge tells us that the objects we know are made up of electrons, or particles of electricity, which in turn are only "specks of modified ether." Ether, then, is the $\nu\lambda\eta$ of the physical universe, and as such deserves *par excellence* the name of "matter." Yet Sir Oliver Lodge draws a sharp distinction between ether and matter, and bases his article on the assumption that ether is immaterial. He is not consistent even in using the terms as defined by himself, for on p. 255 he says that electric particles are "not material, but corpuscular" (an obscure distinction), while on p. 256 he says that "electrons are themselves material."

Having set up an arbitrary distinction between ether and matter, Sir Oliver Lodge goes on to predicate "movement or locomotion" as the characteristic of matter, and "strain and stress" as the characteristics of ether. But the conceptions of strain and stress are derived from observed characteristics of matter, being in fact simply *frustrated tendencies* to locomotion. Sir Oliver Lodge will correct me if I am wrong here; but it seems to me only a common-sense summary of the case to say that whatever is capable of locomotion is also capable of strain or stress, if prevented from moving by forces equal to those impelling it; and that whatever is capable of strain or stress is also capable of locomotion, supposing the resisting forces to be withdrawn. Therefore, I suggest to oppose matter, as capable of locomotion, to ether, as capable of strain and stress only, is a false antithesis.

Sir Oliver Lodge goes on to advance the hypothesis that "every sensible object has both a material and an ethereal counterpart." The meaning of this is not very clear; but I take it to be that every material object is associated with an ethereal form resembling it, and reproducing in some measure its attributes. Is this ethereal counterpart capable of motion? Apparently not, since ether is capable only of "strain and stress." Are we to believe, then, that every material object has an ethereal shadow-shape resembling it, planted immovably somewhere in space, and doing nothing at all but undergo "strains and stresses"? Sir Oliver appears to suggest this. If not, no doubt he will tell us what he means.

On this theory of ethereal counterparts Sir Oliver Lodge proceeds to base his theory of the soul, which he conceives to be the ethereal counterpart of the body. It is difficult to offer any comment on this until we know better what Sir Oliver means by his "ethereal counterparts"; but I hardly think that this hypothesis of an ethereal ghost, abiding somewhere or other in space with its "strains and stresses" to keep it company, but otherwise simply "planté là," is a very rational or very consoling supposition. Nor, if true, would it afford any assurance of personal immortality. *My* consciousness is inseparably associated, in my experience, with *my* body; I know nothing of this alleged "ethereal counterpart"; if it exists, it is not

"I"; and if it exists after the death of my body, it will not be "I" any the more for that fact.

The term "soul," in its colloquial and literary uses, is surely nothing but a simple synonym for "mind" or "consciousness." The thing it connotes cannot be reduced to terms of ether, any more than to terms of "gross" matter, and the attempt to do so savours rather of Lucretian materialism than of sound psychology or of sound physics.

A. H. M. ROBERTSON.

WIMBLEDON.

PRESBYTERIAN REUNION IN SCOTLAND.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1919, p. 309.)

THE members of the Church of Scotland Committee, in conference with the United Free Church on the question of reunion, have, perhaps, received from Dr Macmillan a well-merited rebuke for their tardiness. It is doubtful, however, if his censures will accelerate their progress, since he blames them rather more for what they have done than for what they have not done, and seems to call upon them both to "speed up" and to stop. What has astonished the present writer most is that the Draft Articles should be accused of stating falsely the Church's constitution in matters spiritual, and that her members generally should be deemed apathetic towards the whole movement. On these two points he would venture to offer some humble criticisms of Dr Macmillan's article.

Is it a travesty of the truth to say that the Church has the inherent right to modify the forms of expression in her Confession of Faith or to formulate other doctrinal statements? Surely the making of Confessions is one of the duties and functions of the Church. She is the custodian and interpreter of the Scriptures, which, she believes, contain the rule of faith. Whoever deemed it to be one of the offices of the civil magistrate to expound the divine truth and to frame creeds? The Confession that now binds us was drawn up and ratified by the Church herself, and not by the State. The declaration that made it unalterable and demanded the subscription of her office-bearers to the whole of it was the Church's Act before it was an Act of Parliament. We know that the Christian body is able to discharge her whole function without the State's support, or, if need be, in opposition to the State. Are we to believe that she never entered into her full being until she received the kindly support of Constantine? In the first three centuries of her life she was gloriously free in her government and in her creed. State assistance, if it is to come to her, must recognise that inherent freedom, otherwise it will mar what it seeks to foster. Better for the Church were a state of outlawry than public recognition and support which threaten her essential liberties.

A fixed confession of faith and State endowment are not inseparable. It is true that Constantine, who first gave public money to the Church, was also the first to ask of her the formulation of a creed. We must note however, his reasons for so doing. His purpose was to establish her identity as distinct from heretical bodies. In this we have the clue to the whole problem. What the State requires is not particularly an unaltering

body of beliefs, or an unaltering constitution of government, but some understandable mark of identity. If a society is going to be in possession of wealth, then the civil authority must have some idea as to how it is going to recognise the society when its members change from age to age. Now, the true identity of the Church is of the same kind as that of a person. She is an organism, a living being, the embodiment, in the last analysis, of the Divine Personality. Reasonably, therefore, can she claim the same liberties as individual persons enjoy, who are not deprived by law of their possessions, if they alter their beliefs or habits of conduct. A mark of identity, however, is easily offered by the individual, but what has the Church to render, to meet this demand of the State? It appears to us that what she herself believes to be the safeguard of her continuance in the faith and works of the Master—namely, the orderly succession of her teachers and rulers, the one appointing and ordaining the other—is the only clear and tangible clue to her identity which she can select for this purpose. It is not a perfect one, for it would be deistic to suppose that, the succession being broken, God's work of grace must of necessity end. For the practical purpose in view, however, it might be sufficient. At all events, it would be true to say that the proof of our sameness with the Church of the past is to be found in the orderly continuity whereby the gifts of ordination have been transmitted, than to seek it in an identity of faith which the growth of knowledge makes plainly impossible, or an identity of government which changing conditions must perforce modify. We believe that the orderly succession of her office-bearers has always typified to the Church her own identity, and cannot see why it ought not to be sufficient for the State. It serves legal purposes well enough in the case of other bodies which administer trust funds. It would surely satisfy her better than the presentation to her of dogmas by which we do not intend to be bound and which, in point of fact, we do not teach. Everyone knows that we practise liberty from the Confession of Faith, and did so years before the formula of subscription was changed. It is, therefore, the operative Act of Parliament establishing the Church, and not the Draft Articles, which is a travesty of the truth.

We turn now to the accusation of apathy. In our opinion, that part of the Church represented by our young men serving in the Army is far from being apathetic on the matter. We have certain knowledge that they are highly suspicious of some privileges enjoyed by the Church of Scotland clergy, and especially of the uneven distribution of the teinds. They regard these things as a barrier in the way of the fellowship that ought to exist between the various branches of Christian believers. They are impatient of the distinctions between the various denominations and the divisions that have so little reason for their existence. Now, this enthusiasm for Christian unity is, we believe, typical of the laity generally. It came, perhaps, from the land of war, where the important things of life shine out in true perspective; but, wherever it sprang from, we cannot but be convinced that it is widespread and full of vitality. In a time when the air is full of talk of unions, of federations, of leagues of nations, how can one arise to tell us that the Presbyterians of Scotland are free from the general tendency towards mutual understanding? If our leaders will consult with laymen, they will find that the times were never more ripe for the crowning of the Reunion project with success. Let the Church appeal to-day to the people, in support of any great religious movement, and she

will receive an astonishing response. Young men are in the mood to be led to any heights of endeavour. The bolder the aim at the reconstitution of life on a basis of righteousness, the larger will be the numbers that will answer the call. Leaders spiritual may reach out for great ends, assured that they shall have behind them an incomparable following of earnest and energetic workers, who will urge them ever forward, on to the City of God.

But "the next few years will undoubtedly be full of grave dangers to the Church of Scotland, and it is unfortunate that it has no leader." The Presbytery of Glasgow "showed great disinclination to face the proposals" of the Draft Articles, while the Presbyteries of Dundee, Perth, Greenock, and Irvine "have practically rejected" them.

We confess to reading these words with dismay. That low hedge which could have been taken in the stride—the leaders still boggle at it! How then shall we reach the fair fields beyond? What, moreover, is the cause of their nervousness? What are the "grave dangers" they fear? These appear to be nothing else than the chance that they may have to pool their stipends, or to make some other provision whereby the United Free ministers may share in their wealth. Their feelings on the matter might be thus expressed: "We have comfortable incomes averaging £500 a year. We are secured in the possession of these by the State. The State never interferes with us. There is no record of its interference except to grant us fresh powers and privileges. Why then should we risk the danger of upsetting this admirable arrangement by making Declaratory Acts? Let us thank Providence for our good stipends and do nothing."

Is that to be the Established Church ministers' reply to the appeal for a united front, wherewith to face the forces of evil and materialism? Is that to be their excuse for the neglect of Christ's work in crowded cities, while the money needed for missions there is criminally wasted in the support of unnecessary churches in country villages? Are the cogent arguments, based on economy and efficiency, which initiated this movement, so to be silenced? Is our Master's prayer, "That they all may be one," to be unavailing because some of His disciples find disunity so full of ease? It is certain that these reasons, these base reasons, will not be allowed to hinder this truly Christian cause. If the ministers are apathetic, then let them remember that they are not the whole Church. If they seek to withdraw now, they will find themselves swept on, from behind, by a current of lay opinion too strong for them; and if it is judged that their general indifference to spiritual movements is due to excessive endowment, they may speedily be freed from further temptation. Let them not comfort themselves in the supposed apathy of their people, for the same enthusiasm as is ready now, at their call, to follow them in any great endeavour, will as surely throw them aside as useless if they hang back from the battle. The only coldness and apathy—if apathy there is—is in the hearts of the Church's leaders. Let them rid themselves of the imputation of it, and show that they are instinct with that new life which is abroad to-day, hungering and thirsting after national righteousness.

W. W. D. GARDINER.

GERMANY.

GHOSTS AS PHYSICAL FACTS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1918, p. 51, and January 1919, p. 319.)

MR ROLLESTON'S note calls for a short comment. The shortest might be the best. Read Schrenck-Notzing's book and Miss Verrall's criticism (which I have now read with interest myself, and regret having missed) and ask yourself, as Miss Verrall does, at the end what is the result. I will give her words: "No review can enable any reader to form an independent judgment of the case . . . I incline to the view that there is evidence in this case of some abnormal faculty round which have gathered fraudulent accretions." She suggests a theory of "physical secretion," and finds herself "in great perplexity, unable to conclude either that the phenomena are wholly fraudulent or that Schrenck-Notzing has proved his ideoplastic theory." Surely this justifies my plea for more attention to the book. Miss Verrall does not finally put forward the regurgitation theory with any degree of confidence, and it is worth noting that she omits to mention that a drug for staining the contents of the stomach was tried before a sitting as well as an emetic immediately after a sitting. Schrenck-Notzing states definitely that germs of food or acids from the stomach were never found.

I desire, however, to add a few words on the "hypothesis of fraud." It is enough for the ordinary scientific man and for the ordinary spiritualist to hear that fraud is alleged. They will at once, for different reasons, refuse to read the book. But it is different for members of the Psychical Research Society. The attitude of that Society is really, in the case of some of its members, very inconsistent. Quite rightly, in my opinion, it does not refuse to investigate Mrs Piper's or other trance phenomena—in spite of "Fielding Hall" sittings, in spite of proof that the great mass of material served up by spirit controls is the result of "suggestion," "fishing," "cryptomesia," etc. Now if materialisations are genuine trance phenomena—and this is one of the most important questions which the Society exists to investigate,—it follows inevitably from the other results of the Society that the medium will help herself in every way to produce them, and that the products, *even where genuine materialisations, will yet appear fraudulent*, for they will be reproductions of "pictures from the *Mirror*," the *Miroir*, or anything else that has been in the medium's (or the sitter's) mind. This is Schrenck-Notzing's working hypothesis. It is a key which, as I pointed out, opens many doors. Mr Rolleston refuses to use it because it is made of base metal, and also apparently because it opens doors which he regards as closed. Miss Verrall's interpretations have also to be revised by a further consideration of whether it does not best fit the facts.

I hope these remarks will show why I do not think it necessary to inflict upon readers a discussion of the various "fraudulent" incidents. As I quoted, "Considered objectively, a whole series of the photographs favours the hypothesis of fraud." It is a matter of opinion which incidents are the worst at first sight, but it is a matter for very serious discussion on the evidence in detail whether fraud in a crude sense is the proper explanation at all. The results are the results of experiments with two mediums, and Schrenck-Notzing and Professor Richet, who is also involved, can be left to deal with allegations about the past career of one

of them. The results, moreover, confirm and render probable a whole mass of previous evidence.

I may perhaps add a word on my personal account. There are in existence great numbers of "spirit photographs." Those I have seen afford striking parallels to Schrenck-Notzing's. They contain in some cases strikingly "fraudulent" results, *e.g.* beautifully exact reproductions of photographs, etc. Research has shown how unbelievably accurate trance-consciousness may be. The Society's true function is to investigate such cases, but it would find in every case that fraud was apparent and possible, and accordingly, since for practical purposes it works in such cases on the hypothesis that where fraud is proved or possible it must be assumed, it would brand or appear to brand the owners of the photographs as "cheats." Now the owners know that they are not cheats and did not get the photographs by cheating, and they will not therefore produce them to the Society and get called names for so doing; but they rest content (more or less) with the ready (and rotten?) explanation offered in every case by the spirit control. Thus the Society is depriving itself of objects for research just as the C.O.S. (some say) organises charity out of existence. It is for this reason that the work of Schrenck-Notzing deserves further study in this country. Upon his hypothesis one may almost say that fraud is welcome and expected—but of course the word "fraud" is used in all sorts of senses, and its presence is no final argument against the spiritist assumption. It is to be hoped now that we shall soon know more of the controversy which has raged on the book in Germany.

W. J. BRATHWAITE.

LONDON.

TWISTED SAYINGS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1919, p. 292.)

PROFESSOR MOFFATT has effectively blasted the modern sentimental perversion of "Mizpah." But is his interpretation of Laban's intention, after all, complete? Laban may have been concerned for the safety of his daughters, but he was even more concerned for a permanent dissolution of his partnership with his wily nephew. Jacob began by being the servant of Laban; he advanced to the position of partner; he ended by appropriating the whole stock. He then made for home with all he had acquired. Laban pursued after him, and made a final attempt to recover his property by retaining the man who had filched it from him. Foiled in this, he did the next best thing: he took sureties that Jacob would never come back to repeat his depredations. On the frontiers of their respective territories he built a watch-tower inscribed with the word "Mizpah," to signify "The Lord watch between us to keep us for ever apart," or, as we might say to-day, "For God's sake, keep to your own side of the fence."

HUNTER SMITH.

CRIEFF.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

MANY important philosophical publications have seen the light during the past six months. Some of them are to be reviewed at length in these pages. Professor James Ward's classical work, *Psychological Principles* (Cambridge Press, 1918), will be welcomed by philosophical students everywhere. It is, in all respects, a great book—a permanent addition to our scientific literature. Dean Inge's two volumes on *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918) will take their place as the authoritative exposition of a system of thought which has hitherto been sadly neglected by English scholars. These volumes are the mature result of twenty years' research, and are full of pregnant suggestiveness in regard to modern problems. Professor W. R. Sorley's Gifford Lectures on *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (Cambridge Press, 1918) handle the ultimate issues of metaphysical investigation from the point of view of recent attempts to work out a theory of value, and will certainly appeal to a wide circle of readers. Professor C. A. Strong's volume on *The Origin of Consciousness* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1918), which is largely concerned with the nature of perception, is a valuable contribution to a subject that has been for some years uppermost in philosophical discussion.

The *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark) is fast nearing completion. The new volume (vol. x., 1918) contains several articles on philosophical subjects. In particular, attention should be called to Mr C. D. Broad's thoughtful and able treatment of the term "Reality." Mr Broad deals specifically with the distinction between existence and reality, the reality of universals, and the opposition between appearance and reality. The two kinds of entities, minds and physical things, which are said without hesitation to exist if they be real are, he points out, particular individuals, while the entities which are said to be real but are seldom naturally said to exist are universals, whether qualities or relations. In discussing the reality of universals, he criticises Meinong's well-known contention that complex universals involving a contradiction, such as a "round square," must, in a sense, be real because they can be subjects of propositions, and argues that the statement, "A round square is contradictory," although standing for a genuine proposition, does not stand for a proposition about an object denoted by the phrase "round

square," but means, in truth, "If an object be round, it cannot be square, and conversely." I notice that Mr Broad persists in treating "appearances" as existent objects, but he seems to me to misunderstand the position of those who reject this view. Mr C. Delisle Burns has a short but useful account to give of ancient and mediæval "Realism." Mr A. E. Heath's treatment of "Realism in Modern Thought" strikes me as eminently inadequate and unsatisfactory. It is confined almost exclusively to the so-called "New Realism," and has not a word to say about the much more important work of a thinker like Adamson. And it actually singles out Shadworth Hodgson and Hobhouse as the "forerunners" of English "new realism," which does not, I imagine, owe anything to either of them, and which both would emphatically repudiate. Professor John Burnet's long article on "Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism" will be most helpful to readers of his recent book on Greek philosophy, and throws much new light upon his well-known views in regard to Socrates. Professor Henry Jackson's account of "Plato and Platonism" is largely an epitome of his important papers in the *Journal of Philology*, and re-enforces his way of conceiving the earlier and later theories of Ideas. The article on "Rights" by Professor J. H. Muirhead is clearly and lucidly written. The principles underlying the conception of rights are, he contends: (i.) that rights in the full sense of the word are relative to human personality as it may be at its best; (ii.) that personality expresses itself in activities that are in essence social. Rights imply duties in a deeper than the legal sense. And a conflict of rights arises not so much (as in the older view) between an abstraction known as the individual on the one hand and an abstraction called society on the other, as between the rights and duties that attach to an individual in virtue of his membership of different social groups. In an account of the work of "Rothe," the present writer has sought to make clear Rothe's conception of God as the Absolute Spirit and of the way in which he takes the world to be related to God. There is much in Rothe's metaphysical speculation that merits more attention than it has yet received. Dr H. J. Watt's treatment of "Psychology" is interesting and exhibits a good deal of independent thinking. But I think Dr Watt has attempted too much within the space at his disposal, and would have been better advised to have concentrated his endeavour upon that side of psychology which is more especially concerned with religious experience, about which he says nothing. Dr W. H. R. Rivers's account of "Psycho-therapeutics" is quite admirable and supplies a large amount of information published here for the first time. "The great interest of modern trends in psycho-therapeutics is," he says, "that at this late stage of social evolution they seem to be again bringing religion and medicine into that intimate relation to one another which existed in their early history."

The last volume of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (N.S., vol. xviii.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1918), containing the contributions to the Society during the thirty-ninth session, extends to over 650 pages, and is a striking witness to the vitality and vigour of philosophical reflection at the present time. It comprises eighteen papers and two symposia, together with three "Short Communications." Professor Laird will speak about the symposia (which have also been issued in a separate volume), and I confine attention here to the papers. Professor H. Wildon Carr's Presidential Address on "The Interaction of Mind and

Body" occupies the first place. Professor Carr maintains that life is to be conceived as at the start an undifferentiated unity which in order to become actual must differentiate itself. The differentiation is, he urges, dichotomous in character—a separation into two individual systems, which are governed by opposite and contradictory principles, but which at the same time are complementary. One principle is realised in the mind, an enduring agent preserving past and projecting future action; the other is realised in the body, an efficient instrument inserted into the whole system of interacting forces within which it is operative. The interaction of mind and body is not interaction of part with part, but always of whole with whole; the relation between them is not that of causality but that of solidarity, which implies that although the two systems are distinct in nature and diverse in function they yet complement and co-operate with one another for a common end. Mrs Adrian Stephen, writing on "Thought and Intuition," throws much new light upon Bergson's much-discussed antithesis. She represents Bergson as setting out from the idea of a mind not in a state of complete ignorance, but as including potentially, in the whole field of its acquaintance, all the experience which the external objects or conditions that solicit its attention are capable of producing. This is what Bergson calls "virtual knowledge," and he conceives the various intellectual operations as so many ways of limiting our horizon, of narrowing down our acquaintance, and confining it within such bounds as best suit our practical convenience. Dr G. E. Moore's extremely acute and suggestive essay on "The Conception of Reality" is largely a criticism of Bradley's distinction between reality and appearance. But, in the course of his inquiry, Dr Moore is led to determine what he takes to be the most important usage of the terms "real" and "unreal," according to which they do not stand for any conceptions at all. The proposition "Lions are real" means that some particular property—say *the* property of being a lion—does in fact *belong to* something, or that the conception of being a lion is a conception which does apply to some things. Now, the only *conceptions* which occur in this proposition are (*a*) the conception of being a lion, and (*b*) the conception of belonging to something, and obviously "real" does not stand for either of these. Professor J. A. Smith discusses the question, "Is there a Mathematics of Intensity?" His answer is in the negative. Intensive wholes fall within the field of "muchnesses," and between these wholes and magnitudes or multitudes there is always a misfit, always only an analogy, and not an "exact" correspondence. Professor J. B. Baillie, in his paper on "Anthropomorphism and Truth," combats on the one hand the contention that the individual mind is made what it is by the truth, and on the other hand the contention that the truth is what the mind practically makes it to be. Both views, he argues, ignore (*a*) the consideration that the individual mind is not a fully developed and fully equipped finite reality, but is ever growing, its growth towards increasing fulfilment of its nature and of unison with its world being the very essence of its experience; and (*b*) the fact that it is one single indivisible individuality which determines the laws and conditions of practice and the laws and conditions of intellectual activity. In an article on "The 'Modes' of Spinoza and the 'Monads' of Leibniz," the present writer tries to trace the many lines of thought pursued in common by these two thinkers, and to bring out the striking similarity that evinces itself in many of their results. There are several

contributions on the philosophy of religion. The Bishop of Down criticises "The Theory of a Limited Deity," and Dr F. C. S. Schiller, in a paper on "Omnipotence," defends the theory against Dr D'Arcy's attack. Mr W. R. Matthews sets forth "The Moral Argument for Theism," and Mr A. A. Cock comes to the rescue of "The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God." Two important papers on social philosophy are included: that of Mr J. W. Scott on "Realism and Politics," dealing largely with the views of Russell and Bergson, and that of Professor H. J. W. Hetherington on "The Conception of a Unitary Social Order." Finally, there is a valuable and exhaustive account of "The Philosophy of Proclus" from the pen of Professor A. E. Taylor.

Speaking of Proclus leads me to note the appearance of the second edition of Mr Thomas Whittaker's treatise on *The Neo-Platonists: A Study in the History of Hellenism* (Cambridge Press, 1918), a book which has long been recognised as a most thorough and scholarly piece of work. The author has added a new and lengthy appendix on "The Commentaries of Proclus," and this enhances considerably the value of the work and will be of the utmost assistance to students of neo-Platonism. Proclus, he tries to show and succeeds in showing, was not only a great systematiser but a deep-going original thinker. The fatality of his having been born in the fifth century was the reason of his being unable to bring out his remarkable thoughts except by writing huge commentaries. There is, in fact, more originality of detail in his commentaries on Plato than in his systematic treatises. The main portion of the body of the book is occupied with an account of the system of Plotinus, and many readers will turn to it in conjunction with Dean Inge's more elaborate work. Mr Whittaker also discusses in an interesting way the polemic of neo-Platonic writers against Christianity, and traces the influence of neo-Platonism on the official Christian philosophy of the succeeding period. He points out, for instance, the fundamental identity of Dante's conception of the beatific vision with the vision of the intelligible world as portrayed by Plotinus. So, too, in regard to the notion of emanation Dante is indebted to neo-Platonism. "That the higher cause remains in itself while producing that which is next to it in order of being, is affirmed by Dante in terms that might have come directly from Plotinus or Proclus." Mr Ernest Barker's thorough and exhaustive work on *Greek Political Theory*, the first volume of which, dealing with *Plato and His Predecessors* (London: Methuen & Co., 1918), has been published, is an extremely valuable study of Greek thought, and will further the revival of interest in Platonic philosophy. Mr Barker examines very fully the theories of Justice, of Education, and of Communism in the *Republic*, and in the five concluding chapters lays out in a comprehensive manner the lines of reflection pursued in the *Laws*, "the most neglected, and yet in many ways the most wonderful—and the most modern (or mediæval)—of all the writings of Plato." On many matters—*e.g.* the issue of might against right; the meaning of militarism; the character of international relations; and the scope of a true national education—the author acknowledges that he could not help being conscious of a new feeling for an old message coming from the circumstances and environment of the times. Attention should be drawn to the section of the book that is concerned with the newly discovered fragment of the Sophist Antiphon. Its importance lies in the fact that in it, for the first time, we have the *ipsissima verba* of a

Sophist who opposed a naturalistic conception of *φύσις* to *νόμος*, and believed in the superiority of *φύσις*. Two carefully written articles on "The Psychology of the Affections in Plato and Aristotle," by Professor H. N. Gardiner (*Phil. R.*, September 1918 and January 1919), merit consideration. The second article, in which Aristotle's doctrine is discussed, and extensive use made of passages in the *Rhetoric*, is especially worthy of notice.

As a companion volume to his *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, Professor R. B. Perry has published a series of lectures under the title, *The Present Conflict of Ideals* (New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918). The lectures purport to be a study of the philosophical background of the World War, and were delivered on the Mills Foundation last year at the University of California. They deal with the moral, emotional, political, and religious implications of naturalism, idealism, pragmatism, and realism respectively, after which an attempt is made to relate these tendencies to the conflicting national ideals of the present war. The book contains some thoughtful criticism, especially of the ethical principles of naturalism and of absolute idealism; but I am bound to confess that so far as its main purpose is concerned it does not seem to me to be a success. It is a mistake, I think, to suppose that the national ideals that led to the war were the outcome of philosophical speculation, and the perusal of what Professor Perry has written has more than ever confirmed that opinion. Naturally, however, Professor Perry has some interesting things to say. What is needed for the justification of a resolute morality and the sober hopes of a religion of action is, he argues, a world in which consciousness in the specific and limited sense may operate effectively, and in which there is therefore a chance of its bringing the world into accord with its interests. And he thinks realism is the only philosophy that can provide such a world. For realism recognises the distinctness of consciousness, while at the same time admitting it into the natural world as a genuine dynamic agent. In its ethics, realism, it is contended, is individualistic, democratic, and humanitarian; in its religion, theistic and melioristic. It is a philosophy which refuses to deceive or console itself by comfortable illusions. It distinguishes the good from the evil, and seeks to promote the former, not with a sense of assured triumph, but rather with the confidence that springs from resolution. But one wonders for which of the "new realists" Professor Perry is speaking. Mr Bertrand Russell, for instance, would certainly not subscribe to many of the consequences which are here drawn from realism, and yet in describing the realistic doctrine the author has been drawing largely on Mr Russell's presentations of it.

Recent periodical literature offers many articles of metaphysical interest. In an article on "The Idea of God: A Reply to some Criticisms" (*Mind*, January 1919), Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison discusses in detail the objections raised, chiefly by Dean Rashdall, to certain of the arguments in his volume of Gifford Lectures. In the first place, Professor Pringle-Pattison defends the distinction he had drawn between idealism as a spiritual theory of the universe and "subjective idealism," or "mentalism." He urges that, although all things exist *for* mind, yet they *do* exist; a thing is not itself a phase of the being of the experiencing mind. Finite minds require an environment by which they are shaped and from which they receive their content, and it is nonsensical to seek to represent the environment as a

state or process of the mind itself. In the second place, as regards the relation between finite centres of consciousness and the supreme Spirit, Professor Pringle-Pattison maintains that, although a self may be largely identical in content with other selves, yet to speak as if their common content affected in any way their existential distinctness is to be the victim of a confusion. So far as we think of God simply as self-consciousness, this element of otherness must remain. But God means for us, not simply or primarily the existence of another self-conscious Being, but rather the infinite values of which His life is the eternal fruition, and which are freely offered to all spirits for their appropriation and enjoyment. So that both God and man become bare points of mere existence—impossible abstractions—if we try to separate them from one another and from the structural elements of their common life. In the same number of *Mind* (January 1919) Mr C. A. Richardson, writing "On Certain Criticisms of Pluralisms," tries to answer objections raised by Bosanquet and Pringle-Pattison to the spiritualistic monadology of Dr James Ward. Mr Richardson maintains (a) that from the point of view of Ward's theory there is no difficulty in accounting for what Bosanquet calls "externality," seeing that the object of experience is to be regarded not as one or more existent entities, but as an "appearance" to the subject of existent entities other than himself; (b) that Bosanquet's account of consciousness does not agree with the facts, consciousness being not the "meaning" of externality, since the "meaning" of an object is only *for* a conscious subject, and no attempts to get the subject out of what is essentially objective can possibly succeed; (c) that Pringle-Pattison's objection to the conception of "laws of nature" as having been evolved in time breaks down, because it is not intended to deny the subsistence of laws, but merely to assert that laws may, and do, change, and that we do not start with fixed species; and (d) that there is no intrinsic difficulty in the conception of a bare monad, for there is no inevitable reason why that peculiar complex of presentations which constitutes what we call "the body" should enter as an element in every experience. Mr Richardson also discusses another side of Dr Ward's theory in an article on "The Notion of a Deterministic System" (*Phil. R.*, January 1919), where he contends that in that realm of ends which constitutes the world as we know it, we find, not logical determinism, but teleological guidance. There is an able criticism of "The Basis of Bosanquet's Logic" in *Mind* (October 1918), by Dr L. J. Russell. Dr Russell argues, *inter alia*, that while every judgment is relative to some system which is sufficiently complete to render the judgment necessary, yet it is possible to construct various systems of this kind, as, for instance, in the game of chess, without finding it necessary to draw on any unspecified portions of reality. And if we specify the precise portions of reality on which we are drawing, then not reality, but the system we have specified, is the ultimate subject of our judgment. Mr S. Radhakrishnan, writing on "Bergson and Absolute Idealism" (*Mind*, January 1919), tries to show that the divergence between the standpoint of Hegel and that of Bergson is not so great as it has usually been taken to be. Life and matter, as Bergson regards them, appear diametrically opposed in their nature and properties and the ends they have in view. One seems to be working against the other. But they are so opposed only when they are abstracted from the whole to which they belong. In the whole they are found to act in harmony; the opposites are opposed to one another and not to the unity. Bergson, indeed, seems

to consider the strife to be the end of evolution, the ultimate expression of the universe, while Hegel holds that their negativity is cancelled in the whole viewed from a broader standpoint than that of individual existence. Yet, though Bergson is not clearly conscious of it, the logic of his argument compels him to assent to the reality of a whole in which strife is. Mr Hugh A. Reyburn, in a paper on "Mental Process" (*Mind*, January 1919), criticises with acuteness Professor Alexander's three conceptions of a spatial non-material mind, of the distinction between enjoyment and contemplation, and of the relation of subject and object.

Mr Bertrand Russell's article on Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic* (*J. of Phil.*, January 2, 1919) is of great interest both on account of its criticism of Dewey's book and on account of the new light it throws upon some of his own views. Mr Russell explains that when he speaks of "data" he is not thinking of those objects which constitute data to children or monkeys; he is thinking of the objects which seem data to a trained scientific observer. The kind of "datum" he has in mind is the kind which constitutes the outcome of an experiment, say in physics. We have reason to expect *this* or *that*; *this* happens. Then *this* is what he calls datum. The fact that *this* has happened is a premiss in the reasoning of the man of science; it is not deduced, but simply observed. The state of mind he is imagining in investigating the problem of the physical world is not a naïve state of mind, but one of Cartesian doubt. In regard to Professor Dewey's instrumentalism, Mr Russell says: "Escape from one's own personality is something which has been desired by the mystics of all ages, and in one way or another by all in whom imagination has been a dominant force. It is, of course, a matter of degree; complete escape is impossible, but some degree of escape is possible, and knowledge is one of the gateways into the world of freedom. Instrumentalism does its best to shut this gateway. The world which it allows us to know is man-made, like the scenery on the Underground: there are bricks and platforms and trains and lights and advertisements, but the sun and stars, the rain and the dew and the sea, are no longer there—sometimes we seem to catch a glimpse of them, but that is a mistake; we only see a picture made by some human being as an advertisement. It is a safe and comfortable world: we know how the trains will move, since we laid down the rails for them. If you find it a little dull, you are suffering from the 'genteel tradition,' you belong to an 'upper' class given to a detached and parasitic life."

The *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* has issued a special number (September–December 1918) à propos of the fourth centenary of the Reformation. The number contains a series of articles on the German, French, and English Reformation, and upon the Reformation and the Modern World. In the January–February number there is a striking article by Benedetto Croce, entitled "Critique de moi-même," and also a continuation of G. Marcel's critical study of Royce's metaphysics. An article by D. Parodi on "Ernest Renan et la philosophie contemporaine" ought likewise to be mentioned.

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Nature on this view is regarded as "the medium for the production and perfection of goodness in finite minds," but "it would be too proud an assumption to assert that the whole of nature, of which we know only the barest fragment, has no other purpose than this one which concerns ourselves. Omniscience is a foible against which the modest philosopher should be on his guard. What other purposes than this there may be in the wealth of worlds which people space, or even in the small world known to ourselves, we cannot tell; and, except as a matter of speculative interest, it does not concern us to know." In these words we seem to hear the very accents of John Locke, most typical of English thinkers. Freedom, it is repeated, is essential to such a theistic interpretation. "So many theists are convinced determinists that this statement may have an appearance of arrogance. Yet no other view seems to me really open." Freedom involves the admission that there is a limitation of the divine activity—that things happen in the universe which are not due to God's will. But this does not justify the objection that we are making the divine nature finite, for it is not limited by anything outside itself. "Rather we may say that a higher range of power and perfection is shown in the creation of free beings than in the creation of beings whose every thought and action are predetermined by their Creator."

The argument, it will be seen, bases itself more and more exclusively, as it proceeds, on the facts of morality. This was the author's deliberate purpose. But Professor Sorley had recognised in advance that this is only one avenue of approach, and he reminds us at the close that "the way is not from the categorical imperative alone. From nature and art and knowledge men have risen to the contemplation of God and found in him the key to the problems of life." "Wherever there is intrinsic worth in the world, there also, as well as in moral goodness, we may see a manifestation of the divine. God must therefore be conceived as the final home of values, the Supreme Worth—as possessing the fulness of knowledge and beauty and goodness and whatever else is of value for its own sake." If the argument had been developed in these other directions, it might have led to some infusion of that Platonic idealism which Professor Sorley contrasts with the pure personalism of his own position; for, although ultimately unmeaning apart from their conscious realisation, the contemplative values of beauty and truth are more impersonal in their suggestions than morality with its insistent practical appeal. Yet the author's deliberate self-limitation has amply justified itself in the result, for to it is largely due the impressive sense of unity and completeness in the argument which the reader carries away with him.

The volume is dedicated to the memory of the author's soldier son, one of the clearest and freshest voices, as well as one of the most thoughtful, among the youthful poets who gave their lives in the war.

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Psychological Principles. By James Ward.—Cambridge: University Press, 1918.—Pp. xvi+478.

AT last Professor Ward has replaced the article on Psychology in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* by a book. In the interests of the subject, it is a matter for profound regret that he was not able to do so long ago. The article, as soon as it appeared, was recognised to be a work of the first rank and importance. In an early review of it by Bain in *Mind*, to which Professor Ward himself refers with evident pleasure, the reviewer, after specifying some of its outstanding merits of treatment, speaks of it as “a signal achievement of philosophical ability,” and in the concluding words of the review gives his opinion that in expanded book form it will have its place “among the masterpieces of the philosophy of the human mind.” Shortly afterwards William James referred in *Mind* to the article as “the deepest and subtlest collective view of the subject which has appeared in any language,” and elsewhere he characterises it by what is emphatically the right adjective—“masterly.”

The recognised importance of the article has no doubt obliged most English teachers of philosophy and their more advanced pupils to make themselves in some degree familiar with its main doctrines, but the work has not exercised its due influence on, or taken its rightful place in, psychological teaching—and that for reasons that are obvious enough. Its form as an article in a huge encyclopædia made its use as a text-book impossible, or at any rate very inconvenient. Of course one could obtain the separate part, and one came rather to like the big page with its double column and marginal summaries; but the part was not on sale in the ordinary way, not well bound, and not convenient to use except at a table and with a book-rest. If the article had been published separately, as others of far inferior importance were, one can hardly doubt that it would have become *the* English text-book for teachers of psychology and for all students beyond the elementary stage. Probably its place has been taken for the most part by James's *Principles* and later by Professor Stout's books. But James's attractive volumes are rather a collection of brilliant essays than a systematic treatise, and Professor Stout's books create serious difficulties for the student by their variations in terminology and their apparent variations in fundamental analysis. Now, the article had the two signal merits, that it works throughout with one clear and consistent scheme of analysis, and that it steadily pursues the broad lines of mental development without any wandering off into side issues or any mere elaboration of details. It was pre-eminently a systematic treatise on “Psychological Principles,” as the book is now rightly called. And it is this that makes the long delay of publication in book form so regrettable. Professor Ward refers in his Preface to “a psychology which arrogates to itself the title of ‘new,’” and from time to time he has combated the “presentationism” to which he alludes; but for English-speaking students of psychology its mischievous influence would have been more effectively counteracted if the present book had been available as the basis of sounder teaching. The fault, of course, is not with Professor Ward. In America (not to say Germany), the foremost psychologist in the country would long ago have been the head of a fully equipped department, with all the opportunities of influencing the teaching of his

subject which such a position is calculated to afford. And in view of the extraordinary width of range and the equal grasp with which Professor Ward can use and combine for the elucidation of psychological principles the results of the most diverse lines of investigation—I am thinking at the moment of the articles in *Mind* on “Assimilation and Association”—one may surmise what he might have achieved in such a position.

The book gives a considerably fuller and more rounded treatment of the subject than the original article did, though the restriction to questions of principle is still severely observed. “Owing to the exigencies of space,” as the author points out, “the sections of the article dealing with experience at the self-conscious and social level had been unduly compressed. Hence . . . chapters xii–xviii, forming almost a third of the book, are, with the exception of a few pages, entirely new; and the last two were no part of the original plan” (Preface). These last two chapters are valuable and interesting in a high degree. The first of them gives very briefly a unified general view of the mental synthesis or growth to which all the partial processes considered in the earlier chapters contribute, and then passes from this synthesis, as studied in a more abstract way in the “psychological individual,” to the more concrete way in which it is conditioned in the actual individual born at a given point in a series of individuals connected by descent. This more concrete view introduces the new factor of the inherited *Anlage* (or sum of inherited tendencies), and in this connection Professor Ward gives an interesting discussion of the relation of psychological to biological heredity. The last chapter continues the topic with a discussion of the nature of temperament, instinct, talent, and genius, in their relations to each other and to the inherited *Anlage*, and concludes with a discussion of the features of mind in which the developed individual personality comes to expression, viz. intelligence in its more concrete or personal form, sentiment, and above all character. With these two chapters it is natural to connect closely the two preceding chapters on Self-consciousness and Conduct (including sections on Value, Choice, and Freedom), which deal with the corresponding abstract topics of general psychology. These topics, briefly or even scantily outlined in the article, receive here a much fuller handling. The chapter on Self-consciousness contains a very careful statement regarding the fundamental assumption of the psychological subject, and should be of much service in making clear the psychological aspect of this debated problem. One of the advantages, indeed, of the fuller exposition of the psychological point of view which is afforded by the book as a whole may well be, I think, to make more evident the way in which, and the limits within which, the psychologist may claim to use such concepts as those of the subject and activity without raising metaphysical issues.

In the earlier parts of the book, which are based more directly on the article, there are important additions, such as the new introductory chapter on “The Definition of Psychology” (previously printed in the *British Journal of Psychology*), the fuller treatment of sensation, and the separate sections on the tactual and the visual perception of space. In the Preface the author thinks it necessary to anticipate a possible criticism that the book is a “patchwork.” Such a criticism, it may safely be said, would have occurred to nobody but Professor Ward himself. For, however much he may feel that the circumstances under which the book has been written have made it an inadequate realisation of his own cherished plans,

the systematic unity of his treatment of the subject is really its outstanding quality. The student, I fear, will still find the work very stiff reading. The extreme closeness of argument and conciseness of statement, and the very sparing use of illustrations—though these are peculiarly happy when we do get them,—make this inevitable. But my own repeated experience as a student was that the difficulty of a passage arose, not from any fault I could fasten upon the text, but simply from the fact that Professor Ward set the standard for his readers uncomfortably high.

One would hope that the appearance of the book may become the occasion, as it certainly affords the material, for a thorough discussion of the fundamental assumptions and principles of the science. The criticisms with which I am acquainted of the article, or of particular doctrines in it, have mostly been by writers who came to it with some hostile bias, and who often missed their mark more or less widely in consequence. Even Adamson, whose brief criticism of the fundamental analysis is more of the type one would like to see, shows a somewhat inaccurate understanding of the doctrines criticised. An adequate discussion of its fundamental principles would be the most fitting tribute to a work which so amply deserves, as Bain anticipated, to take its place as a "masterpiece" of psychological theory.

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The Origin of Consciousness. An Attempt to conceive the Mind as a Product of Evolution. By C. A. Strong, late Professor of Psychology in Columbia University.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1918.—Pp. viii. + 330.

FIFTEEN years ago Professor Strong published a book which certainly deserves to live, if for no other reason than on account of the striking problem propounded in its title, *Why the Mind has a Body*. In that book the author defended a view which he described as "psychophysical idealism," according to which the brain-process is to be regarded as the manifestation of consciousness, consciousness being the thing-in-itself that appears as the brain-process. By thus subordinating the physical to the mental, and conceiving the former as phenomenal merely, the theory was brought into accord with the fundamental principle of idealistic philosophy. The universe was held to be in all its parts mental in character; individual minds and other things-in-themselves were conceived as together constituting a single system, the continuity and order of that system being symbolised by the continuity and order of the physical world.

Since then Professor Strong's notions of matter and the perception of matter, of consciousness and its relation to the mind, have undergone radical transformation, although he still continues to believe that that which appears to us as physical is in itself psychical (by which, however, he does not mean inextended). On the one hand, the distinction that he had previously taken to be one between phenomenal things, which alone we directly perceive, and real things or things-in-themselves existent behind them, he now sees to be a distinction between things as perception exhibits them and things as they really are, without implying that things are not

really to a large extent as perception reveals them. The object perceived is not a mere sense-datum but a thing—an inanimate object, an animal, another human being. "By touch I perceive not hardness but a hard thing; by vision I perceive not colour but a coloured thing; by touch and vision together I perceive not the two qualities but the one qualified thing." On the other hand, while formerly he was accustomed to think of consciousness as constituting the substance of mind, it now seems to him that something which he would call feeling or sentience is the stuff of mind, whereas consciousness is only its function. Mind-stuff, as such, is not psychic in the sense of being cognitive and voluntary or even conscious, but in the sense of possessing that character which is the necessary presupposition of consciousness, and which, along with extension and activity, must be taken to be present in all matter, if it is to be capable of giving rise to what we call a mind.

The title of the present volume is not so happily chosen as that of its predecessor, and hardly indicates the sort of topics with which the author is concerned to deal. His purpose, he tells us, is not to discuss the evolutionary forces by which the genesis of consciousness has been brought about, but rather to consider in what way our traditional conceptions of the mind must be modified in order that the mind may become a fit subject for evolution. In particular, he is anxious to remove three obstacles that present themselves to such a derivation,—(a) any doctrine of the self-transcendence indisputably involved in knowing which would preclude complete resolution of mental states into feelings or sensations; (b) the differences of quality between mental states that apparently remain irreducible; and (c) a unity of the mental life such as would constitute it a separate existence cut off from other existences by an absolute barrier. The main portions of the work are devoted to the first problem, and in these an attempt is made to determine the nature of that awareness which is a constant feature of all knowing. The characteristic features of the writer's theory are unfolded in his interesting and suggestive analysis of the process of perception.

Professor Strong maintains that in perception two distinct things require to be distinguished,—(1) *psychic states*, such as pains, desires, emotions, mental images, sensations, and (2) the function of *awareness*, or *givenness*. Psychic states are not "states of consciousness," or states of awareness; for consciousness is not itself an existence. Consciousness or awareness is a mode of relation between existing entities,—the relation, namely, of givenness. To be aware of a thing is only another way of saying that the thing is given,—these are, in fact, a single relation viewed from opposite ends. What, however, is "given" is not the *existence* of a thing but its *essence*, and the givenness of the essence is no security for the existence of the object or the character of the essence for the character of the object; although in most cases there is justification for thinking that where an essence is given an object exists and that it possesses more or less the character given in the essence. By an "essence" we are to understand, in this reference, anything that we can think or know, considered solely with regard to *what* it is,—that is to say, the entire *what* of a thing, conceived in abstraction from its existence. So understood, an essence is a universal, though when of the kind given in sense-perception it is perfectly concrete and is universal only as indefinitely repeatable in space and time; it is, therefore, an entity

of the logical type, and is not either a physical or a psychical being. In order to transform such givenness into sense-perception, there must supervene *affirmation* or *belief*,—i.e. the implicit assumption (not to be confused with inference), which is shown by the way in which we act, that the given-essence does in fact reveal an existing object. "In perception the essence and the existence of the object divide, and the former alone is apprehended by consciousness, while the latter is asserted or assumed. This, taken with the fact that the essence is given by means of a psychic state, and that its givenness depends wholly on the psychic state, not on the actual existence of the object, makes it possible for an object to be given that does not exist or to be given in a form more or less different from that in which it exists. Cognition, in other words, may be erroneous or inadequate. On the other hand, the same mechanism makes it possible for an object to be given which is really the essence of the object" (pp. 40-41). Furthermore, the essence is not intuited by an abstract ego, or intuited simply; it is apprehended by means of a concrete state as vehicle. Givenness originates by states of our sensibility being used as symbols for objects. That which uses them is the organism, and the organism is at once psychic and extended. The use they are put to by the organism is that of guiding it in its adjustments to objects. Givenness or consciousness may thus be said to be "the meaning or intent which the sensation acquires through becoming in fact the index of the object" (p. 122). For example, a horse has not merely a visual sensation, but has an essence given to him, the essence "a fearful object," if the visual sensation causes him to shy. The psychic state, or sensation, is not by itself conscious, any more than it is given to consciousness; it is conscious only *quâ* used as a symbol,—only as the vehicle of an intention. It is not denied that consciousness is in a sense ultimate; but it is not ultimate in the sense of being an indecomposable psychic fact or an existence, and it is explicable in such a way that its origin becomes scientifically intelligible.

This bald sketch of an elaborate theory, which is worked out with considerable skill and ingenuity, can, of course, do it but scant justice; but may, perhaps, be sufficient to induce readers to follow the argument for themselves. That the theory contains valuable elements of truth may at once be conceded. I welcome, for instance, Professor Strong's emphatic repudiation of the view that what is given is a "presentation" or "sense-datum." "When I present a lady with a bouquet of flowers, I do not present her with the presentation of the flowers, but only with the flowers" (p. 37). And on more than one occasion I have myself insisted that what I have called the "content apprehended" is an "essence," and not an existent entity. But I find it impossible to accept Professor Strong's contention, if I understand it rightly, that the "essence" is merely given; and that "givenness" is identical with "awareness." That seems to me to be virtually admitting the very doctrine against which he protests, the doctrine, namely, that perception is a mode of intuition. I should venture to urge that there can be no awareness of the essence until an act the nature of which consists in the function of discriminating has been directed upon the object, and the characteristics which make up the object's "whatness" have thus to some extent been differentiated. The essence as the essence of the object is no doubt there from the beginning, but it is not there from the beginning

as an apprehended essence. And I confess that I have failed to discover why it is that Professor Strong finds it so imperatively requisite to enforce the position that in addition to the apprehended essence the existence of "sensations" must be admitted as factors in the process of perception. It is true he is never very explicit in regard to the mental activity involved (see *e.g.* p. 183); but the "sensation" as "the vehicle of the datum" is, at any rate, to be distinguished from such activity, and as the "symbol" of the existence of the object it is the essence of the sensation only and not its existence with which we are concerned. As such, it seems to be a superfluous duplication of the essence of the object. If it be "literally true" that "the sensation by which we perceive grass is itself green," why should not the apprehended green of the grass be itself a sufficient "symbol" of the grass's existence?

My space is exhausted, and I am debarred from discussing the many other matters which Professor Strong handles in his suggestive volume. What he has to say about introspection appears to me important, and I am in full accord with his criticism of the doctrine that mental states exist by our being conscious of them. But I am altogether unconvinced by his argument in regard to the unity of the self, and I do not see in what way the conclusions he conceives himself to have established furnish support for the "panpsychism" (according to which "external things are in their intimate being of the same nature as the psyche") which he has evidently greatly at heart.

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The Philosophy of Plotinus. The Gifford Lectures at St Andrews, 1917-1918. By William Ralph Inge, C.V.O., D.D., Dean of St Paul's, etc. 2 vols.—London: Longmans, 1918.—Pp. xvi+270; xii+253.

IF criticism consisted in finding disagreements, my difficulty in reviewing Dean Inge's volumes on Plotinus would be extreme. He has himself only found one divergence between my interpretation of the philosophy of Plotinus and his own; and I do not find even this to be real. The particular position to which he takes objection (vol. ii. p. 183) is where I say that Plotinus is "without the least hesitation a determinist" (*The Neo-Platonists*, 2nd ed., p. 76). To this he objects that Plotinus "is quite convinced that mechanical necessity cannot explain psychical or spiritual life, and in these higher spheres he denies that necessity and free-will are incompatible." With this I quite agree; but perhaps I ought to have put it more explicitly that Plotinus and the whole Neo-Platonic school are the most strenuous opponents of what Shadworth Hodgson called "compulsory determinism," and, more especially, of the mechanical variety of this. On the other hand, I find him to be a determinist in the sense of Kant and Schopenhauer, who in a somewhat similar way combined necessity with the freedom of the personality; this freedom consisting in its being a factor in real or metaphysical causation, not simply a link set in motion externally as part of the destiny of the whole. Dean Inge's own view seems to me to be of the same kind. He holds, with Plotinus, that freedom is included in necessity; and I have noted in more than

one place a repudiation of what I understand by indeterminism. I find this repudiation implied especially in a passage (i. 243) where he says that to take "regularity—all that can be predicted"—as "a proof of thralldom to blind necessity and mechanism" is a thesis to which "superstitious supernaturalism holds out both hands" (see also ii. 67). This is a determinist retort to the argument of indeterminists from the moral consequences of the belief in thorough-going causation. The reproach, of course, does not touch all the indeterminists themselves; who include, in some sense, Aristotle with his recognition of an absolute *τύχη* among the constituents of the world, Epicurus with his "declinations," and Renouvier with his acts of free choice imprevisible from within or from without by any intelligence, even that of the creative Deity to whom he ascribes the origin of all other minds. Yet, when the doctrine is taken up into a religion, it seems to have the effect of encouraging superstition, and, as Hume showed in contrasting the effects of Catholic and Calvinist theology, also political absolutism. This Renouvier admits in criticising the "liberty of indifference"; and he tries to distinguish his own indeterminism from that which has been officially taught by the Jesuits since the Jansenist controversy. (Compare Shadworth Hodgson, "M. Renouvier's Philosophy," *Mind*, O.S., vi. 191 ff.) So far as I can see, I am myself, theoretically and practically, in agreement on the question both with Plotinus and with Dean Inge.

The only apparent divergence being thus disposed of, I select a few points of interest where there are only the slightest differences in shade of opinion to note.

The public, I must first say, is to be congratulated on having two volumes of such circumstantial exposition, setting forth with abundance of original and judicious observations the doctrine of one of the greatest among religious philosophers. Perhaps the religiosity is a little overstressed in places; as, for example, in the translation of the concluding passage of the Sixth Ennead (ii. 138-142), where the language becomes more directly theological than it is in the Greek. That throughout the book Spirit is preferred to Mind or Intellect as the translation of *νοῦς*, of course changes the terminology in the direction of the later patristic usage, where the place of *νοῦς* was taken psychologically by *πνεῦμα*, but here for moderns no difference of fundamental meaning is conveyed; and the variation in rendering has sometimes the advantage in giving more of the emotional tone. Yet "intellectual love" and "intellectual beauty" are not in English without an emotional colour of their own; so that "spirit" and "spiritual" seem acceptable rather as variants than as fitted to become the exclusive renderings.

Upon the Categories I agree with a thesis that Dean Inge puts forth as an audacious one. The categories of the ideal or spiritual world for Plotinus ought to have been Goodness, Truth, and Beauty (ii. 74-5; cf. 104). His actual doctrine of categories I too find to be "one of the most obscure and least attractive parts of the Enneads" (i. 194; cf. ii. 58). Its history illustrates the absence in the Platonic school—shown earlier in the variations of the Academy from Old to New and backwards—of all servile deference to the authority of a master. No Neo-Platonist followed Plato in his attitude to the Arts; and a disciple who revered Plotinus as Porphyry did had no hesitation in rejecting his list of Categories because it seemed inferior to that of Aristotle. Of course

we always find, sooner or later, someone to put in the foreground the least valuable part of a system, especially if it is the most arid. Hence it is not surprising that one or two moderns have professed to discover in the hundred pages at the opening of the Sixth Ennead precisely the vital centre of the whole system of Plotinus.

The categories which Dean Inge proposes to substitute are, as he says, categories of value; and he recognises that none of the ancients had become quite clear to themselves about the relation between value and existence (i. 131, n. 3). Yet he shows how near Greek thinkers had come incidentally to marking off the three values of Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. To the definitive distinction Proclus, as he points out, came nearest (ii. 76-7).

That the distinction was not irrevocably fixed before Kant, who was led to it by taking over from the psychologist Tetens the classification of the phases of mind into thinking, feeling, and willing, illustrates those phenomena of reaction and interrupted progress of which Dean Inge is acutely aware. The "pseudo-scientific doctrine of perpetual progress which often passes for Christian" (ii. 68) he speaks of as "that strange will-o'-the-wisp of nineteenth-century thought" (i. 188). In the nineteenth century itself it was similarly treated by Renouvier, who, while professing only philosophical, as distinguished from theological, convictions, was on some sides in sympathy with Christianity. Nothing, certainly, could have more confirmed Renouvier's previsions regarding the collapse of the optimism founded on the belief in an automatic "law of progress" than the world-war with its sequel of Bolshevism. (See especially his two studies of Victor Hugo, as poet and as philosopher.) Yet I think rather more ground for a qualified optimism may be discovered than Dean Inge allows, at least in his closing pages. Earlier, he finds a certain antique hardness in what Plotinus says about the weaknesses of the average decent people in the later Roman Empire, confronted with the barbarian wolves. They are morally better, says Plotinus, than the spoilers; but they have failed to cultivate the virtues needful for the time. "The wicked rule through lack of courage in the ruled; and this is just" (ii. 175). Is not modern civilisation, we may ask, entitled to find in this a salutary hardness, and one encouraging for itself? The modern West, inheriting the Græco-Roman civilisation, has restored political freedom, and has not succumbed to a revived barbarism for want of the appropriate virtues. This ought to be taken into account when the present state of European life is compared with that of the third century. No doubt we also are at the end of an age; but there is no indication of a decline of energy; and so we may hope to preserve our "deposit of truth" against the forces at once of reaction and of dissolution.

To return to a more speculative point, which, at the same time, is not without a definite bearing on practice: Dean Inge singles out for praise the thought developed most distinctly by Proclus, that the extremes, God, or the One, and Matter, are alike simple. Complexity belongs to intermediate natures. Yet the extremes are not identified, as in some modern philosophies. Benn, with the acute insight into detail that often accompanies his depreciating general estimate of Neo-Platonism, has pointed out that the minds that drew this distinction were subtler than those of the modern philosophers who have identified opposites. Berkeley, he might have noted, quite appreciated the subtlety, and

insisted on it. Dean Inge has a very interesting application. "The extremes," he says (ii. 116), "are no more identical than the 'religion' to which, in Bacon's aphorism, depth in philosophy recalls us, is identical with the religion from which a little philosophy estranges us." On one side, this seems to imply the admission that a Christian Platonism can hardly become more of a popular religion than the Platonism of Plotinus and Proclus. On the other side, with the aid of a connected position of Proclus, it is not without a suggestion of hope for the future of philosophical religion. According to Proclus, in proportion as a principle is higher, its influence extends further down; so that the action of the highest principle, descending through all stages, does not exhaust its effect before reaching the lowest recipient. All other principles, in proportion as they are less elevated, stop short in the descent. Then, if Time is the form of progress to an end (i. 183-4), may we not expect sometime the fulfilment of what seems in Schopenhauer's system the astonishingly optimistic forecast, that the mass of mankind will come directly under the dominance of philosophic truth? For I do not understand that which Dean Inge regards as essential to Christianity to be inseparably connected with historical events. Separated from these, Christian Platonism would become a pure philosophy, only with a shade of difference from that of Plotinus, to whom he acknowledges a relation of discipleship.

The characteristic of Christian, in distinction from unmodified Hellenic Platonism, would apparently be a stronger sense of the depth of the problem of evil in the world. We are thus led to think of the undoubtedly Christian affinities of Schopenhauer. Now the ground of Schopenhauer's more sombre feeling about the world is the conviction that evil is something positive and rooted in the will, not a mere resultant of an element of negation setting apart, and therefore opposing to one another, the diverse manifestations of reality. Yet the question arises whether, after all, this conviction is not more logically reconcilable with the principles of Plotinus as drawn out by Proclus than with a doctrine of absolute creation like that which was for Origen the irreducibly Christian thesis in his speculative doctrine. The element of real pluralism—the thesis that souls are not created without a latent pre-existence of the Many beside the One—might very well be expressed by the term *aseitas*, borrowed by Schopenhauer from the Schoolmen. That an individuality should be sometimes evil at root is certainly a position rejected by the Neo-Platonists, and not formulated even by Schopenhauer, who seems to think of the ultimate individual as always possibly good, though evil in its blind striving. Suppose, however, it were adopted, it seems more compatible with the explicit recognition by Proclus of something uncreated in the Many than with the dogma that all things were created good. Professor Burnet has found a position like it in the passage of Plato's *Laws* that suggested to some the notion of an evil world-soul. In this case we should have even more distinctly what Dean Inge finds in Plotinus, "the subordinate pessimism which results from a radical optimism" (i. 150). Dualism would still remain to overcome, and the phrase "beyond good and evil" as meaningless as it must be if used to convey anything but the final and absolute moral indifference of the universe. There is for Plotinus, as Dean Inge shows, something beyond the morally good; but evil is never conceived as co-ordinate and coequal with good, but always as

incidental and kept under in the cosmic harmony. If there is harmony, and the world is one, there is no real dualism.

That this harmony often seems to be found too easily, I willingly concede; though Plotinus has a much severer struggle with the problem of evil than some modern optimists. Yet, while he points out this defect, Dean Inge's final and considered word is that ultimately no contradiction can be found between the philosophy and the religion of Plotinus. His system is "still coherent, as he left it, a strong argument that it is not vitiated by inner contradictions" (ii. 206). This had been my own verdict after studying closely the development of his thought into new detail by Proclus. For the differences never affect the system. The harmony of the structure remains. In fact, I do not know of any other system that holds together so well under the test of analytical study. And this, with a metaphysical doctrine, is a stringent test.

T. WHITTAKER.

LONDON.

Life and Finite Individuality: Two Symposia. Edited for the Aristotelian Society, with an Introduction, by H. Wildon Carr.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1918.—Pp. 194.

THOSE who are interested in contemporary philosophy should be very grateful to Dr Carr for editing this volume. It is an open secret that the pages of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* are the best mirror of current philosophical thought in these islands. All the schools get a hearing, and the contributors really try to say something. Some of them, to be sure, say it better and some say it worse, but at least there is genuine discussion. Speaking generally, this freshness of treatment and readiness to argue form the chief merit of the *Proceedings*; but the *Proceedings* have at least two other merits, one more general and one more special. The more general merit (especially in the symposia of the Society) is that the topic discussed always has a living interest. The more special merit is that the Society is a real medium of exchange between philosophy and science (including political science), since its membership is not restricted to technical philosophers, but includes many eminent men of science.

These characteristics of the recent volumes of the *Proceedings* are found most saliently in the symposia of the Society, and especially in those which take place annually at the joint meeting with the Mind Association. It was felt by many that the symposia in the summer of 1918 had a quite peculiar value and interest, and that it would be a service to have them published separately. The yearly volume of *Proceedings* is bulky in itself, and too expensive for most private purses; but some of the debates at least ought to be accessible to a wider public. Moreover, this volume contains matter additional to that already published in the *Proceedings*. Besides Dr Carr's Introduction, the book contains the reply of each of the openers of the two discussions to his critics. A reply, as we all know, is often the best part of a debate, and it is always a pity that the reader should be robbed of it.

The first of the two symposia in this volume (pp. 11-74) deals with the most interesting of the many perennial problems in the philosophy

of science. The question whether physical, biological, and psychological categories are irreducible raises all the important issues concerning the relation of the mind to the living organism, and of the living organism to lifeless things. It goes without saying that this problem is Janus-faced, looking to philosophy on the one side and to empirical science on the other. Is the development of the mind of man strictly comparable to the growth of a trout or of a fern, and do the trout and the fern, in the last analysis of science or philosophy, develop according to the type of principle which we find sufficient to account for the formation of crystals, sand-ripples, or soap-bubbles? Must an autonomous biology reject animism and the vital force on the one hand, and, on the other, avoid mechanism despite all its devices of tropisms and other special machinery for self-regulation and self-orientation? What is the precise bearing of these questions upon biology and psychology themselves, and how do these theories stand when they are considered in the large as part of a great world-problem?

It would be useless in this place to try to give more than the barest indication of the actual course of discussion in the symposium. The essential purpose of the debate was amply achieved, since the fundamental requirement that there should be a frank interchange of ideas between men who know their business concerning both the scientific and the more general issues could not have been met more adequately. The symposium opened, as all such discussions should, with statements of a thesis and of an antithesis. Dr J. S. Haldane maintained that the root principles of physics, biology, and psychology are incommensurable; and Prof. D'Arcy Thompson (who admitted that the mind is *sui generis*) argued stubbornly, *pied à pied*, that the two former sets of principles are not incommensurable at all. I think he had the best of the argument, and I find his exposition delightful reading. That, however, is as it may be, and I have not the space even to describe the arguments of the other gladiators—Dr Chalmers Mitchell and Prof. Hobhouse. Their names are a sufficient guarantee; but perhaps I may note in passing that Prof. Hobhouse's attempt to prove that the *differentia* of organic behaviour is the presence of conation at a low level shows how very representative the discussion was.

The title of the second symposium—"Do Finite Individuals possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being?" (pp. 75-194)—may be somewhat alarming to the general reader; and if, on glancing through the book, he happened to notice Prof. Stout's apology for a "somewhat arid" logical discussion (not to speak of sundry references to grammar), his alarm might become something like dismay. Well, it is never easy for a professional philosopher to know what will or will not appeal to the general reader, and I do not wish to dogmatise on the point; but I myself find Prof. Stout's logical discussion the most interesting part of a very comprehensive and masterly argument. He says all the things I should like to be able to say half as well and half as entertainingly. Here again judgments may differ, and perhaps it is sufficient to say that Prof. Bosanquet opened the debate with his characteristic thesis that the finite individual, poet or *Dachshund*, is subordinate to the cosmos, and even an adjective of it. His argument, of course, had strong conviction and remarkable ability behind it. And he has real eloquence at his command as well as dialectical skill. Prof. Pringle-Pattison argued the thesis of

his early *Hegelianism and Personality* and his recent *Idea of God*; and it is needless to add that he argued well. I have referred to Prof. Stout already, and I regret very much that I have no space to describe Lord Haldane's argument.

The technical reader will probably find most instruction in two features of the discussion. In the first place, the point of view of nineteenth-century idealism (as I may perhaps call it) receives three essentially distinct presentations in the papers of Prof. Bosanquet, Prof. Pringle-Pattison, and Lord Haldane; while Prof. Stout, as we all know, is one of the most dangerous critics of this philosophy. In the second place, the opening paper, in particular, makes a definite attempt to meet hostile views in detail.

If I have given the impression that the discussion as a whole moves in the atmosphere of grammar, logic, and severely technical metaphysics, I am heartily sorry. I do not know whether or not it is an accident that the disputants in this symposium are all Gifford Lecturers, but it is plain that the problem of the mode of being of finite individuals raises the great issue of human worth, permanence, and stability. That is the port towards which a Gifford Lecturer steers, and that is the reason, I suppose, why so many people read Gifford Lectures. The disputants, then, know as well as anyone that their logic and metaphysics have a direct bearing upon the problem of the wise man's attitude to life, and they show this fully in the discussion. We have still to wait for Prof. Stout's Gifford Lectures, though happily we shall not need to wait long. The other lectures we know. But we do not know, without being told, how the lecturers would reply to one another. Perhaps we should try to argue that out for ourselves; but, even if we are not lazy, it is a rare privilege to have the opportunity of testing our guesses.

JOHN LAIRD.

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, BELFAST.

Studies in the History of Ideas. Edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. Vol. I.—New York: Columbia University Press, 1918.

THIS is a volume of admirable, short, compact studies, having no obvious relation to one another, but arranged in the chronological order of the historical period to which each is more or less specially devoted. There is no reason why the reader should start at the beginning or with any one in particular, and probably everyone who takes up the book will be led by some predilection of his own. The best way to give an idea of the nature and character of the studies is not to give a catalogue or running comment, but to take a few as samples.

I began with Professor Woodbridge's study of "Berkeley's Realism," not on account of anything provocative in the title, but because it so happened I had myself recently been engaged on the same study. It is an excellent piece of work, based on a careful collation of the indications given in the *Commonplace Book* as to the actual contemporary theories which influenced Berkeley, and in particular those against which his arguments are mainly directed. Briefly, Professor Woodbridge claims to prove that

the influence of Locke is both less and less direct, and the influence of Newton greater, than is generally supposed. It was the mathematical interpretation of nature which seemed to Berkeley the basis of the scepticism it was his main directing purpose to destroy utterly. This seems to me historically sound. There was also, however, a contemporary philosopher of the first importance whose works Berkeley studied, whom Professor Woodbridge has omitted to notice. Nicolas Malebranche, world-famous in his old age when Berkeley was a student at Trinity College, Dublin, had been moved like Berkeley by deep religious convictions, yet to his philosophy Berkeley is directly opposed. There is no evidence, so far as I can discover, that Berkeley in his early period had read the writings of Descartes and Spinoza. All his references to them are easily explained as second-hand knowledge of their theories. In later life he read them eagerly and was profoundly influenced by them, as we know from *Siris*; but the Commonplace Book refers to Malebranche, and mentions in particular Book I. chap. 6 of the *Recherche de la Vérité*, and the effect it produced on him. My theory is that Berkeley turned aside from his great purpose of writing a long treatise, of which *The Principles* was Book I., on the discovery of Malebranche's doctrine of the senses, and the immediate result was *The New Theory of Vision*. In any case, it is clear that the arguments of Malebranche deeply impressed him, though, having no "things" to connect with "ideas," he had no need of such a theory as "seeing things in God." In fact, as Professor Woodbridge has pointed out, the part played by God in Berkeley's theory is a peculiar one, and the ground for declaring the theory a realism and not an idealism. Our acts of perceiving are voluntary, but our perceptions are "given." God's perceptions are not given; both their content and the order of their succession depend on His will.

My second choice was Professor Montague's essay on "The Antinomy and its Implications for Logical Theory." I was attracted by the title, but also and much more because I happened to know that the author is one who never writes without having something to say, and can be depended on to express it in terse and vigorous language. I was not disappointed, but I was surprised. It is a brilliant piece of dialectics dealing with Zeno's problem, or rather with the recent opposite claims of the rationalist and the empiricist each to have discovered the solution. The poising of the supra-rationalist against the supra-empiricist is delightful, but the surprise is the conclusion. I was about to disclose it, but why should I spoil the enjoyment of it for the reader?

It is ungracious, in an assemblage of such good things, to single out any for criticism, but I cannot help raising a protest in regard to the essay on "Truth and Error in Descartes." It seems to me, in contrast with the essay on Berkeley I have just described, to afford a striking example of how not to write history. It is able and penetrating and brings out some exceedingly subtle points, but it grates on me to have a question such as why Descartes was not a pragmatist discussed in the terms of present-day controversy, and as though William James's ideas were the moving considerations in Descartes's mind. I do not charge the author with intention to do this, but it is the impression he leaves on my mind.

In conclusion, not one of the thirteen essays is prolix or dull, and, as they are sent forth with "Vol. I." printed on the title-page, we may hope there are more to follow.

H. WILDON CARR.

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON.

The Dawn of the French Renaissance. By Arthur Tilley, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer of King's College, Cambridge.—Cambridge: at the University Press, 1918—Pp. xxvi+636.

THE purpose of this work, we are told, was "to trace the beginnings of the French Renaissance and to lay a sure and firm foundation from the study of it as an organic movement affecting the whole life and thought of the nation." Such a purpose bears with it the promise of a valuable addition to the literature of the history of culture. Nor are we essentially disappointed. The size of the book enables it to be more than a compendium, whilst it is less exacting than a history on a large scale. If we may designate it in a phrase, it is a scholar's general history, for Mr Tilley demands a certain training in his reader to follow the bibliographical detail, in which he himself has such comprehensive knowledge.

Mr Tilley tells us that he is not an expert in any branch of art, and yet he presents us with a particularly attractive account of architecture, sculpture, and painting. From the point of view of the average reader, these chapters—on The Early French Renaissance in Art—of Part III. are the most interesting of the book. The accounts of the progress of architecture—the change from fortress to country-house, the development of the châteaux, of hôtels, of smaller town-houses, and municipal buildings—are brought into touch with French social history with a sympathetic and enlightening pen. The foreign influences—especially the Italian—are discussed with admirable discernment and illustration, without for a moment losing sight of the real independence of France in her instinct for the selection of ideas from every quarter.

We find Part III.—The Renaissance in Art—the most vivid and suggestive. Part I. deals with history—the Relation of France and Italy; Part II. with the French Renaissance in Letters. Each of the three parts is nearly equal in length, Part I. and Part II. ten or twenty pages less than two hundred, and Part III. twenty or thirty pages more than two hundred pages in length. In each of these parts Mr Tilley deals faithfully by his readers. He has studied the French authorities, earlier and later. He is up to date. Moreover, he tells his readers where to go for further information. The book is therefore a treasury of knowledge on the subject. We are delighted at the plan, not the quantitative equality of division, but at the idea of presenting all the vital aspects of the early Renaissance movements in a synthetic whole, and the attempt to trace the organic unity throughout all the national mental activity—whatever its form of expression. Our workers at the reintegration into a sound perspective of the specialistic researches have been too few, and have been rather afraid of themselves. Mr Tilley trusts that as "a stranger, untouched by patriotic impulses or by the desire to rise superior to them, he will be found impartial." His work is the outcome of conspicuous labour, and calculated well to enable readers to obtain comprehensive knowledge on a fascinating period of history, on particularly easy terms.

We feel, however, one lack in this welcome work. Whilst we recognise the inevitability that the "Renaissance in Letters" should be based on bibliographical research, we think that a full account should not bring this basis too prominently into the general perspective. The study of Latin and Greek of the period is treated too much as if it were purely philological.

No doubt this element was prominent. But it was true, even in Erasmus's age, that the classics were studied for the "solid things" in them, and the neo-Latinists had ideas which burned within them for the political, social, and philosophical as well as for the religious reform of their times. It is not sufficient to speak of the *Adagia* of Erasmus as "this fine flower of the ancient world" and "this epitome of ancient wisdom." When the subject of the volume is the *Dawn* of the French Renaissance, we must remember and emphasise the basis of the wonderful *modern* views which Erasmus announced to an astounded new world of scholars, his *ideas* and *opinions* on all sorts of topics and persons of the age. The incidental wealth of reference, of freshness of vision, of optimism with regard to the future, of independence of criticism, and his genius for right and sound perception of the moral and intellectual implications, form a basis for the future thinkers who were to arise in France when the leadership in thought passed from Italy to France; and, as Mark Pattison has said, in Budæus, Turnebus, Lambinus, Joseph Scaliger, Casaubon, Saumaise, French learning led the world. The dawn of *intellectual independence*, in our opinion, cannot be left to be implicitly discovered by the reader for himself in philological and bibliographical details about the progress of "letters." Again, in the development of the University of Paris, Mr Tilley has become so engrossed by the Italian factor that he has found no room for the Spanish influence, no inconsiderable element in the fortunes of the University of Paris at this time. Further, we are surprised to find inadequate reference to the great questions of social criticism, *e.g.* war and peace, by such Parisian students as Erasmus and Vives. It is on this side of the *Dawn* of philosophical, rationalist, and social thought in scholars in France—preparatory to the development of such writers as Rabelais and Montaigne, and still more distinctively philosophical writers—we find this book comparatively scanty in tracing the origins.

But we cannot leave it on the note of adverse criticism. It contains the result of too much devoted labour to deserve anything less than warm appreciation. It is a most attractive book in what it does contain—it is full of learning. And—no small merit—its full and excellent index will make it constantly useful to the student.

FOSTER WATSON.

ORPINGTON, KENT.

On Society. By Frederic Harrison.—London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1918.

It is a matter of astonishment that with so many recent sociological treatises in our hands, and among them the important joint production of Hetherington and Muirhead, we should nevertheless find in Mr Frederic Harrison's newly published work *On Society* so much that not only claims our attention, but also serves as both stimulus and guide. For the book consists chiefly of lectures and addresses delivered more than a quarter of a century ago. It does not include the author's more recent reflections and activities, for, as he himself tells us: "From 1880 to 1905 I was chosen to lead the society which had its centre at Newton Hall. From that time my main business was engaged, by lectures there and by essays in the *Positivist Review* (1893-1918), to develop the moral, social, and religious meaning

of the Positive system." But to this he adds what is also quite to the purpose: "The Cause to which my life has been devoted, and which this book seeks to illustrate and explain, is not simply a theory of Society, but is also a practical scheme for the regeneration of Society in the future. That is, it has a twofold character, being a Social Philosophy and a Social Polity. In the first part of the book I endeavour to sketch some of the essential doctrines on which we conceive a normal Society should be based. In the second part, which follows, I give some examples of the way in which a group of men and women convinced by these doctrines sought to work them out in their lives." The foregoing is also more concisely stated: "This book is a summary of what we sought to popularise and to teach."

It will, therefore, serve as a basis whereby to review briefly the principles and the practice of the Positivist Society of which Mr Harrison has for so many years been the leader. And first, as regards the practice. As a cult, Positivism has secured a very limited following. This fact perhaps tells both for and against its intrinsic value; it tells for the value if the ideals of the system were too exalted for a general acceptance by a nation as yet most imperfectly educated; but against—and once more only perhaps—if it could make no more general and winning appeal to the ignorant and the ungodly.

Leaving this aspect of the volume, we proceed to examine its claim to be a theory of life. It is "a system of Action, and a system of Thought, as much as it is a system of Devotion. Its characteristic feature is to combine these three in one mode of real life, under the inspiration of our common humanity. We do not enter here into rivalry with the worship of any theology; we shall imitate none, as we shall attack none." Have we not in this brief exposition of the Positivist doctrines almost enough for our whole critical purpose? As a system of Action it is admirable; as a system of Thought it is inspiring and elevating; but what does it mean by Devotion? Briefly, and entirely, it is a devotion to our human-kind, to society; its religion is, as the propounder himself has loved to phrase it, the "Religion of Humanity."

I fear that the initial capital of this word *Humanity* creates no Deity, though it may possess more potency than all the three letters in the *God* of Mr H. G. Wells. As I have remarked elsewhere, to some of us humanity is explicable only in terms of a Providence that has created humanity. The kingdom of man is at best a narrow realm, and a sorrowful; much too narrow and too sorrowful to have a god of its own, still less a god of its own creation. Among the many doubtful rights of man for which we now clamour so wildly, this surely is one of the strangest:

"The right to play the God,
On our own knee to worship our own name—
Humanity—dust!"

The fact is that the Positivist system deliberately excludes what the Christian religion most jealously includes among its fundamental doctrines, namely, the superhuman element; and as opposed to the Positivist Kingdom of Humanity, we have it thus in the other creed—"Seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and His righteousness." In other words, to the average doubtful or sinful or broken heart this grandiose word *Humanity* offered neither an attractive kingdom nor a worshipful

God, nor a satisfying ideal of righteousness. All these Christianity did offer; and if Positivism is a splendid failure, it became such, I believe, chiefly because Christianity remained as its rival. I use the word "remained," for the period during which Positivism made its venture has been one of trial and decline for the Christian faith—not, however, of annihilation:

"Strangely that Record throve; its slender scroll
Purged a whole Pagan world; and even to-day
'Tis vital beyond earthly, and outbids
All upstart creed."

This leads us to inquire whether any system of ethics apart from religion can serve as a complete theory of life. But here we are confronted by the fact that, as we have seen, Mr Harrison calls his ethical system religious; it is the "Religion of Humanity." And further, though by a very inconclusive argument, he dissociates his ethics from his religion: "So will it be with Positive Morality. It will be only the outer court of the Temple of Religion—the Religion of Humanity." At this point, therefore, we seem to require a new definition of religion; or perhaps we ought rather to revert to some of the older meanings of the word. But first, in fairness to Mr Harrison, we had better hear some of his more explicit utterances on the subject. What does he really mean by the "Religion of Humanity"? On one page he writes: "Truths centred round the idea of a paramount Providence—a real, universal, and human religion." If we now ask him what he understands by *Providence*, we have this for at least one of his many answers: "That eternal Humanity, from which he (man) derives all that he has, and to which all that he can give is but justly due." Thus we are brought back to our former position, and must now examine more closely the credentials of this terrestrial and human divinity. Does religion, as generally understood even in our day, imply nothing more than this? Some years ago I attempted to trace the growth of our religious faculties (*Handbook to Tennyson*, pp. 33–41), and perhaps a short extract may serve our present purpose: "The use of language endowed us with thought on the one hand, but also, in great measure, with the higher feelings and abstractions on the other. If we now speak of these higher feelings as being either moral, or merely emotional, we have a threefold division of mental life; and although the boundaries between these divisions are always debatable, yet the intellectual, the emotional, and the moral life are sufficiently distinct as a graspable growth of contrast. Next, knowledge may be regarded as the substance of the intellectual life, beauty of the emotional, and goodness of the moral. Further, science may be regarded as the minister and the expression of knowledge, art as the minister and the expression of beauty; while from one point of view religion will be recognised as the minister and the expression of a morality that extends through and beyond human experiences into the regions of the infinite and the eternal." If this exposition is a sound one, it appears that a superterrestrial—supernatural—superhuman element is implied in the term *religion*; and in all ages this element is popularly supplied by what is known as *theology*.

And now, returning to a former question, it further appears that we may not trust a recent writer who assures us that "we are free to choose between God and ethics, it does not matter which"; to my thinking, the

ethics imply the God, and the God the ethics. However, I have no intention to labour the point here, for in my judgment it has been firmly established by Rashdall in his *Ethics*; and that writer further points to the fact that all non-religious systems of ethics differ as to their fundamentals, and are therefore unreliable. And to this I venture to add that no such system, as far as my knowledge of them goes, is either consistent within itself, or complete; and until a perfect science of morality is constructed (if ever that may be), religion, and the religion of Christianity, must remain our guide to conduct.

Some of this inconsistency is apparent in the Positive non-theological ethics of Mr Harrison; already we have noticed a divergence in the meaning of the term "Providence" as employed by this writer; and I may add that elsewhere in his published work, and notably in his correspondence, its meaning extends from being a mere synonym for "Society" till it connotes "the Gracious Father of all." So is it also with many other points of his doctrine, even with Immortality. On this subject again I may refer to his letters; here is one occasion on which he seems to yield, it may be unconsciously, to what Addison calls "this longing after immortality." He is writing to me on the subject of the Latin quotation—*viva adhuc et desiderio carior*—at the end of the Preface to *On Society*, where it closes some lofty and pathetic words to the memory of his wife. The Latin quotation, he says, "is borrowed and adapted from one in a totally different sense used by Professor Gilbert Murray. He does not know from whence it comes—nor do I. How could it be put in English in five or six words as an epitaph? I cannot find English for *desiderio* in bereavement." In reply I suggested as renderings: "Yet living, dearer for regret," or "Yet living, dearer still through loss"; and to this sense of the words he raised no objection. In fact, and speaking again generally, it is my belief that the fundamentals of his doctrine are by no means unequivocally established; he often modifies his strictly mundane opinions till we become aware of views that extend beyond the confines of earth—and of "thoughts that wander through eternity."

Indeed, as I stated at the outset, in spite of a cramped creed and some philosophical doctrines that are discredited or outworn, the book is not merely an interesting memorial; enough remains of immediate value to guide us through our present perplexing maze of social and industrial trouble far more unerringly than almost any other treatise of the kind, however recent. I will illustrate the point by one quotation: "That which Communism seeks to do in an absolute way, by law and force, Positivism seeks to accomplish in a relative way, by opinion, by moral influence, and a change of feeling and habit—in a word, by a powerful and constant religious conscience. . . . The difference between the two may be thus summed up. Positivism is a moral and religious socialism; Communism is a material dissolution of society. It is dis-socialism."

In the space at my command I could not examine more than one element in Mr Harrison's social philosophy, but this one—the religious,—in my judgment, is by far the most important. For the rest, let me repeat that his theories and practical suggestions in regard to the political, social, and industrial aspects of life are noble and instructive, and I heartily commend them to every thoughtful reader.

MORTON LUCE.

De chronologie van het leven van Paulus. Door Dr D. Plooiij.—N.V. Boek-handel en drukkerij voorheen E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1918.—Pp. vii + 195.

A CAPITAL monograph. One says this all the more readily that two at least of Dr Plooiij's conclusions fail to convince one. He argues plausibly in favour of the South Galatian hypothesis, and he reproduces, ingeniously but inconclusively, the idea which he has already put before the English public, that the Book of Acts was written by Luke towards the end of Paul's imprisonment at Rome, as a sort of apologetic statement on his behalf. The latter contention occurs incidentally; the former has an entire section devoted to it (pp. 91–110). The data for the South Galatian theory have been often stated, and Dr Plooiij does not make more of them than his predecessors in this country or on the Continent.

However, the main theme of the treatise is chronological. The author sets about his work in a businesslike fashion. His book is well equipped with references and tables; it faces the intricate and often ambiguous evidence with care, and the arrangement of the materials is quite lucid. The results are, on the whole, in line with those who adopt what is called the "earlier" chronology of the Apostle's life. His conversion is dated in 30 or 31. The latter year is chosen by Wellhausen, and it was also Bengel's choice. Indeed, it is curious to notice that Dr Plooiij's dates for the first part of Paul's life agree almost exactly with Bengel's. He makes the first visit to Jerusalem fall in 32 (33), *i.e.* the visit recorded in Acts ix. 26 f., while the second visit, recorded in Acts xi. 30, falls in the winter of 45–46. The next period depends largely upon the inferences drawn from the famous Gallio-inscription, to which Dr Plooiij devotes a succinct section (pp. 27–48); he thinks that the relations between Paul and Gallio must be dated in June or July of 51. This seems rather too definite and precarious a conclusion. However, it enables him to work back and forward, to the Council at Jerusalem in 48—a year earlier than Mr Turner dates it—and to the imprisonment at Cæsarea in 57–59, agreeing here with Belser and Sir William Ramsay against Mr Turner, who makes it 56–58. Paul reached Rome in February, 60.

These dates are calculated upon the basis of a series of exhaustive arguments from the New Testament, from inscriptions, and from authors like Josephus and Eusebius. There is a particularly able (pp. 50–61) discussion of the *Chronicon* of Eusebius. The treatment of the New Testament is more "conservative" than we have been accustomed to expect from Holland; but Dr Plooiij (p. 93, note) repudiates the term "*Holländische Radikal kritik des N.T.*" which his fellow-countryman, Dr Van Eysinga, has employed. He declares that Van Manen has had few followers in his own country, and abjures his methods. In any case, the important thing is scholarship, and this monograph need not fear any criticism of its methods and outfit.

JAMES MOFFATT.

GLASGOW.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE ANTECEDENT PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL.

C. D. BROAD, M.A.

IN the HIBBERT for October 1918 I dealt, to the best of my ability, with the question how far and in what sense human survival is a thing to be desired. I there expressed the opinion that ethical arguments for survival are all in principle vicious; that metaphysical arguments are unlikely to succeed on such a subject; and that empirical investigation by way of psychical research seems the only method left for those who are not prepared to base their beliefs or disbeliefs on the authority of revealed religion or of Professor Ray Lankester.

For psychical research, human survival is one hypothesis among others to account for certain alleged phenomena. In the present paper I do not propose to discuss the evidence for these phenomena or the proper interpretation of them, but to attack a preliminary question. Even if the phenomena be genuine, in the sense that fraud and self-deception have been cut out of the list of possible explanations, there remain other hypotheses to account for them besides survival, *e.g.* telepathy from the living, the agency of non-human spirits, etc. Now, the final probability of an hypothesis always depends on two factors: (*a*) its antecedent probability as compared with that of the alternatives; and (*b*) the completeness with which it accounts for the phenomena as compared with its rivals. By the antecedent probability I mean that which the hypothesis has relative to all known facts that seem to be relevant *other than* the special set of facts which it is put forward to explain. If this be very small for one hypothesis h_1 , and much greater for an alternative h_2 , then, even though h_1 explain the facts better than h_2 , it will generally be more prudent to try to find

some suitable modification of h_2 than to put any great faith in h_1 . It is therefore highly important, before we criticise the alleged facts brought forward by psychical research, to come to some conclusion as to the probability of human survival relative to the remaining propositions which we know or suspect to be true of the world. This is what I propose to do in the present paper.

Any such investigation must necessarily be incomplete and tentative. Though I do not think that such special propositions as the survival of men fall within the range of proof or disproof by metaphysical argument, I can see, of course, that the antecedent probability of human survival will vary greatly with one's metaphysical position. If materialism were strict metaphysical truth, survival, though perhaps abstractly possible, would be to the last degree unlikely. Again, if idealism in one of its forms were strictly true, survival would not indeed necessarily follow, for many eminent idealists, such as Lotze, Mr Bradley, and Professor Bosanquet, hold quite consistently that their systems do not necessitate it, and that it is on the whole improbable. Yet idealism is distinctly more favourable to the probability of survival than is the view of the world taken by common-sense, or by non-philosophical scientists, or by dualistic philosophers. Thus a complete discussion would involve the statement and defence of a metaphysical position, and I have neither the space, the faith, nor the ability to offer anything of the kind.

What I propose to do, therefore, is to consider in turn arguments for and against human survival drawn from the constitution of the world as it appears to common-sense and to natural science. In criticising them I shall necessarily step on metaphysical ground, but I hope that this ground will largely be neutral as between rival metaphysicians. Most competent philosophers are agreed that the views of common-sense and of science cannot be literally true; and the preliminary criticisms of all schools are much alike, however far their later arguments and constructions may diverge.

Ethical arguments, sometimes explicit and more often implicit, play so large a part in moulding the actual beliefs of men on this subject, that I must begin by devoting a few lines to showing why, in my opinion, they are all in principle worthless. It is said (and I agree) that if no one survives the death of his body, the world is exceedingly evil. Moreover, there seems often to be flagrant waste and injustice in the (humanly speaking) accidental death of a good man in the height of his usefulness, and in the prolonged and successful life of a bad and

malicious man. And it is argued from this that men probably do survive. Now, the principle of the argument must be this : The world does not have more than a certain degree of badness ; if there be no survival, this degree of badness will be surpassed ; therefore there must be survival.

Now, if the first premise be based inductively on observation, the argument obviously cuts its own throat. Our inductive data are the facts of life as known up to the present. These include, by hypothesis, a great deal of apparent evil and injustice. Either you take this at its face value in making your inductive argument about the universe as a whole, or you do not. If you do, no process of inductive argument will enable you to conclude that the universe as a whole is likely to contain a less proportion of evil than the part which forms the sole basis of your argument. Hence you cannot return after your argument and call in the goodness of the whole to redress the apparent badness of the part. If, on the other hand, you *start* by treating the evil and injustice which are observable as perhaps only apparent, then you may indeed conclude that the universe as a whole is likely to be better than the part appears to be. But it is circular to use this conclusion to strengthen the belief that the evil of the part is only apparent, for you have only proved the superior goodness of the whole by playing fast and loose with your data. You might just as well have started by treating the virtue and happiness which are observable as perhaps only apparent.

If, again, the goodness of the world be asserted on *a priori* or general grounds, the argument meets with an equally fatal difficulty. There certainly is *some* evil, and therefore the goodness of the whole must somehow be compatible with it. But in that case it seems impossible to lay down any principle by which you can assert that some evils (*e.g.* the annihilation of human spirits) are too great to be compatible with the goodness of the world, whilst others (such as toothache) which certainly exist are compatible with it. No doubt there must be a line drawn somewhere, but I fail to see that we can have the least idea where.

Lastly, it is sometimes argued that the universe has produced people capable of virtue and justice. It therefore cannot be wholly indifferent to right and wrong, and hence there is a probability that it will not be so unjust as to let us perish. This argument is of the form that "who drives fat oxen must himself be fat." No doubt, since there are virtuous people, the nature of the universe must be compatible with the (at least temporary) existence of such people. But we have no

guarantee that what produces virtuous (and, I may add, vicious) people will behave towards them as a virtuous person would.

Ethical arguments may therefore simply be dismissed as irrelevant wherever they occur, and we may pass on to factual arguments used by common-sense and natural science, discarding them at once when they contain an ethical premise.

Now, on the face of it, the most striking feature of the world as known to common-sense is, for our purpose, that it does not present the smallest trace of evidence in favour of survival. Continued action is a necessary, though not a sufficient, criterion of the continued existence of any substance; and this is conspicuously lacking after death. The body ceases to give the characteristic responses at death, and soon it decays and loses even its characteristic shape and appearance. Hence the only evidence that we ever had for the existence of a man's mind has ceased abruptly, and, apart from the alleged facts investigated by psychical research, has ceased for ever so far as our experience goes. We do indeed often believe in the continued existence of substances in spite of long periods during which neither we nor anyone else are aware of them by any of their usual signs. *E.g.*, we believe that silver continues to exist though it be dissolved in nitric acid and kept for years as silver nitrate. But in such cases we believe that at any moment we could restore a substance having the properties of the silver which we dissolved, and connected with it by identity of mass and continuity of spatial positions. Every such factor making for a belief in continued existence is lacking in our ordinary experience of dead men, and thus such a belief seems to have nothing whatever in its favour, and to be, from a logical point of view, a bare unmotivated possibility.

Yet, of course, as a matter of history, this has seldom seriously militated against a belief in survival. Such a belief has been all but universal. Now, on the one hand, the mere universality of a belief is no proof of its truth. On the other, the fact that a belief has been widely held by ignorant and primitive men is not a proof of its falsehood. Confronted, then, by a strong belief which seems to have arisen and survived in spite of complete absence of evidence in its favour, we must consider what factors may have caused the belief, and whether any of them are *reasons* as well as *causes*.

A primitive man would certainly not accept the statement that there is practically no evidence to be found in ordinary experience for survival. He would know of dozens of cases of men seen and heard after their death, and he might even

think that he had met with such cases in his own experience. Now, without prejudice to the genuineness of abnormal phenomena in general or to the possibility that savages occasionally experience them, we may be quite certain that in most cases the primitive man is mistaken in thinking that there is any need to assume the continued existence of the dead to explain the phenomena which he regards as evidence for survival. We may divide such phenomena into two classes. The first consists of those which are capable of a perfectly normal explanation ; the second, of those which are now dealt with by psychical research. There is no reason to think that the latter will be more numerous or striking among savages than among civilised men. The first group provides no evidence at all for survival, since the facts have simply been misinterpreted. The second, supposing it to exist, furnishes no evidence *antecedent* to psychical research, since, by hypothesis, it consists of precisely those phenomena which form the subject-matter of that science. Hence the primitive man simply had more *causes* but no better *reasons* for a belief in survival than we have ; but a belief irrationally caused in him may have survived in us.

No doubt experiences of fainting and sleeping helped the belief in survival. In these conditions the mind gives no external manifestation of its existence, and the body in many ways resembles a corpse. Yet consciousness returns, and, in the case of dreams, we can remember that it was not really absent whilst our bodies were giving no outward signs of its existence. What more natural, then, than to suppose that at these times the mind leaves the body and follows its own adventures, and that at death it leaves it for good ? But the differences between sleep and death make it impossible to count this undoubted cause of a belief in survival as a valid reason in its favour. If, after dissolving a piece of silver on several occasions in nitric acid and getting it back again, we one day dissolved it in something else and found that nothing we could do would bring back anything with the properties of silver, surely the inference would be obvious. It was reasonable to think that the silver survived the nitric acid treatment because it could be restored ; it would not be reasonable to conclude from this that it survived the treatment after which nothing like it can be again obtained. If we chose to assume that it still exists, our assumption is an unmotivated possibility. So that once more we have a cause of belief which is not a reason for belief.

Probably neither of the above-mentioned causes would

have sufficed by itself to produce an almost universal belief in survival. Both are to be regarded rather as interpretations of real or supposed facts in terms of this belief than as the original causes of it. The truth is that we have the greatest difficulty in actually envisaging the cessation of our own conscious life. It is easy enough to think of anyone else as having really ceased to exist; it is almost impossible to give more than a cold intellectual assent to the same proposition about oneself. In making a will, *e.g.*, containing elaborate provisions for what is to happen to one's property after one's death, it is almost impossible—unless my own experience be wholly exceptional—not to think of oneself as going to be conscious and able to oversee the working of one's bequests. I at least can continually catch myself in this attitude, and I should imagine it to be quite common even among people who are intellectually persuaded of their future extinction.

Ought we to attach any weight to this instinctive belief which nearly everyone has in his own survival? The mere fact that it is believed without reasons is no conclusive objection against it, since, unless *some* propositions can be known to be true without reasons, *no* proposition can be known to be true for reasons. We must therefore consider the belief without prejudice on its merits. Now, it seems perfectly clear that it is not a self-evident proposition like an axiom, which becomes more certain the more carefully we inspect it. Nor can it be regarded as a postulate, *i.e.* a proposition which, though not self-evident and incapable either of proof or disproof by experience, has to be assumed in order to organise experience and furnish a motive for research. The Uniformity of Nature (in the sense that all conjunctions of attributes are instances of *some* general law) seems to me to be a postulate in this sense; the proposition that John Jones will survive the death of his body seems to be nothing of the kind. In fact, the belief seems to me to represent nothing more profound than an easily explicable limit, to our powers of imagination. Naturally, all my experience of myself has been of myself as active and conscious. There have indeed been gaps during dreamless sleep or fainting fits, but consciousness has revived and the gaps have been bridged by memory. Again, at every moment I have been obliged for practical purposes to think of myself as going to exist at later moments; it is therefore a breach with the mental habits of a lifetime to envisage a moment after which the series of my conscious states shall finally have ended. Such a practical difficulty due to habit seems the sole

and sufficient explanation of our instinctive belief in our own indefinite continuance ; and it obviously provides no evidence in favour of the truth of the belief.

I think, therefore, that we must conclude that a mere contemplation of the world as it appears to common-sense furnishes no trace of evidence in favour of survival. Ought we to hold that the absence of all evidence *for* constitutes evidence *against* ? This is a somewhat delicate question. Sometimes the absence of evidence for a proposition makes strongly against it, sometimes it does not. If I look carefully round a room, and, seeing no one, say, "There is no one in the room," my evidence is purely negative, but is almost conclusive against the proposition, "There is someone in the room." But the fact that I did not see a tuberculosis bacillus in a room would make hardly at all against the probability of there being one there. Finding no evidence for a proposition is only evidence against it if the proposition be such that if it were true there ought to be some observable evidence for it.

Now the proposition, "Some men survive the death of their bodies," is not precisely in the position of either of the two quoted above. I know enough about human bodies and about tuberculosis bacilli to be sure that one of the former could hardly be present in a room without my finding it, but that one of the latter could not be seen even if it were present. I know very much less about the conditions under which one human spirit can make its presence known to others ; but I do know something about it. I am a human spirit connected with a body, and all other spirits of whose existence I am certain are in the same position. Setting aside the phenomena treated by psychical research, I know that one such spirit can only make its presence known to another by first moving its own body, thence agitating the air or ether, and thence affecting another human body. My friend dies ; I remain alive and connected with my body. Communication with me, therefore, still presumably needs the same complex and roundabout series of material changes as before. Its very complexity and indirectness make it probable that, even if my friend has survived, some necessary link in this mechanism will have broken down. Hence the absence of evidence for his survival cannot logically be regarded as strong evidence against it.

The present position, therefore, is that at the level of the world as it appears to educated common-sense there is not the faintest trace of evidence for survival, though there is a pretty general belief in it. The causes of this belief can be discovered and seen not to be reasons. But the absence of evidence for

survival cannot be taken as strong evidence against it in view of what we know as to the means by which embodied human spirits have to communicate with each other.

Is there at this level any *positive* evidence against survival? I think that there are two sets of facts which impress common-sense and are interpreted as bearing in this direction. One is the apparently haphazard way in which men are born and die. Human beings are constantly brought into the world thoughtlessly and by mistake; many children exist for a few minutes or hours and then die; many are born idiotic. The general impression produced is that the claim to permanence of creatures whose earthly lives begin and end in these trivial ways is somewhat ridiculous. An unwanted child is produced, let us say, in a drunken orgy, and in six weeks dies of neglect or is killed by its mother. Does it seem likely that a being whose earthly career can be started and stopped by such causes is a permanent and indestructible factor in the universe, or indeed that it survives the death of its body at all?

The second fact that seems to bear in the same direction is the continuity between men and animals. The bodies of both begin and cease to be endowed with minds through precisely similar physical and physiological causes. No doubt the mind of any living man differs not merely quantitatively but also qualitatively from that of any living animal; still, the most primitive men can hardly have differed appreciably from the highest animals in their mental endowments. Did *Pithecanthropus erectus* and does every Australian aborigine survive the death of his body? If they do, have not the higher animals an almost equal claim? and, if you grant this for cats and monkeys, will you not be forced in the end to grant it for lice and earwigs? If, on the other hand, you deny that any animal survives, on the ground that their minds are not complex or important enough to be permanent factors in the universe, how can you be sure that any man yet born has possessed a mind of the necessary degree of importance and complexity for survival?

The two facts just quoted do, I am sure, exert a considerable influence against the view that men survive bodily death. I think that they influence me personally more than any others. But the question remains: Have they any logical claim to exert this influence?

The first argument, I am inclined to think, is wholly fallacious. It really involves the illegitimate introduction of a judgment of value into a question of fact. And the judgment of value is itself a rather superficial one. It is thought that,

because the causes of birth and death are often trivial, therefore what seems to begin with birth and end with death cannot be important enough to survive. But (a) you cannot argue from the triviality of a cause to the impermanence of its effect. (b) The cause is only trivial in the irrelevant ethical sense that it does not involve a considered and deliberate choice by a virtuous human being. There is really no logical transition from : x is caused by the careless or criminal action of a human being to : x is the sort of thing whose existence is transitory. (c) When we say that the cause is trivial we commit the usual mistake of taking for *the* cause some factor that happens to be of special practical interest to us. The complete cause of the birth of a child or the death of a man must be of almost unthinkable complexity, whether the child be born or the man killed carelessly or with deliberate forethought. This is true even if we confine ourselves to the material conditions; and we are not really in a position to say that the *complete* conditions of so singular an event as the manifestation of a new mind through a new body are contained in the material world.

The second argument is of course of the classical type which tries to show by continuity of cases that if a man asserts one proposition he ought in consistency to assert another which he would like to deny. Such an argument might be met in one of two ways. We might boldly admit that the minds of lice or of earwigs are just as likely to survive as those of men, or we might try to show that there are relevant differences between the two which make it more reasonable to expect that a man will survive than that an earwig will do so.

The *mere* fact that a man's mind is much more valuable than an earwig's, and therefore worthier to be a permanent factor in the universe, must be regarded as irrelevant; for there is, so far as I can see, no direct connection between value and permanence. No doubt, what is very transitory is not likely to be very valuable, but it does not follow that of two things the more valuable must be the more persistent.

But of course the differences between the minds of men and those of lower animals are never *mere* differences of value. The two sorts of minds only differ in value because they differ in comprehensiveness, unity, and complexity, and because valuable elements are present in one which are absent in the other. Now, it is at least arguable that the superior complexity and unity of a man's mind give it a better chance of survival than an earwig's. Still, I hardly think that the general course of nature suggests any straightforward connection between

unity and complexity on the one hand, and stability on the other. Both the very simple and the highly comprehensive seem to have a fair chance of stability for different reasons. The very simple (like the atom) is stable because of its comparative indifference to changes in external conditions. The highly unified and comprehensive complex (such as the solar system) is stable because it contains so much within itself that there is little left over to disturb it.

Now, this rule does not on the whole favour the survival of men rather than that of earwigs. If we take the *complete* conditions of mind to be material, then of course men and earwigs are in precisely the same position. The minds of both will be uniquely dependent on conditions which lie wholly outside them, and the superior comprehensiveness of the human *mind* counts for nothing, since we know that the human *brain* decays. If, on the other hand, we suppose that consciousness depends upon further and, to us, unknown conditions, our complete ignorance of these precludes us from arguing about them. It would, after all, be quite in accordance with what we know of the order of nature that the earwig's mind should gain more stability from its simplicity than the man's mind gains from its comprehensiveness. The earwig may gain more on the swings than it loses on the roundabouts. There therefore seems to me very little reason to think that earwigs are *especially* unlikely to survive; and I should therefore not consider that, if the survival of men involves that of earwigs, this would make much against the probability of human survival.

I think that people often deceive themselves in arguing from complexity and unity to superior probability of survival by making a confusion between persistence and personal identity. I should agree that, *if* both men and earwigs survive, there is much more likelihood of continued personal identity for the man than for the earwig. But then survival and personal identity are not the same. The latter involves the former, but the converse does not hold. It seems to me quite possible that two series of states of consciousness might have such causal and other connections and such continuity between them that an external observer would be justified in counting the second as a continuation of the first and in speaking of survival. And yet the two series might not be so related that there was any personal identity between them. So my view would be that the differences between human and animal minds do not make it more likely that one shall survive than the other; but they do make it more probable that, *if* both

survive, there will be personal identity with the former than with the latter.

There is also, doubtless, another cause which makes people think that the survival of men is more likely than that of the lower animals. The characteristic mental activities of men seem to be much less closely associated with their bodies than those which they share with animals. To the eye of common-sense, at least—however much this view may need to be modified by the more accurate researches of science,—reasoning and deliberate choice are much less obviously dependent on bodily changes than sensation and reflex action. Hence it seems quite consistent to hold that a mind capable of reason and deliberate choice may survive the death of its body, whilst one which consists of nothing but feeling and impulse will not. Moreover, these characteristically human activities are not specially directed towards the preservation of the body or the production of changes in the material world. Now, if we judge living beings teleologically—and in practice it is hard not to do this—it does seem that an animal accomplishes its whole end and object in maintaining its body and reproducing its species. The characteristically human activities do not seem to be “meant for” such purposes alone. Thus, from a teleological point of view, it does seem that no purpose would be served by the individual survival of an earwig which dies at a reasonable age after bringing up a family; whilst, on the other hand, you can never say that when a man dies he has accomplished all that any man is “good for,” and could merely repeat himself indefinitely by survival.

It is exceedingly difficult to say how much weight ought to be given to arguments of this kind; but I do not think it is safe to neglect them altogether. The principle of judging living beings and their parts in terms of a supposed “purpose for which they were made” is undoubtedly valuable as an heuristic method; and it hardly seems possible to suppose that what constantly works can be wholly out of relation to the truth.

Lastly, some people no doubt shrink from admitting the possibility of survival to lower animals out of horror at the immense number of minds which there would be if none, even of the lowest kind, when once started is ever destroyed. This shrinking from mere numerical vastness seems childish. We have no reason to suppose that the world is conducted in accordance with the Law of Parsimony, and the universe may quite well exhibit a prodigality in the item of minds which would horrify the inhabitants of Aberdeen.

To sum up. In the main the proper and sufficient answer to the argument from continuity is that it only makes against human survival if we regard the survival of low kinds of minds as *specially* improbable. Now, there has not appeared to be any strong reason for thinking the *survival* (as distinct from the *personal identity*) of lower minds less probable than that of higher ones. And so the argument from continuity fails to produce a positive reason against human survival. It is true that when minds are regarded from the teleological point of view, which may have some validity, it does seem slightly more probable that human beings should survive than animals. But, just in so far as this argument applies, the alleged continuity between human and animal minds is weakened. If any stress is to be laid on these teleological considerations, we ought, I think, in consistency to hold that the survival of one man is more probable than that of another, since some men resemble the lower animals in their tastes and capacities much more than do others.

The world, then, as it appears to common-sense, offers no reasons for and no positive reason against human survival. The only reason against is the utter absence of all reasons for, and this we have seen is not in the present case a very strong argument. Let us therefore inquire whether the more accurate and detailed investigations of science provide us with any grounds for deciding in one way or the other.

Science on the whole does not reverse but merely amplifies and elaborates the views of common-sense on the connection of mind and body. We already knew that mind and body are intimately connected, and that disease or injury in the latter may gravely modify or to all appearance destroy the former. All the additional information gained from science may be summed up under the following three heads:—(i) More detailed knowledge has been got of the correlation between injuries to particular parts of the brain and defects in particular departments of mental life. Connected with this is the knowledge that many mental processes which seem to common-sense almost independent of the body have bodily correlates. (ii) We have gained the surprising information that, in spite of the apparent interaction of mind and body, the body and its material surroundings form a closed energetic system from the point of view of the Conservation of Energy. (iii) We know more about the detailed structure and general plan of the brain and nervous system.

Now, what bearing has all this on the probability of human survival? We find bodies without minds; we never find

minds without bodies. When we do find minds we always find a close correlation between their processes and changes and those of their bodies. This, it is argued, strongly suggests that minds depend for their *existence* on their bodies; in which case, though survival might still be abstractly possible, it is to the last degree unlikely. At death there takes place *completely* a process of bodily destruction which, when it occurs *partially* during life through accident or disease, carries with it the destruction of *part* of our mental life. The inference seems only too obvious.

An attempt is often made to meet this argument on the following lines. We can draw a distinction between the existence of a mind and the manifestation of that existence to other minds. It might be argued that it is only the latter which depends on bodily conditions. When our brains are injured we cannot inform other people through our bodies of what is going on in certain departments of our minds. They interpret this as meaning that nothing is going on there, whereas really it is only the means of communication that have broken down.

I do not think that this view can possibly be the whole truth. In the first place, people often recover from injuries and illnesses, and can then tell us what was going on in their minds when they were ill. Now, sometimes they do tell us that their minds were working much as before, but that they were unable to communicate (*e.g.* in cases of aphasia, aboulia, etc.). But often they find introspectively that the period is practically a blank even to themselves. I do not see that we have the right to fly in the face of this distinction drawn by patients themselves on the ground of their own introspection. If we insist on doing so, we must hold that, when a man says that a certain part of his life was a complete blank, either he has lost part of his memory or he is only able to communicate what he knows to be false on the subject. The latter would surely be an absurd conclusion to draw; the former gives up the case altogether, for, if an accident really has destroyed a man's power of remembering certain incidents of his life, it has *not* merely injured his power of communicating with others, but has injured the actual working of his mind.

Again, it is only too common for a wound in the head radically to alter a man's character, to all appearance. Suppose, *e.g.*, that a cheerful and amiable man after such an accident exhibits for the rest of his life moroseness enlivened with fits of homicidal mania on the most trivial occasions. A person who holds that bodily accidents only affect the means by which one

mind communicates with another, and not the mind itself, will have to say that this patient is really still brimming over with benevolent sentiments, but that unfortunately they can only express themselves by frowns and peevish complaints, and by occasionally attacking people with carving-knives. The converse would presumably also hold, and, for all we know, persons who appear to be lifelong philanthropists may in themselves be boiling with malice which some kink in their brains prevents them from expressing by word or action. A theory which has to go to these lengths may surely be rejected.

I think, however, that it is possible to put forward a view which avoids these extravagances and has a good deal in its favour. I suggest that what we call a mind always depends upon a system involving two sets of factors neither of which alone can be called a mind. One set is bodily and consists of the brain and nervous system. This by itself is obviously not a mind. The other set I will simply call "immaterial conditions." I suggest that these, too, by themselves have no right to be called a mind. A mind is the joint product of these two sets of conditions, the bodily C and the immaterial γ ; it ceases for the time to exist if either be destroyed or if they cease to stand in the right mutual relations. The mind is thus partly dependent, not merely for its power of manifesting itself, but for its actual states and character, on the bodily conditions C . But it does not follow that the factor γ is destroyed when C breaks up. Certainly, on this view, when C breaks up, the particular mind $M = \phi(C, \gamma)$ ceases to exist. It remains possible, however, that γ continues to exist. Now, γ by itself is not a mind any more than C by itself. But if γ persists, it is possible that in the course of its history it may enter into the right relations with a material system C' (which of course might or might not consist of matter of the familiar kind). A new mind $M' = \phi(C', \gamma)$ would thus be formed.¹

Now, the question whether two substances are to be regarded as identical or different is always largely a matter of definition. The minds $\phi(C, \gamma)$ and $\phi(C', \gamma)$ will have a factor in common; and if certain relations hold between the two, we could regard the second as a continuation of the first. In that case we should probably express the facts by saying that the mind had "gone into cold storage" for a time and had then emerged. But the real truth would be that the immaterial factor γ (which we have no reason to regard as

¹ C and γ might be compared to two chemical elements, say silver and chlorine, and M to a chemical compound like silver chloride. The latter depends on the former, but has utterly different properties from either of them.

being itself a mind) had persisted after the destruction of $\phi(C, \gamma)$ and pursued its own adventures till it entered into the combination $\phi(C', \gamma)$, which is a mind with certain cognitive and other relations to $\phi(C, \gamma)$.

Such a theory has several advantages. It does not make the mind a mere epiphenomenon of the brain, yet it allows of as much dependence of mind on brain as science may be able to find. On the other hand, it avoids the difficulty of making the mind a mere user of the body, unaffected in itself by what happens to the latter, and like a pilot in a ship. Most careful thinkers have found it necessary to reject this analogy; the facts make it clear that the union of mind and body is more intimate than this.

But it might well be asked: Is there any positive evidence for such a theory? The only conditions that we know are the material ones; we admit that nothing can be said with confidence about the supposed immaterial conditions: are they not, then, a mere superfluity? I do not think so. There can be no doubt whatever that mind differs from brain, and that states of mind such as my belief that $2 \times 2 = 4$, or my desire for my tea, differ both in themselves and in their mutual relations from states of brain, however closely the two may be connected. My states of mind in their mutual relations form a substantial unity whose terms and relations are of a perfectly unique kind.

Scientists often overlook this fact because, when they talk of states of mind, they are thinking mainly of sense-data, which they confuse with sensations and regard as states of mind. Obviously these *do* have many of the characteristic qualities and relations of matter. But even if they—as distinct from our awareness of them—be states of mind at all (which is highly doubtful), they are certainly only a small and rather trivial sub-class of mental states. One thing, *e.g.*, which physiologists have to accept is the existence of our beliefs about physiology. These are certainly not a mass of sense-data. Our knowledge of physiology consists of a set of beliefs standing in *logical* relations such as *material* objects and their states cannot possess. Again, consider the subject-matter of physiology. The theory is stated in terms of matter, not of sensations or sense-data. Therefore, if the beliefs which constitute the science of physiology be *true*, the physiologist must stand in cognitive relations to objects which are not mind-dependent. Hence the result of the action of the brain must often be to produce, not a special kind of *objects* (*viz.* sense-data), which are rather like matter, but to establish a special kind of *relation*

(that of cognition) between minds and material objects, which bears not the faintest resemblance to the relations that hold between two pieces of matter.

Now, on the face of it, minds begin at certain dates and grow as the material system develops. Hence anyone who holds that minds are *wholly* due to the material system must hold that certain portions of matter are capable, not merely of affecting other bits of matter, not merely of causing changes in already existing minds, but of actually creating substances of a perfectly new and unique kind. He assumes not merely causation but creation, and he ascribes creation to matter. Now, this does not seem plausible; and anyone who thinks that, in making such an assumption, he is merely applying in a new field the already familiar notion of causation, simply deceives himself. For this reason I think the assumption that some entirely different factor co-operates with matter in the initiation and development of mind is far from being a mere superfluity. If you say that it seems a queer assumption, the appropriate retort is that it has at least the merit of forcing us to remember the extreme "queerness" of the whole situation which we slur over by talking of mind being "caused by" matter, as if the production of a new substance bore any analogy to the familiar causation of one state in a substance by another.

My reason for supposing an additional factor beside matter is thus obvious. My reason for calling it "immaterial" is that, if it were merely more of the same kind as matter, it would not help us. My reason for refusing to call it mind is (*a*) that I do not know enough about it to know whether it resembles the only minds we know in any important respects; and (*b*) that it certainly cannot be identified with the mind of a given man, since that undoubtedly depends partly, even in its most intimate traits, on his brain and nervous system as well as on this immaterial factor.

Naturally, such an hypothesis could not be proved by experiment. To do so it would be necessary to find the people whose brains and material conditions were exactly alike. If their states of mind were different, we could be sure that there must be some other factor beside their brains conditioning their minds. But of course the conditions of such an experiment cannot be fulfilled. Nevertheless, the hypothesis fits in fairly well with certain supposed facts.

E.g., some alienists draw a distinction between mentally and physically caused nervous diseases. I am told that the brain of an epileptic often presents on dissection no observable

differences from that of a normal man. Now, of course, the most probable explanation is simply that there are relevant differences, but that they are too minute or obscure to be noted. But the other possibility does remain that the real difference is in the γ factors of the normal man and the epileptic.

Again, let us suppose that Sally Beauchamp really was, as she claimed to be, co-conscious with B_1 . This would be neatly explained by supposing that the Beauchamp brain co-operated at the same time with two different γ factors, and that Sally was $\phi(C, \gamma)$ and B_1 was $\phi(C, \gamma')$. The different characters of the two personalities combined with the practical identity of their knowledge would thus be explained, since the limitation of the mind to a certain set of objects must mainly depend on the C factor which is common to both.

Let us finally see where we stand. The position is this: At first sight the more accurate information which science gives us on the relation of body and mind seemed to furnish a positive ground against survival by showing that the mind is *completely* dependent on the body even when it seems to common-sense to be relatively independent. But when we came to look carefully we saw that things are not so simple. We had, indeed, to admit that the actual states and traits of any known mind (and not merely its external manifestations) are correlated to the highest degree with states of brain. But we saw reason to think that these are probably never the *complete* conditions of the existence or states of any mind. An immaterial factor seemed to be also needed and to fit in with the facts. (This is liable to escape notice (*a*) because scientists do not clearly distinguish their minds from their brains, and (*b*) because the familiarity of the word "causation" enables it to cover a multitude of sins.) This factor, however, cannot be identified with any mind that we know, and may perfectly well not be of the nature of mind at all. And of course it *may* itself cease to exist when the brain decays.

But, on the other hand, the breaking up of the material part of a complex system is no proof or strong presumption of the coincident cessation of its immaterial part. It may be mere nonsense to speak of γ 's breaking up or ceasing either by "elanguescence" (to quote Kant) or suddenly "with a pop" (to quote the alternative of a less famous thinker). Hence it remains possible that γ factors persist. Nor need we assume that they remain unaffected by their temporary association with C's, or that when separated from one C they merely vegetate till (if ever) they become connected with another C to form another mind. It may be that γ 's pursue their own adventures

and interact with each other in all kinds of ways during their separation from C's. Hence that γ which has, in conjunction with a certain C, constituted the mind of John Smith may (a) retain many traces from what happened to the joint system; and (b) may some day, according to laws unknown to us, enter into such relations with another material system C' as to constitute another mind. The identity of the γ factor and the traces that it has kept from the $\phi(C, \gamma)$ combination may be sufficient to provide for memory and other marks of personal identity between $\phi(C', \gamma)$ and $\phi(C, \gamma)$. In that event we shall have the right to say, not merely that John Smith's γ factor has persisted, but also that John Smith has survived.

I should therefore be inclined to say that, although the results of science do not give us the slightest positive reason for believing in survival, yet they do not offer any positive reason against it. For the scientific view either involves the sheer miracle of the creation of a new kind of substance by matter alone, or it has to be supplemented by a hypothesis which makes survival perfectly possible.

So, in the long run, neither science nor common-sense has anything to tell us that is logically relevant either for or against the probability of survival. What does emerge is that—granting the hypothesis about γ factors—survival, in the sense in which it is of practical interest, involves the simultaneous truth of three propositions, any one of which may fail: (a) that γ factors persist; (b) that they afterwards meet with suitable C factors; and (c) that the mind produced by this second conjunction shall have personal identity with that produced by the former conjunction.

All detailed conjectures about such an obscure subject are rather unprofitable. But we may at least hazard the guess that, so far as we can see, it is only with a few men and under exceptionally favourable circumstances that all these conditions are likely to be fulfilled.

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ISAAC TAYLOR'S "PHYSICAL THEORY OF ANOTHER LIFE."

MISS MARKER.

ISAAC TAYLOR was born in 1787 at Lavenham in Suffolk, and became known as an artist, author, and inventor. He wrote for the *Eclectic Review*, of which he became a member of the staff, and published several books that made their mark at the time but have now fallen into neglect. Most of his life was spent at Stanford Rivers, near Ongar, in Essex, where he died in 1865. One of the best known of his works was *A Physical Theory of Another Life*, published in 1836—a book which contains so much that is helpful to present-day readers, that the following extracts have been put together in the hope of making it known to a wider public. The extracts are not given quite in the sequence in which they come in the book, and they lose much in being separated from the context and from the more complete development and elaboration of the ideas presented; but it is hoped that enough has been given to form a clear idea of his theory and of the line of argument, which it is possible for everyone to adopt and to work out for himself.

The theory that Isaac Taylor puts before his readers is, that by careful study of the conditions of this present life the germ of the future life that is to develop from it can be discovered; that from the instincts of which we are conscious in our earthly natures we can glean a forecast of the powers that will be ours in the future; and from the limitations that we suffer from and chafe against we can derive an insight into the conditions of the world that will provide the next stage of our existence. All through the book his aim is "to bring our religious conceptions into definite alliance with the real world and with nature, and to break up a little those vague and powerless notions which place our religious

expectations at a dim remoteness from whatever is substantial and effective"; and, as he further says, "Let us try to persuade ourselves that the future and unseen world with all its momentous transactions is as simply natural and true as is this homely world of land and water, trees and houses, with which we have now to do."

It may be the message for this age, and more especially for this time of crisis, that further revelation is to come to humanity through the material world, and through channels that up to now have been overlooked. At the present time there is a strong feeling of expectation that more light will be thrown on divine truths, and that some definite revelation will be manifest in the near future. There is at the same time a strong feeling of dissatisfaction with the present state of the Churches—a feeling that they have not moved with the times, and that their ministrations and teachings are inadequate to the needs of the present age. The clergy are conscious of this themselves, and of the fact that, in spite of their heroic attempts to organise missions of repentance and hope, and by repeated exhortations and days of intercession to bring fire and enthusiasm into the religious spirit of the people, the result has been failure, and apathy and indifference are still prevailing where religion is concerned. It is a fact that they are thoroughly out of touch with the greater portion of the civilised world, and they are aware of it. And yet never has there been a time when the need for a vital faith has been greater, when human souls have been through such a furnace of suffering, both physical and mental, when emotions of all kinds have been so acute, or when conduct has risen to such heights of heroism and sacrifice. During the last four years deeds and examples of courage, of superhuman endurance, and of all the finest and most Christ-like qualities have become almost commonplace. They have been multiplied again and again, so that what would in former times have roused the whole civilised world to admiration, and resounded through the ages, is now accepted as the natural order of things, and the mind has become almost sated by the recital of them. And yet the men who have done these things have had no apparent ardent motive, no religious enthusiasm, to spur them on to superhuman efforts and achievements. One can only conclude that subconsciously they possess these truths, and that at times of special strain or peril the earthly nature drops away and the divine stands revealed, and we wonder at the superhuman powers that are unexpectedly displayed.

In the preface to the third edition of the book Taylor expresses the hope “that no reader will so far misunderstand his intention, as to suppose that a train of thought professedly theoretic or hypothetical, and on a subject connected with which we have no direct information beyond what the Scriptures incidentally convey, is to be allowed to interfere with, or to supersede any article of our religious belief. . . . He hopes and believes that the following pages do not contain a single sentence which, fairly interpreted, can lay him open to blame on this ground.”

An introduction to the subject, and explanation of it, is best given in the author’s own words. He says: “We may easily imagine the knowledge of a future life to have been conveyed to us through some other channel than that of the Christian Writings. In that case we should have felt to have been in no danger of culpable presumption while seeking further information, concerning the destiny of the human family, in any mode which might have come within our reach; and if the means of our obtaining this further knowledge had been natural and ordinary, we should without scruple have prosecuted our enquiries in the very spirit, and with all the freedom, that belong to other physical researches.”

“If it be true that human nature, in its present form, is only the rudiment of a more extended and desirable mode of existence, we can hardly do otherwise than assume that the future being must so lie involved in our present constitution as to be discernible therein; and that a careful examination of this structure, both bodily and mental, with a view to the supposed reconstruction of the whole, will furnish some means of conjecturing what that future life will be, at least as to its principal elements.”

The condition of corporeity, as Isaac Taylor calls it, he describes as the blending of mind and matter, in which each is dependent on the other. “The body is to the mind the means of a mode of existence, and the organ of an exertion of powers which, in its incorporeal state, it could never have known and exercised.”

The mind may have the power, under future conditions, of so disposing of material elements as to fashion for itself a body absolutely in accordance with its needs, imprint with its own individuality to an even greater extent than this present animal body, and so entirely under its control that disease in any shape or form will be an impossibility. In the present life the mind is in a greater measure overpowered by the animal body, which usurps the principal part, but in a future state the

body may be the slave of the mind, so entirely subservient to it as to carry out its behests without making its presence felt, in the same way as the limbs now obey the brain without any conscious effort being required.

“In approaching the hypothetical part of our subject, I must remind the reader of the important distinction between the mere creatures of the imagination, and the legitimate results of analysis and abstraction. Plainly it is not the imagination that can render us aid in conceiving of a new and different mode of existence; since this faculty is but the mirror of the world around us, and must draw all its materials from things actually known. It may exalt, refine, ennoble, enrich what it finds, and it may shed over all the splendour of an effulgence such as earth never actually sees; yet it must end where it began, in compounding elements and in re-combining forms, furnished to its hand; and if ever it goes, or seems to go, beyond these limits, the product is grotesque or absurd, not beautiful. . . . But the faculty of analysis may boldly and safely outstep the imagination; and it may, by a careful examination of the constituents of human nature, considered in their abstract value, be able, in accordance with sound principles of analogy, to point out other modes of construction, such as, while they imply only small actual changes of form, involve high prerogatives. In some of these instances it may not be difficult to assign a reason why such prerogatives should not have been granted to man, in his present condition; and yet it may be equally easy to show that they are abstractedly possible, and that they are compatible one with another, and that they comport with the probable purposes of a higher range of intellectual and moral life.

“And be it always remembered that, although hypothesis is not truth—or we should rather say, is not truth ascertained,—yet when legitimately used, it is the most ready and effective of all the means in our power for acquiring truth. It is by hypothesis, framed with at once a bold and cautious sagacity, that the boundaries of science are extended; and it is in the use of this method that facts and principles which once seemed to be placed far beyond the reach of human intelligence, have at length been brought to form a part of our well-established modern philosophy. . . .

“Nothing can be more absurd than the supposition that any efforts of the mind, how strenuous soever, can enable it to conceive, even in the faintest manner, of a mode of existence essentially and totally unlike our actual mode of life; for this we are to imagine ourselves to be endowed with a real creative

faculty. But the task we now undertake, although arduous, is altogether of another sort; inasmuch as it is proposed to specify the conditions of a mode of existence, differing from the present *as little as may be*, and yet in a manner that shall secure the highest advantages. On a line of conjecture like this, sobriety may be mistress of our course, nor need we set a single step, without a sufficient reason for the direction we take. That the principle of analogy will hold good, in connecting the present with the future constitution of human nature, is a persuasion which, while the material universe is before us, it is scarcely possible to resist; and that such an analogy will actually run on from the present to the future, the language of Scripture plainly implies. But if so, then it cannot be thought a hopeless task to trace the rudiments, at least of the future, amid the elements of the present life. Our part then is to examine, in succession, the several constituents of our corporeal existence, and to consider of what extensions each faculty may be susceptible, or how it might be set at large from the limitations that actually confine it.”

It would not be possible within the limits of this article to follow all Isaac Taylor’s conjectures and arguments, but some extracts showing his deductions, and the method by which he arrived at them, have been selected.

“Our conviction of the reality of things future, or unseen, has suddenly become more impressive, merely in consequence of our having seen reason to think of them as *natural*, or as proper parts of the established scheme of the universe, instead of miraculous interruptions of that scheme. . . .

‘With the daily and hourly miracles (so to call them) of the vegetable and animal world before our eyes; with creations renovations, transitions, and transmigrations innumerable, going on, while yet individuality and identity are preserved, nothing ought to be thought incredible or even unlikely, concerning the destiny of man, which comports with these common wonders, and which in itself is only an analogous transformation. . . . Everything belonging to human nature is mysterious; or rather, bespeaks the existence of powers and instincts *undeveloped*, and which, though they just indicate their presence, do not reach their apparent end in the present state.

“It is true indeed that many species of animals fulfil (so far as we know) the law of their existence, and reach their highest excellence, under one form of life; and then die, as they were born, with no other difference than what belongs to the changes involved in growth and decay. But then none of these species offer, in their organization, any indication of

incompleteness, or show the latent types of an expected metamorphosis; whereas, in every case where a transition from one mode of life to another is to take place, the germs of the future being are wrapped up in the organization of the present being; and in every such instance a well-practised naturalist, in examining it (supposing it to have been hitherto unknown to him) during its initial stage, would, without hesitation, announce it to have in prospect another, and a higher mode of life; for he would discern within, or upon it, the symbols of its destined progression, and he would find in its habits certain instincts that have reference to a more perfect manner of existence. Now is it so with man? We have already taken this for granted, and the theme is one that has often been touched, and it is not a necessary part of our argument, inasmuch as the task we have chosen, is not that of proving the truth of the doctrine of a future life, but that of following some probable conjectures concerning it, taken as true, on the authority of the Christian writings.

“The proposition then which we assume is this, that the rational and moral consciousness, with the various faculties therein comprised, is to survive the decomposition of the animal structure, and is to attach itself to a new and more refined structure. Of course therefore it is not to the *animal organization* that we are to look, as if to find *there* the symbols of a metamorphosis, or the germs of another type of life; for the mere animal is to accomplish its purpose in the present initial era of human existence; and, like other intransitive species, it develops all its parts, and falls into decay without leaving any renascent element. But it is among the moral sentiments and the intellectual faculties, that is to say, within the circle of the proper consciousness of the man, that we ought to find, if at all, the indications of a second birth, and of a new economy of life. Now all that has been said, and that may be said, and it is not a little, in illustration of the theorem of the immortality of man, as foreshown by his moral sense, by his expectation of retribution, by his aspirations after a better existence, by the vast compass of his faculties, and by his instinctive horror of annihilation—all these prognostics of futurity, and if there are any other, are capable of being condensed into a single proposition, setting forth the fact—a fact the mere statement of which contains virtually a demonstrative proof of the principle it involves, namely—That the idea or the expectation of another life is a constant element of human nature, or an original article in the physiology of man. . . .

“ But if a future life does await the human family, and if it be a change involved in the original constitution of our nature, then it must be allowable to speak of it, and the means and mode of the change, as we might of any other part of the scheme of the universe.”

“ This transition, which now we find it so difficult to think of, otherwise than with a sort of incredulous apprehension as a mysterious article of our Christian faith, shall, when it occurs, be felt, however momentous in its consequences, as a simple fact, and as forming a natural epoch in the history of man, whom we shall then understand to be a creature destined, from the first, to metamorphoses, and to far extended progression.

“ A certain degree of illusion attaches to whatever is future and untried ; and this false colour, spread over our prospects, at one time exaggerates our hopes, and at another, by reaction, damps them as much. If a future change in our condition be a very extensive and important kind, we are very apt to suppose that, even if our consciousness of identity be not impaired by the event, our ordinary modes of feeling, and our characteristic sentiments and tastes, will none of them remain the same. From previously entertaining these delusive expectations it happens, when we come actually to pass through some such important revolution of our personal condition, that our first emotions are not as much those of surprise at the greatness of the change, as of disappointment at the small extent to which it has affected our usual sensations, and at finding how little our customary personal consciousness has been disturbed. We feel ourselves possessed of the same familiar self—of the same peculiarities of taste ; and that the very same moral and mental habits have passed on with us, through the hour of transition, from one condition of life to another ; nor can we say that this transition, in itself, has made us more wise and virtuous, or that it has enhanced by so much as a particle, our personal merits ; although it may have enlarged our range of action, and perhaps have added to our means of enjoyment.

“ Now we may reasonably imagine that it will be precisely thus in the moment of our passage from the present, to another mode of existence. The several powers of life shall have become more intense in their activity, our consciousness will have been expanded ; the faculties will no longer labour and faint at their tasks, or relapse exhausted : life will burn clear and steady, and will need no replenishing ; but yet the inner man—the individual—the moral personality, will be un-

touched:—the remembrance of yesterday, and of its little history, will be distinct and familiar; and we shall come to an instantaneous conviction of the momentous practical truth, that the physical and the moral nature are so thoroughly independent one of the other, as that the greatest imaginable revolution passing upon the former, shall leave the latter simply what it was.

“A short season probably, will be enough to impart to us an easy familiarity with our new home, and a ready use of our corporeal instruments, and a facility in joining in with the economy around us. Moreover, it is reasonable to believe that, whereas in the present state, the heterogeneous elements of mind and matter, as consorted within the animal organisation, are held together as by force, and so as to occasion a vague feeling, coming over us at times, as if we were dreaming, or as if our very life were an enigma, and as if we were held back from actual contact with what is real and substantial;—on the contrary, when the corporeal nature has become nothing else than the instrument and vehicle of the mind, and when the two elements of our existence have come to be perfectly blended, and when, as a consequence, our feelings are all of one sort, and when our several energies and impulses, instead of counteracting one the other, shall flow on always in the same direction, that then there shall attend us an incomparably more vivid sense of reality—that then we shall perceive all things with a sharp intensity, and shall have a bright, vivid, consciousness of life, such as shall make us think of the gone-by period of animal life, as if indeed it had been a dream. It is so that a man may have groped his way, hour after hour, across a marshy level, veiled in fogs, till he comes to the foot of a steep, where, after some arduous steps, he gains a height, and not only overlooks the mists of the swamp, but beholds a wide illumined landscape, and the clear sky, and the sun.

“At the moment of recognising our personal consciousness, after passing through the future physical transformation, what we must fix upon will unquestionably be our habitual emotions, tastes, and moral dispositions; for it is these that constitute the very core of our being, and it is these that must stand out, with so much the more characteristic distinctness, when whatever that was accidental and adjunctive has fallen off from us. All merely animal sensations will have been superseded; all mechanical and technical habits will have lost their means and occasions; the intellectual furniture will, for the most part, or perhaps entirely, have given place to knowledge of a more direct and substantial kind; but the sentiments we have

cherished, and the affections that have settled down upon the mind, and which constitute its character—these, now, with a bold supremacy, will make up our consciousness, and compel us to confess ourselves the same. Much indeed that belonged to our first stage of existence, will, in the retrospect, appear shadowy and unimportant; but not so any of those events or courses of conduct that shall be found to have created or controlled our moral being. . . .

“We conclude that any expectation of an improvement of the moral nature, merely in consequence of a transition from a lower to a higher stage of physical existence, will be found delusive. And yet, though we must not suppose the moral faculties to be renovated by such a transition, we may well believe that it will give scope to a much increased intensity of all emotions and affections of this class, whether they be benign or malignant, pure or sordid. This probable enhancement of feeling in another life deserves some attention; for it is conceivable that the most profound or agitating sensations of which we are conscious in the present state, may seem trivial, when they come to be compared with the corresponding passions and affections of the future life. . . .

“The corporeal limitation of the passions becomes, in truth, a matter of painful consciousness, whenever they rise to an unusual height, or are long continued; and there takes place then, within the bosom, an agony, partly animal, partly mental, and a very uneasy sense of the inadequateness of our strongest emotions to the occasion that calls them out. We feel, that we cannot feel as we should; emotions are frustrated, and the affections which should have sprung upward, are detained in a paroxysm on earth. It is thus with the noblest sentiments, and thus with profound grief; and the malign and vindictive passions draw their tormenting force from this very sense of restraint, and they *rend* the soul because they can *move* it so little. Does there not arise, amid these convulsions of our nature, a tacit anticipation of a future state, in which the soul shall be able to feel unboundedly, and to take its fill of emotion?

“Far from supposing that, in a higher region, where the affections shall be more intense and more permanent, nothing shall be done or thought of, but to indulge these profound sentiments, or that an invariable, inactive, unproductive ecstasy, is to fill the endless circle of ages, on the contrary, we assume it as certain that every active faculty, corporeal and rational, shall then come into play at a vastly enhanced rate, and with much more fruit and advantage, than at

present:—the impulse being greater and more uniform, the movement shall be proportionably accelerated. . . .

“We may sometimes have persuaded ourselves, in the fondness of speculation, that certain inveterate difficulties are now at last cleared up, and that the scheme of the moral universe lies all outspread before us, as in a map. But the wise speedily surrender any such conceit, and return gladly to the only ground of which either men or seraphs can feel a footing—the ground of implicit submission to the Infinite Nature. It is indeed highly probable that certain *particular difficulties* which embarrass our speculative theology, and which now afflict us by their formidable aspect, may utterly vanish at the moment when we reach a higher and more advantageous point of view; and we may then wonder at the slenderness of those modes of thinking which could allow of our being staggered in any such manner. . . .

“We see it to be thus, even now, with the pious, who although they may be exercised as they advance in their course more and more severely, still grow, not merely in fortitude but in peace and joy. And thus it is in common life, that the youth contemns the troubles of childhood, while he cheerfully encounters the more real difficulties of his entrance upon the world; and again that the man forgets the small cares of his youth, and bears up beneath the multiplied anxieties of ripe age; each new period, in relieving us from one burden imposes another and a heavier, and calls into play whatever fortitude we had acquired in our preliminary course; and yet does not forbid our continued enjoyment of existence.

“Again: a passive fortitude is not the only virtue which the training we are under tends to cherish; for there is a manifest purpose in the construction of the moral and social system to call for the more active excellence of courage, and the spirit of enterprise; nor need we exclude (properly understood) the stirring sentiment of ambition. Can we doubt that He who, in His word, is ‘calling us to glory and to virtue,’ and who by the same channel, enjoins a manly and vigorous discharge of our parts, is also, in the actual circumstances through which we are led, preparing the intellectual and moral powers for what they are to perform in another sphere? . . . Adhering then to the rule of analogy, and confiding in the principle that a rational consistency, and an adaptation of means to the end, runs through the divine proceedings, we conclude that the future life shall actually call into exercise a bold energy, and intrepidity, and ambition too; an ambition not selfish or vain, but loyal.

“In assuming so much as this, we are by no means obliged to suppose that those who, in the present state, shall have gone through their probation, and won immortal glory, are anew to become liable to loss, injury or jeopardy of happiness. Without admitting any such supposition, we may readily conceive of a state of things in which there may be services to be performed, enterprises to be undertaken, and a promotion to be aimed at such as none but the bold and the strong shall be equal to, and none but the aspiring shall dare to attempt . . . there may be dominations to be exercised which those shall secure to themselves who can prove, by services done, that they are equal to the weight of the sceptre.

“It is surely a frivolous notion (if any actually entertain it) that the vast and intricate machinery of the universe, and the profound scheme of God’s Government, are now soon to reach a resting-place, where nothing more shall remain to active spirits, through an eternity, but recollections of labour, anthems of praise, and inert repose. No idea can do more violence to all the principles on which we reason, than this does. Not less unreasonable is it to imagine that the future Government of God, instead of being carried forward, as now, by independent and intelligent agencies, shall proceed by the interposition of His immediate power, while the creatures stand aloof, as idle spectators of omnipotence. . . .

“It would not be very difficult to show in what way, probably, every one of the active qualities, moral and intellectual, which are now in training, may come into exercise within a future system, even although that system should exclude the necessities and pains of the present state. All the practical skill we acquire in managing affairs, all the versatility, the sagacity, the calculation of chances, the patience and assiduity, the promptitude and facility, as well as the higher virtues which we are learning every day, may well find scope in a world such as is rationally anticipated, when we think of heaven as the stage of life that is next to follow the discipline of earth.

“Thus far we have thought of the future exercise of the active virtues, in relation chiefly to personal interests. But if we duly consider the force, and the probable issue of those intense emotions of good will to others, and of compassion toward the wretched, which are now at work within generous bosoms, and which yet are very slenderly or partially brought into play at present, we shall be impelled to think, nay, confidently to conclude that these dispositions are, in this world, only bursting the husk, and germinating underground, in

preparation for free expression and fructification in the beams of a warmer sun. With no other indication of the destinies of the universe than what may be furnished by those swelling emotions of pity that are now working, pent up in tender and noble hearts, we should hardly fear to err in assuming that a sphere will at length open upon such spirits, wherein they shall find millions to be governed, taught, rescued, and led forward, from a worse to a better, or from a lower to a higher stage of life.

“With the material universe before us, such as we *now* know it to be in extent, our conjectures need not be put to much difficulty in imagining what may be wanting to fill out our idea of a future economy, where, what now we so ardently long to do, but are baffled in attempting, shall be practicable, and shall offer itself to our hands, on the largest scale. . . .

“Mind, in its first stage of combination with matter, exercises only the lowest of its faculties, and is long little more than merely passive; but it gains every day upon the conditions of animal life, exerts more and more of its inherent powers, mechanical and rational; and at length, not only governs, in a high spontaneous manner, its immediate body, but so diverts and controls the powers of the material world as to make itself, in a sense, master of nature, and to serve itself of her laws. The arts of life are precisely so many conquests of mind, and so many instances of the yielding of matter to the pleasure of mind. Again, by its powers of abstraction the most abstruse relations of the material world are mastered and reduced to a practical subserviency; and then, by the aid of these same relations, the vastness of the material universe is so far grasped by our methods of reasoning, as to yield itself in degree to our conceptions, and to come within the range of our calculations. Man, although not yet lord of the visible universe as an adult, is lord of it as an heir; and he exercises an authority becoming the minority of one for whom vast possessions are in reserve. This is not the language of empty pretension: modern science and art make good, in detail, all that is here affirmed at large.”

Very fascinating are the conjectures as to the extension of bodily powers in another stage of existence, when mind shall have more completely conquered matter and adapted it to its own ends. Movement or the power of locomotion, sight, language or the power of communication between minds, Isaac Taylor expects to be capable of great development, but on the same lines that they exhibit here on earth. Language, indeed, wonderful though it is in its many different forms and

its vast range of signs, which are even now found inadequate for the complete expression of thought, will be largely superseded, he anticipates, by a more subtle form of communication, by which mind can impress mind without the need of words or signs. He says (to take the subject of movement first):—

“That this enlarged power of locomotion actually awaits human nature might be plausibly inferred on the ground that the muscular force is now felt to be—a power restrained; that is to say, a faculty equal to much more than is yet permitted to it: and perhaps, with not a few individuals, the conscious muscular energy is strictly analogous to that of a strong man fettered and handcuffed, who meditates what he will do when set at large. Is there not a latent or a half-latent instinct in the mind which speaks of a future liberty and ranging at will through space? There are some, perhaps, who will admit that they have indistinct anticipations of this sort, quite as strong as are those moral and intellectual aspirations after immortality which have been considered good presumptive proofs of the reality of future life. The author would be very slow to seek support to an argument, such as the one now in hand, from scriptural expressions, which, probably, ought to be interpreted in a spiritual sense only; he will therefore merely name the often quoted passage (Isaiah xl. 31) as *possibly* having a secondary reference to the future corporeal powers of the sons of God—‘They shall renew their strength—they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint.’”

On the subject of mental capacity he says:—

“It seems safe to affirm, in relation to what may be abstractedly possible to the human mind, that, whatever it has at any time actually achieved under favourable circumstances, or whatever effect it may, for a few moments only, have sustained, the same, to say no more, it might at all times perform, and might continue to perform, if it were but exempted from these causes of embarrassment and exhaustion which are felt to arise from the imperfections of the animal organization. If indeed we are calculating, in any instance, what it may fairly be expected that men, such as they are, will achieve, we must reckon only upon the average amount of their powers—bodily or mental. But if the question be—what might the human mind achieve, set free from the infirmities and disadvantages that attach to individuals, then it is not the actual average that is to be regarded; but the actual maximum; and the rarest and most admirable performances of a favoured few, who have far outdone their com-

petitors, are to be assumed as the real measure of the abstract powers of the human intellect. And even this measure ought to be regarded as probably too low, inasmuch as there is reason to suppose that the most vigorous human mind still labours under some considerable disadvantages of the corporeal kind, and would be capable of far more, were it wholly exempted from all the obstructions and obscurities that attach to the animal brain. . . .

“Language, consisting as it does of arbitrary signs, is manifestly a rudiment of the material system; it is a fruit and consequence of our corporeity, and might, with some propriety, be designated as the point of contact, where mind and matter, artificially yet most intimately blend, and reciprocate their respective properties. . . .

“Every machine and instrument is an adaptation of some existing power or principle, conferring upon the intelligence that has devised and that employs it, a special advantage, in carrying on some operation, which otherwise would be barely practicable, or not at all so. . . . Now of all the instruments or artificial combinations which man employs, there is not one at all to be compared with language;—there is not one nearly so elaborate in its construction, or so copious in its materials, or so nice and appliant in its evolutions. . . .

“And yet this vast apparatus, taken in its most refined form, is found, in relation to the occasions of the mind, to be scanty, inexact, and poor. . . . Whether regarded as an instrument of silent thought, or as the medium of communication between mind and mind, language proves itself so inadequate to some of the purposes to which it is applied, as to forbid the hope that those sciences will ever reach a permanent and indisputable state, which depend upon it as their only means of expression. . . .

“Every profoundly impassioned and sensitive mind, and every mind accustomed to hold language in abeyance, during its processes of analysis and abstraction, is painfully conscious of the inferiority of any actual medium of expression that is at its command. . . .

“A supposition that offers itself in relation to the future communion of minds, is this, namely, that the method of expression by arbitrary signs should be altogether superseded, and that, in the place of it, the mind should be endowed with a power of communication by a direct conveyance of its own state, at any moment, to other minds; as if the veil of personal consciousness might, at pleasure, be drawn aside, and the entire intellectual being could spread itself out to view. ‘If there are

tongues,’ says the apostle, ‘they shall fail’; and it may be intended, not that the various languages of earth shall be exchanged for the one language of heaven, but rather that language itself, or the use of arbitrary symbols, shall give place to the conveyance of thought, in its native state, from mind to mind. The conveyance of emotions, by the varying expression of the countenance, and which is understood as if instinctively by infants, and by animals, gives us a faint indication at least of a mode of communication much more intuitive and immediate, than that of language: nor is it very difficult, by the aid of this instance, to carry forward our conceptions so far as to grasp what we are now supposing, namely, an instantaneous and real unfolding of the thought and feeling of one mind, by an act of its own, to other minds. . . . For the purposes of a moral economy, and the preservation of individuality of character, seem necessarily to demand the seclusion of each mind, except so far as it may choose to discover itself. . . .”

Isaac Taylor’s fears that he might be thought to be setting aside religion and superseding the teaching of Christianity were beside the mark, and prompted no doubt by the narrow and violent controversies of that day. Religion cannot be set aside by any ideas that make God’s nature more plain to mankind, that reveal His scheme of the universe more clearly. Christ Himself taught His disciples mainly by analogy; He took His examples from the humblest and most common objects of daily life, and paid small reverence to accepted forms and authoritative teachings. It is not the function of the Churches to arrogate to themselves the sole authority for Divine knowledge, or to be the sole source of inspiration. Those are God’s free gifts to mankind, and they are not locked up in the keeping of any particular sect, but are revealed to all humanity, outside the Church as well as within. The material world is teeming with evidence for all to see and read for themselves, once the key is put in their hands. The day of simple things is dawning, when the Divine Will will be discovered and studied in what are now thought to be insignificant ways, and by the same minute indications from which science has discovered and revealed the laws of the natural world. The same laws that govern the stars and order their movements through space can be studied in the most commonplace happenings of everyday life; the same conditions rule, as far as can be ascertained, in the worlds that are so many millions of miles away from us, as in our own world; and it only adds to the beauty and grandeur of our conception of our own lives, and their destina-

tion, if we can think of them as following a perfectly ordered sequence and working out their slow development on strictly unbroken lines.

The important point in all considerations of the kind is, that our reasoning should be based on sure indications, and that the interpretations should be grander, the horizons wider, the characteristics more tender, more pitiful, more full of mercy, the interests more varied. In all things there should be more—not less; for however much we bring all these qualities into our conceptions of the nature of the life to be and the plan of its construction, we shall never with our earthly minds attain the full measure in those respects. It would be as easy for a human being who had lived all his life in a cave to imagine and describe the characteristics of the outside world, with all its immense variety of tropical vegetation, its Arctic snows, the wonder of its storms and the glory of its sunsets; or for anyone who had lived all his life under cloudy skies to have any conception of the myriads of stars that those clouds had always hidden from his view. We may gain a clearer, stronger picture of the future, that may be nearer to the reality than anything yet dreamt of; but the full measure will only dawn on us when we have left this world behind, and then in all probability only by many different stages in the wonderful journey that is stretching out before us.

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HONITON.

THE REVIVAL OF CASUISTRY.

ISRAEL ABRAHAMS, D.LITT.

I.

To the war must be attributed some unexpected results, though Sir Douglas Haig assures us that the result of the war itself was exactly what was expected. Among the unexpected results, beyond question, has been the revival of Casuistry. Already green in the blade, the plant is ripening to the ear.

Some moralists are much concerned at the prospect. Writing in 1907, that accomplished commentator, W. C. Allen, has this note on the great text, *Love your enemies*: "Christ here sweeps away all casuistical distinctions between neighbours and enemies, Jews and Gentiles."¹ But what of the Germans? Chrysostom would scarcely have hesitated in his answer. Here is a noble passage from his homily on the same text:

"Physicians, when they are kicked, and shamefully handled by the insane, then most of all pity them, and take measures for their perfect cure, knowing that the insult comes of the extremity of their disease. Now I bid thee, too, have the same mind touching them that are plotting against thee, and do thou so treat them that are injuring thee. For it is they above all that are diseased, it is they that are undergoing all the violence. Deliver such a one from this grievous contumely, and grant him to let go his anger, and set him free from that grievous demon, Wrath. Yea, for if we see persons possessed by devils, we weep for them; we do not seek to be ourselves possessed."²

This attitude is the antithesis of casuistry, for it disputes the ground principle on which the latter depends, viz. that circumstances alter cases. But when Dr Lyttelton, in the early months of the war, applied Chrysostom's generalisation to the Germans, there was something of a storm. So the casuist

¹ *International Critical Commentary on Matthew* v. 43-48, p. 55.

² Hom. 18, on Matthew, § 6 (Oxford, 1843, i. 278).

was re-born, and Dr Lyttelton felt called upon to protest that "the Greek word used for 'love' allows, nay, demands, very stern severity sometimes."¹ More recently, the Archbishop of Canterbury has taken much the same line. Responding to Professor Deissmann's appeal for the renewal of Christian fellowship, the Primate, while assenting generously to the ultimate acceptance of the plea, gravely adds the proviso: "But righteousness must be vindicated, even although the vindication involves sternness."² Here we see two principles struggling for mastery—the chivalrous treatment of a fallen foe, and the practical demand for punishment. This is the very atmosphere of casuistry. The same is true of the distinctions drawn, both in the controversy as to the Psalter and in regard to requital for German atrocities, between private enemies who must be loved and public enemies who may be hated. In fact, there has been a luxuriant growth of a literature on the casuistry of hatred.³ This literature is liable to a serious defect. What we require from philosophy and ethical science is neither a vindication nor a restraint of passion when passion is hot, when motives—whether militant or pacifist—are open to suspicion; but a careful, objective discussion while conditions are calm, and thought is free from the taint of the momentary and the selfish.

II.

Of a somewhat different type is the casuistical plea which was strongly urged during the war in behalf of Red Cross lotteries. The war did not produce, it merely emphasised the type. It was always latent in our English temperament. Saint-Saens' opera, *Samson and Delilah*, had to be turned into an oratorio before a performance was licensed in London some years ago. Lotteries, it is conceded, are an evil. But Red Cross work is a good. You do not weaken your general detestation of the evil because you permit an exception in a good cause. A similar casuistical argument, viz. that Premium Bonds should be issued by the Government in the interests of thrift, was momentarily defeated, but it was persistently urged,

¹ *Times*, April 22, 1915.

² *Times*, Nov. 27, 1918. Cf. Mr Lloyd George's speech of April 16, 1919: "We want a stern peace because the occasion demands it, the crime demands it; but its severity must be designed, not to gratify vengeance, but to vindicate justice."

³ See, e.g., G. F. Stout's fine essay in *The International Crisis in its Ethical and Psychological Aspects*, 1915.

and is scotched not killed. The real interest of this type of case lies in the method by which it is resisted. The Bishop of Norwich did not meet it by a direct refusal to permit distinctions between lotteries for good and bad causes. We have to think of the effect of our conduct on others, "who may be unable to appreciate the logic of our position or the distinctions which we ourselves can draw." But the Bishop very wisely concedes that such an argument may be pushed very far indeed in defence of conventions. "Often it is a plain duty to risk misunderstanding; is it really and clearly so *in this case?*"¹ We might allow ourselves, in this connection, a grim smile at the readiness with which certain popular amusements, which seemed incongruent with the austerities of war-time, were promoted when the profits went to fill the coffers of war charities. But we must deny ourselves this pleasure.

Nor does space permit a full analysis, in more serious mood, of the phenomena of conscientious objection to the war. The distinctions drawn by various individuals as to what constitutes a militant act were often sound enough. But, sound or unsound, many of the conscientious distinctions were essentially casuistical. So, too, has been the recent development of sympathy. The Rev. F. B. Meyer urges a milder treatment of conscientious objectors without "endorsement of the position which they have taken up."² The Rev. L. S. Lewis, while proclaiming that he "cannot agree with those who conscientiously objected to fighting in this war," yet asserts (and rightly asserts): "A man who will really suffer for conscience sake is always admirable and one of the nation's greatest assets, *even if he be utterly mistaken in his views.*"³ Lord Hugh Cecil had a day or two earlier used much the same argument: "In a Christian state persons admittedly good and religious ought not to be punished for declining, *even perversely*, to do what their consciences forbid."⁴ In a more recent leading article⁵ *The Times* refuses to accept this view. It only goes so far as to see the unwisdom of giving bad causes the advertisement of "martyrdom." It has "no sympathy with the errors of the honest conscientious objector." But how does it recognise that the term "errors" is just? Merely because the conscientious objectors are a small minority! When a man finds "the practically unanimous judgment of his country . . . upon one side of a plain moral question, and his personal opinion upon

¹ *Times*, Aug. 5, 1918.

² *London Daily News*, March 18, 1919.

³ *Ibid.*, March 12, 1919; cf. Dr Barnes, *ibid.*, April 28, 1919.

⁴ *Times*, March 10, 1919.

⁵ *Times*, April 4, 1919.

the other, the presumption is that he is wrong." This is true, but it is a presumption disproved by many incidents in the history of morals. "The contention that they have done no wrong because they have adhered to their principles" or "obeyed their conscience is inadmissible." For, "it is easy to pervert conscience until it becomes a biased judge and a false guide." This, again, is true; but again it is the argument which would have suppressed Elijah in favour of the prophets of Baal, or the early Christians in favour of Roman Paganism. The whole question is sadly mishandled on both sides, and for the same reason. The popular neglect of casuistry as a valid aspect of moral philosophy has left us unprepared with principles of judgment. The war has roughly reminded us of the neglect, and casuistry has been reborn under the worst of conditions.¹

III.

Fortunately, however, the popular revival has not stood alone. Violently confronted with some of the complex problems of life, the average man is sorely troubled. But there was, prior to the war, a new academic interest in casuistry.² In strong contrast to Jowett, both Fowler and Rashdall gave their blessing to casuistry in their formal treatises on the Principles of Morals. Moore gives it careful consideration also in his *Principia Ethica*. Wenley, in the essay in Hastings' new *Encyclopædia*, is no out-and-out foe of the art. One recent academic illustration may be cited because of its far-reaching significance. For the vigorous controversy regarding Dr Henson's elevation to a bishopric turned on the casuistical interpretation of the acceptance of the Anglican Creed *ex animo*. "A formula may be subscribed *ex animo* by different people in different senses," says the Rev. A. Fawkes in his defence of the bishop. Dr Sanday suggests that, when the bishop declared that he accepted the creed *ex animo*, what he really meant was that "he honestly (*ex animo*) believed his views to be entirely compatible or in accordance with the creeds." On the other hand, Professor Lake will

¹ It would be unjust to conscientious objectors to forget that many of them were deeply pained at their inability to share the nation's war activities. When Nottingham opposed the enthronisation of William and Mary, in Macaulay's language, "though his own conscience would not suffer him to give way, he was glad that the consciences of other men were less scrupulous."

² A brilliant combination of the academic and popular treatments is to be found in Dr L. P. Jacks' story, "The Casuists' Club" (in the volume entitled *Philosophers in Trouble*). Without deriving the same moral from his reflections, Dr Jacks anticipates several of the considerations presented in this article.

have none of this. "Liberals do *not* accept the creed *ex animo*, because it represents, not our mind, but that of a generation which, however great it may have been, was nevertheless mistaken in its view of the interpretation and authority of the Scriptures on which the creed is based."¹ Professor Lake would not fit his mind to opinion, but opinion to his mind. But does he really imagine that he can, with the instruments of criticism, formulate an opinion to fit a Church, in terms which would mean the same to his mind as it would to any other mind? We should need as many creeds as minds—nay, as many creeds as moods in one and the same mind. It is beyond the wit of man to formulate a creed, or enunciate a single dogma, which shall be acceptable in the same exact sense to a variety of minds. Moments undoubtedly arise when casuistry must roughly be abandoned and dogmas candidly rejected. The Liberal Jew does not revise the Maimunist Creed—he discards it. But within such extreme limits casuistry is not merely justifiable, it is imperative. For the most part it is the ignorant, the unthinking, the arrogant, who can gaily demand that everyone shall interpret intricate formulas in one and the same conventional sense.

IV.

This being so, it is a lamentable effect of Pascal's wit that casuistry so long fell into moral disrepute. The readers of the *Provincials* may be few, the wit of the "Letters" a mere tradition, but their decisive influence remains. It is indubitable that the modern antipathy to casuistry, whether it be the antipathy of Jowett or Sorley, derives from Pascal. Otherwise, how comes it that the side issue of Probabilism is so inevitably introduced? One writer actually describes probabilism as "the logical outcome of the casuistical method."² That this view needs modification is shown by the fact that the Pharisaic casuistry expressly rejected probabilism.³ We are not concerned now with the smaller question as to probabilism being, in Dr Stewart's language, "the inevitable consequence of a compulsory confessional and a multitude of confessors." Probabilism means the reliance on "any grave doctor" as "probably" a safe guide. Whatever the connection of this doctrine with the confessional, it has no necessary connection with casuistry, and the obloquy cast on probabilism ought not

¹ Cf. the series of articles in the HIBBERT JOURNAL in 1918.

² Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, s.v. "Casuistry."

³ See in particular the remarkable passage in the Mishnah, *Eduyoth*, v. 7.

to react on casuistry. Whether Pascal was just to the Jesuits will always be disputed. One school of his apologists declare him just in the main, but unfair in detail; others find him just in details, but unfair in his general depreciation of Jesuit morality.¹

This question cannot now occupy us. But what does seriously concern us is an acute comment of Sainte-Beuve. Of the *Provincial Letters* he writes: "Elles ont tué les Jésuites et les Molinistes et les Thomistes, elles ont tué ou rendu fort malade bien d'autres choses aussi." Sainte-Beuve was thinking of Pascal's employment of ridicule, for he adds: "Pascal, le premier du dedans, ouvre la porte à la raillerie, c'est-à-dire qu'il introduit l'ennemi dans la place, d'où il ne sortira pas."² But Pascal's example went further than leading the way to Voltaire. For, besides Escobar and his like, there have fallen as victims of the suspicions he raised, many honest, clear-sighted thinkers, who, as knowledge progressed, have sought to remain loyal to truths which they could not honestly reject, but which at the same time they could not honestly accept without qualification. "All truth," wrote Mr Birrell the other day, "needs provisos, limitations, exceptions." The man-in-the-street, with his supposed plain intuitions as to the true and false, has been pitted against the expert philosopher or trained theologian, who knows that, while such intuitions are sometimes genuine enough, they are often illusions or ignorant guesses. These intuitions, especially where they concern abstract thought, must at all events be subjected to the criticism of the expert. To term such experts casuists in the sense of hypocrites, to proclaim them insincere, to describe their hesitations as due to a desire to retain the gains of conformity while enjoying the personal satisfaction of scepticism—this strikes at the very foundations of truth, and must, if unchecked, undermine them.

V.

This brings us to the heart of the whole matter. Casuistry is not confined to morals. It has intellectual relevance also, and the latter is the more important aspect of the two. We are familiar with the illustration of the driver. If he is too concerned to avoid each little obstacle on his road, he loses his nerve; if, on the other hand, he keeps his gaze on the central

¹ H. F. Stewart, *The Holiness of Pascal* (Cambridge, 1915), pp. 39, 40.

² *Port-Royal* (Paris, 1842), vol. ii. pp. 541-2.

way, he will not only progress but will avoid the obstacles. This is, essentially, the one real argument against casuistry,¹ both of the moral and intellectual types. Where the argument fails is its ignoring the fact that roads are often so cut up or roughly paved that there is no central clear way at all. In his widely read essay "On Compromise," Lord Morley charges the modern Englishman with a "profound distrust of all general principles."² The cause is "a lazy accommodation with error." Throughout his essay Morley only once glances at what may be the truer cause. "This dread of the categorical assertion might be creditable, if it sprang from attachment to a very high standard of evidence, or from a deep sense of the relative and provisional quality of truth." Having made this concession in one brief sentence, the author rejects it with contumely, passes from it, and throughout the discussion shows no sense that the problem precisely is: How can one make categorical assertions at all? Morley is one of the last survivors of the eminent Whigs in politics and philosophy who conceived truth as so simple and obvious that it could be put into clean-cut propositions which only the demented or the dishonest could dispute. Now, it would be easy to show that there have been constantly co-existent in all ethical systems both general propositions and casuistical accommodations of the type which Morley regards as a compromise with truth.³ Much more important, however, is the fact that, whatever was possible in a past age, the modern complexity of knowledge tends to make it increasingly difficult to make categorical statements at all. "Hedging" is not always the comfortable result of laziness; it may be the disturbing outcome of industry. Facts are too many for the learned; generalisation can only be made, if made at all, with misgiving and hesitation. The ignorant has no such difficulty; he can always express himself in general terms. But the well-informed finds himself, at every step on the road to a generalisation, pulled up by the consciousness of other facts which bar his progress to the categorical goal. Either general propositions, in many realms

¹ A loss of moral proportions, says Jowett (*Epistles of St Paul*, ed. 2, vol. ii. pp. 393-6), arises from scrupulosity over trifles.

² On the other hand, Macaulay, in his *History* (ed. Dent, ii. 279), regards it (and surely with justice) as a merit in English Parliamentary methods "never to lay down any proposition of wider extent than the particular case for which it is necessary to provide."

³ It is noteworthy that while he discourses at large of the limits of accommodation with current convention, Morley scarcely touches the opposite problem: How far ought current opinion to accommodate itself to the conscientious protestantism of a minority?

of thought and experience, must be altogether eschewed, or they must be formulated with reservations.

This obvious trouble is felt very keenly in theology. It would have been, no doubt, quite easy for Bishop Henson to record a "*nolo episcopari*," if he had found the creed inadmissible. But his very difficulty, I take it, was that he did *not* find it inadmissible. He could not *ex animo* deny the creed in any categorical sense. It is this difficulty that assails all theologians nowadays. Take the broader question: Are the Scriptures inspired? Historical criticism has intensely complicated the answer. The man-in-the-street may possibly be prepared to answer with a categorical Yes or No. But the qualified student cannot answer in this delightfully naïve manner, much as he would like to do it. For, unfortunately for him, he has arrived at this position: *either* the whole idea of inspiration must be sacrificed—and the plain facts preclude him from assenting to the sacrifice without palpable untruth; *or*, he must use the term inspiration in a sense very different to that of the man-in-the-street, who has never read other Scriptures than the English Bible, has never heard of Hammurabi's Code, has never seen the Babylonian Story of Creation, has never become acquainted with the Assyrian, Egyptian, Greek, Indian, or Arabic religious literature. Thus the student must either be an insincere sceptic or a suspected casuist. Not a pleasant alternative, this! And the complexity of knowledge is matched by the complexity of morality. That circumstances do alter cases, that there are many varieties of moral standards all deserving some consideration, are truisms of ethics; yet the anti-casuists hurl at one's head Kant's categorical imperative. Assuredly Kant's rule: Act so that your conduct may become a universal law, needs Hillel's corrective: Judge not thy fellow-man till thou art come into his place¹—or, as we may paraphrase it: Do not expect another to act in *his* circumstances as you would fain act in *yours*. In other words, we can have neither science nor ethics without casuistry, and it is lamentable that the safeguard to rash and inaccurate generalisation should bear a degraded name.

VI.

Casuistry is commonly defined as the application of general rules to special cases, particularly where duties conflict.²

¹ Mishnah, *Aboth*, ii. 4.

² Cf. the definition in *N.E.D.* In the case of a "saint" there can, of course, be no such conflict. The vision of the Highest which he conjures up makes such a conflict impossible. But all men are not saints.

Dr Rashdall uses more general language when he speaks of the art and science of casuistry as the "detailed application of the ideal to the concrete difficulties of individual and social life."¹ One misses, however, in modern definitions and discussions the very aspect which has led to the revival of the art. This aspect may be termed the *interpretative* function of casuistry—not so much the application of general rules or principles to particular cases, as the analysis by means of particulars of the sense in which the general is true at all, or may continue true. It may be that, historically considered, casuistry deserved its obloquy as tending to moral laxity. But the Pharisaic casuistry could erect a fence as well as open a door. And while the Jesuits were accused by Pascal of being too easy, the Pharisees were charged by Justin with being too hard. If Escobar made the yoke of the Gospel too light, putting, in Stewart's phrase, "cushions under the knees of the penitent," the Pharisees rendered the burden of the law too heavy, making, in Schürer's phrase, "life a continual torment to earnest men." These two criticisms, one may concede, are not logically inconsistent; but the fact that they are both seriously offered suggests that casuistry, *as such*, can scarcely be responsible both for the alleged laxity of Jesuitism and the supposed severity of Pharisaism.

Most writers, indeed, assume that there was this common ground: to the Jesuit, as to the Pharisee, the ultimate guide or authority was external rule or law as opposed to ethical principle. Both were using the method, not of the moralist, but of the lawyer. But is it possible, without reservation, to uphold this distinction, just though it be from some points of view? Is it not based on a fundamental misunderstanding of one whole aspect of the lawyer's function? It is quite true that he *applies* law, but his application of law interprets it. The meaning of law, the range and the limitations of its validity—these are defined by the cases decided. The lawyer is not merely the administrator of law, he is also its interpreter. No doubt many people think of law and conscience as opposed. An anonymous writer, the other day, quoted with approval Sir Charles Napier's rebuke to the native judges of Cephalonia: "Laws are made to prevent a judge from acting according to his conscience."² The judge's conscience is uncertain, the law is fixed. But the curious thing is that this precedent was cited against the conscientious objectors whose case has been made the subject of law! The law, which has

¹ *The Theory of Good and Evil* (Oxford, 1907), ii. 414.

² *The Times*, April 7, 1919.

no conscience, has nevertheless to determine the rights of conscience.

Clearly, the lawyer is necessarily a casuist. But the casuist is not necessarily a lawyer. The moralist who refuses to regard morality as law may not be in the same identical boat as the legalist, but he is in a boat of very similar build. General principles may clash just as much as special rules, and casuistry creeps in with ideas as well as with institutions.¹ Half the trouble with religious minds in England just now is precisely due to the clash of two Gospel principles: the injunction (which most feel bound to obey), *Do good to them that hate you*, and the menace (which some would apply to Germany), *With what measure ye mete*. Again, the idea of a League of Nations is by no means a lawyer's idea. It is essentially a humanitarian conception, derived ultimately from the prophetic vision of a universal peace and brotherhood. But no sooner was the plan mooted than the casuists got to work. The League of Nations must be a league of *free* nations. At first this limitation was designed to exclude Germany. But it ends by including it, under certain conditions. The League is to prevent war, but even Viscount Grey contemplates the possibility of war as the means of controlling disturbers of the world's peace. One remembers the child who went on thumping his brother until the latter would agree to "make it up." But the most promising point about the League of Nations controversy is that the casuists are at work *in advance*. Some years ago the present writer, in common with many others, signed a memorial to our Government against the use of aircraft in war. The protest was ignored. But now, after some grim experience, the distinction is perhaps to be drawn. Would it not have been better, to cite a parallel instance, if the question as to the inhumanity of the submarine had been tackled *before* it was proved so terrible a weapon against a maritime nation?

VII.

In fact, the most inept of all the objections raised against casuistry is the objection that it *imagines* non-existent cases.

¹ Liberalism in religion, as *e.g.* on the question of Sabbath observance, is quite as casuistical as was any legalistic system. *Cf.* the treatment of the subject in C. G. Montefiore's *Bible for Home Reading*, i. 87. It may be said that this fine Liberal casts out a lower casuistry by means of a higher casuistry. But his whole argument is casuistical, none the less. And the same is true of most non-legalistic definitions of what is and what is not an infringement of Sabbath rest.

If moral casuistry differs from the lawyer's, it is in this very quality of anticipation. The lawyer applies law to cases as they occur; the moral or philosophical casuist tries to define before the cases occur. This use of the imagination is one of the most valuable functions of casuistry. Fowler devotes a whole section to the office of imagination in morals.¹ He is specially good when discussing the imaginative element in sympathy in its relation to casuistry, which, by "imagining cases," fosters the faculty of entering into the circumstances and feelings of others. Kant would have us *generalise* our acts. Fowler agrees, but argues that we must also *specialise* them. "It is," says Fowler, "from neglect of the rule now under consideration that men are often so unjust to the moral sentiment which prevails in classes of society different from their own, or in other countries, or in other forms of civilisation. The peculiar circumstances of an age or country may often explain and justify its peculiar institutions; and even when they do not wholly justify, they may so extenuate them as to leave the critic no excuse for hasty and unqualified condemnation."²

Here—though, writing so long ago as 1894, Fowler does not use the now fashionable term—we find ourselves in the realm of Pragmatism, with its fertile interest in opposed theories of truth, with its uncertainty as to absolute standards. Baldwin has a sentence on probabilism which he did not expand. "It is logically related to pragmatism."³ Now, the irreconcilable foe of casuistry must not only reject the metaphysics of pragmatism—in which rejection he would be right,—but he must exclude from his sympathy the "varieties of human experience" which are the foundation of humanism. For humanism is, essentially, nothing but a more pleasant term for casuistry. When Villemain was defending Pascal tooth and nail against "unworthy casuists," he represents his hero as burning with a sense of the "sublime uniformity of moral principle—a rule wholly independent of places, times, and

¹ Professor Gilbert Murray has said that: "The unwillingness to make imaginative effort is the prime cause of all decay in art." The same is true in other matters than art. The drama is reviving in the "problem" variety because it is becoming more willing to "make imaginative effort." The problem drama is indeed a branch of casuistry. Its frequent failure is due to its casuistry being bad and inexpert.

² *Principles of Morals* (ed. 1887), ii. 247, 288.

³ *Dictionary of Philosophy*, s.v. "Probabilism." In general it may be said that casuistry is a logical necessity of all those systems of ethics which depend on the estimate of values. These values cannot but be largely *personal*, and the estimate casuistical.

manners.”¹ Now, the pragmatic or humanistic casuistry disputes this. It denies that morality is independent of temporal or geographical conditions. It denies, moreover, that moral principle is formulable in terms which fail to pay regard to circumstances. And it feels the necessity of inquiring into the valid limitations of all general propositions, whether they be intellectual, moral, or dogmatic. Casuistry, so regarded, is both a justifiable discipline and a fruitful instrument for attaining truth.

The casuist, in this sense, is no enemy of the great principles. On the contrary, truly performed, his function is to safeguard and uphold the great principles. The casuist misconceives his part if he seeks to establish working *rules* for penitents or politicians. For the casuist must not aim at defining morals by setting up maxims, nor truth by propounding truths. The genuine casuist really wishes men both to do justly and to love mercy; to mete out due measure to the cruel and yet to show tenderness to all men. He really wishes men to be intellectually honest, to accept the established dogmas while recognising the possible limitations of their veracity. As the result of a clear examination of provisos, exceptions, and individualities, he may help to save the great principles themselves from being crushed out of existence by imperfections of human knowledge and the inherent inconsistencies of human nature.

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¹ Villemain's exaggerated assertion must not, however, lead us to the opposite extreme. For it is not without justification that President Wilson said: "Men have never before realised how little difference there was between right in one latitude and in another, under one sovereignty and under another" (*Times*, Dec. 28, 1918). The study of comparative religion is indeed a department of casuistry. But the study could not be *comparative* at all unless there was an implied recognition of the fundamental identities underlying all religions. Moreover, when we speak generally of the *differences* between men's consciences, we must not forget that the resultant *agreement* is equally real. The fact seems to be that the great agreement which does undoubtedly ensue out of the struggle between various ideals is, in large measure, due to the existence of those various ideals. The clash of consciences leads to the triumph of Conscience.

THE FINANCIAL DANGER.

SIR GEORGE PAISH.

IN the HIBBERT JOURNAL of last January Dr L. P. Jacks directed attention to the "very formidable risk in the general economic situation which, if not guarded against, may prove the downfall of our hopes, however bright these might otherwise be," and raised the question, "Can international action be taken for minimising the danger, by pooling the risk and by pooling resources to meet it?" To answer this question Dr Jacks put forward tentative proposals by which the war indebtedness would be placed under international management and control, the necessary power being vested in a Board of Trustees, and suggested that the present financial danger could be met by some form of international insurance.

Although the suggested plan has been much criticised, informed people are well aware that the ideas underlying the proposal are sound, and that the present financial danger necessitates co-operative action by all the nations, not only in the interests of the belligerent countries which have so severely suffered from the war, but also of the nations which have gained so much financial advantage from the war. A breakdown in world credit would injure every nation, belligerent and neutral alike.

The need of such a course as that suggested by Dr Jacks is further evident from the criticisms to which the financial and economic clauses of the Peace Treaty have been universally subjected. There is now a consensus of opinion in all nations that the hope that the Entente nations will be able to readjust their finances and to get rid of their excessive burdens by exacting immense payments from the enemy country is illusory. At all times it is difficult for a nation to repay its debts to other nations, and in practice such repayments are rarely made. Most nations which owe money to

other countries not only never repay the capital they have borrowed, but the annual sums needed to make interest payments are usually retained by a process of new borrowing. To remit from one country to another the vast sums which Germany will have to remit in order to meet unlimited demands made upon her for reparation and indemnity would under ordinary conditions in a time of peace and of competition be physically impossible, while in the circumstances in which Germany is now placed, without any appreciable amount of raw material, with inadequate supplies of food, with her organisation for the sale of her goods in foreign countries destroyed, and with no credit, it is quite out of the question. Consequently, before long the nations must discover some other means of maintaining the world's credit and obtaining the funds for the work of reparation than those contained in the proposal to make Germany pay a practically unlimited sum.

In the following plan I have endeavoured to take into account all the circumstances of the situation and to discover a feasible solution of the very grave problem which now confronts the nations, and which, as Dr Jacks has pointed out, can only be met by co-operative action. The plan was drafted as soon as it was possible to discover the main elements in the situation left behind by the war, in order to facilitate the work of international reconstruction, and thus to diminish the grave political, economic, and financial dangers which delay is entailing.

In these days the world's wellbeing is based upon credit—individual, national, and international—to such an extent, that if credit is once allowed to break down, the bankruptcy of even the richest Powers would be inevitable, and the trade of the whole world would become disorganised.

At the moment when the maintenance of credit is of such vital importance, the belligerent nations are not only immersed in debt falling due for payment from day to day, but the various classes in each country are showing strong objection to submit to the burdens which these debts impose upon them.

And in this critical situation the question of raising the loans needed to make good the war damage in France, Belgium, Servia, etc., must be considered forthwith, as the longer the delay in starting the work of reconstruction, the greater will be the disorganisation and dissatisfaction in these countries, and the greater the danger to social order and established Government.

Thus the situation is that already the belligerent nations of Europe are almost overwhelmed with war debts, both home

and foreign, and that they, in conjunction with the United States and other countries, must now further pledge their credit in order to provide the money needed to repair the damage of the war until Germany is in a position to pay as much of the bill as it is within her power to pay, which she can do only gradually and by instalments spread over a long period of years.

No nation is rich enough or possesses an income large enough to pay such a sum for indemnity to other nations as the Entente Powers now owe to their own people and to foreign countries, and it is improbable that Germany will be able to pay more than the full cost of repairing and restoring the damage committed by her armies, navies, and aeroplanes, even provided that that work is performed with the utmost economy. Indeed, Germany's ability to make this limited payment by instalments over a long period of years is doubtful, having regard to the conditions under which her international trade must be carried on. A nation cannot pay very large sums to other nations if it is unable to sell its goods abroad; and even when it is able to sell its goods freely abroad, it can only remit the proceeds of the goods it sells in so far as they are in excess of the sums it has to pay for produce which circumstances compel it to buy from other lands.

In considering the possibility of obtaining a large indemnity from Germany, it is essential to recollect that even in normal times a large part of the German people is on or below the poverty line, and that the surplus incomes of the remainder are required mainly in order to provide the necessary capital for the yearly additions to population, as an increasing population necessarily needs more houses, factories, etc. In the past, after supplying her home needs, Germany has never had a surplus for investment in other lands of more than about £50,000,000 in any one year. Under present conditions of diminished agricultural production, the loss of a large part of her raw materials, high prices of foreign food and raw material, and world hostility to the idea of purchasing German goods in exchange for the food, raw material, and semi-manufactured articles she needs, it is difficult to discover how Germany can sell yearly to other countries even £50,000,000 of goods and services (over and above those exported in exchange for the supplies of foreign food and raw material needed to keep the German people from starvation) for the purpose of paying for the war damage. When the cost of living falls to a more normal level, and when the world is willing to buy German goods with greater freedom, Germany's

power to make payment for war damage will expand, and doubtless after a time she will be able to remit abroad annually a substantial sum in order to meet the cost of reparation.

In brief, although it may be possible ultimately to secure from Germany a sum that will pay a large part of the cost of repairing the physical damage caused by the war, there is no possibility of Germany ever being in a position to pay a sum sufficient to redeem the war debts of the Entente Powers.

Furthermore, it should be clearly understood that inasmuch as Germany cannot provide for a great many years the money needed to meet even a substantial portion of the war damage, and as her credit under existing conditions is not nearly good enough to permit her to borrow the money from other countries, the credit of the Entente nations and of the United States will have to be utilised for this purpose in order that the international loans which must be issued from time to time to provide the money for the work of repair may be raised. Moreover, credit must be supplied without delay to enable the industries of Europe to be restarted, and thus to supply the people of many countries with the means of paying for the food and clothing they so urgently need.

Thus, extended as the credit of the Entente nations is already, it must be further extended in order to repair the war damage, and to remove the dangers which would arise if great numbers of people are without homes, without employment, and without money.

Then, what needs to be done to avert the grave dangers that threaten the world?

The credit obtained by the Entente nations consists of both internal and external debt.

The internal debt constitutes seven-eighths of the total, the external debt the remaining eighth. To meet interest and sinking fund on the home debts will be a difficult task, but it is much simpler than the task of meeting the foreign debts at maturity, or even of redeeming them over a period of years.

The internal debts have been incurred mainly to persons within the various States who have made war profits, or who, in spite of the high cost of living during the war, have been able to keep their expenditure below their incomes, and so to lend unprecedented sums to their respective Governments. Inasmuch as the aggregate wealth of the Entente nations has not increased, but rather has decreased, this means that a large part of the wealth and income of the belligerent nations during the war has been heavily mortgaged to that part of their own citizens which was able to make war profits or savings, or which

invested in Government securities the proceeds of property and securities sold to persons who succeeded in making war profits and in effecting war savings. The wealth and income of the nations are reduced by the creation of the internal debts, but the wealth and income of individuals who have made no profits from the war, or who have been unable to effect savings, are reduced to the extent that the incomes of persons who have accumulated war profits or savings are increased. If the whole burden of the internal war debts could be placed on the persons whose war profits and war savings have directly or indirectly enabled the internal war debts to be subscribed, then these debts would easily be provided for or liquidated.

But great as are the difficulties in connection with the internal debts, they are small in comparison with the task of redeeming the foreign debts. Very large amounts of foreign debt have been raised by various members of the Entente, which will experience great difficulty in repaying them because of the injuries they have suffered in preventing the whole world from being dominated by a military autocracy.

It is true that France, Russia, Italy, Belgium, Servia, Rumania, and Great Britain eventually will receive substantial compensation for the actual damage they have suffered. But they cannot receive this compensation from Germany herself for many years, and one must not fail to note that any credit they will obtain in anticipation of its receipt will be needed for the purpose of restoring to them their normal productive power. Moreover, the receipt of this money will not remove the injury to which they are now subjected from their diminished productive power on the one hand and the great advance in the cost of living on the other, an advance which is greatly to the advantage of the countries which supply the European nations with food and raw material, and to the disadvantage of the countries which need, owing to their own reduced output, to buy greater quantities of food and raw material than ever.

Prior to the war France was calculated to possess about £1,500,000,000 of foreign investments. The considerable part of these investments that was in Russia is now of little value, and will probably bring no income for a number of years. Of the remainder, some have been sold to the United States and to other countries during the war, while the balance, being invested for the most part in loans at fixed interest, is yielding but a very small real income, as the debtor countries are able to pay interest in high-priced commodities. Before the war France was deriving an income from interest on her foreign

investments of about £75,000,000 a year. This income is now replaced by a substantial outgo for interest on the large foreign war debt she has incurred during the war. To meet this situation, France is calculating upon receiving from Germany a sum for reparation and for indemnity that will enable her to redeem the whole of her foreign indebtedness and a large part of her internal debt. Unfortunately, this hope is clearly delusive, and in the absence of a comprehensive plan for meeting the cost of repairing the war damage not only will France be unable to obtain from Germany any sum whatever to meet her foreign indebtedness, but she will be unable even to obtain any appreciable sum for some time to come for making good her war damage.

Indeed, the possibility of getting any substantial sum from Germany depends upon the willingness of the whole world to lend its combined credit, as well as upon causing the German people to participate in the plan to the extent which their resources and their power to sell their produce abroad will permit. If the demands upon Germany are excessive, and the German people have no stimulus or inducement to work hard to meet them, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain any substantial sum from Germany. On the other hand, if they are moderate, and the German people themselves are convinced of their moderation, then a very substantial sum can be obtained. The one method means not only the bankruptcy of Germany, but of France also; the other plan will set France upon her feet again.

The position of Italy is much the same as that of France. Indeed, having regard to Italy's resources, it is somewhat worse. At the outbreak of war Italy was indebted to the world for a substantial amount, and, on the top of this, she has contracted during the war period a foreign indebtedness of about £600,000,000. Under existing conditions it is quite impossible for Italy to pay the interest on this large amount of money, because she has neither the power to export nor has she a sufficient income from tourists or from her sons abroad to provide the necessary exchange. Italy also is expecting to obtain an indemnity from Germany and Austria large enough not merely to repair the damage of the war, but to pay off a considerable part of her debt, both home and foreign. But just as the French hopes of a huge payment from Germany are obviously delusive, so are those of Italy. Therefore, as regards Italy also it is essential that a comprehensive plan should be arranged to enable her to repair her war damage and to reduce her foreign indebtedness to

reasonable limits, otherwise the bankruptcy of Italy will be inevitable.

It is obvious that Russia is unlikely to obtain from Germany a sufficient payment for reparation that will enable her to rebuild her towns, villages, and farms, as well as to pay off the foreign indebtedness she has created during the war. Prior to the war Russia was already heavily indebted to other nations, more particularly to France and Germany. It is calculated that the extent of her pre-war foreign obligations of one kind and another was not far short of £1,000,000,000, and on the top of this indebtedness now comes the £700,000,000 or £800,000,000 of foreign debt she has incurred during the war. Even were Germany able to pay the whole cost of the damage inflicted upon Russia, the money would be needed for rebuilding devastated districts and would not be available for the payment of Russia's foreign debt. Consequently, not only are the nations which have supplied money to Russia during the war affected by her bankruptcy, but the countries which had lent her so much money prior to the war are very seriously injured, more particularly France and Germany. It is obvious that Russia cannot possibly extricate herself from the slough of debt, both home and foreign, in which she is submerged, without a great deal of help from outside; and it is equally obvious that until the finances of Russia are thoroughly reorganised and her credit re-established there will be little prospect of any permanent pacification of the country.

A comprehensive plan of world finance should enable all these things to be done and the finances of Russia to be placed on a sound and strong basis.

It is scarcely necessary to refer to the financial situation of Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, Greece, and the other minor belligerents. It is obvious that unless means are found for making good the war damage in these countries, their condition will be deplorable, and they will not be able to repay any part of the substantial sums of money lent to them. Here again a comprehensive plan of world finance is essential to prevent the complete breakdown of credit.

The situation of Great Britain essentially differs from that of her Allies. Prior to the war Great Britain had invested abroad a sum of about £4,000,000,000, bringing to her an income of somewhat over £200,000,000. During the war she will have realised securities and borrowed abroad directly and indirectly a sum of about £2,000,000,000. On the other hand, she has lent abroad during the war a corresponding

amount to her Allies and Dominions. Of this total about £600,000,000 has been lent to Russia, over £500,000,000 to France, about £400,000,000 to Italy, £150,000,000 to other nations, and considerably over £200,000,000 to the Dominions. Inasmuch as in any case it will not be possible to obtain a larger sum from Germany than will meet the cost of repairing the physical damage caused by the war, the various countries to which Great Britain lent this large sum of money will not be able to meet their debt by means of these reparation payments. Thus as matters now stand Great Britain is faced by the prospect that she has incurred obligations to foreign countries in order to finance her Allies and Dominions, and that, as the latter are not and will not be in a position to redeem their loans, she must meet her foreign obligations out of her own resources. The reason for Great Britain's action, of course, was that her credit was better than that of her Allies and Dominions, and consequently had to be utilised in order to enable the latter to purchase the munitions and supplies essential to victory. While this is the explanation, it does not alter the fact that the British people will be compelled to devote a very large part of their surplus wealth for many years to come to the work of redeeming their foreign debt, and that their activities as world banker will be severely restricted.

In all, France, Italy, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, Greece, and one or two other minor Powers, together with the British Dominions, have borrowed abroad for war purposes about £3,000,000,000 in the aggregate, excluding duplications, and are now quite unable to repay this great sum of money. (Including duplications the amount is about £4,000,000,000.) They would, however, be able to repay and provide interest upon a smaller sum.

The belligerent nations that have come through the war, not only without discomfort but with advantage, are the United States and Japan.

The American people during the war have bought a very considerable amount of American securities previously held by foreign investors, redeemed their floating debt to Europe, and, in addition, have lent abroad during the war over £2,000,000,000 of money.

The financial situation of Japan has also been substantially improved by the war.

This, in brief, is the situation of the world at the present time. The war has greatly injured the well-being and the credit of the belligerent Continental nations, both Entente and enemy; it has crippled Great Britain in her capacity of world

banker by reason of the aid she has given to the Entente nations in helping them to finance their expenditures; while it has brought advantage to the United States and Japan, of the belligerent nations, and a very large addition to the wealth of neutral nations, more especially of Spain, Argentina, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries.

Careful study of the situation reveals one way of escape from the present situation, and one only. All the nations must pool their credit in order to overcome the danger, each in proportion to its ability.

A long and a very strong loan of some £5,000,000,000 will be needed for the purpose of repairing the war damage, of reorganising the finances and currency of Russia, and of funding the foreign debts of the Entente nations, amounting in the aggregate to about £3,000,000,000 after duplications are excluded.

The first consideration in issuing a large loan to investors in all parts of the world is *security*. Can the loan be made so secure that the bonds will be accepted everywhere as absolutely safe? In order to meet this test—and it is one that cannot be avoided—it is obvious that the loan must be guaranteed severally and jointly by all the Powers, in order that, if any one Power should fail to provide its quota of interest and sinking fund, the rest would jointly accept responsibility for the deficiency.

No one will doubt that America's credit is fully strong enough to guarantee the due payment of principal and interest to the extent of 20 per cent. of a loan of £5,000,000,000; that is to say, America would make herself responsible for the interest and principal upon £1,000,000,000 of the proposed loan. Against this obligation America would receive £2,000,000,000 of bonds in repayment of the debt due to her by the Entente nations.

Again, it is obvious that Great Britain's credit would be amply sufficient to induce investors to subscribe another 20 per cent. or £1,000,000,000 of the proposed loan on the understanding that the British people would themselves pay interest and principal upon this amount. This would mean that out of the loan of £5,000,000,000 Great Britain would receive £2,000,000,000 in repayment of the debt to her of the Entente nations and of the Dominions. Of this she would hand over £1,000,000,000 to the United States in repayment of the debts she has incurred to the American people, and would retain in her own coffers that part of the other £1,000,000,000 which she has supplied out of her own funds or by sales of

securities abroad. On the other hand, she would have to provide interest and sinking fund out of her own income to the joint purse on £1,000,000,000 of the proposed new bonds.

In other words, America and Great Britain would each contribute £1,000,000,000 for the maintenance of the world's credit.

Of the proposed loan of £5,000,000,000 it is evident that Germany would be able to bear the responsibility for interest and principal on £1,000,000,000, although it is doubtful if the world would give her credit, either directly or indirectly, for a larger sum. Still, with America and Great Britain jointly responsible, the world's investors and bankers should certainly make no difficulty in accepting the guarantee of Germany for 20 per cent. of the loan, together with her joint guarantee for the remainder of the loan. It is true that Germany will, for some years at any rate, find great difficulty in paying for her imports by means of her exports. Nevertheless, as time goes on and the German people show by their actions their loyal acceptance of and their complete adherence to the principles laid down at the Peace Conference in Paris, their trade should show steady expansion, and they should be able to provide the £50,000,000 a year for interest and sinking fund without undue strain.

Thus, of the proposed loan 20 per cent. of the interest and sinking fund would be provided by America, 20 per cent. by Great Britain, and 20 per cent. by Germany, making 60 per cent. in all, and £3,000,000,000 out of the £5,000,000,000 needed would be thus provided for.

Of the balance, France should have no difficulty in supplying interest and principal in respect of 10 per cent. or £500,000,000, calling for an annual sum of £25,000,000 a year. Inasmuch as the foreign debt of France is likely to be nearly £1,500,000,000 before the expenditure in connection with the war comes to an end, this arrangement would relieve the French people of the burden of providing either interest or principal on nearly £1,000,000,000 of money, irrespective of the fact that the physical damage suffered by France from the war will be made good out of the proceeds of the loan at no cost to France whatever. In other words, France will derive advantage under the present plan to the extent of not very far short of £2,000,000,000.

When peace is restored and order re-established in Russia the Russian people should be easily able to meet the interest and principal on 10 per cent. or £500,000,000 of the loan. The foreign debt incurred by Russia during the war is about

£700,000,000, and such an arrangement would mean that Russia would be forgiven about £200,000,000 of her foreign debt, and would, at the same time, be given the means of repairing the war damage sustained by her civilian population. When a settled Government is re-established, Russia will probably recover with great rapidity both from the effects of the war and from the present disorganisation.

The amount of foreign debt incurred by Italy during the war is about £600,000,000, an amount which would severely strain Italy's powers to provide interest and principal. It is desirable, indeed essential, that Italy's foreign war debt should be reduced to about £200,000,000 in order to bring the total within her powers of payment. That is to say, Italy's responsibility for the proposed loan of £5,000,000,000 should be not more than 4 per cent., to involve an annual charge for interest and principal of £10,000,000.

The other great Power whose future would be in jeopardy in the event of a complete breakdown in the world's credit is Japan, notwithstanding her renewed prosperity. During the war Japan has rendered valuable assistance to the Entente cause in the Far East, and the Japanese people have supplied large quantities of munitions to the Entente nations. Consequently, they have made large profits from their international trade. With these profits they have bought back a considerable amount of the debt they incurred abroad during the Russo-Japanese War, and have made substantial loans to the Entente Powers, more especially to Great Britain, and have added some £50,000,000 to the stock of gold in the bank of Japan. In considering Japan's participation in the guarantee of an international loan it is essential to recollect that she is a relatively poor country, and that the rates of wages and the standard of living of the Japanese people are very low. Nevertheless, it is of the utmost importance to Japan herself that she should assist in preventing a breakdown of credit, which could not fail to bring disastrous consequences to the Japanese people. Taking all the circumstances into account, Japan even during the next few years should find no difficulty in providing interest and sinking fund on about £200,000,000, or 4 per cent. of the proposed loan—that is, provided that Japan is given every opportunity for developing her trade with Asia in general and with Siberia in particular.

After the great Powers have done all they can reasonably be expected to do, it will still be necessary for the smaller nations, which will so greatly benefit from the new principles of world government, to assist in the work of supplying the

credit now required to permit the war damage to be repaired and to make provision for the repayment of the foreign debts of the Entente Powers. Thus Belgium during the war has accumulated a foreign debt of about £300,000,000, an amount which would undoubtedly prove a serious burden if the Belgian people were left alone to provide interest and principal upon it. Belgium could, however, reasonably be expected to meet interest and principal on £50,000,000, or 1 per cent. of the proposed total loan.

Again, it is obvious that Greece, in view of the very substantial additions to her territory and to her income which these extensions will bring, would not experience much difficulty in providing interest and principal upon a further 1 per cent. of the loan, or £50,000,000, if the foreign debt she has incurred during the war were paid off out of the loan.

On the whole, India has derived substantial economic benefit from the war, and will derive very great advantage from the maintenance of world credit. Practically the whole of the capital needed to increase the well-being of the Indian people by the construction of railways, public works, etc., has been supplied from abroad, almost entirely from Great Britain, and in the event of a breakdown in world credit the well-being of India would receive a blow which would probably effectually stop the progress of that country. Therefore the people of India would act wisely in agreeing to participate in the responsibility for the new international loan to the extent of £100,000,000 or 2 per cent., involving a service for interest and principal of £5,000,000 a year.

The Colonies of the British Empire possess almost unlimited resources of undeveloped wealth, and as time goes on will grow rapidly, both in population and in well-being. Probably no countries depend for their future so much as Canada, Australia, and South Africa upon the maintenance of credit. Before the expenditures connected with the war come to an end it is evident that these Dominions will have borrowed from the Mother Country a sum of £250,000,000. The burden of this debt for war purposes would be serious; still, Canada, Australia, and South Africa should each be able to meet the interest and principal upon £50,000,000, or 1 per cent. of the proposed loan. In other words, this debt of £250,000,000 should be cancelled and replaced by one of £150,000,000 placed equally upon the three countries.

The neutral nations of Europe and of South America have derived very substantial advantage from the war. Spain, Holland, Denmark, and Argentina have specially benefited.

Moreover, the defeat of an aggressive Power intent upon acquiring additional territories has freed them from a menace which none realised more than they. No one can doubt that if the enemy had succeeded in winning the war Holland would have been added to the German Empire, and it is by no means improbable that Denmark would also have been acquired. Under the circumstances each of these countries might reasonably be asked to assume responsibility for £50,000,000, or 1 per cent. of the loan, which would involve a charge upon them of only £2,500,000 a year.

Norway and Sweden have also derived financial advantage from the war; and inasmuch as the League of Nations will now give them complete security from all foreign danger, these two countries combined should, in proportion to their population, find no difficulty in being jointly responsible for 1 per cent., or £50,000,000, of the International Loan.

The financial position of Spain has been practically transformed by the war. Whereas before the war that country had difficulty in meeting its foreign obligations and the peseta was at a discount, it has during the war not only accumulated a vast amount of gold but it has purchased a substantial amount of foreign securities. Out of the much greater income which this additional wealth should bring to Spain, that country should have no difficulty in assuming responsibility for 1 per cent., or £50,000,000, of the Loan.

Of the many countries which have so greatly benefited from the world system of credit Argentina is one of the most prominent, for practically all her railways, towns, harbours, and docks have been built and her farms and industries developed with foreign capital. In future Argentina will continue to depend both upon Europe and upon the United States for the greater part of the capital needed to provide for the expansion of her production and the equipment of her new populations. Hence a breakdown of credit could not fail to have disastrous consequences for a country so absolutely dependent upon its maintenance. Argentina has derived substantial advantage from the sale of her produce at high prices, and her credit is now strong enough and her income large enough to undertake the responsibility for the remaining 1 per cent., or £50,000,000.

In this manner the world can provide security, interest, and sinking fund for the loan of £5,000,000,000 so urgently needed to provide for the reparation of the damage caused by the war and to redeem and refund the *foreign* debts which the Entente nations have incurred through the war. Should

the amount required for these purposes, as well as for restarting the industries of Europe, be greater than £5,000,000,000, the percentages for which the various countries accept responsibility would be maintained, but the amounts which these percentages involve would be increased.

The proposed loan would be secured upon the wealth of practically the whole world, and would consequently be the strongest security that the human mind can devise. Such a loan should be made free of all taxation in every country, and should find a ready market the world over. Probably it could be placed at a rate of interest of only 4 per cent. A sinking fund of 1 per cent. should be at once set up which would raise the sum required for interest and principal to 5 per cent. The loan would be exceedingly attractive to bankers as well as to investors.

The bonds would not be equal in value to gold for exchange purposes, as demand for gold in every country is practically unlimited when the exchange admits of gold imports, whereas the power to sell even an international bond of the strongest description is necessarily limited by the ability and willingness of investors and bankers to purchase it. Nevertheless, the bonds should be of value for exchange purposes as a supplement to gold.

In brief, the existing financial situation of the world demands that comprehensive measures shall be taken forthwith to place matters upon a basis so strong that the present grave danger will not only be averted, but will entirely disappear.

With regard to the internal debts of the nations, these must be settled after the manner that each nation considers desirable. Nevertheless, just as in international affairs the countries that have made profits out of the war must now contribute to the work of restoring and strengthening the world's credit both in their own and in the general interest, so in national affairs the persons who have gained financial advantage from the war must contribute liberally to the work of restoring national credit and enabling the nations to bear the heavy burdens left by the war in such a way that their progress shall not only be unhampered but shall be stimulated.

GEORGE PAISH.

LONDON,

MEMORIALS OF THE FALLEN: SERVICE OR SACRIFICE?

PROFESSOR W. R. LETHABY.

THE other day I was asked some questions on the cost of stained glass, as it was proposed to put a stained-glass window as a memorial in a village Wesleyan chapel. Another memorial has been mentioned to me: "the form decided on is the replica of some old village cross"; and yet another was to be a "runic cross." The spirit of the inquiries was entirely wholesome and sweet, but it raised (as it will in the minds of crotchety people, "who never agree with what they don't propose themselves") a whole flight of preliminary questions and doubts as to ultimate possibilities. There are thousands of other cases where like questions are being asked without our being ready with considered replies. As usual it will be muddle. Again the generous people are untaught; again they are to sacrifice before an idol, or a whole row of idols.

Is it necessary, is it what the fallen themselves would have wished, that four and a half years of war and destruction shall be followed by a great outpouring of unproductive, and indeed futile, labour? Must a sort of murder be followed by a sort of suicide?

The problem as a whole in its great mass needs thinking over and out, and it would be well if the intelligent people of the universities, churches, and councils would consider it and take the responsibility of giving some teaching. Have the universities no national functions? It seems that millions of pounds are again to be wasted, and at such a time, in doing what we at most can least well do. Sometimes, indeed and alas! it may be spent in further vulgarising our ancient churches. Meanwhile Englishmen and heroes have too few houses to live in, and too little vital and reproductive work to do. Why

should it be unmonumental to provide some of these? Billiard-marking and diamond-cutting will not be enough to employ all who come back. Would it not be possible to direct some of the memorial streams to irrigating truly productive work? The best of all memorials would be those which helped speedily to organise the drifting masses of men who are returning to *promises*, and the unproductive monuments will not do that.

There is a feeling in the air that we ought to offer pure sacrifice for the fallen, and that there is some meanness in making memorials serve a useful purpose—that we must advertise our regret and compassion in lavish oblations of marble, brass, and glass. Then there are artists and firms all ready to provide the expected right things; but we must remember that these are the priests who live by the sacrifices, “thrusting their forks into the cauldron.” It is in the nature of things that artists should be chiefly interested in their own matters, and we can hardly expect a general theory from them unless they were called together in consultation, when they would be quite equal to giving disinterested advice. What we most need is some such calling together for discussion. If we could hold a meeting of the fallen and put some suggestions before them, is it the brass and glass that they would choose? We might readily find out with a high degree of probability by holding a meeting of the maimed and injured and asking them what their fallen comrades would have liked—this or that?

This idea of a stone sacrifice is very largely a modern development. Of course there have “always” been monumental memorials, but they were generally direct records, a writing on a wall, or they were tombs. Now, tombs in antiquity were not simply monuments to the dead; they were eternal houses for those who were in some ghostly way living another kind of life. They were not mere memory memorials.

More self-conscious memorial monuments and pompous tombs came in with the Hellenistic decline. The great “Mausoleum” of the semi-oriental satrap was soon followed by huge trophy monuments, triumphal arches, and sculptured memorial pillars. All these are heathen, imperial, and part of the apparatus of hypnotism by pomp.

On the other hand, great and serious works of service have generally been associated with the thought of memorial purpose. It was known that only life can ensure further life: only living grain can fructify.

Pericles rebuilt the sacred high city of Athens as a

memorial of the Persian War. Alexander founded Alexandria as a memorial to himself. S. Sophia, Constantinople, was in some degree a memorial of the putting down of the Nika riots. So our own wise Alfred re-founded London after withstanding the Danes. Most of the great works of men have been memorials, and all the greatest memorials have been aids to life. The earliest churches were martyr memorials.

In the Middle Ages the favourite memorial was abbey founding, and abbeys were experiments in community life. At the Renaissance time colleges, schools, almshouses were built. "Almshouses": the very words are memorially beautiful if we had not starved the meaning, so thin, bony and grim—cold as charity. Of modern-time works Waterloo Bridge is very far the finest memorial we have; indeed, it is in a different category from "memorials proper," and is in its way perfect. Again, the Albert Hall is as much better than the Albert Memorial as it is more serviceable. Trafalgar Square is at least superior to the Nelson Column. Only reality can give the true monumental note.

If we think again of our need and purpose, there is an enormous volume of noble constructive work which is necessary to the life of the people, works from those of a national scale down to those suitable for our villages.

The nation might consider some such schemes as the following:—

1. Town and village re-building and re-enlivening. A general effort after health, joy, and beauty; a policy of weal in place of "wealth," festivals, folk-schools, eisteddfods, stadiums.

2. The establishment of a dozen new universities of experimental types, recognising crafts, art, and all kinds of research, production, making, and doing.

3. National old-age hospitals in place of the feared and hateful workhouse infirmaries.

4. Country redemption and general tidying up, burying old tins, burning old paper, and tearing down insulting advertisements.

5. Making the railway system rational, efficient, and orderly: our stations and station-yards must be nearly the worst in the world.

6. An Irish Channel tunnel and finely constructed railway to a port on the Atlantic. A really worthy gateway to the West, a British Appian Way.

7. The setting up of a Ministry for Civilisation, which would recognise the need for national story, music, drama,

and art, and give some attention to our wretched coins, stamps, public heraldry, and "brilliant ceremonies."

8. The re-building of the greater part of London.

9. The embanking and guiding our over-flooding rivers, and planting the wasteful hedges with fruit trees.

10. The organising of summer camps attached to all large towns, where some of the experience gained during the war might be maintained.

Every county might experiment in building a new town. Every town might throw out a garden suburb. Every village might build at least one stout and neat little house which might be let to someone who has suffered. It would be perfectly easy to put a worthy commemorative inscription and list of names on such a building. Organised labour could make use of the memorial motive in founding a town for craft teaching and industrial research, also for experiments in well living in small houses. The ideal is certainly the house which could be worked without slavery and without the greasy waste and hidden squalor of rich houses. How best to live with the least consumption is an aim which might safely be put before all people when a time comes for considering possible ideals in civilisation. Here indeed would be a fair field for the play of our competitive energies. We need a practice of economic experiment and research, health laboratories, group living, community hospitality, better cooking, and some human amusements which don't pay dividends. The material appliances of our civilisation are altogether inadequate. We badly need Wisdom in her works as well as in her words. We have to think of civilisation as a whole, as an ambition, as experiment. If we could establish a wisdom council on this one object of making worthy memorials the precedent might widen, and it might at last be remembered that even Government must recognise that it has to be more than an "administration." Some day when we have learnt not to slay ideals with our "sense of humour" we may find it desirable to have a Minister for Civilisation.

The ever-accelerating momentum of modern life — or existence—has passed into eccentric orbits, and we seem to prefer to patch wreckage rather than to make a plain way. A special effort is necessary to find the bare data for rational production. It is hardly possible to get it understood that a "work of art" is not a design thrown off by a genius, but it is a piece of honest work consecrated to a noble purpose. At least a work of art implies workmanship. Labour of course must be cast into appropriate forms, but the craftsmen saw to that

before "design" became the tastes and whims of middlemen. We have to wake to the understanding that nobody really cares for "art" sterilities, and we are not even able to do them speciously well. After the mayor's speech at the unveiling function we turn our backs on our monuments, and never speak of them again; except of some which we make into whetstones to sharpen our wits, or rather our tongues.

Those strange peoples the ancients made memorials simply and directly, building their hearts into them. We have heart, too, but not frankness; we seek manner, not speech; and we spend our strength in preliminary anxieties, so that the works themselves are born tired.

The very names we call the "styles" confess all. Designs in Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Gothic, Elizabethan, and Georgian styles are only waxworks in a chamber of horrors.

Ornamental design is dealing with signs and symbols, the saying of something in another mode of language. Our hope in some abstract beauty which shall say nothing, being without natural affection, meaning, feeling, heart or head, is altogether vain. These designs in the "grand manner" are pompous nullities, which only advertise that dulling of the spirit we call education. In seeking the beautiful nothing we seek a ghost which is not there. May we not sometime learn from our failures, and so make these, too, of worth? Must hope be always the bud of disappointment? A designer takes infinite pains to be quite safe and non-committal, and then committees sit on the "design" till it has been finally made dull and dead. Nothing living can pass through the torture of anxious committees. In a work of art courage is needed and an untired mind in the worker. Every fine work is the embodied enthusiasm of maker-poets—we cannot take fire from the cold ashes of committee compromises or the reflected flames of stylists.

We are not ready to produce works of art consciously poetic—wherefore again let us do things obviously useful for life's sake. Above all things the returned soldiers, or their widows and mothers when they return no more, need houses. Would not a pleasant, tidy little house in every village bearing on a panel, MEMORIAL COTTAGE, and other words and names, be the most touching, significant, and beautiful of all possible monuments?

W. R. LETHABY.

HARTLEY WINTNEY, HANTS.

FREEDOM AND GROWTH.

EDMOND HOLMES.

I BELIEVE that human nature, in all its length and breadth and depth and height, comes under the master law of growth. I also believe that the spirit of man is, ideally and potentially, free. How can I reconcile these beliefs? Do they not flatly contradict one another? Is not growth a movement towards a predetermined form? And if the goal of growth is predetermined, what place is there for freedom in the process? There is only one way of escape from this impasse. I must so interpret each belief as to show that it is dependent for its own inner meaning on the truth of the other. I must devise a theory of growth which will countenance and even postulate the idea of freedom. And I must devise a theory of freedom which will countenance and even postulate the idea of growth. If each of these ventures is successful, the two will no doubt converge on a common goal. Meanwhile, as I cannot embark on both simultaneously, I will begin with the problem of freedom.

With consciousness comes the sense of freedom; and with the sense of freedom comes the sense of responsibility.

Antithetical to and correlative with the idea of freedom is that of necessity. As consciousness, in the life of man, seems to be slowly emerging from the depths of unconsciousness, so freedom seems to be slowly extricating itself from the enveloping network of necessity.

To think rationally about freedom is well-nigh impossible. For the function of reason is to discover the all-pervading, all-controlling order in Nature, which it begins (unknown to itself) by postulating; and freedom introduces into human life—the highest plane of Nature that is known to man—an element of apparent disorder, or at any rate of incalculableness, which threatens to stultify all the operations of reason, all its efforts

to understand the world. The result is that reason can find no place for freedom in its provisional scheme of things, and is therefore subconsciously prejudiced against it even before it begins to examine its title-deeds. Hence the inherent futility of the arguments against—and for—freedom. The history of philosophy tells us that the problem of freedom is at the centre of one of those whirlpools of controversy which are ever changing their scope and their position, but which continue to rotate with unabated energy and which seem as if they would never whirl themselves to rest. The problem has been again and again re-stated, but the solution of it has not been found. Each thinker in turn tries to untie the knot, and ends by cutting it. One subtle and insidious fallacy vitiates every argument that has ever been employed in this most barren of logomachies—the assumption that the question is open to discussion. One might as well try to prove or disprove the existence of colour on purely *a priori* grounds as ask, in disregard of the direct testimony of consciousness, whether freedom is or is not a vital attribute of the soul of man. All the arguments for freedom, though they may fill volumes, amount to no more than this: I feel that I am free; therefore I am free. And all the arguments against freedom, though they may fill hundreds of volumes, amount to no more than this: I can find no place for freedom in my theory of things; therefore I am not free.

Can the defender of freedom do more than plead the cogency of the sense of freedom? To defend freedom on metaphysical grounds, to pretend to fit it into a reasoned scheme of things, is to play into the hands of the determinists (as they call themselves). What really happens in the freewill controversy is that the sense of freedom holds the key to the position against a beleaguering host of theoretical objections. The argumentative defence of freedom should therefore limit itself in the first instance to an attempt to expose the fallacies of the determinists. Out of a critical study of their arguments a theory of things may evolve itself which will countenance freedom on dialectical grounds. But to begin by trying to prove that men are free agents is to assume by implication that the question is open to discussion, and in doing so to weaken the authority of the sense of freedom, and therefore to invalidate our claim to be free.

That the question cannot be discussed on its own merits is proved by the fact that in nine cases out of ten the corresponding controversy turns out to be a mere episode in the larger strife between the materialistic and the idealistic

tendencies of human thought. The Calvinist and the Mussulman, whose sole concern is for the power and glory of their supernatural God, do indeed regard man as the victim of a compulsion which is at once spiritual and quasi-mechanical. But, with these exceptions, determinism deprives man of freedom in the interest of material forces and physical laws. For, as a rule, the determinist approaches the problem of freedom from the standpoint of physical science. In doing so he necessarily prejudices the question; for physical science finds it needful to deprive the world of freedom (which would introduce utterly indeterminable factors into its problems) before it can even begin its appointed work. But it is not freedom only that physical science finds it needful to withdraw from Nature—or rather from that abstraction which it miscalls Nature,—but every spiritual quality. The result of this is that the triumph of determinism is as barren as it is cheap. The aim of determinism is to bind man's will in the chains of mechanical causation; but in the very act of being seized and fettered its victim escapes from its grasp. For the arguments by which it deprives me of freedom prove nothing except that I—the self, the living soul, the living will (for will is soul on the threshold of action)—have ceased to exist.

Even the determinism which, without actually breaking with the popular psychology, tends to regard every action as the resultant of motives, is, or at least may be, as destructive of man's personality as is the doctrine of human automatism. We do not need determinists to teach us that no man can act except from motives. The question is: where do these motives come from? From external sources only, or also from the inner life of the man who acts? The new English Dictionary defines determinism as "the philosophical doctrine that human action is not free but necessarily determined by motives which are regarded as external forces acting on the will." In this definition the word *external* is of cardinal importance. "External forces." Are any of the forces that act on the will wholly external to it? Can they be? Is it possible for a force to remain external to the will and yet to act on it? I doubt it. One knows from experience that every influence which comes or seems to come to a man from without is coloured and otherwise modified by the man's personality. Indeed, it is only by entering into quasi-chemical combination with a man's personality that an external influence can transform itself into a motive. And the same influence can transform itself into a thousand different motives by entering into combination

with a thousand different minds. The sight of a bottle of brandy is a strong temptation to one man, a matter of indifference to a second, a source of disgust to a third. It follows from these premises that if all motives are, as determinism assumes, external to *me*, *I* do not exist. For something of *me* (so vital is my connection with my environment) has immingled itself with each of the many motives that govern my conduct; and that something is abstracted from *me* whenever the motive in question is regarded as wholly external to my will. Therefore, when all my motives have been transformed by determinism into external forces of which I am the supposed victim, nothing of *me* remains. But if *I* do not exist, it is a waste of time to debate the question of my freedom. My will is an essential aspect of myself. If I am nothing but a shorthand symbol, my will is obviously non-existent, and as such can neither be bond nor free.

There is one aspect of the problem which the disputants on both sides are apt to lose sight of. As freedom and necessity are antithetical and therefore correlative terms, the vanishing point of either idea must needs be the vanishing point of the other. It follows that if there is no such thing as freedom in Nature, there can be no such thing as necessity. Determinism deludes itself when it claims to have demonstrated the unreality of freedom. What it has really done, if its arguments are as conclusive as it believes them to be, is to cancel an entire category of human thought. But its arguments are inconclusive, in the sense that, the more triumphant is their vindication of necessity, the more effectually do they safeguard freedom. For wherever there is necessity there is constraint, and wherever there is constraint there is a constraining power. This power may itself be the victim of a higher necessity; but the chain of effect and efficient cause must lead us at last (ideally, if not actually) to a power which, having nothing beyond or outside it, is self-constrained and therefore free. Thus acceptance of the idea of necessity compels us, sooner or later, to recognise the *a priori* possibility (not to say necessity) of freedom.

Now, it is obvious that if the *a priori* possibility of freedom be conceded, Nature in the cosmic sense of the word, Nature in her totality, is free. For since her limits are presumably illimitable, since her being is presumably the all-in-all of existence, it is clear that she cannot be controlled by any superior power and that the end of her activities cannot be alien to herself. Though all lesser things be the victims of necessity, she at least is free. She at least is the arbiter of

her own destiny, the orderer of her own goings, the lord and giver of her own life.

But when we study the Universe, detail by detail, the freedom that belongs to the whole seems to vanish from our sight. No one would dream of saying that a cloud was free because it moved across the sky; that a stone was free because it rolled down the mountain side; that a flake of snow was free because it floated down to the ground; that a plant was free because it put forth leaf and flower and fruit. Nor need we go far to seek an explanation of what common-sense accepts as an obvious fact. For, in the first place, each detail in the complicated machinery of material existence acts under the stress and pressure of the whole. The proof of this statement rests with physical science, which is ever discovering new links in the chains of causation that bind each thing to all and all things to each. And, in the second place, the ends for which each particular thing is working lie beyond the scope of its own individual existence. Indeed, the ultimate end of its action may be said to coincide with the ultimate end of the Universe. Nor is it only in the lesser details of material Nature that necessity reigns supreme. As science advances from effect to cause, and from cause to law, freedom flies before it and finds no rest for her feet. The Dryads have long since left the woods, and the Naiads the streams; and the physical forces that have taken their place are to the full as blind and helpless as are even the least of the phenomena that are supposed to have been produced by their agency and to be governed by their laws. There are no limits to this process. Potentially, if not actually, science is master of the whole material universe. There are islands and continents which it has not yet had time to conquer; yet even on these it has landed and hoisted its flag, the flag of mechanical necessity and physical law.

Where, then, it will be asked, is freedom to be found? I answer, "At the heart of the Universe." The true self of Nature, the world seen as it really is, is free.

But what is at the heart of the Universe? What is the true self of Nature? What face does the world wear when seen as it really is? I have said that the free-will controversy is a mere episode in the larger strife between the materialistic and the idealistic tendencies of human thought. We can now see that this is so. The mind of man is so constituted that, if it tries to think of Nature as a whole, it must needs bring her being, just as it brings every typical aspect of her being, under the great law of polar opposition. What are the poles

of Nature's being? The history of philosophy tells us that there are two main systems or tendencies of speculative thought, whether quasi-scientific or popular,—materialism and idealism. The right name for idealism is of course spiritualism; but that word has unfortunately contracted other associations. The two philosophies agree on one point—that matter and spirit are the antithetical poles of Nature, and that one or other of these is the pole of intrinsic reality. Materialism holds that matter is real, and spirit phenomenal. Idealism holds that spirit is real, and matter phenomenal. If we are asked what we mean by *matter* and *spirit* respectively, we must say in the first place that we mean by each the opposite of the other. And if that answer is considered unsatisfactory, we must go on to say that, when we make our own experience our starting-point, the path of analysis takes us towards what is material, the path of synthesis towards what is spiritual. This is equivalent to saying that by matter (in the final sense of the word) we mean what is ultimate in analysis; by spirit (in the final sense of the word) what is ultimate in synthesis. For materialism, what is ultimate in analysis is absolutely real; for idealism, what is ultimate in synthesis is absolutely real.

What is ultimate in analysis? Who can say? At one time we flattered ourselves that we had got to bedrock, that in the atoms of the physicist we had discovered what we called "the bricks of the Universe." But of late years the bricks of the Universe have shown a tendency to melt away into electrons, into whirls of energy, into no one knows what. This, however, does not seriously disconcert the materialist. For materialism is the philosophy of the average man, so far as he is a conscious thinker, just as idealism is the philosophy of his buried life; and, as a conscious thinker, the average man, who is as a rule sense-bound, is content to believe in a general way that the path of analysis—analysis of his own sense-experience—is the pathway to reality, and to leave it to his confederate the physicist to follow that pathway to its goal. It might bewilder him to find that the more penetrative is our analysis of matter, the more immaterial (in the negative sense of the word) does matter tend to become. But, strong in his naïve belief in the intrinsic reality of the outward and visible world, he averts his eyes from the vista which scientific research, since the discovery of radium, has opened up to speculative thought.

In the idealistic philosophy the corresponding problem admits of an obvious though somewhat paradoxical solution. What is ultimate in synthesis is the Universe itself, Nature

in her totality, the All of Being, or whatever else we may please to call it, conceived of as an organic whole. Belief in the reality of spirit is belief in the organic unity of the Universe. Idealism stakes everything on the Universe being, in the last resort, a Cosmos, an ordered and unified whole; just as materialism stakes everything on its being, in the last resort, a Chaos, a dance of atoms, a whirlpool of force.

It would be beside my purpose to argue for or against the idealistic conception of the Universe. Suffice it to say that it is the only conception which countenances the idea of freedom. For materialism, the world of our experience is a complex of machinery; and in a mechanical world there is no place for freedom. But a mechanical world, though infinite in all its dimensions, is less than the Universe. For machinery is always the product and expression of a mind outside itself. Materialism knows nothing of a mind outside the world of our experience; but, in its place, it subjects the world to a blind force which it calls Necessity. Whether the complex of machinery in which we live and move is under the control of mind or in the grip of necessity, matters little from my present point of view. In either case it is less than the whole. And when we speak of the Universe we mean the whole, or we mean nothing. If the Universe is really the Universe, if it is really the All of Being, it must be free.

I have said that if there is such a thing as freedom—and if there is not, there is no such thing as necessity,—then Nature, by which I mean the totality of existent things, is free—free in the sense of being all-inclusive and therefore, *ex hypothesi*, exempt from external constraint. I have also said that if we study the internal economy of Nature we can find no trace (apart, of course, from our own sense of being free) of the freedom which we must needs predicate of the all-inclusive whole. I have asked, then, "Where is freedom to be found?" And I have answered, "At the heart of Nature." Nature, seen as she really is, is free. By the light of the idealistic theory of things I can now see that what is at the heart of Nature is the unified totality of her own being; that what is real in Nature is the spirituality, the soul-life, in virtue of which she is not a Chaos but a Cosmos, not an aggregate but a whole. And here let me say that, when I use such words as *spirituality* and *soul-life*, I always have in mind the definition of spirit as what is ultimate in synthesis, and am therefore thinking, not of what is immaterial, ethereal, imperceptible by our gross senses, and so forth, but of the principle of unity, the principle of wholeness, whether in an individual

organism or in the Infinite Whole. I am thinking of this, and perhaps of something more than this. The soul of the world is something more than the principle of cosmic unity: it is the Cosmos in its ordered totality; it is the One in the Many, the world itself seen by itself, seen by its own all-penetrating, all-embracing vision.

This, I say, is free. The heart of the Universe is the fountain-head of freedom. What follows with regard to man? In what sense and to what extent is he free? He is free, with the full freedom of unfettered Nature, so far as he can draw life into himself from the heart of the Universe, so far as he can live in the infinite and the eternal, so far as he can make the soul of Nature his own. So far as he can do these things, or rather this one thing—for the one thing has many facets,—he is free. Let us for the moment assume that he can do this thing in some sort and some degree. Let us assume that he can draw into himself some measure of life from the heart of the Universe. How he may be able to do this is a problem which we will consider presently. Meanwhile let us assume that he can do it; and let us go on to say that so far as he can do it he is free. So far—but no further. Absolute freedom is an infinitely distant and wholly unattainable goal; yet every step that takes us towards it brings its emancipative influence more and more fully into our lives. We are apt to divide things into the bond and the free. But in this, as in other matters, our static, dualistic view of things leads us astray. For freedom is an ideal rather than a possession, a process rather than a state. The germs of freedom are present in the germs of spirituality, wherever these may be found; and the degree of freedom is measured by the degree of spirituality, from the first stirring of mere vitality up to the highest imaginable development of spiritual life. Thus (to take obvious examples) adults are freer agents than children; men of culture than savages; human beings than animals; animals than plants; plants than machines or stones. If necessity is the law of the world without us, freedom is the law of the inner life of man. Compulsion from within, spiritual compulsion, the pressure on one exerted by one's own highest and widest self, is freedom.

It is well that we should sometimes remind ourselves that freedom is an ideal rather than a possession, a prize to be won rather than a privilege to be paraded and enjoyed. For it is as easy to overestimate as to underestimate the degree and the range of human freedom. Orthodox Christianity, for example, has always been too ready to assume that the will of

man is absolutely and unconditionally free, and that his shortcomings are therefore due to perversity rather than to infirmity of will. And there are modern thinkers who seem to share this view. Dr Schiller, the Oxford philosopher and critic, in support of his contention that "there is no natural law of Progress," says: "Surely we shall never find our way to God unless we realise how entirely free we are to go to the Devil, and how imminent and constant is our danger of going there." But are we entirely free to go to the Devil? In the abstract perhaps we are. But what of this man or that man? The average man is as little able to go, at will, to the Devil as to enter, at will, into oneness with God. If anything, he is less able to go to the Devil, for his natural tendency is towards good and therefore towards God. A man must be high in development, must have won a quite exceptional measure of freedom, if he is to qualify for admission either to Heaven or to Hell. The average man is no automaton; but he is, at best, partially, provisionally, and (in the main) potentially free. Inherited tendencies, inherited traditions, compulsorily formed habits, dictated rules of conduct, prescribed ends of action, prejudices of various kinds, his own childhood, his own youth, press in upon him on all sides and seriously restrict his freedom. To suppose that he can at will free himself from the pressure of these influences and go straight to God, or the Devil, as the case may be, is to ignore the teaching of experience. Let a man use such freedom as he possesses to win more freedom, and let him co-operate as best he may with his natural tendency towards good. We can ask him to do as much as this, but we cannot in reason expect him to do more.

In order to test the worth of this theory of freedom, let us confront it with one or two of the difficulties in which any such theory is bound to involve itself, and see how it deals with them.

There is a point of view from which, even in the sphere of moral action, man seems to be under the dominion of irresistible forces and inexorable laws. History is ever teaching us that the ends of human conduct are immeasurably larger than man himself intends or conceives them to be. Again and again, as we study the records of the past, we are forced to confess that men are, as it were, instruments in the hands of some wide and mighty power—the "Providence" of the Christian, the "Destiny" of the Mussulman, the "Nature" of those who can call it by no other name. We aim at this or that immediate object or personal end. Later on, we or those who come after us are able to see that in working for it we

were working for ends which we never dreamed of compassing, ends which transcended the range of our desire as far as they transcended the limits of our sight. It sometimes seems as if our impulses, our tendencies, our instincts, desires, and passions, our very lusts and propensities to evil, were all being used by Nature for secret purposes of her own. When this feeling takes possession of us we are tempted to say, with Renan, "*Il y a quelque part un grand égoïste qui nous trompe*"; "*Nous sommes exploités*"; "*Quelque chose s'organise à nos dépens; nous sommes le jouet d'un égoïsme supérieur.*" At any rate the feeling of helplessness in the hands of Nature is a real feeling; and the wider our experience and the larger our view of things, the stronger does it tend to become.

But when it leads us to think of our Lord and Master (whoever he may be or by whatever name we may call him) as a "great egoist" who is exploiting us for purposes of his own, and of ourselves as

"impotent pieces in the game he plays,"

then the spiritual theory of freedom comes to our rescue and provides us with an antidote to our specious but shallow pessimism. For it tells us that inasmuch as freedom is the counterpart of spirituality, both in Nature and in us, we have but to spiritualise or integrate ourselves in order to share in Nature's freedom, and to make our destinies coincide, potentially and ideally, with hers. The slave who toils at the bidding of another has no part or lot in the fruits of his labour; but man, even when he seems to be a passive instrument in the hands of Nature, is toiling for ends which he may, if he pleases, make his own. The sense of helplessness that sometimes overwhelms him is really the sense of the pressure to which the central tendencies of things are subjecting him; but this despotic pressure is the very source of his freedom, for Nature (so far as she reveals her purposes to him) realises her own destiny by spiritualising his life; and the end for which her central tendencies are working is the evolution of his soul (which is also hers) and its consequent emancipation from the forces that fetter its freedom and impede its growth. That I am clay in the hands of the potter matters nothing, for it is only in the mould of spiritual freedom that my true self can be shaped. As I expand my being in response to the pressure of Nature's vital forces, I draw those forces little by little within the scope of my own inner life, and at last absorb them all into myself.

There are other experiences in the sphere of moral action on which this conception of freedom seems to throw light.

There is one in particular which no one who studies his own feelings can fail to observe. In yielding to a lower impulse—to the passion of anger, for example, or to a fleshly lust—we feel as if we were scarcely free agents. We yield, either because we are the slaves of an acquired habit, in which case we are no longer free, or because the impulse comes upon us like a whirlwind and constrains us, as it seems, from without. On the other hand, when we surrender ourselves to the pressure of a higher motive we feel that we are free; and the higher the motive, the stronger does our sense of freedom become. I find it difficult to account for these feelings except on the hypothesis that freedom is spiritual necessity or compulsion from within. The man who does right is constrained by a higher impulse. But the higher impulses belong to the spiritual side of man's nature, or, in other words, to the true self; and action that is initiated by one's true self is obviously free. Moreover, the ends of righteous action always coincide with the ends of the true self. The man who habitually does right has allied himself with the real or spiritual tendencies of Nature, and in virtue of this high partnership has placed himself (potentially, if not actually) at the centre of the Universe, the point from which all the energies of Nature radiate and to which they all return; and so he controls the aboriginal sources of his own action and reaps its ultimate results. The bad man, on the other hand, is acted upon from without. The lower impulses which issue in wrong-doing belong, for the most part, either directly or indirectly, to that more animal side of our nature in respect of which we belong to the material universe and are therefore in bondage—in some sort and some degree—to physical necessity. And the ends towards which they move us are always foreign to our true life and adverse to our higher interests, as is proved by the fact that we curse ourselves for having gained them. Nay, the sources of the motive power that constrains the vicious are external objects which act upon the lower self as a magnet acts upon steel. Thus the drunkard is constrained by the brandy bottle; the profligate by a seductive face or figure; the thief or the miser by the glitter of gold.

“How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds
Makes ill deeds done!”

Yet there are times when even the best of men become conscious, perhaps more vividly conscious than the rest of us, of their helplessness in the hands of mightier powers; and while this feeling lasts, they, if not the rest of us, are ready to disown their freedom and glory in their bonds. Religion,

speaking as the interpreter of man's spiritual experiences, tells us that when we do right it is not we who do it but God who dwelleth in us. Is this "constraining grace" of God compatible with the freedom of man? If the vicious are slaves to their own lusts, and the virtuous to the grace of God, are not all of us the bondsmen of necessity? No, for the pressure of the Divine Will is a source of freedom, not of bondage. In the last resort, indeed, it is the only source of freedom. For to be constrained by God, who, being the spiritual pole of the Universe, dwells in each human soul as its unattainable ideal, is to be constrained by one's best and deepest self; and to be self-constrained (in the deepest sense of the word *self*) is to be free.

The difference between virtue and vice shows itself most clearly in the reaction of conduct on character. By yielding to lower impulses men form bad habits, and so forfeit their freedom. By responding to higher impulses they gradually acquire a mastery over the lower self, and so free themselves from the trammels of necessity. In brief, freedom is lost or won by conduct. This fact—for we know from experience that it is a fact—is easily accounted for on the hypothesis that freedom is the counterpart of spirituality. For to be virtuous is to live to the spirit; and to live to the spirit is both to be and to become free. The vicious man, on the other hand, by degrading his life to the level of its own material subsoil, gradually accustoms himself to the yoke of physical necessity, and in so doing forfeits his birthright and degenerates into a slave.

It follows from these premises that the man who does right without an effort, and therefore without any apparent exercise of volition, is really freer than the man who feels that his will has been in battle and that resistance has been met and overcome. The moral struggle is at heart a struggle against coercion and therefore for freedom: with the gradual acquisition of freedom, the tension of the struggle diminishes; and if freedom should ever be fully and finally won, the struggle would have ceased. Those who do right because they cannot help themselves, because the compulsion from within is overwhelmingly strong, are the freest of men.

Thus there is an intimate connection between virtue and freedom and between vice and necessity. Yet nothing short of the total extinction of my freedom can absolve me from responsibility; and when my freedom has been finally extinguished, I, the self, the ego, shall have ceased to exist, and the question of my responsibility need no longer be

discussed. So long as *I* survive, I am potentially free; and the presence of this germ of freedom suffices to condemn me when I do wrong. When necessity has finally triumphed, nothing will be left for it to coerce. When freedom has finally triumphed, I shall know at last that all the while I—the real I—have been free.

Having tried to justify the conception of freedom as spiritual necessity, by showing that it resolves difficulties and throws light on obscurities in our ethical experiences, I will now conclude my defence of it by interpreting it in terms of my own instinctive feelings and secret convictions. On one point I have never wavered. I am as free as I feel myself to be. This feeling is its own guarantee; and no argument that draws its premises from a lower level of experience can invalidate it in the court of reason or shake my faith in its authority. But my sense of freedom, though it never sinks to zero, is an exceedingly variable quantity. Sometimes I feel as if my freedom were absolutely unfettered. Sometimes I feel as if I were the plaything of world-wide forces, as helpless—almost—as a straw on a rushing stream. The truth is that the question as to my freedom resolves itself into the question as to the limits of myself. If I am nothing but a “conscious automaton,” I am obviously the helpless victim of mechanical necessity; but in that case there is no I to be victimised. If, on the contrary, I am a spiritual being, freedom is my birth-right, and the degree of my freedom varies directly with the extent to which I have developed my potencies of spiritual life. In other words, the expansion of myself is accompanied and progressively measured by the expansion of my freedom. It is the movement of the stream of spiritual life through the channel of my being, on the way to its own ocean source, that endows me with freedom; and it is the self-same movement that is developing my spirit and making me what I really am. I become free by becoming myself, and I become myself by becoming free. I am not I, in any sense of the word, until I have won some measure of freedom. I am not I, in the true sense of the word, until I have made all the forces that constrain me my own. It follows that the question, “Am I free?” is so far from admitting of a definite and final answer that it has to receive a fresh statement and a fresh answer, and perhaps also an ever-changing answer, in the case of each individual man. The terms of the question are always fluid and unstable, and the answer is always moving forward—with the movement of the human spirit—in the direction of its own ideal, the direction of an unqualified and all-embracing “*Yes*.”

Here, then, we have a theory of freedom which not merely countenances the idea of soul growth, but postulates it and bases itself upon it. If man is free because, and just so far as, he is at one with the supreme source of freedom, with the heart of Nature, with the soul of the Universe; if the degree of his freedom is measured by the degree of his spirituality, by the progress that he has made in integrating himself, by his nearness to the spiritual pole of existence,—then it is certain that if man is to win freedom he must follow the path of soul-growth. For it is only by growing (in the fullest sense of the word), by continually expanding the scope and raising the level of his existence, that he can hope to attain to oneness with the life which is all-in-all and therefore wholly free. His potentialities are infinite. If and so far as he can realise them, he will live in the infinite, and the fetters of necessity will therefore fall away from him. If and so far as they remain unrealised, he will remain in bondage to his own limitations, constrained by forces which act upon him from without because he has not been able to make them his own. But to realise potentiality is to grow.

Yes; but to grow is to fulfil destiny, to move towards a predetermined form. How, then, can growth emancipate the growing soul? How can a man, by yielding to a relentless pressure—for what pressure is so relentless as that of growth?—become able either to resist that pressure or to intensify it? How can self-determination be predetermined? How can the very stress of necessity set its victim free?

We are up against the central paradox of our existence. A paradox it will always remain. Yet it may be possible so to deal with it that it will “comfort while it mocks.”

We have worked our way to a theory of freedom which countenances the idea of growth. What we now need is a theory of growth which will countenance the idea of freedom. Such a theory is at our service if we will not shrink from the immense demands which it will make upon us. We have seen that if by freedom we mean exemption from external constraint, there is one thing and one thing only which is absolutely free—the soul of the Universe, the living Whole. If this—the fountain-head of all freedom—is the true self of each of us, the self which each of us, so far as he fulfils his destiny, is predestined to realise, and if it is by growing on all the planes of his being, by bringing all his latent powers to maturity, that one fulfils that high destiny, then the ideas of freedom and predetermined growth are reconcilable through the paradoxical conception that man is predestined to become

free. And if this is indeed his destiny, then, while he is fulfilling it, he must be winning freedom through his fulfilment of it, and must therefore be free either to thwart it or to ally himself with it. And as, by using his freedom to thwart his destiny, he will gradually forfeit his freedom and become the slave of his own lower desires and impulses—the hereditary enemies of his spiritual growth,—so, by using his freedom to co-operate with his destiny, he will win an ever fuller measure of freedom, thereby fitting himself for the work of co-operating, in an ever higher degree. Indeed, there is a stage in his development beyond which his destiny cannot fulfil itself without his active co-operation. Thenceforth, the more effectively he co-operates, the more willing is destiny to hand over to him the duty and responsibility of directing his own growth. At last, in the fullness of time, he will become his own destiny, and predetermination and self-determination will become one. From this point of view one sees that in man, as in every other living thing, the process of self-realisation is the fulfilment of a destiny, the evolution of a latent life, and yet that the individual soul is free—not absolutely, as Dr Schiller seems to suggest, but within ever-varying limits—to go to God or go to the Devil, to make or to mar itself.

On one point we must make our minds quite clear. The goal of self-realisation is oneness with the One Life. This, and nothing less than this. The idea of self-realisation is all too easily misinterpreted; and to misinterpret it is to invert its meaning. If the Universe is a living Whole, the only way for each of us to integrate himself (and so win freedom), without disintegrating it, is to become one with it. He who thinks to win freedom, not by growing into oneness with the living Whole, but by becoming a living whole on his own account, by integrating himself independently of the supreme Integer, by separating himself from the Cosmic life and finding the fullness of life in a little world of his own, has renounced his high birthright in the act of laying claim to it prematurely, and has become a disintegrative and morbid influence in the body politic of the great world to which, in spite of himself, he still belongs. Separatism, individualism, aggressive egoism, self-realisation, with the stress on the word *self*, is the sin of sins, the malady of maladies, the exact equivalent, in the pathology of the soul, of the disease of rebellious and therefore malignant growth which we call cancer in the pathology of the body. And the end of it is not freedom, but imprisonment in an ever-narrowing self.

We can now see that the theory of freedom which countenances the idea of soul-growth and the theory of soul-growth which countenances the idea of freedom are one. It sometimes happens that ideas which are irreconcilable and even mutually exclusive on the normal levels of experience and thought, admit of being reconciled and even harmonised into a higher and more comprehensive idea on that supernormal level which we indicate by the formula "at infinity." And it certainly seems as if the apparently irreconcilable ideas of freedom and growth ceased to be irreconcilable when viewed from the standpoint of the ideal and ultimate identity of the individual with the Universal Soul. Realising, then, as I do to the full, that the supreme mystery will ever remain mysterious, I must henceforth be content to find rest (such rest as it affords, the rest of eternal motion) in the conception to which the central experiences of my life—the sense of freedom and the sense of predestination,—as I follow them out in thought, direct my mind—a conception which is a paradox in itself and paradoxical in all its developments—the conception that to universalise myself, to become one with the soul of all things, is my ideal destiny; and that I can either thwart that high destiny, in the strength of the freedom with which it invests me, and so become the thrall of a lower destiny, or escape for ever from thralldom to destiny by striving to fulfil my own.

EDMOND HOLMES.

THE ATHENÆUM.

MODERN JUDAISM.¹

CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE.

THERE still lurk in men's minds a good many misconceptions about the religion of modern Jews. Three mistakes about Judaism are common. And the trouble about these mistakes is that they all have a certain basis in fact. They are all quarter or half truths. And such mistakes are, perhaps, the most troublesome of all mistakes.

The first mistake is that the Jewish religion consists of a lot of queer practices without any beliefs, or without any beliefs to speak of.

This impression is inaccurate. As far as orthodox or traditional Judaism is concerned, I do not deny the "lot of practices," but all these practices rest upon a basis of beliefs. They depend upon beliefs, and they have no value or meaning without the beliefs. But yet the common mistake rests upon a bit of truth, and the bit of truth is not entirely creditable to Judaism, or rather to a certain school of Jews. For various reasons, into which I cannot enter, some Jews were induced to exaggerate the importance of the religious practices—of the mere *doing* of them, the mere fulfilment of them—and they even began to oppose the practices to the beliefs; to exalt the one, to depress and depreciate the other. That is a modern aberration, not more than a hundred and fifty years old. And it is already decaying. It has not died out; but it is decaying. A truer and deeper Jewish orthodoxy is wholly opposed to it; Liberal Judaism is intensely opposed to it. It is a passing aberration, opposed to the fundamental genius of the religion. Judaism, like every other great religion, is, in one sense, a life, a way of living. In that sense it is a practice, a doing: but it is also, and even more, the spirit which animates that practice, that doing; it is a way of looking at

¹ A lecture to soldiers.

life; it is, therefore, the fundamental beliefs which that way of looking at life depends upon and implies. If any Jew practises a lot of religious rites, but practises them formally, outwardly, without being able to express, to himself or to others, the belief upon which these rites depend—such a man is but the dried-up shell of a Jew: the spirit of Judaism has departed from him. For it is still true: “He is a Jew who is one inwardly.”

The second and third mistakes are connected with the attitude and relation of Jews towards the Old Testament or Hebrew Bible.

The Jewish religion is supposed to be very closely related to the Old Testament. The Bible of Judaism is the Old Testament only. This is true. So far there is no mistake. But the important question is: to *what* in the Old Testament is modern Judaism related? Or rather, to *what* in the Old Testament is modern Judaism, not merely formally, theoretically related, but actually, vitally, really related?

For there is enough material in the Old Testament—unsystematised, inconsistent material—to make up, or form a basis for, half a dozen different religions. The Old Testament contains documents separated in time at least seven hundred—perhaps nine hundred—years from each other. And not only have you got in the Old Testament this immense difference of date between earliest documents and latest documents (contrast the New Testament, all the parts of which were written within a compass of eighty or ninety years), but you have also the most different points of view, the most different sorts of authors. You have prophets and priests, you have storytellers and sages; you have historians who wrote to tell the facts, and historians who wrote for a purpose; you have simple pious souls, you have subtle thinkers and sceptics; you have hoary superstition, and you have exalted faith; you have low conceptions of God, you have pure and sublime conceptions of Him. And, in between these last two extremes, you have all kinds of combinations and of compromises. To *which*, then, of all these different parts of the Old Testament, to *which* of all these varying and inconsistent teachings and points of view, is modern Judaism related? It surely cannot be equally closely related (though it may be historically related) to them all? If a man were to say, “My religion is the religion of the Old Testament,” such a remark would tell us very little about his religion. It would, indeed, defy the wit and power of man to possess as his religion the religion, or rather, the religions, of the *entire* Old Testament. No

doubt we all of us are inconsistent in our religion: in none of us is religion a pure harmony and unity. Our religious beliefs are not fused perfectly together. But I would defy a man to be *so* inconsistent as to hold within his mind *all* the religious teachings and doctrines of the Old Testament, and to believe them *all*. The thing is a sheer impossibility. A man's religion could be an Old Testament religion, and it might be a poor religion, or a rich religion; a pure and noble religion, or a superstitious and ignoble religion; an immature religion, or a highly developed religion. This, then, is the second mistake about modern Judaism. It *is* still related—closely related—to the Old Testament, but not to the *whole* Old Testament. And the salient question arises: With what parts or what teachings in the Old Testament is this close relation maintained?

The third mistake about modern Judaism is that, so far as religious beliefs are concerned, it is supposed to have stopped short at the Old Testament, and to have had no further religious development. The man in the street recognises that the ordinary orthodox Jew *does* things—that he practises rites—for which there is no Old Testament warranty or command; but he imagines that the religious *beliefs* of the Jew (so far as he has any) are all contained and found within the four corners of the Hebrew Bible. His own Christian religion includes those beliefs which the New Testament added on to, or developed from, the Old. The Jewish religion is the Old Testament only. Or, if there was any development at all, it was only for the worse; it was not development, but retrogression. Hence, a contrast between Old Testament and New Testament (to the disadvantage of the Old Testament) is often supposed to be the same thing as a contrast between Judaism and Christianity. Whereas the truth is that Judaism has never quite stood still, and has sometimes made considerable advance. There has been a very sensible development, though doubtless, in one or two points, as compared with the Old Testament at its purest, noblest, and best, there has also been some temporary retrogression. So marked, however, is this third mistake, that the question has sometimes been put to me: "Do Jews believe in a future life?" This amazing question illustrates the mistake very glaringly. For in the Old Testament it is true that only in the very latest passages, and in these only once or twice, is there any clear allusion to a future life of bliss or suffering beyond the grave. So that if the religious beliefs of modern Jews were limited to the Old Testament, the question would be very reasonable.

But, as a matter of fact, in the short interval of one hundred and fifty years between the Old Testament and the New Testament, the doctrine of a future life (in at least one of its many forms) was fast becoming, just as it has ever since remained, an official dogma of the Synagogue.

Modern Judaism is in living relation with only a part of the Old Testament, and it is not unfair to say that that part is, upon the whole, to be identified with what is best in it, most elevated, most humane and most human. It could even be pointed out that modern orthodox Judaism has less relation with certain lower ideas of the Old Testament than some phases of modern orthodox Christianity. Thus all the sacrificial conceptions of the Old Testament—including the atoning efficacy of blood—have no place in modern Judaism at all. They have just dropped out. In modern Judaism God freely forgives the repentant sinner, just as He does in the highest and best teaching of the Old Testament. He required and He requires no intervening or additional sacrifice of any kind whatever. It is true that some orthodox Jews of to-day practise rites which depend upon hoary superstitions, and are inconsistent with the best and purest Old Testament conceptions. But it may be safely asserted that those who practise these rites are totally ignorant of the superstitions upon which the rites depend, and which originally gave rise to them. They practise them because they believe that the perfectly wise and perfectly good God has, for some unknown reason, ordered Jews to observe them. They are His decrees to His Jewish servants and children, and it is not for the servant and the child to question the ineffable wisdom of his King and his Father. He has simply to obey, and to obey with joy, to obey in love. Both Orthodox and Liberal Jews of to-day are moved and affected by the high and pure conceptions of the Old Testament, and not by its lower and more immature conceptions; their religion is an attempted synthesis of what is best and noblest in the Old Testament, while everything else is ignored or explained away. And anybody who knows anything about religions must be aware what adepts they all are—or rather, what adepts all their adherents are—in the noble art of explaining away!

Now, upon the two facts that modern Judaism stands in a special relation, not to the Old Testament as a whole, but only to certain parts and ideas of the Old Testament, and these, speaking generally, not the lowest parts and ideas, but the highest and the best, and that Judaism has religiously developed and progressed since the Old Testament along

its own lines, there depends this further fact that modern Judaism is a religion which, in its deepest essentials, in many of its most important beliefs, is closely akin to modern Christianity.

To what causes may these kinships or agreements be attributed?

The first cause is the fact that the Hero of the Gospel story was a Jew, and that his teaching—at any rate, as recorded to us in the first three Gospels—was, in its essentials, Judaism. That word Judaism in this connection may need qualification. Some may wish to add, “a purified or developed Judaism”; others, “a Judaism off the Rabbinic line”; yet others, “prophetic Judaism”; and finally others might say, “a Judaism far greater than any phase of it which had gone before.” But whatever the qualifications, the substantive must remain. Jesus taught Judaism: in his own eyes, and according to his intention, he taught no new religion, but, at most, only a corrected and developed version of the old religion of his fathers. And he was not deceived. Hence it is not surprising that there should exist to-day these fundamental agreements between the two religions. It is all the less surprising when we call to mind that Judaism, since the age of Jesus, has developed on its own lines, and has now reached conclusions which are in essential, though not necessarily in verbal, agreement with some of those portions of the teaching of Jesus that brought him into conflict with certain Jewish authorities of his own day. So far as there is any opposition between *average* Old Testament teaching (but this is really a dangerous abstraction) and the teaching of Jesus, this opposition has now largely been transcended, because modern Judaism has risen above this Old Testament average. Even as regards the five famous oppositions in the Sermon on the Mount, it may be safely stated that there is no vital difference to-day between modern Judaism and modern Christianity. Doubtless the Jew would tell you (for we are all human) that if this difference does not exist *now*, it is because it did not exist *then*, or it is because the plain words of Jesus (*e.g.* “resist not evil”) are now explained to mean something which they did not originally mean. Doubtless the Christian (for he too is human) would tell you that if the opposition does not exist now, it is not because Judaism has developed on its own lines, but because, though the Jew will not own up to it, he has simply adopted considerable portions of the teaching of Jesus, and added them on, as well as he can (and even if the result is a misfit, a putting of new cloth on to an old garment) to his lagging and deficient

Judaism. However this may be, the fact remains that this essential agreement exists.

A second reason for it is that the Church, with admirable tact and considerable courage, never let the Old Testament go. It always insisted that its sacred Scripture comprised both the New Testament and the Old Testament, and it urged that great and important religious and ethical truths are contained in the Old Testament as well as in the New. Old Testament ideals have been, and many of them still are, Christian ideals. Doubtless the Church has sometimes suffered by this insistence. It is only fair to allow that Old Testament limitations (*e.g.* witchcraft, and the law against witches) have wrought prejudicially in the development of Christian civilisation. But, on the whole, the gain has far outweighed the loss. To substantiate this contention, note what emphasis is laid by religious teachers to-day upon social justice, upon peace, upon the Kingdom of God on earth, including in that earthly kingdom just and decent social conditions and outward well-being as well as pity, unselfishness, and love. Now, all this is the great ideal of the Hebrew prophets of the Old Testament and of Judaism. Again, note how much that is best and most important in Old Testament literature, religion, and piety still unites together Jew and Christian. Most emphatically is this true of the Psalter. The two religions are, moreover, at one as to what they absorb and revere in the Psalter and as to what they reject. Christians often use a phraseology which is offensive to Jewish ears, because they forget that Judaism is not merely a religion of the past, but also a religion of the present. They rightly object to certain elements in the Psalter—for example, its imprecations upon the enemy; they speak of these elements as anti-Christian and as Jewish, but they are really as much opposed to the best spirit of the modern synagogue as to the best spirit of the modern church.

Lastly, modern Christianity, while it has certainly not disowned, yet either lays less *stress* upon some Christian doctrines to which Judaism was especially opposed, or it teaches these doctrines in a less violently anti-Jewish form. The doctrine of the Atonement, for example, is now commonly expounded in a way which is much less opposed to Jewish convictions than it used to be fifty or sixty years ago. Trinitarianism is carefully explained to be the very antithesis of Tritheism, and is even *popularly* set forth in a much less Tritheistic manner. Emphasis, moreover, is commonly laid, not upon metaphysical subtleties, but upon the teaching, character, and life of Jesus, and the essence of Christianity is

commonly said to reside more in these than in the subtleties. And modern English Judaism, while not abandoning the Law, or the conception of Law, is yet, especially in its Reform and Liberal phases, becoming less legal and more prophetic. It is doing this in its own way, and on its own lines. If you question its representatives—assuming that they do not belong to the Liberal wing—they will immediately assume the defensive and deny that there is any change. And, perhaps, the change is partly unconscious. But it is nevertheless going on.

Modern Judaism, while in some points it has tended to injure and impoverish itself by opposition to Christianity, is also gradually becoming capable of a fuller and deeper self-consciousness. And it will be a self-consciousness not *more* remote from the modern Christian self-consciousness, but nearer and more akin to it. In England, at any rate, Jews have drawn nearer, not to anything that can justly and definitely be called Christianity, but to acknowledged and common fundamentals, and to an acknowledged and common religious spirit, uniting Judaism and Christianity together. For the modern English Jew lives in a Christian environment. He not only opposes, but he absorbs. English literature has been immensely influenced by the Old Testament, but English literature, after all, is a Christian literature. And that English literature is a common possession both of Christian and of Jew.

What, then, is the *result*? What *are* these fundamental religious agreements?

Modern Judaism is a Theistic religion. It proclaims one God, just, righteous, loving, omnipresent, near. It teaches that the best metaphor for His relations to man is the metaphor of Father and child, and that the next best metaphor is that of subject and King. With this spiritual God man can and should commune in prayer. The result of this teaching about God, as regards the religious and moral life, is, I contend, much the same in Judaism as in Christianity. The fullest and the best modern Judaism seeks to put into, and to draw out from, the divine Father and King what modern Christianity puts into and draws out from the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit respectively. Jews accumulate upon the One what Christians divide up among the 'Three, but the result is much the same.

Again, the ethical ideals of Judaism and Christianity are now essentially the same. If this is so, seeing that conduct, though not the same as religion, is yet so great a part of religion, a practical identity on the *ethical* side means a large correspondence upon the more technically *religious* side.

The relation of man to God and of God to man is not conceived on the same lines in the two religions. But the *result* in modern times, and for modern men and women, is much the same. Both emphasise human responsibility; both accept a measure of freewill; both believe in the reality of the divine help, in the mystery of the divine grace.

Once more. Both Judaism and Christianity are religions of hope, for the individual and for the race. Both lay stress upon the Kingdom of God upon earth; both are keen on social justice, on social progress, on peace and goodwill. But both also believe in a life beyond the grave, and both tend more and more to believe that none who, however falteringly, seek God, shall ultimately fail to find Him, that no soul which He has fashioned shall be separated from Him for ever.

Both Jew and Christian declare that God is righteous; both declare that God is loving. Yet both are sometimes inclined to perceive differences in these agreements. "God is love," says the Christian, and that is the teaching of Christianity and of the New Testament, and of Christianity and of the New Testament only. "Very good," says the Jew; "I accept the distinction. I say, then, that God is righteousness, and that righteousness is higher than love." But, as a matter of fact, the difference is largely verbal. For what the one finds in love, the other ascribes to righteousness. "I will seek that which is lost, I will bring again that which is driven away, I will bind up that which is broken, I will strengthen that which is sick" (Ezekiel xxxiv. 16). Well, if that be the common ideal of divine and of human action, it matters little if the one section calls it righteousness and the other section calls it love.

In my insistence upon agreements, I do not forget that there are differences. But some of these are exaggerated, or they have become smaller than they once were. It could be shown, for instance, that Judaism is not what it is often declared to be—a system of injunctions and prohibitions without principles; or again, that while it is a religion of Law, the Law of which it is now the religion is not what it is commonly supposed to be, or what, perhaps, it sometimes in the past has been. The Law is not now the Pentateuch: the Pentateuch is only its symbol. It is rather the Law which may also be called Duty, and of which Wordsworth wrote: "Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong, And the most ancient heavens through Thee are fresh and strong." It is the Law of God as well as the law of man. Fashioned, in one sense, by man, it is yet, in another sense, eternal and

superhuman. To it, his own creation, man must bow down in reverence and awe: for it is not only man's creation, but it is God's creation; or, rather, it is uncreated and divine; not merely superior to the individual, but also superior to the race. Of such a Law could not the Christian as well as the Jew recognise the obligation and the supremacy?

Thus Christianity and Judaism are kindred pathways to common goals. They both look forward to the same kind of renovated earth for humanity; and for the individual they both look forward to a drawing nearer unto God, and to a keener enjoyment of Him, beyond the grave. All Theistic religions should be allies; but more especially should this be the case with Judaism and Christianity. Jews should not hold the fixed idea that Christianity, wherever it differs from Judaism, is necessarily false. Rather should they believe that, enshrined in, or symbolised by, what they consider to be unacceptable doctrines and statements, are aspects of truth that, in a purer form, will ultimately become part of the fuller and deeper religion of a yet distant future. And Christians should not suppose that Judaism is, at best, the mere preparation for Christianity, a preparation which stopped growing, or grew awry, at the close of the Old Testament period or at the birth of Christianity; but they should regard it as a living religion, which has grown and has developed, and which continues to grow and develop, upon its own lines. It is a religion, let them suppose, which, compared with their own, is indeed imperfect (just as Jews say of Christianity), but which yet lays important, if one-sided, emphasis upon certain fundamental religious truths, and stands for the maintenance, and even the development, of certain great ethical and religious ideals. Let both Jews and Christians believe that the two religions—their own and their neighbour's—are contributing to a fuller and more harmonious religious synthesis for a future which shall be grateful to the labours and to the fidelity of both.

CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE.

LONDON.

CHRIST AND THE LIBERAL CREED.

REGINALD F. RYND,

Reader of the Temple.

POLITICAL liberalism is founded on a denial of the divine right of kings, or of any form of constituted authority, based on custom or tradition, that operates apart from the rational acquiescence of the governed. Liberalism in all its manifestations partakes of some element of these first principles, but it is in connection with its direct relation to the religion of Jesus that I wish to examine the claims that are made for it, and to inquire into its right to include Christianity in the orbit of its ever-extending influence. There is a large class of thinkers in this country who are anxious to apply the idealism that especially belongs to liberal thought, as such, to the principles of Christianity as they bear on matters of political and international importance; and it cannot be denied that we have here perhaps the central problem that is posed by the professed acceptance of Christian standards in the vast and intricate field of public policy, whether international or domestic.

From the days of Paul onwards we do not find that the religious philosophy of Jesus has lent itself readily to broad questions of policy. This was no doubt inevitable when the most intimately personal and individual moral appeal ever made to man was transferred to a field of action where prejudice and party passion were bound to cut across the purely personal sanctions created by the teaching of Jesus. We must make a balance of profit and loss in the immensely extended range of operations that resulted from the consolidation of Christianity initiated by St Paul, but it can hardly be questioned that the resultant change largely destroyed that delicate balance of motive, that subtle distinction between right and wrong, that especially belongs to the religion of Jesus. As early as the second century we have crossed the threshold of a new order of religious interest, of a new type of

religious experience, and as Christianity began to be realised in the social and political forms with which it was getting into ever closer and closer contact, it not unnaturally absorbed some of the baser political or national elements with which its activities had become inevitably identified. The logical results of this liaison were not slow in disclosing themselves. The unseemly struggle between Pope and Emperor was one and perhaps the worst fruit of the new impulse of religious enthusiasm, which, no longer centred in the deeper though far less complex emotions of the human conscience, became the sport of passions which it lay outside the power of Christian sanction to control. The contrast between the religion of Jesus as it lay in the depths of the awakened human conscience, and as it appears in the hideous conflict of policy or opinion that for ten centuries devastated Europe, is too glaring to be explained in the facile but fallacious terms of evolution. But, without trenching on the treacherous ground of "development versus corruption," it may be safely affirmed that, by the successive policies of compromise that have sought to adapt the delicate spirit of the Christian philosophy to the crude requirements of public policy, we have soiled the purity of the most perfect instrument of human progress ever placed at the disposal of mankind. That many aspects of liberal thought are based on the teaching of Jesus needs no demonstrating. But how far they represent the logical and inevitable implications of His thought is another question. The attitude of Jesus towards constituted authority and the enforcement of law that naturally accompanies it cannot be determined by an appeal to isolated statements. It is the absence of any broad dynamic apprehension of Christian teaching that has resulted in the historic conflict of religious opinion that has split Christendom from end to end, and the effort to decide "cases of conscience" by this or that text has added to rather than allayed the confusion of moral issues. It is clear that if the Sermon on the Mount is to be the basis of our practical morality there must be large fields of action in which Christian ethics can never be more than partially applied. The foundations of all public morality rest in the last resort upon force, and if Jesus, as is so often asserted, decreed the total abolition of all forms of social or political coercion, it must be shown that the power of love or moral suasion, which is the only restraining force left to us, can effectively fulfil the functions of police in keeping society from the dangers of anarchy and crime. It is here that we meet one of the most dangerous features of liberal idealism in all its naked disregard

of facts. It is touching to find this naïve trust in the innate goodness of human nature, and it is something vastly better than the ancient libel on humanity that goes by the name of original sin; but does the state of the world to-day encourage the idea that "self-discipline" is a sufficient substitute for the traditional instruments of law and order by which society has been able to retain those assets of civilisation best worth keeping? Both in family and State traditional authority has delegated, or rather abrogated, its powers in favour of a sentimental relaxation of all wholesome restraints; and while children are defying the law, social or moral, and mobs are breaking the heads of peaceful citizens, or murdering those sent to restrain their violence, our statesmen and publicists are busy beating the "democratic" drum, and calling the world to witness the beautiful fruits of unlimited social and political *laissez-aller*. If Jesus decreed the abolition of force, it is strange that He should have made use of it. Nor do we find any trace of that sentimentalism that would cheerfully reduce the world to chaos in pursuance of an ideal fraught with incalculable peril to a social fabric it has cost so much to erect. Jesus seems to have reckoned with the forces of moral disorder in their possible impact on the new evangel. Otherwise it is difficult to see the meaning of His warning about the "wisdom of the serpent," which was to supplement the "harmlessness of the dove," or of the words in which He deprecates the casting of what is "holy" to "dogs." His attitude towards political authority may, *e silentio*, be no less clearly determined, though His policy of non-resistance may be due as much to the inherent other-worldliness of His moral appeal as to any deliberately formulated policy. But that He left political sanctions and restraints as He found them, and never by so much as a word attempted to substitute for them an ideal incapable of being politically realised, can hardly be disputed. By the strange order of idealism under review the basic Christian qualities are credited with an almost talismanic potency that will cast its spell on the worst forms of human passion. "Love" will work wonders where there is some sort of correspondence between the spirit it creates and the human consciences it is sought to bring beneath its sway; but where this correspondence is lacking no result can follow but the desecration of what is holy and the surrender of the most sacred of human interests to the morality of the "jungle"; and that this is where our idealists are leading the world to is fairly clear, if recent events have any meaning at all. It is almost impossible to draw a line between right and wrong

and declare that this or that type of social or political action is on one side of it or the other, in the light of Christian ethics. The endless confusion that surrounds "conscientious objection" and kindred exhibitions of misguided individualism make it clear that purely national sanctions cannot be brought altogether within the purview of Christian morality. They belong to a different order of ideas; they rest on a different basis of ethical principle, and it is still an open question how far a man is justified in basing his conduct on scruples that run counter to the expression of national will.

Here is the conflict of obligations in its most acute form, and it is clear that a process of *de-nationalisation* is inevitable where the extreme forms of liberal idealism are allowed free play. Self-determination is, we are told, to be the palladium of national freedom in the future. But it is difficult to see how this principle is to secure international morality any more than it will secure social or domestic morality if indiscriminately applied to social groups or the family. Certain members of society, just as certain members of a family, are obviously unfit to be given the free and unfettered control of their movements: and the current notion that the remedy will be found in "more" of a medicine that has largely contributed to creating the disease is simply irrational. Certain forms of Christian liberalism would, without any hesitation, leave the "sheep" to the mercy of the "wolves," on the assumption, apparently, that every "wolf" is a potential "sheep," and that the metamorphosis will be complete when a sufficient amount of mutton has been consumed. This type of universalism, this peculiar optimism, is founded on a sentiment that, whatever else it may or may not be, is in no sense of the word "Christian." Jesus made no attempt to raise human dignity by an exaggerated view of the value of the individual. He considered the Pharisees beyond the pale, and He was apparently quite content to leave them there. Those who actually heard His message and acted on it must have been an infinitesimal proportion of the Galilean population. However much we may dislike the conclusion, there were thousands who were left to the misery and darkness in which their lives were shrouded, and on no single occasion does Jesus utter a protest against a rapacious and alien government that had reduced the unfortunate provincials to dire poverty. Jesus left much uncertain where guidance would have been invaluable. There is no note of social "protest," which is such a powerful factor in the religion of to-day. There is no attempt to smooth off the rough edges

and reduce human life to a system in which all the "play" of personal or political forces shall be forced into the mould of a certain type of religious emotion. But this does not suit the Saxon sentimentalist, who dislikes rough edges, and who feels that if Christianity does not apply to every type of human character, or meet every combination of human circumstance, it must be made to do so. It cannot be too often insisted upon that Christ's Kingdom was "not of this world"; and in so far as this morality was intended to apply to this order of existence at all in its social or political forms, it only did so by a transfusion of human motives with the living stream of a new enthusiasm, which was not intended to correct moral evil so much as to transcend it. So fine and delicate an instrument of ethical perception as Christianity as it came from the lips of Christ could not provide an unalterable standard by which to measure the intricacies of political right and wrong: and it is clear that the principle of "do as you would be done by" cannot be applied wholesale in a field of action governed by centuries of tradition, and ruled by motives of more or less temporary expedience which society dare not abandon.

What, then, is the policy of liberal idealism towards Germany and her quondam allies? We are told that we must forgive them: that any primitive or repressive action would be wrong: that if we wish to win them we must abandon the object with which we went to war, now that it is within our reach: that to demand indemnities is to fall from grace and merely to perpetuate the evil principles we fought Germany to overcome. We are told that Germany is repentant and is anxious to take her share in the building up of a new international code, a new national conscience. If this is so, let Germany give some proof of it. But even if there were far more evidence in support of these assertions than there appears to be, have we the right to remit punishment for the foulest crime any civilised nation has ever committed? What would be the effect of a universal amnesty for all criminals, of the withdrawal of the police, of the application of the sublime morality of Jesus to men who understand nothing except the power behind constituted authority to enforce its decrees? "To overcome evil with good" is a principle of ethical obligation that may operate successfully in the more circumscribed field of Christian action in which we determine our duty to each other, but its general application would result in just those hideous forms of social rapacity which every country in Europe is trying to overcome, and from which we in this country have only escaped "by the skin of our teeth." The

emasculated type of Christian temper, which declines, against the express teaching of Jesus, to consider anyone as a "heathen man," or a "publican," and outside the circle of Christian influence, is merely one among many products of the tendency to concentrate the Christian ethic in this or that aspect of the teaching of Jesus. Jesus was a master of paradox. He left us the spirit of a new ideal, not a fixed and immutable moral code : and as far as it is possible to decide this knotty question at all, He seems to have bent His energies towards a new interpretation of life which was to be realised in a new relationship between God and man, and not in its application to the whole complicated order of social or national policy.

We simply do not know how far the principle of human "brotherhood" was to affect the delimitations of nationality, or exactly in what degree it was intended to transcend them. To regard such "brotherhood" as an indefectible right, which no breach of human law can serve to contract a man out of, is to teach what Jesus never taught, and to throw to the winds the whole sum of human experience which it has cost mankind so much to accumulate. Liberalism is a beautiful and beneficent creed, and some of the finest fruits of human liberty have sprung from it : but the men and nations who can make proper use of the dangerous weapons it puts into their hands are few. Human progress, on the large scale of social or national life, must proceed under strict safeguards. All growth is perilous : but none so perilous as that which is initiated by passion, or springs from a partial development in which the faculties do not reach maturity together.

REGINALD F. RYND.

LONDON.

OPEN HOUSE.

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE CHURCH.

W. MAXFIELD ROGERS.

I CONFESS to an instinctive horror of institutions, a horror which both reason and experience have, so far, failed to allay. It began, I think, at the age of ten, when a Spartan mother despatched me, in the depth of winter, to an institution called "school," far away from everything bright, cosy, and homelike. Among other detestable attributes, this institution possessed long, cold, stony cloisters, their gloom at intervals made more apparent by sulky lamps, the oil of which had a clammy habit of oozing down the walls, and filling the damp, inhospitable air with its rank smell.

And to this day, when people speak to me of the Church as an institution, I think of those cloisters.

No doubt a very respectable and convincing lecture could be given on the necessity of institutions; but were that redoubtable warrior, Dr Clifford, to rise immediately afterwards and discourse on their tyranny, I should find myself frantically applauding.

For institutions appear to me to be essentially inhospitable. There is about them a forbidding air, the reverse of welcome. The individual, if by force or otherwise he enters in, abandons hope: he is swallowed up, lost, dissolved, and absorbed into the corporate; he ceases to exist, becomes a cog in the wheel, or, slightly more favoured, a wheel in the machine.

And there is something within me which revolts when the cog and wheel theory is presented, however attractively: and that something is my soul.

I must lose my soul to save it. Very well. I will lose it among the highways and hedges; I will breathe the fresh air and freedom of the road; mix with the spiritual tramps and ne'er-do-wells of humanity, and share with them their dislike, dread, and contempt of institutions.

For to them the institution is the workhouse.

Holy and devout men have spent their lives in the attempt to force this workhouse spirit on the Church. With portentous labour they build up a conception of God as the rather plebeian domineering Master—themselves being a highly specialised caste of foremen,—and use their last drop of ingenuity in the framing of fresh definitions of authority for the benefit of the inmates, whom they designate “the faithful laity.”

This conception of the Church as a big, bare, barrack-like building, an arid centre of Bumbledom—this idea that God cares for committees rather than “isolated units,” for institutions more than individuals—will not do. It will have to go.

It is the reverse of the old proverb. It says, “Take care of the precious pound of gold; the pennies may look after themselves.”

But so long as there is one “isolated unit,” one penny gone astray, your pound does not exist; you are but saving up for it.

In a magazine produced by wounded soldiers it was humorously suggested that “this hospital consists of doctors and nurses,” the patients being so much raw material upon which to practise. Now a hospital, as its names implies, is really an invitation from those who have health to those who have not: an invitation to partake of their hospitality. The sufferers are, or should be, received as guests and treated with the utmost courtesy and tact. To wait upon them is a privilege. To help them back to health is a work of love. And when they are all cured, the hospital, as such, ceases to exist. A community of healthy people, “made whole,” no longer requires it.

So it is with the Church. You may call it an institution if you please; but once you grasp that most glorious conception, that every living soul is equal in the sight of God, you will quietly drop the word.

Mankind is a family under one Father, who is God. Certain people are aware of this fact because God Himself came to tell them so and to prove it by His deed. Their privilege is to tell their brothers and sisters this good news, and to prove it by their deeds. They are not put in authority over anyone—there is no authority about it, except that they speak with authority, as Christ their Lord did; that is, they are certain of what they say. They extend the hospitality of God to their brethren; they invite them to come and be made whole, and to help build the Church, which when it is finished

is a community of holy people. They may pause at times to admire the growing structure, and the timid among them will probably inquire, "Are you quite sure we are building on the right lines?" but one thing is certain—a Church with one stone missing is a monstrosity. If that stone cannot be placed, they may well sit down and view their work with despair. Care they never so much for the community, the "isolated unit" has them at his mercy. Their only remedy is to go to him in a body and implore him to make the "tale" complete. Should he prove obdurate, they must, if need be, die for him. That is their view of authority, and the only condition they will make. And success will be theirs.

The reason why there is joy in Heaven over one sinner who repents is that the Church cannot get on without him. Till he returns, the completion of this thing of glory and beauty, for which Christ gave His life, is hindered, frustrated. It cannot be denied that God cares for the community, it is certain that Christ loves His Church, but He is not satisfied, does not view it with complacency, so to speak, till it becomes a community, till that last troublesome fellow out there among the mountains is brought home and seated, smiling and famished, at His board. That is the consummation for which we work and pray. In the meanwhile, God keeps open house. The invitation stands, and no one is turned away.

Surely we have had enough and to spare of entrance examinations. We have fenced the Church round with conditions of admission and status, trusting to make it secure against the assaults of the world, the flesh, and the devil, and we have but enclosed an idea, an institutional idea, a grim, frowning workhouse, very far removed from God's idea. A defensive war, as every soldier knows, is a lost war. Is there no one among us bold hearted enough to fling wide the gates, and join the Saviour in His immortal quest?

"The Spirit and the bride say, Come.
And let him that heareth say, Come.
And let him that is athirst come:
And whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely."

This is the Catholic conception of the Church. It is the burning centre of Christ's hospitality.

W. MAXFIELD ROGERS.

EASTBOURNE.

THE ETHICS OF WILLIAM BLAKE.

THE REV. RICHARD ROBERTS,

Church of the Pilgrims, Brooklyn, N.Y.

I.

THE myth of Blake's madness has been dispelled by Swinburne and G. K. Chesterton; but neither the voluminous periods of the former nor the easy epigrams of the latter can alter the fact of Blake's obscurity. Among the papers unfortunately destroyed after his death, Blake may have left a key to his symbolism; without such a key the student of Blake must resign himself to the certainty that he will have to traverse occasional tracks of unyielding mystery. One of Nietzsche's disciples has found it expedient to explain to the world that his master was preaching to the elect, not to the crowd; concerning Blake such an observation would be a plain redundancy. Though he cared little for the elect and much for the crowd, he spoke in a dialect which was Greek to the multitude. He seems to have deliberately chosen a vehicle which does not at the best of times make for easy legibility; and the medium, in the process of use, achieves an elaboration and an intricacy which surrenders only a partial meaning to the most patient attention. Symbols are dangerous tools; they may hide as often as they reveal the reality which they are supposed to represent. They should, indeed, always be wild—large staggering things that awake us out of sleep; but somehow, somewhere, in name or shape, they should possess an element of obviousness, a clue however slender to the reality beyond. Wildness in Blake's symbolism there assuredly is; and it is only to patient toil that the hidden treasure is exposed. For Blake rarely condescends to offer us a clue. And indeed it may be maintained that his symbols are not only wild but riotous. Huge symbolical figures and living persons jostle

each other freely in his folios. A weird cartography of the supra-sensible regions stands side by side with a quite orthodox map of England. Only a sure amphibious instinct can tell the traveller whether he is in the phantom environs of Golgonooza or in the brick-and-mortar suburbs of London. To multiply perplexity, Blake's figures have an elusive habit of dissolving into each other in a seemingly capricious fashion; and one is inclined to wonder whether the poet's wild team did not sometimes get out of hand. At any rate, the most mystically minded reader of the prophetic books cannot hope to escape spells of provoking and breathless bewilderment. Yet the fact remains that there is no ambiguity or obscurity about the main outlines of what Blake wished to say to the world.¹

The starting-point of Blake's thought is the sovereignty of the creative impulse. The end of life is Art—creative imagination expressed in any medium, whether of sound or of substance, by which the human spirit may make itself articulate. Blake's God is the supreme Artist; Jesus was the incarnation of the Poetic Genius. "Prayer," the poet inscribes on his engraving of the Laocoon, "is the study of Art. Praise is the practice of Art." "A Poet, a Painter, a Musician, an Architect, the man or woman who is not one of these is not a Christian." "The Eternal body of Man," he says in the same place, "is the imagination, that is, God Himself, the Divine Body, Jesus; we are His members. It manifests itself in His works of Art; in Eternity all is Vision." The emphasis upon the Divine Immanence is constant and consistent:

"Go tell them that the Worship of God is honouring His Gifts
In other men: and loving the greatest men best, each according
To his power, which is the Holy Ghost in man; there is no other
God than that God who is the intellectual fountain of humanity."²

At the same time, he is aware that this doctrine does not cover all the facts of life. Man does not live up to this view of him; and Blake has to take account of that phenomenon which a modern thinker has aptly described as the "divided self." Blake meets this situation by stating a doctrine of conversion. "Man," he says, "is born a spectre or Satan, and is altogether an evil and requires a new selfhood continually, and must continually be changed into his direct

¹ The illustrative citations that follow are drawn almost entirely from *Jerusalem*. Blake seems to have gathered up the whole of his mind into that "prophecy."

² *Jerusalem*, f. 91, lines 7-10.

contrary.”¹ This is a doctrine of original sin and conversion hard and definite enough for the most conservative Christian. But it does not follow that the new nature as Blake sees it will behave itself in the same manner as the converted person of the common tradition. According to the latter at its best, we are transfigured into saints; according to Blake, we are turned into artists.

Blake does not, however, regard human perversity as inherent. It is not an attribute but a *state* of the soul. He bids us distinguish between

“The Eternal human

That walks about among the stones and fire, in bliss and woe
Alternate, from those States or Worlds in which the Spirit lives.”²

He is insistent that neither sin nor righteousness should be imputed to persons (this was the error of the orthodox), but to *states*. To change man it is therefore necessary to change *states*. It avails nothing to blame men for what they are or do; the only reasonable attitude to men whose characters and actions are the consequences of *states* is one of forgiveness. But while we forgive, it is our business to destroy the state in which human nature is perverted and to create the state in which man will receive “a new selfhood continually.” This is Jerusalem, that unified world in which the unity and inward balance of personality will be restored. For the real trouble of personality is its disintegration, its internal chaos, which arises from the absence of co-ordination and co-operation between its parts. In Blake’s psychological scheme, the central personality or humanity is associated with its *spectre*, or the reasoning power, its *shadow* which is desire, and its *emanation*, which is the active life of the imagination, the energy of the poetic genius, the creative self-expression of personality. It is in this last that the real man is seen; and the spectre and the shadow are ancillary to it. The body is not so much the vesture of personality as a derivative from it; and Blake constantly protests against the habit of throwing soul and body into antithesis. The body is just that portion of the soul which is discerned by the senses, and is the seat of the energy by which the poetic genius is enabled to express itself. “Energy,” says the poet in *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, “is the only life, and is from the Body; and Reason is the bound or outward circumference of Energy. . . . Energy is eternal Delight.” The perfect life

¹ *Jerusalem*, f. 52, lines 18 ff.

² *Ibid.*, f. 49, lines 72-75.

is that in which energy is informed and inspired by the poetic genius, regulated on the one hand by reason and on the other stimulated by desire. The perverted life is that in which energy is misguided by the conflict of reason and desire and the victory of either. Desire is not to be suppressed, neither is it to be unbridled. Blake has a fine contempt for those who restrain desire; they only succeed "because their desire is weak enough to be restrained." On the other hand, he is well aware that to exalt desire into the place of prime reality is a blunder and a peril. It leads to sensuality, to the "vegetated" life, to which all vision is denied. Speaking of Vala, the figure symbolical of Desire, he asks Jerusalem:

"Why wilt thou give to her a body whose life is but a shade?
Her joy and love, a shade, a shade of sweet repose,
But animated and vegetated, she is a devouring worm?"¹

This warning against the materialisation of desire is, however, not to be regarded in any sense as a disparagement of physical love. Blake's doctrine of the body raises the processes of reproduction to a plane almost sacramental; his plea is simply that these shall not deteriorate because of the disorganisation of the soul, but be regarded and maintained as the organs of a genuine poetic creativity.

The supremacy of reason was, however, in Blake's judgment a greater menace than the excess of desire. Both the inanition and the "vegetation" of desire were indeed due, the former wholly, the latter partly, to the exaggerated power of the rational faculty. The sovereignty of reason entails either the suppression of desire or the separation of desire from it, with all that this involves for desire of excess and "vegetation." The poet's complaint against the claim of reason to monarchy is that it is an

"Abstract objecting Power that negatives everything;
This is the Spectre of Man, the holy Reasoning Power,
And in its holiness is closed the Abomination of Desolation."²

Blake does not mince matters when he comes to deal with the exploits of the spectre. This was no affair for gloved hands or dainty speech. He lays about him lustily—and is no doubt enjoying himself hugely all the time. He sees the spectre reducing everything to cold abstractions, and weaving these abstractions into icy, iron-bound systems of thought and conduct which blind and bind and befog simple people. He sees "Abstract Philosophy warring in Enmity

¹ *Jerusalem*, f. 12, lines 1-3.

² *Ibid.*, f. 5, line 58.

against Imagination.”¹ Men are delivered into bondage to abstract nouns. Invective, scorn, vitriol irony—these he pours voluminously and impartially upon those philosophers whose “wheels” bind and crush humanity, whose definitions mark the Satanic “limit of opakeness.”

“But the Spectre, like a hoarfrost and mildew rose over Albion,
Saying,—‘I am God, O Sons of Men. I am your Rational Power.
Am I not Bacon and Newton and Locke who teach humility to men,
Who teach doubt and experiment, and my two wings, Voltaire, Rousseau?’”²

And again :

“For Bacon and Newton sheathed in dismal steel their terrors hang,
Like Iron scourges over Albion, Reasonings like vast Serpents,
Infold around my limbs, bruising my minute articulations.
I turn my eyes to the schools and Universities of Europe,
And there behold the Loom of Locke, whose woof rages dire,
Washed by the water wheels of Newton ; black the cloth
In heavy wreaths folds over every Action ; cruel works
Of many wheels I view, wheel without wheel, with cogs tyrannic
Moving by Compulsion each other ; not as those in Eden, which
Wheel within wheel in freedom revolve in harmony and peace.”³

Blake believed that a pure intellectualism made for scepticism. He saw intuition going down before speculation ; faith succumbing to logic. The soul was under these conditions doomed to a sterility which could not fail to be deadly to Art. But the poet was more concerned about its effects on personality than upon its after-effects on Art. Intellectualism tended to make man less than the whole man should be, to shut down the non-rational avenues by which man gains some of his information about the universe in which he lives. Blake saw that it takes the whole of a man and all men together to get at the whole of the truth.

II.

In religion the supremacy of the reasoning powers leads to rationalism ; and in Blake’s time it had expressed itself in deism. With the deists Blake deals faithfully and continuously. Deism was essentially a reaction from superstition ; but, like all reactions of this kind, it overshot the mark. It became a protest not only against credulity but against faith. Revelation was ruled out ; and *natural* religion was set in antithesis to *revealed* religion. It is easy to see how this view would provoke Blake to reprisals. If the deists were

¹ *Jerusalem*, f. 5, lines 1–58.

² *Ibid.*, f. 54, lines 15–18.

³ *Ibid.*, f. 15, lines 4–20.

right, then the bottom was knocked out of his universe. But the poet was not the person to take all this lying down; and he set himself to show that the end of deism was darkness and death.

There are only two possible processes by which men can reach a conception of God—revelation and apotheosis. The former descends from above, the latter ascends from below. Either it comes as the self-manifestation of God, or it is constructed by the imagination of man. Blake's charge against the deists was that they had made God in their own image. The object of their worship was an apotheosis of the "natural" man. "Your religion," he says to them, "is the worship of the God of this world by means of what you call Natural Religion, and of Natural Philosophy, and of Natural Morality or Self-righteousness, the Selfish Virtues of the Natural Heart. This was the religion of the Pharisees who murdered Jesus. Deism is the same and ends in the same."¹ "The God of this World" was not an abstract idea to Blake. He was the demiurge Urizen of his mythology, who seems to possess some kind of concrete personal existence and is the cause of the world's misery. The world-order as Blake saw it was the handiwork of Urizen, and he saw no hope for man except by the total overthrow of the God of this World and the enthronement of Jesus.

But the deists accepted the world-order as it was, and its traditional institutions and conventional modes of thought and feeling as fixed and immutable decrees. For them religion was conditioned by the need of self-accommodation to this environment, and virtually consisted of the endeavour after such virtue as was in harmony with these conditions. They acquiesced in war, for instance, as a regrettable yet organic element in the processes of the world, and no doubt vindicated it on those moral grounds upon which conventional religion has always justified it. Blake saw that war was inherent in the world-order as it was; but his complaint against the deists was that they consecrated and hallowed and gave theoretic justification to the very system which was responsible for the horrors of war. "You also," he says to them, "charge the poor monks and religious with being the causes of war, while you acquit and flatter the Alexanders and Cæsars, the Lewis's and Fredericks who alone are its Authors and Actors . . . Every religion that preaches vengeance for Sin is the religion of the Enemy and the Avenger, and not of the Forgiver of Sin. . . . The religion of Jesus, Forgiveness of Sin,

¹ *Jerusalem*, ch. lii, lines 23-28.

can never be the cause of a war nor of a single martyrdom. Those who martyr others or who cause war are deists, but never can be Forgivers of Sin. All the Destruction therefore in Christian Europe has arisen from Deism, which is natural religion."¹ Blake saw—and he was surely right—that war is the ultimate logic of the self-regarding instincts of the massed “natural” man. Civilisation itself is an unstable equilibrium resting precariously upon a balance of the self-regarding instincts of opposing groups; and the origin of the European war shows how little it takes to bring this ramshackle edifice crashing down in tremendous ruin. A “balance of power” may secure spells of quiet life; but a quiet world is not necessarily a moral world. It may be good international politics to play off one set of self-regarding instincts against another; but it is to stultify thought to suppose that such a world-order is a Christian achievement. It may be first-rate paganism; but it is not Christianity. To speak of our Christian civilisation is not even hyperbole; it is sheer nonsense. Our civilisation is simply a pagan system touched lightly here and there by a Christian grace; and Blake saw in his day what has become plain in our day, that what the world most needs is not more progress but a moral revolution, a “change of heart.” It was the distinction of Blake that he perceived anew the revolutionary note of Christianity; and somehow, very soon, if organised Christianity is not to become a hopeless derelict, it must recover its original quality of percussion and attack. It was an ancient charge against the Christian society that it aimed at turning the world upside down; but no one would dream of laying that to its charge to-day.

The moral philosophy of deism is legalism; and it was this that justified Blake’s association of the deists with the Pharisees:

“When Satan first the black bow bent
And the moral Law from the Gospel rent,
He forged the Law into a sword
And spilled the blood of Mercy’s Lord.”²

The moral law was a code of abstract definitions and general enactments by the fulfilment of which the individual attained to righteousness. But in practice the endeavour after righteousness has been accompanied by the growth of self-righteousness, with its uncomely progeny of moral criticism and censoriousness. Moral self-complacency is Blake’s abomination of desolation, the great divider and destroyer, “a pretence of religion to destroy religion.” He draws a

¹ *Jerusalem*, ch. lii., lines 46-54.

² *Ibid.*, lines 71-74.

sustained contrast between the protagonists of natural religion, with its disastrous and enslaving legalism, and Jesus. His hand is heavy upon the Christian Church because it had surrendered to the prevailing tendencies of thought and had permitted its Gospel to be eviscerated by the deists, so that it had preached a Christianity in which logic had displaced faith and law had obscured grace—which was to the poet no Christianity at all. Wesley and Whitfield seemed to him to embody the protest of essential Christianity against the current caricature of it. In the fourth chapter of *Jerusalem*, he sees a “wheel of fire” “devouring all things in its loud fury and thundering course,” and was told that it was the “wheel of religion”:

“I wept and said : is this the law of Jesus
 This terrible devouring sword turned every way ?
 He answered : Jesus died because He strove
 Against the current of this wheel : its name is
 Caiaphas, the dark preacher of Death,
 Of sin, of sorrow, and of punishment :
 Opposing Nature. It is Natural Religion.
 But Jesus is the bright preacher of life
 Creating Nature from this fiery Law
 By self-denial and forgiveness of Sin.
 Go therefore, cast out devils in Christ’s name,
 Heal thou the sick of spiritual disease,
 Pity the evil, for thou are not sent
 To smite with terror and with punishments
 Those that are sick, like to the Pharisees
 Crucifying and encompassing sea and land
 For proselytes to tyranny and wrath,
 But to the Publicans and Harlots go.
 Teach them true happiness, but let no curse
 Go forth out of thy mouth to blight their peace.
 For Hell is opened to Heaven ; thine eyes beheld
 The dungeons burst and the prisoners set free.”¹

Blake perceived what so often escapes us—that for the harlots and publicans Jesus had only compassion. He condemned not so much the mote in the Magdalene’s eye as the beam in the Pharisee’s. Popular religion is still blind or impervious to the circumstance that pride and prejudice, moral self-complacency and censoriousness, the sins of the mind, cut more directly and more fatally at the nerve of life than do sins of the flesh. And if Jesus had no condemnation for the publican and the harlot, it was because the prevailing religious atmosphere doomed them in perpetuity to a condition of ostracism and despair. It held out no hope, no invitation to them ; it relegated them to a sub-human category

¹ *Jerusalem*, f. 77, lines 55-76.

and kept them there. Blake speaks of the "wastes of moral law," and the picture is none too vivid of the sterility of religious institutions which have become the preserve of the respectable. The tragedy of Christianity, not in Blake's day alone—indeed, we may say that the recurrent tragedy of Christianity—is that it tends to decline to worldly scales of value, esteeming external qualities above "truth in the inward parts"; and while it has no room for the down-trodden and outcast, it not only permits but even stimulates among its followers tempers and attitudes of mind which are plain denials of the spirit of Jesus:

"He who envies or calumniates, which is murder and cruelty,
Murders the Holy One. Go tell them this and overthrow their cup,
Their bread, their altar table, their incense and their oath,
Their marriage and their baptism, their burial and their consecration.

He who would see the Divinity must see Him in His children:
One first, in friendship and love, then a Divine Family, and in the midst
Jesus will appear; and so he who wishes to see a vision, a perfect whole,
Must see it in its Minute Particulars: Organised, and not as thou,
O friend of Righteousness, pretendest: thine is a disorganised
And snowy cloud, brooder of tempests and destructive war;
You smile with pomp and vigour; you talk of benevolence and virtue:
I act with benevolence and virtue and get murder'd time after time.
You accumulate Particulars and murder by analysing, that you
May take the Aggregate: and you call the aggregate Moral Laws:
And you call that swelled and bloated form a Minute Particular.
But General Forms have their vitality in Particulars; and every
Particular is a man; a *divine* Member of the Divine Jesus."¹

III.

The latter part of this passage brings us to the active principle of Blake's ethics. His doctrine of the intrinsic worth and the social character of the Minute Particular—the individual man—may be derived from the New Testament; but it has been given to few to perceive the precise implications of this principle with all the vivid definition which they assumed for Blake. Abstract moral ideas are mere creatures of the mind, and possess no concrete existence save as actual relations between persons. It is easy to utter large-sounding generalities about justice and liberty and to think and speak of them as objective realities in themselves, whereas they do not have any actual substance apart from persons. That is why so many crimes have been committed in the name of justice and of liberty. It is possible to deny them to men in the

¹ *Jerusalem*, f. 91, lines 11-14, 18-30.

very act of defending them. We may belie our ideals by the very means we use to reach them. The one sovereign sanctity is personality; the sacredness of justice and liberty is a derivative from this. They are holy because they are the only conditions under which personality can rise to its full stature; and they are not to be fought for by any method which dishonours personality. That were to subordinate the greater to the less, to undermine and destroy the foundations on which one professes to be building. It is personality—at once a Minute Particular and the one real Universal—that supremely matters. “Labour well,” cries Blake,

“Labour well the Minute Particular: attend to the Little ones”;¹

and this is the heart of his ethic:

“He who would do good to another must do it in Minute Particulars.
General good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite, and flatterer;
For Art and Science cannot exist but in minutely organised Particulars,
And not in generalising Demonstrations of the Rational Power.
The Infinite alone resides in Definite and Determinate Identity.”²

Here surely is bedrock—the actual personality of individuals. This is the one sure, fixed point for thought and conduct. True reverence for and a right relation to personality—this is the law and the prophets.

But this right relation is defined by the social nature of personality. Its name is fellowship; and whatsoever destroys fellowship is anathema. Selfishness, whether of the individual or of the group, is the abiding curse.

“Is this thy soft family love,
Thy cruel patriarchal pride,
Planting thy family alone,
Destroying all the world beside?”³

This is Blake’s comment upon the jingo patriotism of his day; and it retains its original sting. Walls, whether of steel or stone, whether tariff walls or walls of false pride, are of their father the devil.

“In my Exchange every land
Shall walk; and mine in every land
Mutual shall build Jerusalem
Both heart in heart and hand in hand.”⁴

The law of God for the life of man is reciprocity, mutuality, call it what you will. In a world where men need each other

¹ *Jerusalem*, f. 55, line 51.

² *Ibid.*, lines 60-64.

³ *Ibid.*, f. 27, lines 94-97.

⁴ *Ibid.*, lines 102-105.

and cannot do without each other, where exclusiveness spells starvation of spirit, the tempers and policies which sunder men from one another spring from a kind of atheism. They are, as Dora Greenwell says in a similar connection, a denial of God because a denial of men. Instead of the healing and unitive influences which should produce the fellowship of his vision, Blake saw the world overrun with passions of vengeance, doctrines of punishment, which, while they were supposed to repress the evil of the world, deepened and widened the gulf which divides man from his fellows. Our human frailty makes it impossible for us to live together except upon a basis of mutual forbearance and forgiveness. The true life is that which in all its reactions makes for human brotherhood. That man has found himself who has learnt to bind his brother man to his heart in healing, forgiving, long-suffering life.

Blake saw with his swift insight that this was the real distinction of the Christian principle of conduct. There were great and notable virtues which men practised and praised before Jesus appeared—there was love of country, the sense of honour, the passion for righteousness, the love of justice, the capacity for sacrifice. There is nothing distinctively or exclusively Christian about these. The one point at which Jesus taught a definite advance in the region of personal relationships was in His command that men should love their enemies. But this was a profound and far-reaching revolution. It broke down for ever the traditional notion that the world was permanently and incurably divided into friends and enemies; it destroyed the midmost "wall of partition"; and His emphasis upon forgiveness is the sequel to this new principle. Forgiveness is the bridge that spans the gulf between me and my enemy. It was the faith of Jesus that the forgiving spirit was not to be resisted; and not the infamy of His own condemnation and crucifixion shook that faith. This point Blake grasped with characteristic thoroughness; and though no good forgiver himself, he was the indefatigable preacher of forgiveness. "The Spirit of Jesus is continual forgiveness of sin." "The glory of Christianity is to conquer by forgiveness."

"Why should punishment weave the veil with iron wheels of war,
When forgiveness might weave it with wings of cherubim?"

It is hardly necessary to add that this took shape in Blake's mind not as an attitude of yielding passivity. To him the fighting instinct was a priceless gift of God, and his figures are chiefly borrowed from the battlefield. The tragedy of the

fighting instinct as he saw it was that it had been misdirected. Greedy men had exploited it for selfish ends. It was muddied and soiled by the spirit of hate, of revenge, and of destruction. That there is no way of satisfying the fighting instincts of humanity save by destroying men at long range in the dull mechanical way of modern war is a mere superstition. Blake shows us a more excellent way :

“ Our wars are wars of life, and wounds of love,
 With intellectual spears and long-winged arrows of thought :
 Mutual in one another's love and wrath all renewing
 We live as One Man. For, contracting our infinite senses,
 We behold multitude ; or expanding, we behold as One,
 As One Man all the Universal Family ; and that One Man
 We call Jesus the Christ ; and He in us and we in Him
 Live in perfect harmony in Eden the Land of Life,
 Giving, receiving, and forgiving each other's trespasses.” ¹

The temptation is strong to point the moral for these disastrous and deplorable times. Yet the moral is plain to see. The old illusions, the old stupidities, the old perversities of thought and outlook which vexed Blake are still with us. This is the agelong moral tragedy of the world ; and it will abide so long as we are content to build our common life on the principles of the jungle. Western civilisation is pagan and materialistic, and it is therefore competitive and self-regarding. Here and there Christianity has modified its essential brutality, but in its craftiness, in its disregard of the ordinary human sanctities, it still out-jungles the jungle. Its characteristic products are the slum and war. And nothing less drastic can change it than some such revolution as Blake sought to stimulate. The call of our day is substantially Blake's to his day—the call to a resolute moral campaign for the dethronement of the self-regard which rules individuals and classes and nations and is the source of the brutalities of competitive industry and of the horrors of war, and for the enthronement in its stead, as the rule of life, of that love “ which suffereth long and is kind . . . which beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things, and . . . never faileth,” which (as one has nobly said) is “ the redeeming identification of oneself with another,” and (as has been no less nobly said by another) “ no flickering or wayward emotion, but the energy of a steadfast will bent on creating fellowship.”

RICHARD ROBERTS.

BROOKLYN,

¹ *Jerusalem*, f. 38, lines 14-22.

GOETHE RESTUDIED.

SIR GEORGE DOUGLAS, BART.

AT a period such as the present, when things German are in the melting-pot, the reconsideration of Germany's literary reputations becomes a part of the order of the day, and has already been embarked upon by a writer in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL*.¹ Not, however, that I would propose to take a leaf out of the enemy's book by waging war on works of art, but rather—seeing that it is an admitted foible of the Britisher to accept with easy complaisance all that foreign countries have deemed worthy of renown—that I would utilise the present opportunity for correcting an overestimate or two into which this amiable weakness has betrayed us. It is with this object in view, then, that I presume to approach the works of Goethe; but, before doing so, I may perhaps be allowed to state what special facilities for studying the subject have happened to come my way. It was my fortune, then, whilst in my teens, to spend the better part of two years in Weimar, as pupil of the British chaplain, the late Dr Thomas Wilson, a friend of Carlyle's, and himself a man of vigorous originality. It was then not far short of a century since Goethe had come to live at Weimar, and rather over forty years since he had died there, and it might still be said that traces of his personality lingered in the town, which, to this day, his reputation pervades. For there were several persons living there who had known him more or less intimately, and, whatever that distinction may be worth, I can myself claim to have grasped a hand which had grasped Goethe's. Well, my tutor and his wife being advanced in life, and I for a long time their only pupil, their instant problem was how to keep me quiet. By and by they discovered that a book

¹ October 1918: "German Poetry: a Revaluation," by Mrs A. G. Campbell.

had the desired effect, and, so long as the book might be a German classic and have a dictionary associated with it, their consciences were easy. So it came about that, whilst still in a state of virgin ignorance of the world, I first read Goethe's works, or at least his plays, lyrics, novels, travels, and autobiography—read them for enjoyment, from a sense of obligation, or, at worst, for something to do. Nor, though much modified by subsequent reading, has the impression then made ever been effaced. I also attended performances of Goethe's plays at the Grand Ducal Theatre, where the tradition of Goethe's management remained; and when British or American visitors to Weimar called on the chaplain, I would sometimes be told off to guide them to the Goethe House, the Gartenhaus, the Denkmal, monument, and mausoleum. So much for opportunities of culture, which, had my father been gifted with prescience, he would most carefully have put from me! But he, good man, saw no further ahead than did the statesmen of his own generation, or of the next, or the next after that.

I have described my tutor as a man of pronounced originality, but, so far as Goethe was affected, his originality remained inoperative. Goethe he took at the current valuation, from which indeed no local voice articulately dissented. Thirty years before this, De Quincey, writing of Goethe and Germany, had declared that the poet had "established a supremacy of influence wholly unexampled,"¹ and with this supremacy was associated, in the estimation of the great bulk of his countrymen, a position above criticism. For them Goethe was indeed sacrosanct. Our own little circle at the Altenbourg, where persons of greater or lesser distinction would be hospitably entertained by the Doctor—the brightest star among them being the Abbé Liszt,—afforded illustration of this. For, no matter what reference to Goethe's works might be made, it was invariably greeted, as I came to notice, with the cry of *Wunderschön! Wunderschön!*—that, when there was question of Goethe's writings, was the stereotyped epithet,—that and, as Poe says, nothing more. Of discussion, elucidation, comparison, there was nothing—only ecstasy. And this, as likely as not, though the passage referred to were the robustious finale of *Clavigo*, the inane novelettes of the *Wanderjahre*, or the laughter-provoking tragedy of *Stella*. In a word, in treating of Goethe, discrimination, that foundation-stone of criticism, was in itself accounted presumptuous. And, if I am here tempted to dwell

¹ De Quincey's *Works*, author's edition, vol. xv. p. 145.

on what might pass as the provincialism of a coterie, it is because later experience has served to convince me that that ejaculation of *Wunderschön!* was typical, and, in fine, that Goethe's merits have been too much taken for granted and the foundations upon which his reputation rests too little subjected to examination. That the attitude of his countrymen towards Goethe is radically uncritical is illustrated by the fact, familiar to most people who have known Germany long, and noted by Professor Seeley,¹ that, after 1870, he was advanced to the rank of premier poet of the world (having before been classed second to Shakespeare), whilst to the cry of *Deutschland über alles* was henceforth associated that of *Goethe und kein Ende*. It was as though the brand-new Emperor had been pleased to celebrate his own elevation by advancing his official poet a step in the hierarchy of the immortals. Nor, I presume, would the fatuity of a Hohenzollern find such a proposal preposterous.

Turning now from Goethe in Germany to Goethe in England, it is clear that among ourselves there can have been no question of fetichism in this matter. None the less does it appear to the writer that, whether from complaisance or from indolence, we too have shown too little independence of judgment where Goethe was concerned, too great a disposition to take his merits on trust. Let us glance for a moment at the process by which his reputation came to be established here. Though not actually first in the field, Carlyle had certainly the lion's share in making Goethe known in England—Carlyle, who in 1824 had published an excellent translation of *Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre*, following it up in 1828 by two substantial critical articles contributed to the *Foreign Review*.² Carlyle writes of Goethe with an admiration which, though slightly better reasoned and controlled, is scarcely less fervent than that with which Swinburne wrote at a later date of Hugo. One thing that strikes us in re-reading his articles is their highly abstract character: it is the *spirit* of Goethe which is being exposed rather than his individual works; nor are these often drawn upon by way of illustration. It will be well to remember that Carlyle, who here writes as "admirer and pleader," did never at any time shine as a literary critic, and that, indeed, his avowed cult of hero-worship is incompatible with criticism. For he who indulges hero-worship is blind—or, it may be, shuts his eyes—to all that detracts from his hero. But the aim of the

¹ *Goethe reviewed after Sixty Years*, by J. R. Seeley, p. 5.

² Reprinted in his *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. i.

critic is to see his man just as he is, with faults and merits in their true proportion. Aiming as he did, for his countrymen's good, to get Goethe accepted in this country, Carlyle may possibly have been right in ignoring Goethe's faults, as he deliberately did. "That Goethe's mind is full of inconsistencies and shortcomings," he writes,¹ "can be a secret to no one who has heard of the Fall of Adam." (A fine meiosis, that.) "Nor would it be difficult, in this place, to muster a long catalogue of darkneses defacing our perception of this brightness." This for his own reasons he concludes not to do, and the result is that his estimate of Goethe remains less a critique than an "appreciation." Such as it is, however, it holds the field, and, till recently, has held it reinforced by an immense authority. And, thus it has come about that, for ninety years past, the hero-worshipper's estimate of Goethe, as distinct from the critic's, has been generally accepted in Great Britain. Like all similar estimates, whatever their intrinsic value, it provokes reaction, though to correct it calls for time and for the work of many hands. Nor, in presenting what pretends to be no more than a personal impression of a great subject, does the present writer aspire to do more than encourage a freer play of mind upon that subject. And he would also have it understood from the outset that it is with Goethe as man of letters solely, and not as philosopher or scientist, that he here sets out to deal.

What strikes one first in comparing Goethe with other writers more or less of his own calibre is that, excepting Victor Hugo, the literary forms through which he expresses himself are more varied than theirs. Hugo, indeed, besides his prose, has at command verse-forms as numerous as the stops of some great organ. But Shakespeare, infinitely varied as he is in matter, found few forms suffice for his requirements. He gave us history, tragedy, comedy, invariably in five acts; and besides these, only lyric verse, as in the Songs and Sonnets, and narrative, as in *Lucrece* and *Venus and Adonis*. Homer, the traditional Homer, *bien entendu*, confined himself to epic and hymn, with a single excursus into mock-heroic or familiar verse in *The Battle of the Frogs and Mice*. Dante, in addition to his great religious or didactic epic, gave us lyric in the *Canzoniere* and in the *Vita Nuova* prose: Milton, epic, tragic and pastoral drama, lyric verse, and prose pamphlet. But, excepting epic and masque, Goethe has worked in all these forms, as well as in satire (*Reinecke Fuchs*) and epigram

¹ *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. i. p. 283.

(*Die Xenien*). And where Hugo's prose, whether creative or not, is always more or less dignified or elevated, Goethe's, in the Italian Journey and the Autobiography, condescends to the familiar. From the all too heterogeneous mass of Goethe's works Professor Seeley has selected as the most essential, *Goetz von Berlichingen*, *Werther*, *Torquato Tasso*, *Iphigenie*, *Hermann und Dorothea*, *Wilhelm Meister*, *Faust*, *Wahlverwandtschaften*, and the lyric poems; and these, with one or two additions of my own, I now propose to pass before the reader in rapid survey.

Considered as the work of a young man of two or three and twenty,¹ *Goetz von Berlichingen* is indeed a remarkable performance, and this not alone because of the new ground it breaks, but because the dramatic faculty as a rule matures slowly, yet in *Goetz* it is already mature. In fact, the only trace of crudeness exhibited by the workmanship is the quite unnecessary violence with which the Unities of Time and Place are treated. Granted that they had curbed talent and hampered drama far too long, it is here as if an ancient grudge were being paid off with interest; so that when *Goetz* is performed as it was originally written, as is sometimes done to this day, it still imposes a heavy penalty upon scene-shifter and stage-carpenter on account of a false convention of the past. In a play written by a poet, and avowedly modelled upon Shakespeare's plays, it is somewhat remarkable that the dialogue should stop always on the hither side of poetry; though, whilst regretting this, we must not neglect to rejoice in the total absence of those Wardour Street archaisms of language which were to be the bane of Scott. And, by the way, it is easy to overrate the debt of Sir Walter to *Berlichingen*. That the labour he expended on his workmanlike translation may have helped to awaken him to the dramatic possibilities of the Johnie Armstrongs and Wats of Harden who were *Goetz's* British counterparts is possible enough. That it determined the direction of his genius is incredible. That had been already done for him by Percy's *Reliques*, even supposing that it was not preordained and provided for, as Seeley suggests, by the mere atavistic tendencies inherent in an imaginative scion of his house.

Pregnant with literary consequences, however, as was *Goetz*, it paled before the *Sorrows of Young Werther*. For

¹ "Although *Goetz* was not published until the spring of 1773, it was written in the winter of 1771, or, to speak more accurately, the first of the three versions into which the work was shaped was written at this time."—Lewes's *Life of Goethe*, vol. i. p. 151.

ourselves, it is almost impossible to conceive of the stupendous effect produced by this little book at the commencement of the last quarter of the Eighteenth Century. But that process becomes easier if we reflect that *Werther* tore off the trappings in which, for a full century and a half, the classicist and the conventionalist had been wont to swathe the love-passion, presenting it nude and unashamed. In England, possibly elsewhere, scant justice has been meted out to the character of the protagonist. For, however rightly alien from our ideal of manhood be a type of sensibility and of emotion uncontrolled, we may at least acknowledge in *Werther* a man of gentle nature, delicate perception, and unusual endowment. Neither is he a poltroon, nor, outside the sphere of his special infirmity, does he want decision of character. It is a truth in art that genius does what it is impelled to do, leaving the realisation or comprehension of it to the reader or the critic. And of this *Werther* affords a notable instance. For it is undeniable that the heroine, Charlotte, is altogether undistinguished: a mere comely exponent of household virtues which are happily as common as they are excellent. And just such is the type which an imaginative nature such as *Werther's* is most prone to idealise, endowing it with every gift conceived of by its own exuberant fancy—just such is the type, and dire is apt to be the retribution exacted from the guiltless impostor when the mirage vanishes, or when he who had created it at last comes to his senses. To this special aspect of the conflict of temperaments Goethe's romance does not, however, draw attention; nor is this particular tragedy consummated. There is a moment when the vehemence of *Werther's* passion seems about to carry Charlotte off her feet. But she regains her equilibrium, as she would do in real life, and there is a perfect truth to character, though not to the story, in the malicious contemporary epigram which would have us leave her, as we had found her, busy cutting up bread-and-butter. Between the *Wethers* and the *Charlottes* of the human race no satisfactory *modus vivendi* has ever been arrived at.

After two such resounding successes as *Goetz* and *Werther*, it certainly behoved a young poet of five-and-twenty to ponder carefully what card he should play next. In analogous circumstances, a young English singer of our own period followed up the *Atalanta in Calydon* and *Poems and Ballads*, which had fixed the eyes of the world on him, with a far from unworthy successor in the shape of *Songs before Sunrise*. But Swinburne, as Goethe's apologist might tell us, had a great literary tradition behind him, whereas the models supplied by Goethe's

predecessors were scanty, mediocre, and ill-assorted. Whether we charge it to the state of literature in Germany, or to that gross inequality of performance which was Goethe's most inherent defect, certain it is that *Clavigo*, following upon *Werther*, furnished an example of the Art of Sinking which has rarely been surpassed; whilst to urge that it was written against time and for a gage is merely to add levity, or a very defective sense of responsibility, to the other and purely artistic sins of which it serves to convict Goethe. Except in so far as, like *Goetz*, it was founded on a memoir, and, like *Werther*, showed a reckless disregard for the feelings of persons then alive, *Clavigo* had little or nothing in common with its brilliant precursors.

In so comparatively slight a paper as this, it is unnecessary to keep strictly to chronological order. Though not completed until eleven years later, the historical tragedy of *Egmont* was begun in 1775, when Goethe was six-and-twenty. That it should have won the reputation, or at least the popularity, it has so long enjoyed must be to Goethe-students somewhat of a puzzle. For, with singular obtuseness of perception, the author has contrived to subordinate the interest of a great popular struggle for liberty to that of a love-intrigue, or love-idyll, of the Rosamund or Robsart type. Nay, he has even gone out of his way to damage the character of an otherwise sympathetic hero by inventing the said idyll—as if there were not heroes enough who had come to shipwreck over women, without including in their number one who was domesticated even to a fault.¹ Again, than the total elimination from the action of the play of *Egmont's* fellow-victim, Count Horn, no more clumsy device for concentrating interest on a name-part could easily be conceived. Nor is it reasonably disputable that, judged as a dramatic presentation of a struggle for freedom in the Low Countries, Goethe's *Egmont* ranks immeasurably below Sir Henry Taylor's noble *Philip van Artevelde*, though, here again, Goethe's apologists will doubtless avail themselves of the plea of no literary tradition.

It is well known that the two plays of *Iphigenie in Tauris* and *Torquato Tasso* were alike originally composed in prose and afterwards turned into verse, the former, in its earlier shape, being acted at Weimar about the year 1779, when Goethe himself took the part of Orestes. In Germany *Iphigenie* is, or

¹ Coxe, in his *History of the House of Austria*, vol. i. p. 621, note, goes so far as to say that, "from the incumbrance of a numerous family," *Egmont* "was influenced rather by the hope of personal advantage than by a consideration of the public good."

used to be, regarded with a respect amounting to veneration, and it is pleasant to remember how the little Weimar theatre never failed to pack when *Iphigenie* was announced for performance. Now, to pour cold water on an earnest effort after culture is a most invidious task, and yet it is in the interest of culture to clear the grounds of our admiration for a given work of art as far as may be from misapprehension. Well, among the crowds who flocked to see *Iphigenie* performed, a vast majority went in the belief that they were to witness a perfect manifestation of the spirit of classical antiquity. And yet it had long ago been pointed out that the crux or *dénouement* of the play—turning, as it does, upon the making of a great sacrifice for truth's sake—is a purely Christian conception, and, as such directly opposed to the Greek classic spirit. Nay, upon this point Goethe himself has left us in no doubt.¹ The two religions, then, Christianity and Paganism, do not combine well; yet, when this objection has been made, it is still possible to allow the existence of much antique beauty in the earlier portions of the play. In *Torquato Tasso* Goethe paints the poetic temperament—paints it in conflict with the prose of everyday life (worse still! with the everyday life of a petty Court), paints all its hypersensitiveness, enthusiasm, uncontrolled impulse and utter impracticability, and, when all is said and done, presents it in no sympathetic light! Indeed, the damning fault of this performance—interesting, at the best, but to a select minority—is that it holds the balance far too evenly. For, besides that complete impartiality is never dramatically effective, it was clearly Goethe's cue as a poet to hold a brief for poets—for those who stand in such bitter need of having their part taken, whom the world has never yet understood, and who have never yet succeeded in explaining themselves. Doubtless had he himself inherited fewer of the advantages and more of the sorrows characteristic of the race, his statement of the *pro* and *con* would have been less finely judicial. But, among the *sacri vates* of the ages, Goethe is the ideal type of the poet prosperous, triumphant, and, I must add, self-satisfied. His agony was over early and left him immune against reinfection. Had he suffered more and enjoyed less, had he been less Olympian and more human, he

¹ In the *Italiänische Reise*, under date October 19, 1786, speaking of a picture of St. Agatha at Bologna, he writes: "I have stamped on my mind both her form and look, and shall read my *Iphigenie* before her, and shall not allow my heroine to express a sentiment to which the saint herself might not give utterance" (*und meine Heldin nichts sagen lassen was diese Heilige nicht aussprechen möchte*). This is conclusive.

would have been a greater poet. For, whatever may be said in praise or in dispraise of him, it is certain that, unlike Shakespeare, unlike Cervantes, unlike Scott, unlike a lesser man than these, whom in his youth he had admired, unlike Oliver Goldsmith, Goethe, whilst winning boundless admiration, wins no hearts. And the reason of this is that, in his organisation, the balance between heart and brain inclines too heavily to one side.

Tasso was completed in 1788, on the poet's return from Italy to Weimar, where he had already spent some eleven years in the service of his appreciative and indulgent friend, the Duke Karl August, one of the few German princelings of happy memory, or indeed of any memory at all. It was a momentous period in his life; but it belongs not to my present plan to enter into details, whether of his elaborate system of self-culture or of the successive love-engagements which, when he could, he caused to minister to that system. His account of the two years or so which he had passed in Italy was not compiled until long afterwards. Based on letters written at the time, it incorporates the comments of a mind which was strong and variously instructed, rather than delicate or refined, upon the natural features, monuments, and manners of the land of his heart's desire. In such a book omissions are to be expected, but, considering that he wrote daily, and to highly cultivated correspondents, the *lacunæ* of the *Reise* are astonishing. As the outpourings of a poet, Shelley's letters written from Italy thirty years later put Goethe to the blush. Yet, unlike Shelley, Goethe had given his imprimatur to these writings. Lacking composition as they do, they can claim none but the humblest rank as works of literary accomplishment. And as his love and longing for Italy were about the most sympathetic and attractive traits in Goethe's character, this is especially disappointing to students of his life and work.

The idea of founding a novel on the shifts, adventures, varying relationships of a troop of strolling players was an extremely happy one; and, seeing that that novel was to be the work of a Goethe, with his congenital love of the stage and his personal experience of theatrical management, something much more than a mere essay in the picaresque style was of course to be expected. That expectation was by no means disappointed. In virtue of its wealth of profound reflection upon life and art, if for no other reason, *Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre* would take its place among the world's justly famous books. But it also incorporates two female character-portraits of such achieved completeness and living

truth, that, had Goethe written nothing else, they would alone suffice to rank him as a great imaginative genius. They are those of Philina, the wanton, and of Mignon, the incarnation of poetic wistfulness, through whose lips Goethe gives dramatic utterance to his Italian *Sehnsucht*; and it is in right of these feminine portraits, with that of Gretchen and some two or three more, that, on the creative as distinct from the reflective side, the name of Goethe may be mentioned in the same breath with that of Shakespeare. Goethe's women are, in fact, his crowning literary achievement. Less radiant than those of Shakespeare, as they are also much fewer in number, they are quite distinct from and could be spared no better than his. For they are the daughters of an older world, one which has learnt and suffered more, and as such they have made for themselves a place of their own in modern hearts.

But by weighting his book with reflection, and endowing it with various other literary values, though he has avoided any suspicion of frivolity, Goethe has fallen into the opposite extreme and made it heavy: *Wilhelm Meister* often drags. This is doubtless partly due to the excessively long period during which he wrought upon it, and to the same cause may be attributed its even worse defect of a lack of definite purpose, or of unity of design. For no one, not even the author himself, has been able to say with certainty what this book is all about. Among outside suggestions the most plausible is this: that the career of Meister—the *ganache*, or “old woman,” as Carlyle severely called him in a letter, which, I need hardly say, was not among those he addressed to Goethe—that the career of Meister paints the vagaries of one who, without true vocation, has embarked on an artistic life. Goethe himself does not subscribe to this view. With a frankness which does him credit, he acknowledges that the work is “incalculable,” and that he himself “can hardly be said to have the key to it.”¹ He adds: “I should think a rich manifold life, brought close to our eyes, would be enough in itself, without any express tendency. . . . But, if anything of the sort is insisted on, it will perhaps be found in the words addressed by Frederick to the hero, when he says, ‘Thou seem'st to me like Saul the son of Kish, who went out to seek his father's asses, and found a kingdom.’” It is not unfair to conclude that uncertainty such as this reflects fluctuations of intention during a ten years' period of gestation. Of *Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre*, the work of Goethe's dotage, it would be uncharitable to say

¹ *Conversations with Eckermann*, Oxenham's translation, under date January 18, 1825.

more than that, after a few opening pages which are charming, the story loses itself amid vapid didacticism, to end by producing a distressing sense that the author no longer knows what he would be at. Goethe's remaining novel, the *Wahlverwandtschaften*, admired by so rare a critic as Walter Pater, has, on a lesser scale, and with a much simpler action, precisely the same faults and merits as its predecessor. And just as the incidents of *Wilhelm Meister* turn upon acting, so it is noticeable that those of *The Elective Affinities* turn upon another pleasing hobby of the novelist's, namely, landscape-gardening.

By far the greatest of Goethe's works, however, remains to be considered. His *Faust* has been plausibly described as the greatest poem of the nineteenth century. Certainly it is Goethe's greatest poem; more than that, it is the poem by which Goethe stands or falls. For, deprive Shakespeare of *Hamlet*, nay, deprive Milton of *Paradise Lost*, and they remain stupendous poets; but deprive Goethe of *Faust*, and he sinks at once to the grade of a writer of exquisite lyrics and of highly suggestive philosophic prose. Rob him of *Faust* and of the lyrics, and he will remain, as I believe, with no more perfect poem to his credit than his own favourite, *Hermann und Dorothea*, which, admirable though it is, belongs essentially to the category of delightful as distinct from great poems. *Faust*, on the other hand, is great but imperfect. And its greatness consists mainly in this, that it thrusts back the bounds of art, and, unlike any play of later date than Æschylus or Sophocles, shows us a drama of the finite against a background of the infinite and eternal. Herein lies its greatness, and herein its imperfection. For it is by excess of the one quality that it misses the other. And in the sense that the thought and burden of the world have grown and gathered weight since Art's Golden Age—in that sense is the work of Goethe more transcendent than the work of the greatest of the Greeks. As a work of art, as distinct from philosophy, the greatness of *Faust* would seem to have been felt, rather than defined, by the critics. But it is safe to say that, in this respect, the play is great precisely where it conforms to the Aristotelian canon of inspiring terror and pity—that is, in the suicide scene and throughout the whole of the intrigue with Margarete; whilst, on the other hand, the preliminary conversations of Faust and Mephistopheles are, dramatically considered, tedious and otiose, the Walpurgisnacht fails to advance the action of the play, and the Intermezzo, whatever it may have been to Goethe's contemporaries, is pointless to ourselves. Goethe's

diablerie is, as a matter of fact, not so good of its kind as his philosophy. Of the Second Part of *Faust* I do not speak. If it is great, it is esoterically so. And, surely, in the case of a poem which has puzzled the pundits for nigh a century, and but puzzles them the more the more it is expounded, it may safely be said that the author, be he Goethe or another, has grossly abused the poet's privilege of dark speech. As to translations of *Faust*, I persist in preferring Anster's. Anster was a poet, which could not be said of Hayward, and could but doubtfully be said of Bayard Taylor or of Blackie. And though his work may be condemned as that of a dilettante rather than a scholar, and as a paraphrase rather than a translation, though he permits himself liberties even to the extent of altering the text, he yet, I believe, gives us more of the warmth, life, spirit, of the original than any later rival has done. The ideal English version is still to seek.

And if this may be said of Goethe's masterpiece, what must be said of his lyrics, which are possibly untranslatable? In the finest and most popular of them—in the *König in Thule*, *Meine Ruh' ist hin*, *Wer nie sein Brot, Kennst du das Land*, *Veilchen*, *Erbkönig*, *Über allen Gipfeln*, and others—Goethe displays a delicacy of workmanship which in him is unusual, and, as the hostile writer in the HIBBERT JOURNAL admits, has given us again and again what is noblest and most essentially national in German literature. Yet I doubt if he has left behind him as large a number of perfect songs as Burns. Too often he is wooden, or otherwise misses his mark. Among his poems in the manner of the antique, for instance, there are many which, aiming at Greek simplicity, forget the charm which is its better part, and result in mere coldness and baldness. Many more of the lesser poems suffer from being written in Latin measures; for though these may be tolerated in a long poem, such as *Hermann und Dorothea*, shorter pieces demand a higher degree of metrical perfection, and hence expose their workmanship to the scorn of the master-metrist who wrote:

“Hexameters no worse than daring Germany gave us,
Barbarous experiment, barbarous hexameters.”

And though he wrote so much elegiac verse, it is notable that Goethe himself acknowledged that German has very few syllables which are decidedly either long or short.¹ But, the

¹ *Italiänische Reise*, 10^{en} Januar 1787, where he makes the further frank acknowledgment, “dass unsere Prosodie in der grössten Unsicherheit schwebt.”

above deductions notwithstanding, it is by the lyric poems, together with *Faust*, and by these alone, that Goethe's reputation stands as high as it does. And were I asked to name the Goethe book which ranks next to these in interest, and next to these sustains his reputation, I should be inclined to name one which is not of his writing at all—to wit, the brilliant picture of a brilliant and comprehensive mind presented in the *Conversations with Eckermann*.

Though it may be suspected to have been drawn up to block the way for indiscreet biographers, Goethe's *Aus meinem Leben* is a very interesting book, though certainly less interesting for its self-revelation than for its sketches of contemporaries. Among literary autobiographies it scarcely stands in the first rank, and perhaps, among autobiographers, Goethe is the only one who has contrived to be dull whilst writing of his own childhood. A great man's indiscretions ought to die with him, nor is it any part of my plan to revive, to his discredit, the story of Goethe's almost innumerable philanderings—of his Frederikas, Lilis, dancing-master's daughters—any more than that of his adulterous *liaison* with Frau von Stein, or his degrading marriage with Christiane Vulpius. More to the purpose is it to glance at a few of those faults in his work from which, rightly or wrongly, Carlyle chose to avert his eyes.

First among these, then, is, in my opinion, the inequality of his performance, in which he much exceeds the worst that has been perpetrated by any poet of the rank that has been claimed for him. Shakespeare has, of course, his slips, Milton his *longueurs*, Dante his arid passages. But these are in every case very much the exception—spots on the sun, or flies upon the lily's globe of light. With Goethe the reverse of this is true. With the exception of a score or so short lyrics, and perhaps of *Hermann und Dorothea*, where the medium is certainly not rebellious, every one of his works is marred by lapses into the heavy and otiose—lapses which are in dangerously high ratio to what is good and fine. Possibly I have already shown the truth of this in respect to his prose. Prose or poetry, his greater works, with few exceptions, betray a lack of the sense of form or shapeliness, which, in one who professed devotion to Greek art, surprises and disappoints. And yet the main causes of his defects are not difficult to discover. In the first place, the lack of a German literary tradition which has already been alluded to. A second cause of his imperfection has attracted less notice. Though a man of all but universal genius, qualified to attain a large measure of success in whatever he turned his hand to, except drawing—notwithstanding

this, nay, probably because of it, Goethe had not the unerring mastery of his craft which belongs to the greatest artists. He lacked the whole-hearted, lifelong devotion to letters of a Tennyson, Keats, or Gray, though these were lesser men than he. He sacrificed his art to his self-culture. There was too much of the Crichton about him, and Crichtons are always second-rate. Art is long, perhaps longer than he knew. And whilst he was administering a duchy, directing mines, managing an opera-house, whilst he was meditating his ingenious or mistaken theories in optics, osteology, or plant-life, his literary gifts, the highest of his many gifts, was left to beat the wind. Can we wonder at the result? He had a wider field than any other poet from which to draw inspiration, but the moulds into which that inspiration was run were often clumsily constructed. Whilst he ranged at large over the world of knowledge and experience, the works which were to represent him to the ages were left to drag and languish, till the initial impulse died. In a sense which is tragic, grandiose, and paradoxical, Goethe ranks with those who fail through grasping at too much. That is, of course, supposing that with him self-culture was a means rather than end, and that he looked beyond it. His style, as may here be pointed out, had much less of the sensuous element than is usual in the poet, and he even aimed at expressing himself without the aid of figures. His mysticism, too, is apt to be much overdone.

A further defect in Goethe, and one which grew on him insidiously, is his tendency to moralise. This is, indeed, a fault which he shares with Schiller and with German literature at large. At his best, he was, of course, a profound and original thinker about life, gifted with a brilliant turn for aphorism. At his worst, he indulges in platitude such as would have provoked a yawn from the sententious village-worthies of his idyll.

A graver fault, one which strikes deeper and which clearly reveals morbidity, will be found in his treatment of sexual passion in his creative work. This calls for somewhat detailed examination. Excepting the Greeks, the love of man and woman has been a favourite and an almost universal source of inspiration to poets. From Catullus to the *Heroides*, the Roman lyrists have given it powerful utterance. It supplies the motive of the *Vita Nuova*, and of the sonnets of Petrarch and Shakespeare, of Rossetti and Elizabeth Browning, as well as of Shelley's *Epipsychidion* and the songs of Burns; whilst, of more impersonal work, it has given us Dido and Æneas, Sophronia and Olindo, Romeo and Juliet,

Marius and Cosette—an embarrassing choice, if ever there was one! And from most poets the love-motive has drawn all that was best and highest. The dower of fancy and the treasures of emotion have been lavished recklessly upon it, and yet have left behind them the impression that, in his own estimation, the poet is unequal to his theme. For to him, in a single phrase, love is the best thing life has to give: the idealising influence in youth and the consolation of maturity. How, then, does this most benign and gracious of the passions figure among Goethe's creations? It figures, almost exclusively, as a baleful and disastrous power, a cruel and avenging deity. The assertion rests on overwhelming evidence. For the inspirer of sexual passion, *Adelheid*, is the evil genius of *Goetz von Berlichingen*; *Werther* is a tale of suicide brought about by hopeless love; in *Clavigo* a forsaken girl dies, and her remorseful lover violates her coffin. In *Iphigenie* there is no love interest, but it is love for Egmont that drives Clärchen to drink poison; love for Leonora that helps to drive Tasso out of his mind. Then, *Faust* is a tragedy of seduction, ending in the victim's death in the condemned cell; whilst, again, in the *Elective Affinities*, Edward, a married man, wins the love of Ottilie, a pure girl, and they both perish by their own act, by starvation. In *Stella*, two women, wife and mistress, resolve to go shares in a man. This, it may be as well to state, is one of Goethe's few "happy endings." In *Wilhelm Meister*, Mariana dies after being deserted by her lover, and Mignon after discovering the same fickle lover in the embrace of Philina. Here, if you like, is a fair catalogue of broken hearts and broken vows! But of all Goethe's heroines, if I except Charlotte and Natalie, Dorothea alone is led fairly to the altar, to live happy ever after.¹

It may be urged that *Anteros* is a legitimate subject for the poet, and that none has turned that subject to finer account than the author of *Hamlet* and *Othello*. I admit this; and had Shakespeare written none but these two plays, he would have been open to the charge which I now bring against Goethe. But Shakespeare was universal; he gives us love tragedies because they exist, but he balances them, as life does, with pictures of true lovers and happy love: balances Gertrude and Claudius with Cordelia and France, Ophelia with Imogen, Iago and Emilia with Portia and Bassanio. In Goethe's works there is, in this respect, no contrast, no

¹ Natalie is an after-thought, and I presume that the after-life of Charlotte, obtuse and stolid though she was, must have been to some extent overshadowed by her lover's fatal act.

relief. Yet a foil of honest courtship would have enhanced the piteousness of Gretchen's betrayal. Goethe had, however, no love for, no delight in, any such subjects. His mind was absorbed and fascinated by the Avenging Love. And that it was so argues something rotten in his state.

This opens up the question of Goethe's moral influence, which is much too large a subject to treat at the end of an article. Lewes says that he "declared himself in the deepest sense of the word a Protestant, and as such claimed the right of holding his inner being free from all prescribed dogma, the right of *developing himself* religiously,"¹ and, if religiously, then surely morally. For such a man as himself this position might possibly be permissible; for most men it must be beset with peril. In so far as it inculcates self-realisation as the main end of life, whatever else it may be it is anti-Christian. And by substituting an ideal of self-culture for one of righteousness, it may be said to have sapped the foundations of prescriptive morality, and to have prepared the way for Nietzsche's doctrine of the Superman, and hence for the Madman's War. This is, no doubt, to wrest it far from Goethe's intention. And yet it is unmistakably of the essence of ideals of self-culture to assign too little importance to the rights of outsiders.

Though that service was tainted, carrying within it, as I have sought to show, the seeds of dissolution, there is no doubt that the service rendered by Goethe to the Germany of his own day was enormous. He has told us himself that, when he entered Leipzig University, there was so little homogeneity in Germany that inhabitants of the various large towns had difficulty in understanding each other. The acceptance of his writings gave unity, a standard of expression, and a rallying-point to the Fatherland. And whatever the future of Germany may be, he is assured of a position among its greatest sons. Is he as great a man for the rest of the world as for Germany, and for the ages as for his own age? That is the question which I invite my readers to consider, each for himself.

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SPRINGWOOD, KELSO.

¹ *Life of Goethe*, vol. ii. p. 392.

ST LUKE'S DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT.

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As compared with other New Testament writers, Luke is singularly reticent in his doctrine of the death of Christ. The announcements by Jesus of the coming Passion are reported by him (ix. 22, 44, xvii. 33), as by Mark and Matthew, and in similar terms. Whether he connected the necessity of death laid upon our Lord with his Messianic vocation, or simply with the force of circumstances consequent upon his word and work, may here be left an open question. It is more important to note the omission by Luke of the phrase (Mark x. 45 = Matt. xx. 28) "and to give his life a ransom for many." Instead of this saying, Luke (xxii. 27) has simply, "For whether is greater, he that sitteth at meat, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at meat? but I am in the midst of you as he that serveth." The precise meaning of the Marcan phrase has been the subject of much controversy. Merx, on the analogy of a similar Arabic expression, sees in it nothing more than a hyperbolic expression for "to render the highest service." If this view be accepted, then Luke's rendering of it might possibly be regarded as an interpretation designed to bring out its essential meaning and guard against a sacrificial theory. It is, at least, significant that Luke does not attribute such language to our Lord. Again, the words in Luke (xxii. 19, 20) which represent Christ's death in a sacrificial covenant aspect are omitted by various "Western" authorities. The difficulties of the ordinary text, and its suspicious coincidence with 1 Cor. xi. 24, "leave us no moral doubt," says Hort, "that the words in question were absent from the original text of Luke, notwithstanding the purely 'Western' ancestry of the documents which omit them." "This is just one of those cases," says Dr Sanday, "in which internal evidence is strongly in favour

of the text which we call 'Western.' The temptation to expand was much stronger than to contract, and the double mention of the cup raises real difficulties of the kind which suggest interpolation." Probably the tendency named must be held responsible for Matthew's addition (xxvi. 28) to Mark (xiv. 24) of the words "unto remission of sins."

It is a further corroboration of the "Western" text in Luke that the Pauline and commonly accepted Christian view of the last meal is wanting therein. Jesus begins, according to Jewish custom, with the cup (ver. 17), and the fundamental conception of the passage is ethical and spiritual—what he had been to them he gives as food which effects their union and renews their life. Such doctrine could have had its origin only in the earliest days of the Christian community.

In Acts the paucity of reference to the Atonement in the speeches of Peter and Paul is remarkable. The Bishop of Manchester thinks it may be due to the fact that Luke wrote for Theophilus—a Greek to whom the Cross was perhaps foolishness. Probably, however, Theophilus himself, like Luke, had become a Christian when the evangelist dedicated to him his two books, otherwise how could he say in the preface to the gospel that he had written it that his friend might "know the certainty concerning the things" which he was "taught by word of mouth" (R.V.^m)? Besides, the reason alleged rather suggests an unworthy motive for Luke's silence—nothing less, indeed, than a desire to curry favour with a patron by the suppression of any allusion to a central doctrine of the primitive faith. Other reasons more in harmony with the methods and character of our author, as they are revealed by a critical study of his works, are not far to seek.

The saying of Jesus reported by Luke (xxii. 27) more aptly fits the context than that which is found in Mark or in Matthew. The Twelve are at supper with Jesus, when a dispute breaks out amongst them as to which of them is to be accounted greatest. Jesus, after contrasting them with the Gentiles, asks, "For whether is greater, he that sitteth at meat or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at meat? but I am in the midst of you as he that serveth." As Wellhausen perceived, the words "and to give his life a ransom for many" do not suit the preceding *διακονῆσαι*, for that means "to serve," "to wait at table." The transition from such service to the sacrifice of life is a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. It may be added that of the eight occurrences of *διακονῆσαι* in Luke's writings (six in the gospel and two in Acts) all may bear the specific meaning

of service in connection with a feast, whilst four, if not five, can mean nothing else.

To what source was Luke indebted for his version of Christ's words?

Bernhard Weiss suggests that Luke in chap. xxii. 25-27 has worked over Mark x. 41-45 in his own free way under the influence of Q. "The thought of Luke xxii. 26 rests on perfectly historical circumstances, for the *νεώτεροι*, according to the pattern of the synagogue still existent in the oldest Christian societies, were those who had to render service of hand (*cp.* Acts v. 6; 1 Peter v. 5), and the *ἡγούμενοι* are to be found (as in Acts xiv. 12, 15, 22; Hebrews xiii. 17, 24) in a position of leadership." Deissmann has also shown that Luke's narrative at this point embodies accurate historical pictures of "the kings of the Gentiles" and of them "that have authority" and "are called benefactors." Christ's treatment of these leads up naturally and effectively to the two questions and the statement which Luke substitutes for the ransom saying in Mark.

Drs Bartlett and Burkitt hold that in this section of the third gospel we have a fragment of Q. Sir John Hawkins, on the contrary, thinks that Luke, in his Passion narrative, does not desert the second gospel, but "employs it with unusual and remarkable freedom," which he explains as due "to his previous knowledge and use of a Passion narrative as Paul's fellow-worker."

As between these two theories, the former has this in its support: (1) that the ransom saying is undoubtedly Pauline in spirit, and is yet absent from a narrative which, on the latter view, is presumably inspired by the Apostle or by "Christians of the Pauline type"; (2) that there is good reason to believe with Harnack and Dr Streeter that Q, the most primitive of Christian records, contained little that may be called doctrinal in the ecclesiastical sense of the term.

Neither Harnack nor Dr Streeter believes that Q originally contained an account of the Passion, but the English scholar admits "it is possible that the version of Q which reached Luke had been already expanded to include an account of the Passion."

A third theory of the origin of Luke's version of the 'disciples' dispute is that it belonged to T—a gospel which perished after the third evangelist had made a free use of it.

Differing as they do in important points, these three theories agree that Luke abandoned Mark at x. 45 or thereabouts under the influence of some other authority, oral or

written. In other words, Luke the historian follows in chap. xxii. an authority which, for good reasons, he esteemed more highly than the second gospel.

If in Luke xxii. the short "Western" text is adopted, the only cup mentioned is given, as we have seen, before the bread at the last supper (*cf.* 1 Cor. x. 16; Didache ix.), and not after it. Such an inversion, in the opinion of Sir John Hawkins, "is more likely to occur in oral than in documentary transmission." Even so it would seem that Luke here followed a recension of Q—itsself originally an oral collection of Logia. Certainly there is nothing in his attitude towards Mark to show that he would follow the second evangelist if Q or T or oral tradition conflicted with him. On the contrary, there are some indications that point in the opposite direction.

Again, Dr Moffatt has noted what a study of the passage reveals. "The narrative of the Lord's supper (even in its shorter form) betrays the writer's affinity with Paulinism; but the remarkable thing is that there are so few specifically Pauline ideas wrought into the texture of a gospel whose author stood within the Pauline circle. The atmosphere of the primitive church can be felt." "Luke could be a friend of Paul without sharing his specific theology, and an analysis of the third gospel turns the 'could be' into 'was.'"

It is in the light of this important fact that we must view the absence of teaching respecting the Atonement in the speeches reported in the Acts of the Apostles. "The death of the Christ," says Professor Lake, "has in Acts but little theological importance." In the speeches of Peter and Stephen the death of Christ is regarded as a wicked act on the part of the Jews rather than as a necessary part of a plan of salvation. The most important passage is iii. 17 ff. "The cause of the blotting out of sins is here, as in the Old Testament prophets, repentance and change of conduct; nothing is said to suggest that this would not have been effective without the sufferings of the Messiah."

The general fidelity to facts, which recent study of the Lucan writings has brought to light, rather raises a presumption in favour of his having given in the speeches such an account of their doctrine as he was acquainted with, whether from oral tradition or, as Professor Torrey would say in respect of Acts i.-xv., from a written Aramaic source. Professor Lake expresses it rather differently. "There certainly is an absence of 'Pauline' doctrine in the speeches in the Acts, if we accept the reconstructions which are based on the view that in the Epistles we have a complete exposition of St

Paul's teaching. But if we realise that the Epistles represent his treatment by letter of points which he had failed to bring home to his converts while he was with them, or of special controversies due to the arrival of other teachers, there is really nothing to be said against the picture given in Acts."

This attempt to approach a solution of the problem of the relation between Paul's reported speeches and his written word has a certain validity. What happened at Corinth and elsewhere after the Apostle had departed undoubtedly gave point and colour to his correspondence. But it is questionable if the Epistles can properly be regarded as merely supplementary to the Pauline addresses. The only speech of Paul which Luke certainly heard (xx. 18-35) is unmistakably Pauline in spirit. This may, indeed, be held to confirm the view that the speeches of Paul elsewhere are an accurate expression of the Apostle's doctrine. And in the main this conclusion may be adopted. But there is a difference between the report of an address at which Luke almost openly acknowledges that he was present, and the accounts of speeches, depending upon sources and traditions, which required to be translated or shaped by him. What the historian heard for himself he faithfully set down; what he learnt at second or third hand had been said by Paul in a given situation he treated with more freedom—partly, doubtless, owing to the nature of the authorities available, partly, also, under the influence of a subjective interest. The very existence in Acts of the speech of Paul at Miletus to the Ephesian elders, and particularly the doctrine of words like those in xx. 28, *τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ κυρίου* (*v.l.* θεοῦ) ἣν περιεποιήσατο διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου—however we read or construe them—proves that Paul did not wholly neglect the doctrine of the Atonement in his missionary addresses. Otherwise stated, Luke in his selection of material from the Apostolic preaching must have passed over, perhaps only half consciously, those elements in it which to him seemed least primitive, valuable, or vital.

Mr Rackham, indeed, argues that "the doctrine of the Atonement is implicit in Acts." "The early Church did not require a new theory. The doctrine of the Atonement by vicarious suffering was enunciated in the Old Testament, especially in the great prophecy of Isaiah liii."

The last statement is undeniable. But, as Dr Kennett has recently shown, "down to the exile there was a school of prophets who insisted that sacrifice was no part of the original religion of Israel, and that it was hateful to Yahweh." He concludes: "The work of Christ, though it is possible to set

it forth in terms of sacrifice, since it accomplishes for us what the Jews thought to be accomplished for them by sacrifice, is not sacrificial but prophetic."

This is how Luke regarded it.

In his mind as a Gentile, the doctrine of the atoning sacrifice of Christ did not, apparently, assume that singular significance which it did in the mind of Paul, the converted Pharisee; or, in a lesser degree, of Mark, formerly "of the circumcision"; or of that Christian Rabbi to whom we owe the gospel according to St Matthew.

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THE FETTER ON PROTESTANTISM.

W. GARRETT HORDER.

"The Holy Spirit has liberated me from a multitude of opinions."

THOMAS À KEMPIS.

SCARCELY any Church in the past seems to have been able to get along without fetters. Protestantism, in spite of its boast of having the right of private judgment, has allowed itself to be fettered to a Book, whilst Catholicism has preferred to be fettered to a Church. Both fetters are real, but whilst Protestantism is bound to a Book which cannot change, Catholicism's bonds are to a company with life, and therefore the possibility of change. That Catholicism has not profited by this advantage, that in some senses she is more fixed than her Protestant sister, does not alter the fact that fetters in the hand of the living may be less fettering than those imposed by a Book.

Every progressive minister in the Protestant company knows to his cost how his work is often hindered by those who regard the letter of the Book as a final court of appeal, so that when he has urged some aspect of truth which has shone by its own light, a bibliolater has thrown at him some opposing text, without any regard to its place in Scripture or the lips or pen from which it came, and thus the truth, though shining by its own light, has seemed to many impossible of acceptance. No plea that the Book is a library of some seventy volumes, and represents the growing appreciation of truth from an age of early dimness to one of noonday light, availed to put aside the hindering text.

In reply to all explanations of the 'progressive nature of Scripture there is often heard the exclamation, "I like a whole Bible!" Scholars pursuing their sacred studies in the seclusion of their libraries do not suffer thus; but those in active ministry know to their cost how the progress of truth is

hindered by the prevailing bibliolatriy of Protestantism, which, though overcome in certain quarters, still holds its power over great numbers in most sections of the Protestant Church.

This fettering of Protestantism is due not to the Book, which in fact provides the remedy against it, but to its misinterpreters. Surely it is high time that this idea of the finality, infallibility, inerrancy of Scripture, denied by professors in theological colleges and writers in monthlies and quarterlies, should be distinctly denied by the leaders of the Protestant Churches, both in their annual gatherings and in the literature issued for their people. This would throw the ægis of the denominations and of well-known leaders over many a minister who still has to suffer a fierce opposition when he treats the Bible as he was taught to treat it by his theological professors. They may steal a pig, but he must not look over the hedge.

I could tell some pathetic stories of the fiery trial through which to-day many a minister has to pass as he seeks to put the Scriptures in their proper place—the place they claim for themselves, not as authoritative but as helpful to faith—the position held by St Paul, usually regarded as the most dogmatic of the Scripture writers—“Not that we would have dominion over your faith, but be helpers of your joy.” When men regard the Book as the final and infallible Word, they run in the very teeth of its own declarations; for its central Figure, who, in a deeper sense than the Book, is the Word of God, told of a Spirit of Truth which should lead into all truth.

This claim to final authority has been the source of unspeakable anxiety to multitudes. The difficulties felt by many religious folk in Protestant circles have chiefly arisen not from facts in nature or humanity, where the real problems lie, but from texts in Scripture which, rightly regarded, need not have troubled them.

In a long ministry I have been appealed to in a great number of instances for advice by persons in religious perplexity, and in the great majority of cases the perplexity has been caused by passages in Scripture—passages which had cut right across the consciences of the perplexed—and the perplexity arose because it was thought the ultimate authority lay in the written instead of in the living Word within the heart, and the God within them resisted the God pictured in certain parts of the Book. It is appalling to think that the Book meant to clear has in numberless cases blocked men's way, and instead of bringing peace has brought anxiety.

Readers of *The Diary of a Church-goer*, which is now known to have been written by that clear-headed and truth-loving man, Lord Courtney of Penwith, will have noticed that church-going was made difficult to him very largely by certain Scripture lessons, which ran counter to his ethical feeling, read without comment as if they expressed the very truth of God.

And until the idea of infallibility and inerrancy is lifted from the Book, and it is regarded as the reflection of God in the past on the minds of men largely coloured by the ideas of their own age, and that it is open to men to correct those earlier words by the latest promptings of the divine Spirit promised to lead into all truth, Scripture will often put hindrances in the way of the thoughtful and truth loving, instead of helping them upward to the vision of God and assurance of the eternal life.

For example, what agony of heart and mind in the past has been caused, not to the indifferent or hardened but to some of the sweetest and saintliest souls, by St Paul's words on foreknowledge and predestination in the Epistle to the Romans, which later were hardened into the terrible article on the decrees of God in the Westminster Confession of Faith. I was once protesting to a Presbyterian minister against that article, and he replied that it had its foundation in the Epistle of St Paul, as if that proved the article to be true! And all the while that same Apostle in his higher moments brushed aside his own narrow vision of God, which had grown out of the teaching imbibed in his earlier Rabbinical days, and told of One "who would have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth." If, in pondering his predestinatory declarations, men had assigned to the Spirit His proper place as a guide into truth, their hearts would have convinced them that here, at all events, the Apostle had been following earthly teachers rather than the inward spirit. It was the exaltation of the written word above the inward spirit which caused the trouble. Had there been a right idea of Scripture, these difficulties would never have arisen. They arise because, as in our Lord's day, people put the Scripture in the wrong place, and think their faith must be in *it* instead of the God to whom it should be one of the guides. The promise of Christ was not of a Book, but of a Spirit. He never promised His followers a Book, but He continually promised them a Spirit.

Indeed, the silence of the New Testament about a Book is quite remarkable. So far as we know, Jesus never wrote,

save on the ground—and, of course, that was not intended to be permanent, for the first shower of rain or the first footfall would destroy the writing. Indeed, we do not even know that on this occasion He wrote any *words*—the stooping to write, it may be, was to prevent the woman thinking He was looking at her, and so may have been the outcome of Christ's delicate feeling. Indeed, we do not know—we certainly have no proof—that Jesus *could* write. Ability to write and materials for writing were not common in those days. Certainly Jesus worked not by pen or stylus, but by voice.

And then beyond this, it is quite certain that Jesus gave no instructions that a Book concerning Himself or concerning the faith should be given to the world. The Book we call the New Testament sprang not from the command of Christ, but from the need felt by men for a record of His life. It did not descend from heaven, but sprang up from earth. The New Testament is a casual not a commanded production. How did it grow up? First of all, Paul wrote letters to the Churches he had founded—most of them to straighten their beliefs or to straighten lives which had gone astray. Most of them were pretty long letters—documents rather than letters—and so the officers in the Churches to which they were addressed preserved them among their archives. These were the beginnings of the New Testament. And then many years after, when the people who had known Jesus had grown few or had passed away, and those who had heard the story of Jesus from their lips were also growing few, it did not seem safe to trust the story any longer to the keeping even of oriental memories, strong as they were, and certain persons set to work to put the story in order and reduce it to writing, and thus, many years after Jesus had departed, the first three Gospels—the Synoptists as they are called—came into being. Still later, probably after all the Apostles had died, one who had been in very close intercourse with St John set down in writing the story heard from his lips, with his interpolations and comments, and so there came into existence the fourth Gospel, which bears the name of St John, and which is of so different a type from the three earlier ones.

All this arose out of felt human needs, not from any command of Jesus. So far as the New Testament shows, no idea of a Book ever entered His mind. Certainly He gave no instructions, nor did He lay down plans for such a Book.

All the thought of Jesus was of a Spirit of Truth, as any reader of the New Testament can see for himself. This to the mind of Jesus was the vital, the essential thing for His

followers. And to that, if we are to be true to Him, we must hold as the vital, the essential thing.

The Spirit of Truth first and foremost. On that Jesus laid His stress. And therefore we cannot be loyal to the Book unless we rely on the Spirit.

I stay for a moment to correct a widely spread idea—probably founded upon a literal rendering of the words of Christ, where He speaks of “sending” the Spirit—viz. that the Spirit was originated or set in motion by Jesus. That before, the Spirit had no assured place or function or influence in the hearts of men. There are those who seem to think that Jesus, as it were, set free or set in motion the Spirit’s energies; that when He went away, the Spirit came among men. Such persons seem to regard Pentecost as the birthday of the Spirit, or, if not His birthday, the beginning of His operations among men.

How anyone can think thus with the Old Testament in his hands it is difficult to imagine. For the Old Testament is dotted over from beginning to end with witnesses to the Spirit’s operations—His operations in all realms—on the face of the waters, as giving skill in the arts, and above all, as moving in the minds of men. The very words which Jesus applied to Himself in the synagogue at Capernaum, “The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because the Lord hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor,” and so on, were read out of those Old Testament Scriptures.

Jesus did not originate the Spirit, nor even set His energies in motion. But when He was departing from His followers, He, as it were, threw them back on that inward energy of the Spirit which had *always* been at work in them, but from which their minds had been somewhat turned away by having Him as a visible leader and counsellor at their side to whom they could appeal. Whilst He was with them they had naturally been looking *outward* to Him; now they must look *inward* to the ever-present Spirit. Whilst He was with them, naturally they had listened to His voice as it fell upon their ears; now that He was departing, they must listen to the still small voice in their hearts, ever counselling them aright.

The period in which He was with them was an interim period—it could not go on for ever; now the normal method must begin which *could* go on for ever.

And so all Christ’s energies were directed to make them realise that it was upon the Spirit’s aid that for all after time they would have to rely.

St Paul seems to have realised this to the full, for he even merges the Christ into the Spirit, as in that remarkable passage in 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18; where he says: "Now the Lord is the Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. But we all, with open face reflecting as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the Spirit." Here there is a mingling of the idea of the Lord, that is, the Christ, whom he could behold and so reflect, with the idea of the Spirit who is invisible. And what is more remarkable is that the merging of the visible Christ into the invisible Spirit gives him the sense of liberty. The reason surely is here, that when we are moved by the Spirit from within, all sense of bondage passes away. Law working from without seems to limit our liberty. Love working from within gives us the fullest sense of liberty.

And the Church has yet to realise that its true guide is not a *book* written, fixed, unaltered for nearly twenty centuries; but a *Spirit* whose witness and leading are fresh every day, and so suited to the needs of each day as it comes. A voice within from a living God stands high above any MS., however precious that may be.

Of course the New Testament itself is an outcome of this Spirit of Truth of which Jesus speaks. It may perhaps be regarded as the firstfruits within the Christian sphere of the Spirit. That is to say, in its pages are tokens of an inspiring Spirit; that in it being inspired to us by which we are inspired. But there are parts even of the New Testament which evidently did not need any special inspiration to produce. For example, it did not need what we regard as inspiration to write the genealogies of Jesus in the Gospels of Mark and Luke. I imagine the writers of those genealogies, if they could not rely on their memories, referred to documents which then existed. Nor need we assign any high inspiration to the record of facts—where Jesus went and what He did; these only demanded the use of memory. A writer of history does not claim inspiration for his record of facts. If they were contemporary facts, he would perhaps rely on his own observation; if they were of an earlier age, he would rely on documentary evidence.

Inspiration begins when deeper matters are reached—insight into the meaning of the facts, or the motives and feelings of the personages of the history. And the inspiration in the New Testament meets us in the insight of its writers—when they pass behind facts—when they make the facts

flash out upon us their inner spiritual meaning. Here we must find our Bible within the Bible—in that which “finds us”—and finds us because the inspired word on the page evokes response from the Spirit within us. Thus the Spirit in the word meets the Spirit in the heart.

The Book we call the Bible is of course the *fons et origo* of our Christian faith. It gives us in its Old Testament portion the history of the nation chosen to be the medium by which that faith was given to the world, and the finest utterances of its greatest sons; whilst in the Gospels of the New Testament we have the only record of Him in whom that nation reached its climax, and in its Epistles we have the first interpretations of that peerless life. These Scriptures must therefore always be regarded as the original documents for the Christian religion, the court of appeal on all questions as to what the original Christian faith was, the first and most precious product of the inspiring Spirit of God. They thus have, like the early writings of Greece, the dew of youth upon them—they give us the first fresh glance on great truths. Here lie, very largely, their charm, their perennial value. But just as scholars, with all their love for the early classics, do not regard the world's literature as finished in them, so we cannot regard the close of the Canon as the close of inspiration. A host of instances could be quoted showing how men in modern times have been as conscious of a divine inspiration as were the Hebrew Prophets when they declared, “Thus saith the Lord.” So assured was Jones Very of this that he declared, “I value these verses not because they are mine, but because they are not mine.” And therefore he would not permit them to be altered. And Thomas Hornblower Gill used to tell how he was conscious of tides of song when hymns flowed from him he knew not how, whilst at other times he could not write, and if he forced himself to write, the verse was of no value. If we regard the Scriptures as the end of inspiration, we are false to their own witness.

Rightly regarded, the New Testament is not an end but a beginning—for it promises a Spirit to guide us into all truths. A guide's eye is not ever backward, but ever forward. And the New Testament is not ever pointing its readers back to itself, but ever pointing them forward to follow the leading of the Spirit into all truth. If this had been realised in the past, the conflict between theology and science, in which theology had to be continually falling back and owning defeat—a conflict which is responsible for the fact that so large a number of men of science and those of the scientific spirit

stand to-day outside all the Churches—would have been avoided, and such men might to-day have been within the Church, not only increasing its numbers and adding to its weight, but broadening its spirit and fitting it to meet the needs of the modern world.

To go back only half a century or a little more. If, when Sir Charles Lyell offered proof from geology of the far greater antiquity of man than the Church had believed, she had not turned to the pages of Scripture to discover what the men of the early Hebrew or the early Christian age believed, but had permitted the Spirit of Truth to lead her to the acceptance of what the Creator had written on the strata of the earth; if she had realised that facts are a writing of God just as real as any writing on parchment—for such writing only presents human visions or interpretations, whilst facts embody the truth itself—how much wider and deeper would have been the influence of the Church to-day! And the same line of remark applies to the earlier action of the Church in relation to, say, Galileo, and to a later action in relation to Charles Darwin.

The claim which Emerson made in one of his earliest, if not the very earliest, of his essays is one which commends itself to the open mind:

“Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the fathers. It writes biographies, histories, and criticism. The foregoing generations beheld God and Nature face to face; we through their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight, and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of theirs?”

If to that be added the effort to glean all we can from the vision of men of earlier ages, as men do in realms we call secular, we should be in full accord with the teaching of Him who spoke of an ever-living Spirit as the guide to all truth.

If the Church had rightly regarded her Bible, she would not have been ever turning to it as a final authority in all realms; but trusting herself to the Spirit of Truth to which the Bible points, she would be led into all truth.

And there is no lesson Protestantism needs to-day more than to learn that the Book to which her eye is always being turned is from beginning to end the witness to an ever-present Spirit to be the guide into all truth—in all spheres.

And a moment's thought will convince us that a guiding spirit is needful as supplementary to a written book. Of necessity, the book must to a very large extent be the product

of its own age. It must be cast in the mould of its thoughts, customs, views of life. And when it is completed—there it is—unchanged and unchangeable. The world may go spinning down the grooves of change—the world itself may be an utterly different world, but the *Book*, of necessity, remains the same, without power to adapt itself to the changed world.

And so Jesus was too wise to ordain a *Book*, or to write a *Book*, or to fasten a *Book* on His kingdom. He was so wise that He committed His kingdom to the guidance of the Spirit—a living Spirit who can minister to the ever-changing thoughts and conditions of the world and of men—a living Spirit who can, as it were, suit His working to the ever-arising needs of the human spirit.

The vitality of the New Testament itself lies not in its detailed commands or laws, but in its wakening of a right relationship between God and men. Jesus says even of His own words, “They are spirit, and they are life.” And His supreme purpose was to open men’s eyes to discern the real relationship between men and God. When we get to the very core of the mission of Jesus we see it to be the persuasion, the convincing of men of the real Fatherhood of God—and that therefore they are His family, and should live as such on earth. This is becoming ever clearer and clearer.

And this furnishes the condition under which the Spirit of God can work. The filial relationship between men and God is not satisfied with the record of communications to men in the past—preserved in manuscripts; it demands direct communication from a living Father to living children; fatherhood practically ceases when communication ceases.

If we could picture to ourselves an ideal family! How would it be ruled? Should we find that the parents had put their heads together and compiled a book with rules and regulations for every conceivable condition and event in the life of the family, so that every child should be compelled to consult this book to know what to do on every occasion? That family would be far away from the ideal! No—if we picture to ourselves an ideal family—it would be one in which the parents, by their love and wisdom, arouse such a confidence and affection in their children to themselves that it becomes their supreme desire to know their parents’ mind and heart and then do what will be pleasing to them, to do as occasion serves. Such a family would not be under laws contained in a book, but under the constraint of love to their parents, its members ever seeking to do the will of the parents they love, living and acting not as under law but as under grace.

And this is the supreme purpose of Jesus, so to convince men that God is their real Father, willing only their good, that their life's purpose shall be only to do His will. And so, as their ideas of Fatherhood grow, their ideals of what will be pleasing to Him will also grow. For men's ideas of fatherhood have grown. Human fatherhood to-day stands for a much higher relationship than it did in early days. Then the father was regarded chiefly as a ruler; to-day, in the best homes, a father is more of a friend than a ruler. I remember the late Samuel Morley once saying to me, "I have tried to be a kind of elder brother to my sons, so much so, that sometimes I seem more like a lodger than a master in my own house." As we all know, fatherhood has grown in tenderness in the modern world.

And that has been leading us to realise that God's is a greater Fatherhood, because more full of love than it seemed to many of earlier times. And this clearer vision of love in God has wakened a greater desire to be in harmony with His will. The Spirit being alive in us can adapt His influence to the changing conditions of our world, which a book cannot do; a book speaks to-day just as it spoke on the day in which it was written. A living Spirit is therefore better than a written word—and the written word tells us it is, for it points away from its pages to the Spirit of Truth to guide us into all truth. St Paul saw this, for he exclaimed, "The letter killeth, but the spirit maketh alive."

We have not even begun to use the Book aright if we have not been pointed by it to the Spirit as the real leader of our souls. If the writers of the New Testament were to come back to earth, they would be astonished and pained to find how we have allowed their words to become fetters, instead of being dynamics urging us on to the pursuit of truth under the guidance of the Spirit. Men have used microscopic methods to discover a meaning in every word of Scripture instead of allowing that Scripture to be an inspirational influence, first to the discernment of and then to obedience to the Spirit of Truth. But our eyes have been so fixed upon the printed page, that we have often failed to listen to that inward Spirit who is the Ever Living Guide into all truth. We have thought God was in a Book rather than as He is, within our heart.

And all the while the Book has been telling us that "the Word is nigh us, in our mouth and in our heart." Christianity is not, as Chillingworth declared, the religion of a Book, nor is it, as the Pope would have us believe, the religion of a Church. It is the religion of the Spirit. If the Book were lost, if the

Church ceased to be, yet if men were moved by the Spirit of Christ, His religion might still flourish in immortal youth.

The poets have caught this aspect of the matter better than most of the theologians. Lord Houghton (Monckton Milnes) says :

Mohammed's truth lay in a Holy Book,
Christ's in a sacred Life.

So while the world rolls on from change to change
And realms of thought expand,
The Letter stands without expanse or range,
Stiff as a dead man's hand.

While as the life-blood fills the glowing form,
The Spirit Christ has shed
Flows through the ripening ages fresh and warm,
More felt than heard or read.

The tide of things rolls forward, surge on surge,
Bringing the blessed hour,
When in Himself the God of Love shall merge
The God of Will and Power.

And Thomas Lynch strikes the same note in his hymn,
"Where is thy God, my soul?"

The supreme purpose of the Book, then, is not to impose on men a minutely articulated scheme of doctrine, nor to shut them within an ecclesiastical enclosure, but to arouse them to a sense of the Spirit within to whom Jesus pointed, who was Himself the example of a Spirit-possessed life, and by these great influences to waken an ever-deepening sense of the Divine Fatherhood. Thus they would be brought over from the realm of Law to the realm of Love, by whose inspiration life would be lifted to its highest levels. For it is surely true that though the record may furnish rich provender for the soul, yet it is only by the vision of life as seen in the Christ, and by response to the inward prompting of the Spirit, that we can be led up to those shining tablelands to which our God is sun and moon. The true ideal is expressed in this verse by Corneille :

O God of Truth, whom only I desire,
Bind me to Thee by ties as strong as sweet.
I tire of hearing, of reading too I tire,
But not of saying, "Thee God alone I need."

W. GARRETT HORDER.

PRAYER AND NATURAL LAW.

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WHEN, in the prehistoric past, man first came to self-consciousness, he found himself, weak and ignorant, exposed to the seeming caprice of a hostile universe. Against this he sought protection by devices of his inventive brain. One such device, imitative magic, has been described (by Sir J. G. Frazer in *The Golden Bough*) as a crude forerunner of natural science. It was an attempt to act upon nature by reproducing in symbolic form the desired natural process. In it there was nothing necessarily religious; it was a science, though as experience has shown a false science, resting on a mistaken theory of natural causation and destined to be superseded in the fullness of time by a more adequate theory and a more fruitful method. But side by side with imitative magic there was another belief which, if at first confused with it, was gradually distinguished. What if the real causes of the varied phenomena of nature lay not in themselves but behind them or above them? What if drought and rain, fertility and barrenness, and the thousand other influences affecting the life of man, were the work of unseen beings immeasurably superior to him in power, yet moved by passions akin to his own? Surely, if this were so, he might hope, by suitable propitiation of these invisible powers, to avert the evil and secure the good—by favour of the gods of nature, to deflect the processes of nature to his desire. For long ages, therefore, much of the energy of mankind was devoted to this propitiation; by the ritual of sacrifice and prayer, in a myriad cults, the gods were besought to influence the natural order (or chaos) in the human interest. From this crudely utilitarian conception all the nobler forms of religion were ultimately to develop. Prayer, at first merely an instrument

for procuring material satisfactions, came more and more to be valued as a spiritual communion. Although this purification, involving as it must a worthier thought of God, may seem to have no immediate bearing on the present inquiry, yet it is really germane to the issue; for on our view of the nature and character of God depends our inference as to the economy of the universe. Nevertheless, it will be convenient to attack the question from another side.

I.

From the dawn of history down to comparatively recent times the influence of prayer on nature was hardly disputed. Sensational instances, as of Joshua staying the course of the sun—and therefore *a fortiori* all minor examples—were received with unquestioning faith. And yet, through all these ages, experience was subtly, though very slowly, undermining this primitive belief. Ordinary existence, even for the rudest savage, takes for granted a principle of natural causation; if he is hungry, food feeds him; fire burns; knives cut; stones fall; in nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand events it would never occur to him to invoke the gods. Prayer is reserved for the exceptional case where, from his ignorance, the issue is doubtful. Not that he consciously put it this way; but practically he divides the world into two parts, over one of which chance and the gods hold sway, over the other observed sequences. Civilised man inherited and maintained this division; but with every increase in accuracy of observation the sphere of prayer became correspondingly narrowed, until at last it was restricted, as in the Book of Common Prayer, to variable phenomena like the weather or epidemic disease, which still seemed, to the imperfect knowledge of the time, to present an element of caprice or contingency.

Thus far we have been considering the unformulated belief of mankind. But of course these observed sequences had also been tabulated, and conscious inferences drawn from them. They were the foundation of that vast temple of natural science where all now worship. From the infinite number of these observed sequences the existence has been inferred of one order of nature, one universal cosmos, governed throughout by natural law, without any interference by angel or spirit, lesser gods or supreme Deity. If modern science were asked where was the place of God in her system, she might answer with Laplace, "We have no need for that hypothesis." Thus

prayer would seem to be relegated finally to the sphere of the moral and spiritual, and warned off the material universe. Moreover, with the progress of sciences like experimental psychology, even her tenure of part at least of this last stronghold grows more precarious.

Such then, towards the end of the nineteenth century, was the conception at which we had arrived: a majestic, all-embracing natural order where there was no room for special providences, where the prayers of all the churches were as futile to divert the stream of causation as Mrs Partington's mop to sweep back the Atlantic Ocean. The God of such a universe, if we must intrude the irrelevant hypothesis, was a God who had willed the immutable order; to ask Him to reverse it for our personal convenience was folly, or worse. Except for spiritual blessing it was impious to pray.

What are we to think of all this? Is it the last word of science or of reason? When in the stress of some overwhelming calamity even the most indifferent are driven to cry to Heaven for succour, when

“Hearts say, ‘God be pitiful,’
That ne’er said, ‘God be praised,’”

are they obeying merely a superstitious atavistic instinct rather than a divine prompting? Or shall we say that science, in advancing such an uncompromising claim, is belying her own principle and erecting a new superstition on the ruins of the old? The question is not so simple as the extreme advocates on either side suppose; before we can answer it, we need a more exact determination of the meaning of science and of natural law, and of the relation between them.

II.

It may freely be admitted that science, *qua* science, can allow of no exception to natural law. It is not so much that millions of unbroken sequences have been observed, and that all, or nearly all, apparent exceptions have ultimately been brought within the rule; for although, as an induction from observed facts, the doctrine of the uniformity of nature may have a high probability, yet it can hardly attain to absolute certainty, because the unknown is ever greater than the known; the multitude of instances on which our reasoning is based are after all, in Sir Isaac Newton's phrase, but a few pebbles on the shore of an infinite ocean, uncharted, unexplored. The force of the scientific claim does not derive from this

induction, but rather from an indispensable presupposition ; the hypothesis of natural law, of an unbroken chain of *natural*¹ causation, is the very condition on which all science depends, her *articulus vel stantis vel cadentis ecclesiae*.²

What then are these natural laws themselves, which science at once affirms and presupposes? What is her own account of them? They are not, as is often too hastily allowed, objective existences in external nature, but rather an essentially human construct. They are, as Professor Karl Pearson³ has well said, merely a convenient "shorthand" whereby man is enabled compendiously to describe and sum up the infinite variety of sense-impressions which we call the material universe. The uniformity of nature, therefore, is only the uniformity of our sense-impressions ; the order of nature is their order, due perhaps to the action of the mind as a "sorting machine" ; natural law is simply the postulate that what the senses perceive the mind can describe under one or several generalisations. Hence it follows that science cannot admit any exception or contradiction of this ultimate postulate, any intrusion of the supernatural, of what Pearson calls "the beyond of sense-impressions," as an explanation. When confronted with a new fact she must adopt one of two courses : either she amends her theory so as to include the novel appearance, or, if that be not immediately possible, she waits in tranquil confidence until some further discovery or wider generalisation shall bring it into harmony with the rest.

An interesting example of the latter procedure is afforded by the long and seemingly irreconcilable dispute between geologists and physicists as to the age of the earth. The physicists, for mathematical reasons, were unable to regard the solar energy, and therefore the earth, as having existed for more than one hundred million years ; on the other hand, the geologists, from consideration of the rate of deposit of the strata of the earth's crust, required a period not of one hundred but of many hundreds of millions. Here we had two sciences, each arguing from apparently irrefragable data within its own competence, flatly contradicting one another's conclusions. What was science, the generalised science which

¹ N.B.—The emphasis here is on *natural* causation, for of course belief in supernatural agency does not deny the principle of causality, but it invokes a cause of which science has no cognisance.

² Mr Bertrand Russell (*Mysticism and Logic : The Notion of Cause*, p. 196) seems to deny this and regard the uniformity of nature as "accepted on inductive grounds." But surely, since science depends on measurements, and measurements on unchanging standards, uniformity is necessarily presupposed.

³ *The Grammar of Science*, 1st ed., p. 135 and *passim*.

included both disputants, to do? Her attitude was not unlike that of reverent Christian theology before the problem of reconciling the existence of evil with her cardinal principle of the goodness of an Almighty God. Like theology, she refused to minimise the difficulty, but also maintained an unwavering faith in her cardinal principle, confident that in the end that faith would be rewarded and wisdom justified of her children. And in this case at least the reward of faith has come sooner to science than to theology; for, by the discovery of radium and of the hitherto unsuspected stores of atomic energy in matter, it seems possible to prolong the age of the sun enormously into the past, and thus to bring the data of physics into agreement with the demands of geology. Instances of science amending her theory to include the novel appearance have been frequent of late years. The phenomena of radium, and of radiant matter generally, are responsible for several important readjustments and revisions. At first radium seemed to contradict the fundamental principle of the conservation of energy, but the atomic theory was amended to meet the difficulty, and subsequent experiment has triumphantly justified the change. The conception of mass has also been radically transformed to explain the behaviour of electrons travelling at a speed approximating to the speed of light. Indeed, modern physics seems to show that the laws of mechanics, which were framed for visible, ponderable particles moving at low velocities, no longer are valid for electrons (atoms of atoms) at high velocities. The difference is not merely of degree but of kind; we are confronted with facts of another order, with laws of another order. Again, a growing number of biologists are coming to a similar conclusion with regard to vital phenomena. The body is no doubt a mechanism and a chemical factory, subject to the laws of mechanics, of physics, of chemistry; but physics and chemistry alone are inadequate to explain the mysteries of life and growth; another principle must be invoked with its own laws, be it called vitalism or neo-vitalism or what you will. Here again we seem to discern a new order of natural law supervening on, though not superseding, the physical and chemical; the organism uses all these latter, and in a sense obeys them, but its true allegiance is reserved for those biological or "vital" laws which are the *differentia* of its being.

But perhaps the most striking illustration of the conventional character of scientific law is to be found in the recently formulated principle of relativity. Hitherto mathe-

maticians and physicists, from Hipparchus to Kelvin, had based their calculations on the common-sense assumption that time and space are constants; that a given portion of space was always of the same dimension, a given period of time of the same duration; space rigid and invariable, time flowing at a constant rate, were axiomatic. No law of nature seemed more firmly established; yet from considerations, too difficult and technical for discussion here, connected with the velocity of light it has been found necessary to abandon or at least to modify this fundamental axiom, and to regard a given length as varying with the direction of its motion, a given interval of time as capable of contraction or expansion. Time and space are not, as everyone had instinctively believed, absolutes but relatives; relative to the system of movement in which they occur.¹ Some will be tempted to exclaim: "If these go, what remains? Is not such an abandonment of long-accepted, never-doubted definitions the very suicide of science?" But the scientific philosopher, Henri Poincaré or another, might conceivably answer: "You misapprehend or have forgotten what we mean by a law of nature. The ultimate laws of thought, the law of contradiction for instance, are sacrosanct and inviolable, for without them all thinking were impossible. But a so-called law of nature, a law of science, has a lesser certitude; it is only a *résumé* of phenomena; the best established may be only provisionally pragmatically true; yet each amended law, as it subsumes under a more satisfactory formula a larger and completer grouping of our sense-impressions, is an ever closer approximation to the perhaps unattainable ideal of absolute scientific truth."²

III.

After the foregoing analysis we are in a better position to consider the question whether or how far natural law may be affected by prayer. One thing at least is obvious: there is nothing necessarily incredible or absurd in such a belief. We

¹ For a simple explanation of the principle of relativity, see Dr Wildon Carr's *The Problem of Truth* (People's Books), pp. 48-53. Also Poincaré, *Dernières Pensées*; cf. also Sir Oliver Lodge, *The Law of Continuity*.

² Cf. *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 204. Mr Russell contemplates the possibility that even the law of the inverse square, in gravitation, may be found not to hold in the future. "It may be some other hitherto indistinguishable law will hold. . . . Hence there must, at every moment, be laws hitherto unbroken which are now broken for the first time. What science does, in fact, is to select the *simplest* formula that will fit the facts. But this, quite obviously, is merely an epistemological precept, not a law of nature."

are all creatures of use and wont, too apt to measure the reasonable by the familiar. We acknowledge indeed a mystery in the interaction of mind and body, but custom blinds us to the fact that every interaction, every succession, the communication of motion for instance from one billiard ball to another, is equally mysterious. Hume's account of causation to this extent still holds good; our familiarity with an unbroken sequence engenders in us the notion of a causal nexus; familiarity breeds respect. Were the succession different, were heat invariably to freeze water and cold to melt ice, the processes would seem to us quite natural, and science would frame her laws accordingly.

Apply this to the case of prayer. Supposing the fact established that prayer does influence the order of nature, science might deal with the problem in one of two ways. (1) If the interferences were slight and sporadic she might deem it best to ignore them, as political economy by the figment of "the economic man" used to ignore the disturbing passions of human nature. Nevertheless, such a procedure would be undesirable, as her calculations would thereby be tainted with contingency through the presence of an unknown variable; proportionately with the increase of the interferences due to prayer the exact sciences would approximate more and more to the inexactitude of sociology. But as, even in sociology, science does not acquiesce in her ignorance, neither would she here. As the power of prayer was more regularly and frequently manifested—a reasonable expectation—science would be driven to adopt a second course more congruous with her spirit. (2) Recognising perforce prayer as a *vera causa*, she would set herself to study its phenomena, to ascertain and formulate its laws. The action of prayer would become for her part of the natural order; a science of prayer, a euchology would be evolved, based on observation and experiment, and intimately connected with psychology and theology. Such a science would of course be difficult; as in the other sciences involving human action, it would be long before an adequate calculus could be framed; but the very difficulty would be a stimulus; and just as we have seen how the laws of chemistry supervene on the laws of physics without superseding them, and the laws of biology on the laws of chemistry, so in like manner would the law of spiritual influence supervene on the whole natural law without superseding that. Thus science in her new synthesis, in her renewed effort to grasp this scheme of things entire, would have annexed another province

and subjected it, like the rest, to her one cardinal indispensable principle of uniformity.

All this is not a mere flight of fancy; there would be, as already pointed out, nothing more absurd or incredible in the action of prayer than in any action of one thing upon another with which we are already familiar. It is merely, as Huxley admitted, a question of evidence. Do the facts warrant the assumption? To this question Huxley and his scientific contemporaries returned a contemptuous negative, and the bulk of instructed opinion in the nineteenth century tended to agree with them. Have we of the twentieth century any reason to qualify this sweeping negative?

Here it will be convenient to distinguish; all nature may be divided for our purpose into two hemispheres, one including the inorganic and the whole of the organic kingdom except man, the other including man only. With regard to the former or non-human hemisphere the negative answer still holds good, and indeed seems even more emphatic. Though, as we have seen, fresh discoveries have necessitated drastic revisions of natural law and scientific hypothesis, yet no case has been made out for the intervention of any supernatural *Deus ex Machina*; the stars in their courses, the atoms in their rhythmic dance, the winds, the tides, plant and bird and beast, the whole of the great non-human order, are, so far as we can discern, quite unaffected by prayer.

When, however, we turn to consider the other or human hemisphere, we note some indications of a change in opinion due to two distinct but correlated causes, the one theoretical and philosophical, the other empiric. (1) Nothing is more remarkable in the thought of the last thirty years than the revolt against pure intellectualism. This revolution, which has also left a deep mark on art and literature and popular thought, has of course found its completest expression in philosophy; writers so different as Fechner and Eucken, Boutroux, Brunetière, and Bergson, Schiller and William James, are here on common ground. Speaking broadly, we may say that there is now a preponderance of opinion for emphasising the importance of the moral and spiritual faculties and even the subconscious as, no less than the narrowly rational, judges and discerners of truth. With such prepossessions men are disposed to look with more respectful attention on much that the orthodox science of the nineteenth century dismissed as superstition. It was William James who, in his remarkable books *The Will to Believe* (1897) and *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), first re-focussed

educated curiosity on the question of the direct intervention of the Divine in human affairs. Drawing his material from the most diverse sources, from Lourdes miracles, from Christian Scientists, from faith healers, from the record of Müller of Bristol, he was able to show a mass of testimony consistent in the main and difficult to explain away. And since these books were written the trend of opinion which they indicated has grown ever stronger. In the Anglican Church, for instance, and still more in the American Church, the new cult of spiritual healing is making continual progress.

What are we to say to all this? Shall we say that, although in the non-human hemisphere prayer is inoperative, in the other and for us more interesting hemisphere of human affairs its efficacy is established? That whether for the cure of disease, for success in dealing with our fellow-men, for victory even in a just war, the effectual prayer of the righteous man availeth much?

It must in candour be admitted that, when every doubtful case due to fraud or delusion has been eliminated, a multitude of instances remain in which, especially in functional disease, prayer has been followed by a complete recovery of health; again, there is no reason to doubt the *bona fides* or the truth of Müller's story of financial help repeatedly received for his orphanages after intense prayer; nor need we doubt that our prayers have been a powerful assistance to our cause in the late war. But what after all do these admissions amount to? Surely to this, and this alone, that prayer does influence nature when it operates on and by and through human nature. This limitation is important; perhaps by considering it more closely we shall better understand the true efficacy of prayer in the natural order.

The anti-intellectualist revolt above described has been largely influenced by the discoveries of brilliant intellectuals, by men such as Charcot, Freud, Jung, and, in England, the Society of Psychological Research; experimental psychology, the study of the unconscious and subconscious, of hypnotism, suggestion, and telepathy, have all contributed. The converging effects of these inquiries have been to show the unsuspected power of mind over mind, and of mind over body, and this not merely in the neurotic and hysterical, but also in quite normal people. Great as may be the miracles of spiritual healing, they are no greater than those of hypnotic healing and of healing by suggestion. Even a quack medicine often works wonders when mixed with faith in him that takes it. The one essential in all cases of healing by suggestion is an

unquestioning faith on the part of the patient; that form of suggestion which produces the strongest, deepest faith will be the most effectual as a therapeutic. A critic of spiritual healing might ask: "What is there in all your cases which cannot be explained by suggestion or auto-suggestion? Why drag in a special intervention of the Deity when similar cures are brought about by other forms of suggestion where no such intervention is supposed?" And would he not say the same of Müller's providential cheques? The donors knew all about his orphanages and their recurrent need of support; they were sympathetically in tune with his effort, ready receivers of the telepathic influence of his fervent prayer. And once more, what of our war intercessions? War is, as Hindenburg truly said, a conflict of opposing wills; whatever strengthens the national will makes for victory. What more potent intensifying influence on national will can be conceived than the mass-suggestion of earnest universal prayer? And, moreover, the deeper our conviction of the righteousness of our cause, the intenser will this suggestion be. Hence the difference in the quality and the result between our prayers and those of our enemies. Thus, if the foregoing analysis is justified, even the marvels and miracles of answered prayer are no transgressions of the natural order.

If it be objected that the explanation is no explanation, since to invoke telepathy and suggestion leaves the mystery unsolved, the objector may be reminded that the same may be said of the law of gravitation. Science, it cannot too often be repeated, endeavours to give us the "how" but makes no pretence to give us the "why" of natural causation. Her aim is economy and simplicity of representation; she forbids us unnecessarily to multiply causes or entities; she recommends "Occam's Razor." There is, however, another and, at the first sight, more serious difficulty on this view. Granted, it may be said, that in a case of spiritual healing the cure is only the effect of suggestion and not of Divine intervention, if the healer and the patient were so persuaded, their faith would be destroyed and the cure must fail. The answer would seem to be that this does not necessarily follow. For, even if the prayer acts naturally, it is none the less a prayer. A devout man may well address his prayer to God, and yet hold that God does not directly intervene. Faith in the real efficacy of prayer need not imply any particular theory as to the process. And he may even contend that the foregoing argument presents him with a theory ready-made. For, if human suggestion be allowed, why must the possibility of Divine suggestion

be ruled out? And, this once granted, similar consequences, though immeasurably greater and more beneficial, would follow; the human mind would become the instrument of God for influencing the body, and through the body the actions and destinies of man. Yet even thus we do not escape from the conclusion that prayer involves no interference with natural law; so far as it is effectual it is itself an example of the law it seeks to influence. Its superiority over other methods of suggestion lies rather in its intimate connection with that higher and more spiritual prayer which, whether or no it restore the body, assuredly purifies and uplifts the soul.

IV.

To hold these opinions is not to dishonour God nor yet to undervalue prayer. In our vision of the physical order we have no mean revelation of the Divine nature, in our resignation to that order no ignoble version of one meaning of the perfect prayer, "Thy will be done." And, in our recognition of our God-given freedom, we have no doubtful indication of that prayer's other and more inspiring lesson that it is we who are the appointed agents of that will, who by knowledge, by patience, by obedience may command the natural order and use it for spiritual ends. *Laborare est orare.*

R. H. LAW.

A LIBERAL CHURCHMAN'S ALLEGIANCE TO THE CREEDS.

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ONE of the results of the great war, which has been both a curse and a blessing to mankind, is that it has made men everywhere insistent on reality. Only the real things are worth while in times like these, and, we may be assured, none but the things that are really worth while will be able to endure in the era that is now beginning. What is true of our industrial and social and political life will be true also in regard to our religion. The unreal can no longer be tolerated anywhere.

Most earnest men and women will agree that no mere ornaments of society, however ancient or venerable they may be, ought to survive in the new world-order, for which millions of human beings have worked and fought and died. If the things in question—customs, rites, or institutions—are hindrances rather than helps in the path of progress, “heavy burdens and grievous to be borne” rather than means for the real betterment of life, we shall all gladly say “Farewell” to them, though in some cases our “Farewell” may be accompanied with reluctance and regret. For we are convinced that in the whole business we are “fellow-workers together with God.” Therefore we cannot despair; we dare not turn back.

Are the creeds, the great historic creeds of the Church Universal, to be classed among the ornaments of our religion? Are they only the *impedimenta* of the Church Militant, and must they be abandoned as she moves on to new victories in her agelong warfare with evil? Some individuals who are both more orthodox and more at home in the Christian fold than Mr H. G. Wells answer unhesitatingly “Yes,” because they think of the creeds simply as records of ancient theological

controversies, or as limitations arbitrarily imposed by ecclesiastical authority upon the thinking of Christian people. It is as absurd as it is unprofitable, say these critics, to recite such documents at almost every public religious service. But the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds are much more than mere records of ancient theological controversies, the nature of which very few people understand, and in which hardly anyone feels a vital interest. It is true that they arose out of heated controversies, but they were meant to be brief and convenient statements of the common Christian faith—of the things that were “most surely believed” by all Christian people. Nor ought the creeds to be regarded as arbitrarily imposed limitations upon the right of Christians to think about the profoundest questions of their religion. To be a disciple of Christ does not constrain one to be an obscurantist. On the contrary, “the moral obligation to be intelligent” (to borrow Professor John Erskine’s striking phrase) rests as heavily upon the Christian as upon any other mother’s son. It is, of course, possible to treat the creeds as limitations on thinking; but to do so is to stifle Christian thought by denying it the freedom necessary for its development, as well as to be unjust to the higher usefulness of the creeds themselves. For the creeds will be most useful to the Christian Church if they are completely separated from the idea of arbitrariness and interpreted as great democratic documents—documents that embody in a broad way the fundamental faith of all Christian men.¹ We must not forget that they are the creeds of the Church, which is the great community of all those who worship God and serve their fellow-men in the spirit of Christ.

With sounder reason several evangelical denominations of Christians, maintaining that their sole concern as Christian bodies is to preach the Gospel as the Master preached it in Palestine nineteen hundred years ago, have virtually ignored the historic creeds of Christendom. The test of discipleship with them consists in the personal acceptance of the Lord Jesus Christ, with all that is implied thereby, rather than in assent to any particular form of belief. Other communions of a more liberal character have rejected the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds on the ground that they are hopelessly antiquated and practically meaningless in the twentieth century. These churches feel free to preach the Gospel of Christ (or so

¹ In respect of origin the Apostles' Creed is more democratic than the Nicene symbol. But both have been employed for centuries in the Church to express the common faith of Christian people, and use in this case counts for more than origin.

much of it as they hold to be valid and valuable in the present age) in their own way. Of course, the creeds were unknown to Jesus, and it may be that the Gospel can be effectively preached without them.

But have we a right to separate the Gospel and the Church, as both these groups of brethren have done? The Gospel, *i.e.* the preaching of Jesus, came first; but in history the Gospel and the Church belong together. The Gospel is the Church's message, and the Church is the Gospel's means of preservation and propagation. Indeed, the Church is in a very real sense the creation of the Gospel. Now, the Christian Church is a living institution. Its life goes on continuously from age to age, and its past is carried on through the present into the future. In this respect it is like any other living organism. And the great historic creeds are part and parcel of the life-history of the Church, just as Magna Charta is an essential part of the life-history of the British nation; and therefore the creeds cannot be ignored or rejected without doing violence to the Church, which is historically bound up with the Gospel of Christ.

I recall the story of an elderly Churchman who lived below Mason and Dixon's line towards the end of the last century. He would never condescend to argue about politics or religion. Argument was for him unnecessary, because, as he stoutly maintained when occasion demanded, he believed in two great things—the Apostles' Creed and the Commonwealth of Virginia. These two, taken together, were his sheet-anchor against every wind that blew. We of this generation are less fortunate, for there are no external authorities to which we can appeal with like confidence. If we have been unmoved either by our own questionings or by the denials of others, we have at last been rudely shaken out of our dogmatic slumber by the present insistence on reality in religion, and we must give a reason for holding fast to the ancient formularies. As Churchmen we say the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, and we are loyal to them. If we were not loyal to them, we should not under any circumstances join in the public recitation of them. Any other course plain honesty forbids. Several questions inevitably arise, and to these we must now devote our attention. Why do we accept the creeds? In what sense do we recite them? How do we say them?

Some other interesting questions might be asked. For example, do we Anglican Churchmen subscribe to the creeds in the English version of the Prayer Book?¹ Or, do we

¹ The Apostles' Creed first appears in English in the Primer of 1539, and the Nicene Creed in the Prayer Book of 1549.

accept them in the Greek form? This may seem at first blush to be a purely academic question, and one that we may properly disregard, since academic questions are not much to the fore in these times of intensely practical interest. But a moment's reflection will convince any one of us that here is a matter of no small importance. I do not refer to the exegesis of phrases like "Light of Light" and "very God of very God," which are clearer in Greek than in English. I have in mind rather words and phrases that are obscured or incorrectly rendered in the English version which we recite in church. For example, the clause "by whom all things were made" ($\delta\iota\ \omicron\upsilon\ \tau\grave{\alpha}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \epsilon\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\tau\omicron$), following immediately after a mention of the Father, is probably understood by most people to be a reference to God's creation of the world. But of course the clause really refers to the instrumentality of the Son in the creation of the universe, being based on several New Testament passages.¹ We might render the words thus: "through whom (*i.e.* the Son) the universe came into being." Again, why does the Nicene Creed begin with the individualistic "I believe"? It is true that the singular is found in the Latin text of the Western Church, but in the Greek text of both the Nicene and Niceno-Constantinopolitan Symbols the first person plural ($\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$) is used.² It may be said that "I" is the Church personified, and that the singular pronoun emphasises the solidarity of the confessing group better than the plural "we." In like manner the psalmists often use "I" and "me" when they speak "in the name of the Church-nation."³ These so-called "I psalms" voice the common sentiments of the religious community, the psalmist's individuality being temporarily merged in the corporate consciousness. Is the "I" of the Nicene Creed commonly understood in the individualistic or in the collective sense? Both of the creeds are corporate confessions of faith, and we ought not to forget or ignore their social character when we use them in the public services of the Church. Would not this idea be brought home more clearly to the average Christian if the plural "we" were restored at the beginning of the Nicene Creed? Finally, in the Apostles' Creed, "the resurrection of the body" is an incorrect and misleading translation.

¹ Cf. John i. 3; 1 Cor. viii. 6; Col. i. 16; Heb. i. 2.

² The modern Greek Church has conformed to Western usage in this respect, but the plural is retained in the Coptic, Ethiopic, and Armenian liturgies.

³ Cf. Cheyne, *The Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter* (1891), pp. 261 ff. Dr Cheyne also calls attention to the fact that the chorus in Greek tragedy sometimes speaks collectively in the first person singular.

In the Old Roman Symbol the phrase was probably *σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν*, the emphasis being on *σαρκός*; and in the Latin *Textus Receptus* of the Apostles' Creed it is *carnis resurrectionem*. There is no ambiguity in either the Greek or the Latin expression, and there is no room for doubt or uncertainty as to what was meant. But "the resurrection of the body," in view of what St Paul says about the "spiritual body" in the fifteenth chapter of first Corinthians, is susceptible of an entirely different interpretation.

Then, too, there is the "higher criticism" of the creeds. Would it suffice to subscribe to the earliest and briefest form of the Apostles' Creed, the Old Roman Symbol of the second century, which scholars have reconstructed from early Christian sources with what seems to be a fair measure of success? Or, may we accept the Creed in the later and somewhat fuller form in which it was known to Marcellus of Ancyra and Rufinus of Aquileia in the fourth century? Or, are we committed to the Creed as it is given in the so-called *Textus Receptus*, on which our English version is based? It contains several significant words and phrases not found in the earlier forms of the Creed.

But these minor points I mention only in passing. We must hurry on to the consideration of our three main questions.

First, then, why do we say the creeds? We read in Article VIII. that "the Nicene Creed, and that which is commonly called the Apostles' Creed, ought thoroughly to be received and believed: for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." The reason that is given for receiving and believing the creeds is the interesting thing in Article VIII. Here, indeed, *pace* Cardinal Newman and Tract 90, is good Protestant doctrine in the Thirty-Nine Articles. Both of the creeds are held to depend upon certain statements of the Bible for their authority over the minds of Christian people. The Articles of Religion were put forth in an age when the Scriptures were believed to be an infallible revelation from Almighty God. Both the Old and New Testaments were held to be free from errors and mistakes of every kind. But we are unable to accept this view of the Bible. We prefer to say that it contains a revelation of God, and we are well aware that it is not infallible, at least in matters of science and history. Scripture is for the modern scholar, as a distinguished biblical critic has recently said, "evidence not proof"; and therefore, remembering that according to Article VIII. the Bible is the source of authority, we cannot ascribe to the creeds an infallibility which we are unable to

accord to Scripture. Creedal infallibility and Scriptural infallibility fall together. But even if they are not infallible, the two great historic creeds may perhaps occupy a position of authority in the Church more or less analogous to that held by the Bible.

The Catholic Churchman gives an entirely different answer to our question. For him the Church is central and fundamental, and on her authority he accepts both the Bible and the creeds. Of course the Church, like any other organisation, has a perfect right to declare that the two historic creeds fully and adequately express her mind concerning the great matters with which they deal; but she cannot invest them with an infallibility which she herself does not possess.¹ No one can successfully gainsay the verdict of history on the alleged infallibility of the Church. The idea of an *ecclesia docens* instructing mankind with infallible authority on subjects of the gravest concern is as foreign to the thought of the modern world as is the high-Protestant idea of an infallible book. The truth is that every form of infallibility, be it ecclesiastical, biblical, or creedal, has for ever perished from the earth.

We do not say the creeds either because we believe that their several articles "may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture," or because the Church bids us do so. We hold fast to them because we think there is positive value in doing so. We believe in the Gospel, and we also believe in the Church; and we are convinced that logically and historically the two belong together. We shrink from separating what God seems to have joined together for the good of men, "lest haply" we "be found even to be fighting against God." Therefore we are not only Christians, but also Churchmen. The Apostles' and Nicene Creeds are *par excellence* the statements of the Christian faith as the Church has understood it. Not as polemical documents but as positive affirmations, they have been seized upon by the common Christian consciousness and turned to popular use. They are not in any sense complete expositions of the Christian faith, and in some respects they may seem to be not well suited to the needs of our time; but nevertheless, recognising them to be an essential part of the Church's life-history, we Churchmen accept them, along with the Church, as the two great historic symbols of the Christian faith, and recite them as such in our public services. And we

¹ F. J. Hall (*Authority Ecclesiastical and Biblical*, 1908, p. 83) says: "Ecclesiastical infallibility means, briefly speaking, that no truly ecumenical teaching of the Catholic Church as to what is necessary to be believed, or essential to be practised, can be erroneous."

believe that by so doing we put ourselves into the mighty current of Christian life more fully and effectually than would otherwise be possible.

Our next question is, In what sense do we say the creeds? They may be taken either in the historical sense, *i.e.* according to their primary meaning, or in a figurative or metaphorical sense, just as the Scriptures may be interpreted either historically or allegorically. It is the business of the scholar to ascertain by scientific investigation the original meaning of the several articles of the creeds, paying due attention to the historical conditions out of which the documents arose. This has been done, and so much unanimity of opinion has been reached that we may justly claim to know, at least in a general way, what the primary meaning of the creeds is. Concerning details there are of course different views.

But are we men of the twentieth century able to accept the creeds *secundum mentem auctorum*? The bishops of the Anglican Communion passed the following resolution at the Lambeth Conference of 1908: "The Conference, in view of tendencies widely shown in the writings of the present day, hereby places on record its conviction that the historical facts stated in the creeds are an essential part of the faith of the Church."¹ This resolution was "solemnly reaffirmed" by the Upper House of the Convocation of Canterbury on 30th April 1914. Canon Glazebrook, in a letter to the Bishop of Ely published in a recent number of *The Times*, offers the following as a "natural interpretation" of the bishops' resolution: "Each clause which mentions an event as having taken place in historical time must be accepted by the faithful as a literal statement of a fact."² And yet he doubts if this was what the Lambeth Conference really meant, and quotes the Bishop of Oxford as follows: "When I say 'He descended into hell,' and also when in a more general sense I say 'He ascended into heaven, and sitteth, etc.,' I confess to the use of metaphor in a historical statement, because the historical statement carries me outside the world of present possible experience, and symbolical language is the only language that I can use."³ In other words, so stout a champion of orthodoxy as Dr Gore, writing after the bishops' Lambeth resolution of 1908, confesses that he feels obliged to interpret certain articles of the Apostles' Creed metaphorically. He admits that the principle of meta-

¹ Gore, *The Basis of Anglican Fellowship*, new ed., 1914, p. 3.

² *The Times*, May 21, 1918, p. 4.

³ Gore, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

phorical or figurative interpretation is legitimate as applied to at least two articles of the Creed. If two articles may properly be understood in a figurative sense, the method may certainly be extended to any or all of them. And what is true of the Apostles' Creed must be true also of the Nicene Creed, for they are both received on the same authority.

Some of those who are unable to accept the creeds in the literal sense have found relief in the discovery that they are in full accord with the purpose of the framers of the documents, though the language used seems to them antiquated or ambiguous. For example, the words "born of Mary the Virgin" were originally meant to assert the reality of the birth and earthly life of Jesus over against the docetism of Marcion and his followers.¹ But why should we of the present generation publicly protest that we are free from the errors of docetism? The vast majority of Christians have never heard of the disease and could not recognise its symptoms if they were confronted with a genuine case. Moreover, there is no evidence that the epidemic is likely to recur. Docetism is extinct, and it has no other than an historical interest for us. But of course we are in hearty sympathy with what may be called the larger purpose or import of the creeds.

The example of the Bishop of Oxford will no doubt hearten thousands of forward-looking Christians who for one reason or another desire to subscribe to the creeds. Many of the clergy and a fair number of the laity, in America as well as in England, have come to feel that the difficulties in the way of the literal interpretation of the creeds are insuperable, and have adopted the metaphorical or figurative method. They are entirely honest in their position, and maintain it openly. Surely, as the matter now stands, no one can be required to accept the creeds in the primary or historical sense.

But what shall we say of the figurative method of interpreting the creeds, having admitted its legitimacy? It is essentially like the allegorical interpretation of Scripture in the hands of Philo or Paul or Origen. The fundamental presumption is that the framers of the various articles wrought more wisely than they knew. For example, "He descended into hell" may mean that Christ goes down, in the Gospel message, into the very depths of sin and degradation to rescue some poor soul from perdition. This happens every day—or rather every night—in the slums of our cities. This may be

¹ Cf. M'Giffert, *The Apostles' Creed* (1902), pp. 122 ff.

what the article means, and then again it may not be this at all. Who knows? Each one interprets as he will, all are satisfied, and the result is chaos. The only principle to be followed seems to be *suum cuique*.

We ought, as serious-minded Christians, to know what the primary or historical meaning of the creeds is, and within certain limits we can find out without much effort. For the purpose of edification we may use the figurative or metaphorical method *ad libitum*. But because we desire to remain in the fellowship of the Church, living our lives and doing our work in the great historic body of Christ, we must not allow ourselves to be restricted to either of these methods of interpretation. The Apostles' and Nicene Creeds are the historic symbols of the Christian faith, and we recite each of them as a whole rather than as a series of articles dealing with various matters of theological interest. The public recitation of the creeds is an act of allegiance to the historic Christian faith; and as we say them we do not interpret either literally or figuratively the various articles of which they consist, but rather we express our allegiance to the faith of which they are the recognised symbols.

It has been suggested by some that the creeds should be sung rather than said in the services of the Church, because it is felt that one may sing with a good conscience words which he cannot conscientiously say. Those who make this proposal might invoke the authority of Calvin, who called the Apostles' Creed a *carmen*. The suggestion does not seem to the present writer to be a happy one. For apart from the ethical question involved, it assumes that the creeds are to be taken article by article rather than as a whole, and thus it loses sight of their true significance in public worship.

Finally, how do we say the creeds? The Bishop of Hereford, Dr Henson, is reported to have declared recently that he accepted the creeds *ex animo*, and that it was dishonourable to do otherwise. Professor Kirsopp Lake is grieved that "a typical Liberal in ecclesiastic matters" should use such language, and in a recent number of the HIBBERT JOURNAL¹ he takes the bishop to task for doing so. According to Dr Lake, to say that one accepts the creeds *ex animo* is equivalent to saying that one accepts them in the literal or historical sense. The speaker who uses the phrase *ex animo* "means to emphasise, not to qualify, his assent." It may be that these words are sometimes used and understood in this way. But is this what they really mean? *Ex animo* seems to the present

¹ HIBBERT JOURNAL, xvi. (1918), pp. 632 ff.

writer to be synonymous with *sincerely*, i.e. without dissimulation or mental reservation.¹ Hence in the present instance the phrase indicates the manner in which Dr Henson accepts the creeds rather than the sense in which he understands them. It can therefore be used with perfect propriety by one who sincerely interprets the creeds in a figurative or metaphorical sense. We all accept the creeds *ex animo*, whatever our interpretation of them may be; for otherwise we should not subscribe to them or recite them in the offices of the Church.

We accept the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds because they are the historic symbols of the Christian faith; we say them as such in our services of public worship; and we repeat them absolutely *ex animo*.

W. H. P. HATCH.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

¹ This is certainly the meaning of *ex animo* in Latin writers. Cf., e.g., Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, 9. 16, 2: "Sed ego uno utor argumento quamobrem me ex animo vereque arbitrer diligi." F. W. Robertson wrote in 1843: "As to the Church of England, I am hers, *ex animo*. I do not mean to say that if I had written her baptismal service I should have exactly expressed myself as she has done; but take her as she is, 'With all thy faults I love thee still'" (*Life and Letters*, 1887, i. p. 101).

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"THE SICKNESS OF ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1919, p. 353.)

MR R. H. TAWNEY's article in the April number of the *Hibbert Journal* is so interesting, clear, and conclusive that I take this occasion to remark a fact which has been in my mind for years. It ought to help many a lay reader out of the bogs in the use of the term "rights."

Owing to the fact that this term, especially when used in the singular, cannot escape that fringe of meaning which is associated with "right" rather than "a right," there grows up in many minds a feeling of legitimacy, or even righteousness, in the exercise of "rights." If readers could substitute, in Mr Tawney's article, in every sentence in which he uses it, his definition of "a right" they would soon discover very different associations connected with the ideas of *power* or *liberty*. It is a great pity that this equivocal term exists in the language. Immanuel Kant somewhere calls attention to the fact that the German language has two words for "evil" where the English has but one, and he remarks the advantage in escaping an equivocation—the first time, so far as I can recall, that Kant recognised equivocation in his dialectics. It is certain that we could better protect the average layman from illusion if the language were not burdened with the confusion incident to the use of "right" and "a right." Not that there is any marked tendency to identify them, but that a fringe of association is inevitable with many people that leads to illusion in the treatment of political matters. Just substitute "power" or "liberty" where "a right" or "rights" are concerned, and also substitute "a right" or "rights" wherever "power" or "liberty" is used, and see how different the sentences will sound unless the real distinction between legitimacy and liberty is kept in view.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

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“ETHER, MATTER, AND THE SOUL.”

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1919, p. 520.)

MR ROBERTSON, while criticising my article in the January *Hibbert*, is evidently interested in the use of terms, and hence, perhaps, can help in explaining how to use the term “material” unambiguously. Sometimes it is used as the adjective of matter, sometimes as a sort of synonym for matter; sometimes again as equivalent to “physical,” i.e. as opposed to psychical or spiritual; while sometimes it is used in a semi-figurative sense as meaning “significant.” In illustration I might instance: “That is a material fact”; “The evidence is immaterial”; “Platinum was the material employed”; “Imports of raw material”; “The material Universe”; “A materialistic philosopher.”

On the whole it has been found convenient to use the term *material* in a wider sense than the restricted and definable term *matter*, though the term *physical* may sometimes be used instead. If I say that the ether of space belongs to the material universe but is not itself matter, it is probable that Mr Robertson and many others would accuse me of inconsistency. But I plead not guilty, and ask them what they themselves would say about light, for instance, or sound.

Mr Robertson makes the definite assertion that the stuff of which matter is made “deserves *par excellence* the name of matter”; but he will hardly find a physicist to agree with him. Physicists may not be authorities on language, but they are generally careful in the use of terms and are bound to discriminate between matter and ether; they even begin to suspect that regular dynamics does not apply equally to both. Mr Robertson speaks of the distinction between ether and matter as “an arbitrary distinction”; but he cannot be fully acquainted with the evidence, which is voluminous and not easy. Besides, it is contrary to common sense to call different things by the same name merely because one is made of the other. Even Mr Robertson would hardly say that flax is pre-eminently entitled to the name linen, or that iron ought to be called horse-shoe nails and steam-engines.

Mr Robertson goes on to object to my claim for locomotion as the essential attribute of matter, and to my location of strain or potential energy in the ether; but here he is dealing with realities, not with terms, and therefore I presume does not wish to be dogmatic. He speaks of strain and stress as “in fact simply frustrated tendencies to locomotion.” Would he apply this well-sounding phrase to the act of winding a watch, or cracking a nut, or sounding a tuning-fork? He will hardly be helped to understand the alternations of strain in a violin string or organ pipe by thinking of frustrated locomotion. He has merely failed to understand my meaning. When a bow is bent the particles of matter are rearranged, they are not strained: it is the intervening connecting medium that is strained. So it is when a weight is raised. The weight itself is not affected, save by alteration of place, yet energy has been gained: and if I ask where the energy is located, I do not pretend to be asking an easy question; it is a question for a physicist, not one that can be answered offhand by a literary critic.

In his third paragraph I understand Mr Robertson to abandon superficial criticism and to ask for information. I am glad to supply it, and

have partly done so already by the illustration of a bent spring. Assuming it true that the particles of matter are merely rearranged or altered in relative position, and also that a connecting medium is responsible for the cohesion and elastic recoil, then the existence of two constituents or components of any object—the sensible portion and the insensible portion, the matter portion and the ether portion—is self-evident.

No doubt he will naturally exclaim that in that case if the body is moved the ether permeating it must move too. Well, there we enter on a subject that requires some study, and in order to be brief I must content myself by referring him to the theory of Fresnel and the confirmatory experiment of Fizeau concerning the speed of light through moving transparent matter. The ether is modified inside matter; and that experiment demonstrates that not the uniform and permeating ether of space, but only the modification, or, if we choose so to express it, the modified portion of ether, moves about with the matter, being essentially part of the object.

In his fourth paragraph Mr Robertson quite legitimately attacks my hypothesis or speculation as to the possible animation, in the case of living things, of this modified or constituent ether, and as to the possible permanence or survival of the animated ethereal portion when the material portion is worn out. Here I will not join issue with him, since it is a hypothesis which admittedly requires a great deal of working at, and in its present stage may quite properly be objected to. It is little better than a hint to assist contemplation, and a clue to such experimentation as may be possible. He says that it is not a consoling supposition, nor affords any assurance for personal immortality. Very likely not. Evidence for that must be based upon facts, not upon suppositions or desires, and unless the fact of survival is first established there is no need for hypothesis nor anything to explain. To anyone not aware of the evidence for that great fact any hypothesis seeking to explain the manner of it must indeed seem gratuitous. But given the validity of certain subjective testimony from the other side as to the possession of a bodily appearance not unlike the old one though no longer capable of affecting our present material senses, we inevitably make guesses as to its nature.

Whether the term "soul" is conveniently applicable to this "spiritual body" is a question of nomenclature, and therefore one on which I am very willing to learn from experts on language as soon as they know the facts.

OLIVER LODGE.

"THE SCANDAL OF NON-ESSENTIALS."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1919, p. 458.)

I CONFESS that I cannot regard Professor Flinders Petrie's easy way to Christian unity as very promising. Without doubt it is fascinatingly easy. Let us all sing the *Te Deum* together; and, I suppose, let each take as much of it as he pleases for historic fact, and the rest for poetic symbolism. I fear that will prove but a thin covering of olive branches over the pitfall of irreconcilable opposition.

But my objection is not only to the Professor's conclusion, but to the method by which he reaches it. He appears to seize upon the ostensible

cause of separation in each case, to empty it of all meaning, to call the discredited thing a label, and then to search for the real cause elsewhere, and find it in racial differences, inherited traditions, etc. No doubt he is right in pointing to these as largely influencing the respective combatants in choosing sides, taking up their positions, and selecting their weapons; but he seems to have overlooked the fact that the given cause in most cases marks the point of collision, that the combatants are to a large extent men who desire to think alike, but who find an obstacle to this, perhaps owing to the causes which he specifies, yet an obstacle which takes the form of some problem which is hard to solve, and the different sides represent different solutions. If one solution ultimately secures general acceptance, the various distinctions of race, etc., do not prevent reconciliation, until a fresh problem presents itself.

Take, *e.g.*, the Homoousion and Homoiousion controversy. However impossible it is to define such a mystery as the Divine Nature, the two watchwords do represent different solutions of the practical problem, how to maintain the Unity of the Deity, along with the duty of offering worship to Christ, each being fundamental to Christianity. The Homoiousion solution, if accepted, would have carried with it a radical change in the Christian religion as received from the Apostles. Our Lord Jesus Christ must ultimately have ceased to be worshipped as God. Its final overthrow meant the reconciliation of vast multitudes of diverse racial and hereditary antecedents. Whatever subsequent dissensions might arise, this at least ceased to be a cause of open conflict. Progress was made, in the only way it can be made, by thrashing out the particular cause of difference which came to the top.

And to-day the main difficulty in the way of corporate reunion, at least outside the Roman communion, is what is called "apostolic succession." "Episcopal succession by physical contact" is how the Professor paints the label. It would be hard to gather from this that the point at issue was whether Christianity involved membership in a body intended by its Founder to manifest visibly to the world the unity of His followers in Him, or simply the individual acceptance of certain doctrines about God. Yet it is nothing short of this, and the controversy is by no means vitally concerned with the method of signifying appointment by the laying on of hands, nor with the original Episcopalian or Presbyterian constitution of the ministry, but with the proposition that, if the body is to be visibly one, its ministers must be appointed by a method recognised as valid by all, and that no one should presume to exercise this ministry who had not been commissioned by someone who was himself universally recognised as duly commissioned to convey ministerial authority to others. This principle once conceded, adjustments on both sides would readily follow; what we can see to be the chief obstacle to corporate unity would be cleared away, and, at any rate for the time being, Christians whose traditions have widely diverged for the past four hundred years would regain the unity which they preserved on the whole for fifteen hundred years before the great Western break-up.

But until this principle be accepted we are separated by a fundamentally different conception of Christianity, even though it can be superficially represented as nothing more than a quarrel about "episcopal succession by physical contact."

C. E. SCOTT-MONCRIEFF.

"GLIMPSES OF IMMORTALITY."

(Hibbert Journal, April 1919, p. 480.)

THE Rev. Alfred E. Garvie on the above subject thus writes (p. 488): "God cannot do more than He has done in Christ; but who can say that in this earthly life every man has become fully aware of what Christ is, and has finally determined his relation to Him?"

Dr Garvie's standpoint may be taken as that of the orthodox Christian of the present day, and I don't suppose he would look upon Francis Stopford as a Christian, seeing that he thus writes, at p. 503, on "The Immortal Soul": "To render the world a little happier, a little brighter, and a little healthier for those who come after—in this work lay immortality, and in so far as I had striven to this end there had gone forth from my being an energy which endures. This energy, conjoined to a vast volume of effluence, a stream of living power, the outflowing of the actions of all unselfish men and women of all time, inspires, strengthens, and compels humanity to the same purpose for ever."

Mr Stopford's views are now by no means uncommon, and they are more like those of the majority of the laity who think for themselves than those of Dr Garvie; but, the question is, Who is right? Have we any soul, any more than the lower animals have? That is a question which can never be scientifically discussed, except by those who know physiology as well as philosophy; but it is a question which the Church ought to face; and if our immortality depends, as I believe it does, on our offspring and our influence, what need is there for the Church? Some have ventured to say that this war, waged among professing Christian nations, proves that the Christian religion is a failure. And it is no wonder it has proved a failure, for its plan of salvation is founded on the myth of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden, and on the atonement of Jesus—Paul, indeed, stakes the truth of the Christian religion on the *resurrection* of Jesus, for which there is no evidence that would convince an unprejudiced jury. It is to psychology we must look to get any satisfactory solution of the question as to the immortality of the soul; and, having studied the subject to the best of my ability, I am compelled by my reason to confess that I have come to look upon the body as a machine—the most wonderful, no doubt, nevertheless a mere machine; and I regard death as an endless sleep. It has taken me a long time to come to that conclusion, but I am certainly a happier and perhaps a better man since I came to think so, and I believe it would be well for humanity if a new Catechism were written and taught to the child. But to whom should its compilation be entrusted? To the medical profession, I think, for the mind cannot be sound unless the body is sound, and the new Catechism will have nothing to say about the soul, or spirits, but be concerned chiefly about the body and mind. Looking back over the history of philosophy, I find that it is to medical men that the credit of any great progress is due. It was John Locke, in his *Essay on Human Understanding*, who taught philosophers that there were no innate ideas; it was Dr David Hartley's reasoning that proved we have no free-will; and Dr Laycock, Professor of the Practice of Physic in the University of Edinburgh, was the first, in his epoch-

making work on *Mind and Brain*, to lay the true foundation of mental science. If, then, philosophers and theologians will enlist the services of the medical profession, and have religion, such as it has become, replaced by science in our school curriculum, there will be some hope of the child being taught to know God in His works, and, learning His goodness, to love Him and do His will.

JOHN HADDON, M.A., M.D.

"THE IMMORTAL SOUL."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1919, p. 492.)

MR STOPFORD's article on "The Immortal Soul" is framed on sound scientific lines. He accepts both the physical and spiritual facts of man's being. He admits that an almost universal belief in God points to the existence of some justification of that belief in Reality. He frames an hypothesis to meet the case, and shows that on this hypothesis the phenomena which we actually observe would be likely to occur.

Although there is not a shred of direct evidence in support of his theory, it must be admitted that *if* (a big *if*!) the intercommunion of souls is achieved through the mediation of that imperceptible entity the ether, whose existence physical science compels us to assume as the most likely explanation of many phenomena, then analogy with other sense-organs makes a guess that such special soul-cells exist not unreasonable.¹ Further, we must confess that the phenomena of mental disease and of diseases due to the ill-functioning of certain ductless glands lend considerable support to such a view. Moral and spiritual obliquities due to cerebral pressure, and to the alteration of the thyroid secretion, do unquestionably occur. None the less, if spiritual activities are mediated by the ether and brain-cells, Mr Stopford's theory, like all scientific theories, does not get us beyond materialism. To bring in a God is quite unnecessary for the hypothesis itself, even though it may be metaphysically necessary if we are to introduce the Good. Thus the difficulty of a material explanation is not properly removed, but only shifted back, though Mr Stopford's materialism is hidden behind a God arbitrarily introduced—arbitrarily so far as the hypothesis itself is concerned, though necessarily for him owing to his belief that the general faith of mankind cannot be mistaken. Moreover—and this second point is really involved in the first,—like all scientific hypotheses, Mr Stopford's only answers the question *How?* not the question *Why?* which, of course, is all that science aspires, or can aspire, to do. If God exists, we find here no sufficient cause for His creative activity. Why should God bring about the long chain of events that led to the evolution of man if men are merely destined to bring more good into their relations with each other and with Him, and then cease to be? What does God gain by that? Does it not indeed involve a contradiction in terms that a Personal God, who *ex hypothesi* is infinite and eternal, should achieve His

¹ The pineal gland was long ago suggested to be the seat of the soul, though recently it has been found merely to control the development of the sexual organs.

creative activity and work it out to its end in Time alone, which Time can have no reality or even existence for Him? Has such a creation any meaning at all in relation to the eternal? And if God be not Personal, is the escape from pantheism, at which the writer evidently aims, at all made good? Mr Stopford has formulated, very clearly, a view which is widely, if vaguely, held among the nobler and more thoughtful to-day—a view whose altruism is truly Christian. But once it is clearly formulated its inherent weaknesses are too apparent to pass unobserved. The hypothesis does not explain the most important fact of all—that men do actually exist; for the conditions assumed make their existence of no value to the God who made them.

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“THE DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTION OF EDUCATION.”

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1919, p. 414.)

PROFESSOR DARROCH in his “Democratic Conception of Education” lays too much stress on training for leadership. So far from “reconstructing our whole system of education” so that “youths of marked ability for leadership may be discovered and educated,” we need to abolish much of the present selection of individuals. We are still too much tied to autocratic, bureaucratic, and undemocratic, methods of medieval times, which selected for education just a sufficient number to recruit the governing classes. There is a world of difference between selecting a few to go forward and marching all forward, eliminating only those who fall by the way. Professor Darroch quite rightly stresses “equality of opportunity” as fundamental, but again his idea is opportunity for exceptional ability. While his suggestion that the scholar shall leave school “capable of carrying on his own education” is a pale, undemocratic shadow of Milton’s “enflamed with the study of learning and the admiration of virtue; stirred up with high hopes of living to be brave men and worthy patriots, dear to God, and famous to all ages.”

Does not the conception of Democracy say to Professors and teachers more emphatically that the educational process is lifelong, and school and college only a beginning? So the school aim should not be to complete anything either vocational or even academic, but merely to train the mind for clear thinking and store it for long views; to open as many subjects as possible—vistas for the unfolding spirit and character, broadening each individual’s outlook and opportunity; though much of it may be classed as mere smattering and pursued no further when a choice of career has been freely made. And does not Democracy demand buildings which are public property, management free from the “dead hand,” religious freedom, democratic control, teachers financially secure and intellectually free, and all vested interests subordinate to the public interest?

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(*Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1919, p. 214, and April 1919, p. 518.)

MAY I be allowed to make two remarks, as briefly as possible, on Mr Vizard's interesting note in your April number (p. 518)?

First, let me make it plain that while I earnestly deprecate many misleading anthropomorphic associations of the word *Person* as applied to God, I cannot conceive God without the fullest attribute of *Personality*.

The essence of *Personality* in anyone consists in the possibility of our entering into mental and spiritual relations with him. But the word *Person* does suggest and connote—and we can never now prevent its doing so even to an educated mind—an individual separate Being with limitations and attributes quasi-human—a conception of God which leads to insoluble contradictions and finally to rejection. The word *Person* as applied to the Godhead seems, in fact, incurably misleading. And, moreover, it has little authority. The word is now happily excluded from the New Testament in that connection (Heb. i. 3, R.V.); and in the *Quicumque vult* the Godhead is described as revealed to men in three *Personæ*: a word which, as every scholar knows, does not mean individuals, as our English word *persons* does, but characters, manifestations, "masks."

Personality is inherent in Him from whom all human *personality* is derived. The word "God" should suggest the Infinite Spirit of Love and Goodness whose offspring we are, whom we may and can and should think of and pray to and trust and love as our Father in heaven. We can with perfect honesty use the noble poetical imagery of the Old Testament and our Church's prayers as the natural language of piety and adoration, if they are not translated into deadly prose and forced on us as the language of a quasi-science. It is not the *Personality* and Fatherhood, but the popular primeval and childish *Personification*, the "anthropomorphisation" of God still insisted on by some theologians as the only orthodoxy (as illustrated in my article), that has alienated so many religious and Christian people from our theology and from the Church. Our Lord came not to destroy but to fulfil the theology, as well as the morality of the Law.

Secondly, I would ask him to consider whether progress in religious thought, or development of theology, is quite appropriately illustrated by the Scripture parable he adapts to it; and whether its genesis and method are correctly described as "reinterpretation." Are not the changes which we have witnessed in our lifetime, and others which preceded them, more truly regarded as the evolution of thought under the inner working of the Spirit of God? We have witnessed the general acceptance of such a doctrine of development under such influence coming with the light of fuller knowledge of the past. This has profoundly modified our views of Creation; of the natural and supernatural; of Providence; of religions other than Christianity; of the nature of the Bible and its inspiration; and of much beside. It is altering very widely the conception that religious men are forming of God and the nature of His government of men. Surely all this is no mere "reinterpretation." It is new and living thought springing from germs and roots in the old. It is a true evolution of theology.

In such a process it necessarily follows that, while a later generation

may be broadly differentiated from an earlier, even children from their fathers, in each generation men will always coexist in different stages. There is on the whole, though not continuous, an advance towards the moral and the spiritual. Sometimes there is reaction towards the mechanical and material. The permanent line of advance is only found as the result of joint effort, and only assured by human experience. Thus God is educating us.

We do not therefore, as I think, need "a drastic change in the form of spiritual religion." That which has no root in the past will have no future. Evolution in the spiritual direction is going on, perhaps, nearly as fast as men can bear it. The wholesome evolution of the last seventy years is, as I think, retarded by the withdrawal from the fold of men, whether clergy or laity, "who have a firm belief in religion and really love the 'Church,'" in their impatience at the slowness of evolution of theology. Meantime Christian thought and religion are slowly outgrowing some of the theology which has clothed them in the past.

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SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

THE shining article in the tenth volume of *The Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (T. & T. Clark) is Mr Stanley A. Cook's, upon "Religion," a piece of close reasoning and a comprehensive survey. One would have welcomed, at the outset, a more detailed examination of the various attempts to define religion; some of the definitions, *e.g.* those of Tylor and Schleiermacher and Sir J. G. Frazer, open up vital issues. But in almost every respect the article lays bare the methods and aims of the study in a way which guides the reader through the complicated materials; it is neither too anthropological nor too philosophic, and it has the further merit of treating the subject as one that lives and moves. Towards the close the author ventures upon a provisional definition of what he means by religion, holding that it "primarily involves some immediate consciousness of transcendent realities of supreme personal worth, vitally influencing life and thought, expressing themselves in forms which are conditioned by the entire stage of development reached by the individual and his environment, and tending to become more explicit and static in mythologies, theologies, philosophies, and scientific doctrines." This may seem unduly cumbrous as a definition, but it describes succinctly the lines of investigation followed in the article itself. In his *History of Religions* (Macmillan) Dr E. Washburn Hopkins of Yale University defines religion somewhat colloquially as "squaring human life with superhuman life." The rest of the book, however, is quite sober and scientific. It is a survey of comparative religion, compact and terse, a manual which does in one volume what Professor Moore of Harvard is doing in two. The text is not easy reading, and the bibliographies are curiously eclectic; but as a work of reference the book has the merit of convenience, especially in the department of Indian religion. Dr Hopkins rightly observes that it is difficult to overestimate "the immense importance of Buddhism in the cultural and religious evolution of Japan," and he traces the doctrine of "karma" from its source in the Rig Veda. Professor John Mackenzie (*Expositor*, April) analyses the latter idea in its Hindu form, differing from Professor Hopkins on the question of its origin, but summing up with equal strength against the alleged moral basis for the doctrine of transmigration, which is vital to the notion of "karma." He notes that "it is in the works

which manifest the spirit of deepest earnestness that the tendency has been most marked to depart from the rigidity of the doctrine of karma, and to grant a place to the grace of God, given freely, not according to merit." The article is a thoughtful and acute piece of writing.

Dr Henry Townsend's *Doctrine of Grace in the Synoptic Gospels* (Methuen) bears a paradoxical title, for "grace" was not a word upon the lips of Jesus; it is a Pauline theological term, in the New Testament, and even when Luke uses it he does not express the Pauline doctrine. Dr Townsend, however, addresses himself to the divine grace as manifested in the person, work, and teaching of Jesus. From this point of view he offers what is substantially an estimate of the Synoptic Gospels, including problems like prayer and miracles. There is a useful sketch of the idea of grace in the Old Testament and in Jewish literature, which helps to elucidate the New Testament development. As it happens, the only Encyclopædia articles which embrace New Testament theology directly are those on "Righteousness" in the teaching of Christ and in the Pauline theology, the former by Dr W. C. Allen, the latter by the late Principal Denney. Even apart from this, there is little to chronicle upon the subject. Professor C. F. Kent and a number of American coadjutors have, however, issued the New Testament section of what is called *The Shorter Bible* (Hodder & Stoughton). For whom even "in our day of haste, half-work, and disarray" is the New Testament too long? Apparently for some readers who are "often confused by different versions of the same incidents and teachings" in the Synoptic Gospels. The help offered to these perplexed creatures here is not exactly a Diatessaron—for extracts from the Fourth Gospel are printed separately at the end—but a series of selected passages from the first three gospels, the Acts, the Epistles, and the Apocalypse, which, it is claimed, contain the heart and essence of the collection. The passages are printed in a new translation which attempts "to reproduce as far as possible the force and vigour of the original." Dr Colin Campbell has issued a third and revised edition of *The First Three Gospels in Greek* (Oliver & Boyd). The text used is that of Westcott and Hort, and the synopsis differs from nearly all others of modern origin in being based upon the old hypothesis that Mark is the latest of the Synoptic Gospels. A few notes at the foot of the page occasionally give reasons for this view. But it would require more evidence than has been adduced to render it tenable. The arguments put forward are courageous and novel, rather than convincing. The present writer has also published a third and revised edition of his *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament* (T. & T. Clark). The Encyclopædia article on "Sacraments" does not discuss the New Testament evidence, but Mr B. S. Easton has a paper in *The Constructive Quarterly* (March) upon "St Paul and the Sacraments," which deals exegetically and historically with the apostle's views. "His sacramentalism has almost certainly absorbed certain Hellenistic elements," but their influence is pronounced unappreciable. Mr Easton agrees with the view that, "rigorously considered, in the Pauline system justification and the sacraments have nothing to do with each other"; and "the Eucharist is not needed for the logical completeness of St Paul's system, and Paulinism could have existed unchanged without it." In the *Expository Times* (March) Mr Harold Smith arranges data upon "The Kingdom of God in the Ante-Nicene Fathers," which suggest that the idea of the

Kingdom as God's inward rule is much more prominent in Origen than in Latin fathers like Tertullian and Cyprian. Dr Foakes-Jackson (*Harvard Theological Review*, April) argues that in "The City of God" Augustine followed Paul in his conception of the Church, instead of adhering to the more primitive idea of the Messianic kingdom as exhibited in the Synoptic Gospels and in Acts. "Augustine seems to have been far more influenced by the Stoic idea of a heavenly State than by the promises of Jesus or the hopes of his immediate disciples." There may be an element of truth in this contention, but Augustine did attach himself to one primitive element of the "kingdom" idea, in his famous interpretation of the millennium.¹ In connection with this department of early Christian thought, it may be noted that the Encyclopædia has only two articles which are relevant—one by the present writer on the "Pistis Sophia," the other by Professor A. F. Simpson on "Pleroma"—tracing the idea from its New Testament usage down to the Valentinian theosophy. In *The American Journal of Theology* (April) Dr C. C. Torrey finishes his study of "Fact and Fancy in Theories concerning Acts." It is a reply to some criticisms of his own theory, and he evidently intends to pursue the subject further. A sensible statement of the reasons why Acts is not to be dated in the seventh decade of the first century is given by Professor E. J. Goodspeed, in *The Expositor* (May); he indicates clearly the internal reasons for believing that Luke wrote Acts long after Paul had died.

The variety of sacrificial² ideas and expressions inherited by the Christian Church is lucidly expounded by Dr M. G. Glazebrook in *The Journal of Theological Studies* (January, pp. 109-126: "Hebrew Conceptions of Atonement, and their Influence upon Early Christian Doctrine"). The incidence of the alphabet prevents this volume of the Encyclopædia from giving much attention to Old Testament theology. There are compact, competent articles on subjects like "Righteousness," "Prayer," and "Priesthood" among the Jews, and an article, by no means satisfactory, on Hebrew Prophecy by Dr E. König. On the other hand, Professor C. F. Burney has published a critical edition of *The Book of Judges* (Rivingtons), to which his Schweich Lectures on *Israel's Settlement in Canaan* (Milford) form an indispensable pendant. The commentary is extremely full and elaborate, with an English translation and prolegomena. It is distinguished by accurate scholarship, as might be expected, by a remarkable power of handling the Babylonian evidence, and also by some novel conclusions on chronological, literary, and religious details. In both works the author holds that it was the Joseph-tribes in the main who left Egypt at the Exodus, entering Canaan under Joshua not long after 1200 B.C., and that some Israelite tribes were already in Canaan; that Yahweh was originally an Amorite deity, represented in Canaan as the Moon-god whose consort was Ashera; and that the book of Judges occupies a "position on the border-land between history and legend," uninfluenced by Deuteronomy. Dr Burney has made a provocative contribution to the study of the period and of Judges itself. It is

¹ In the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (Dec. 1918) M. Edouard Logoz begins a series of promising articles upon Augustine's philosophy of history, by discussing his views of Creation. He brings out the divergence between Augustine and Plotinus.

² This point is made in two recent University sermons, by Canon Sanday at Oxford (*Expositor*, April: "The Meaning of the Atonement"), and by Professor Kennett at Cambridge (*The Interpreter*, January: "The Liberty which is in Christ").

especially useful to have the longer notes in the commentary and the beautifully clear maps in the Schweich volume. Two studies of the prophet Jeremiah have also appeared—one a translation, *Jeremiah in Modern Speech* (J. Clarke), by Dr J. E. M'Fadyen; the other, a volume entitled *The Burden of the Lord* (J. Clarke), by Mr W. R. Thomson. Mr Thomson in twenty chapters puts before the modern reader some salient features of Jeremiah's personality and career. The book is written with knowledge of criticism and with religious sympathy. Mr Thomson claims that "whenever the piety of later Judaism broke through the forms of legalism, and spoke a language in which the religious spirit of to day can utter its deepest longings, it revealed its debt to Jeremiah." M. Paul Humbert's "Remarques sur l'actualité des prophètes hébreux" (*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, Dec. 1918) cover a wider field. Modern democracy, he argues, "se doit de les accueillir au Panthéon de ses grands hommes, car peu de génies sont mieux désignés pour parler à son cœur passionné." He describes with a touch of real eloquence their moral realism, their political sagacity in a time of international confusion and domestic strife, their plea for social justice, and at the same time their wholesome individualism. A. H. Edekoort's *Het Zondebesef in de babylonische boetepsalmen* (Utrecht, 1918), a well-equipped monograph, opens with translations of the relevant "penitential psalms" in the Babylonian religious literature, and proceeds to discuss their theological significance under three heads—(a) the confession of sin, (b) the consequences of sin, and (c) the deliverance from sin. The details are often technical, and only to be judged by experts. But the author makes some effective criticism of writers like A. Jeremias; he writes with what is evidently a thorough knowledge of the subject, and occasionally sums up a question happily—as, e.g., on p. 121 ("The assertion, 'Timor fecit deos,' finds no support in Babylonian religion. . . . Fear in Babylonia was always the result of the sense of sin").

On historical theology, again, this volume of the Encyclopædia happens to be particularly rich. The Pietistic movement which broke up Lutheran scholasticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is analysed by Mr E. S. Waterhouse; the contemporary wave of Quietism in France is described sympathetically by Mrs E. Herman; "Puritanism" and the "Pilgrim Fathers" supplement each other; and, among other articles, there is a notable account of "Presbyterianism" by the late Professor Dall of Kingston, who gives quite an impartial and accurate survey of its religious principles and ecclesiastical polity. "Presbyterianism," he observes, "like other ecclesiastical systems, was no new phenomenon suddenly entering about 1550 on a career totally unprepared for, but was the emergence into freedom of a tendency many centuries old. Substitute Christ for the pope as the head of the Church, and spiritual for corporeal unity, and you have at once the explanation of our Protestant divisions, and the antidote to much of the alarm which they cause in unreflecting minds." This is borne out by the late Professor Gwatkin's article on "The Reformation," which succeeds in being, like Handel's angels, "ever bright and fair"; it stands out in this volume as a masterpiece of historical insight and equity, full of terse aphorisms and illuminating judgments, like: "The fundamental error of the Latin Church was the twofold error of the Pharisees. It mistook the gospel for a law, and again mistook the office of law"; "Feudalism was society organised for war"; "The holiness of the Church was nowhere

more of a living truth than in the Reformed Churches"; "All Protestant states except retrograde Germany are seeking justice, and the Catholic states nearly in proportion to their independence of Rome," etc. There are few subjects more exposed to pseudo-historical dogmatism from admirers and antagonists than the Reformation nowadays, and Dr Gwatkin has supplied his readers with a trenchant answer to many current fallacies. With regard to the policy of Gregory VII., he admits that it was at any rate "a noble dream. But a dream it was; the facts were squalid." Dr J. P. Whitney, in *The English Historical Review* (April, pp. 129-151), comes practically to the same conclusion, though he admires Gregory's character and pleads that, in spite of the weakness of his power, he was not without a certain measure of success. We have also to note the publication of Mr B. L. Manning's essay on *The People's Faith in the Time of Wyclif* (Cambridge University Press). This is a piece of research into the popular religion of England during the fourteenth century—a field where the data are not easily discovered, and where judgments are particularly difficult. But Mr Manning has unearthed and reset a number of salient facts about the worship, superstitions, and religious practices of ordinary people, and enabled Puritans and Evangelicals to claim their heritage in the piety of the Middle Ages. Mr H. C. Barnard's volume on *The Port-Royalists on Education* (Cambridge University Press) is a serviceable collection of extracts.

The passage from history to present-day issues is traced by Mr W. L. Bevan in an article on "Continuity in the Christian Ministry" (*Constructive Quarterly*, Dec. 1918), suggested by the recent volume of essays edited by Dr Swete upon the Early Church and its ministry. Mr Bevan recognises the special tenacity of the historical appeal, due to "the transcendent position assigned to Jesus Christ, and . . . the position conceded to those immediate followers whom He selected to bear witness of Himself." He admits that Christians to-day must organise themselves somehow "in connection and relation with the organisation which we know from historical evidence of the clearest kind existed in the first and second centuries." But the principle of elasticity has to be recognised. There were indications of real freedom in handling ministerial authority even under the institutionalism of the mediæval Church, and co-operation to-day ought to allow for the variations of witness which are one evidence of the freedom that is life. Even beyond this field, one need of the present age is to state freedom in such a way as to bring out for individuals its elements of discipline, showing that faith ought to produce its own discipline and order. St Paul did that for his age, but it is generally more easy to represent faith as a ferment than to grasp the comprehensive view of it as implying control and organisation, and devoid of any petulant quarrel with history. Thus a book like Mr H. T. Hodgkin's *Lay Religion* (Headley), which is a forcible and challenging interpretation of Christianity, suffers from being slightly one-sided in this respect. Mrs Herman's *Christianity in the New Age* (Cassell) is more positive; the authoress recognises that current tendencies are apt to be impatient and shortsighted in their very zeal for improvement, and she suggests some steadying considerations about worship and dogma in her very desire to stir and sustain an impetus towards reconstruction. Professor Gardner's *Evolution in Christian Ethics* (Williams & Norgate) is a welcome contribution to the discussion of present-day Christianity. That the Christian moral will not survive

without the Christian dogma, and that it is capable of restatement, are considerations which require to be reiterated. Dr Gardner's belief that reconstruction depends on a revival of religion is supported by a critical survey of Christian ethical progress, and by an insistence upon three cardinal features—viz. "the recognition of law and order in the ethical and spiritual world, the social and corporate nature of virtue, and the predominance of active over mere passive or abstentional goodness," the last point being also urged by Mrs Herman in pleading for the spirit of adventure in Christian thought and practice. When there is so much hot air abroad, it is wholesome to read sensible, wise chapters like these of Dr Gardner upon the sex-question, secularism, and the League of Nations. He is convinced that "there is yet in the essential and underlying principles of the Christian religion a power of growth and self-adaptation which makes them fit to cope even with the newest developments of personal and of international morality." And, as a modernist, he sets himself to explain what is meant by "essential." Professor Cairns' *Reasonableness of the Christian Faith* (Hodder & Stoughton) starts from the same conviction. But the author deals with the elementary forms of Christian belief, rather than with their specific application. He begins by showing that it does not relieve us of the world's riddle to abandon Christianity, and then proceeds to explain the self-verifying character of faith, as an intuition of the ultimate, elicited fully by Jesus Christ's revelation of God. The short lectures were originally given to audiences during the war, and have a singularly persuasive note. Dr W. Douglas Mackenzie's *Christian Ethics in the World War* (Melrose) is interesting as the work of a converted pacifist, and as a word specially for the American situation. Now that the war is over, some of its arguments are a day behind the fair, but one or two chapters, especially the second (on "The State and the Citizen") and the last (on "Ethical Gains in the War"), retain a value of their own. The book is written with a sober conviction which tells. It approximates to Professor Gardner's book. On the other hand, Mr F. W. Butler's *Grounds of Christian Belief* (Skeffington) addresses an audience such as that sought by Professor Cairns, although it presupposes a readiness to discuss the philosophical basis of Christianity which is not too common. Mr Butler enters a plea for Christianity in view of contemporary thought upon reality and personality, argues persuasively that the supreme ethical values require a theistic setting if they are to be preserved, and insists on the verification of Christian theism. For people who are willing to think, these pages will serve as an adequate introduction to the conclusion that "the actual living and progressive thought of the times provides avenues of approach to Christianity." As the author points out, there has been a recent attempt, by the Rationalist Press Association, to rehabilitate aggressive Materialism, and "its recent popular presentations may gain for it, among those whose critical faculty is only slightly developed, a measure of acceptance not warranted by its merits." There was need for such a little book as Mr Butler's, and he has argued his case cogently. Unfortunately, the article on "Rationalism" in the *Encyclopædia* does not rise to the full height of the subject. There were many phases of rationalism prior to F. W. Newman. Historically, one might almost say that Julian was the first rationalist, so far as Christianity is concerned. And its ramifications are wider than the article seems to recognise.

Several sections of Christian dogma are covered by the *Encyclopædia*,

e.g. "Predestination" and "Providence." The significance of the latter idea in Calvin, however, is much more marked than the author of this article allows; Calvin really subsumed redemption as well as election under the category of providence. The article on "Regeneration" takes careful account of New Testament exegesis, but the subject opens up a province of religious experience which is fully and brightly covered by Mr W. M. Mackay in *The Disease and Remedy of Sin* (Hodder & Stoughton), dealing with salvation as life, and with Christianity as the care and cure of spiritual disease. This book is occupied with problems like conversion and the phenomena of the new life; it is alive to the researches of recent psychology in the field of spiritual religion, and handles effectively the facts which are normally grouped under regeneration. The Christian (theological) section of the composite article on "Prayer" was evidently written before the symposium lately edited by Canon Streeter. "Ritschlianism" is discussed by Dr Garvie on familiar lines. It is also criticised incidentally in Mr W. R. Thomson's *Christian Idea of God* (J. Clarke), a thoughtful survey of modern discussions upon the idea of God. Mr Thomson has acute criticisms to pass upon some contemporary tendencies in speculative theism, but he reaches out to a constructive position. The cardinal difficulty of harmonising the idea of personality with that of absoluteness is to be solved, he considers, by employing the category of Love, which "is our one means of understanding, however dimly and imperfectly, how the limitations of finite personality may be transcended in an absolute experience." This also is the conclusion of Mr S. A. McDowall in *Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity* (Cambridge University Press), although he reaches it along a highly speculative and original line, and by means of arguments which are sometimes enigmatic. It is not possible here to do more than call attention to his proof. Personality as the capacity for fellowship, which is Love, involves a unity, in the highest sense, of infinite reciprocity; in human personality, fatherhood, sonship, and the free spirit, or principle of unity, are to be recognised, and it is held that this threefold nature reappears in the Trinity. Psychological analogies like this are precarious, however. Mr McDowall interprets transcendence and immanence by means of the self-limiting and creative impulse in personality, with considerable, indeed with undue, subtlety. The difficulty of making creation essential to an eternal personality is faced by Mr W. R. Matthews (*Church Quarterly Review*, April, 27-54) in an article on "God as Creative Personality." As he admits, the personality of God is not essential to religion, and even the Christian religion might survive as a form of quietism or mysticism if the personality of God were proved to be untenable. But, predicating personality of God, we may argue that what lends coherence to it is "the activity of an ideal purpose," and that this eternal creativeness may be assigned to God. "If we affirm God's perfect personality, we must . . . think of Him as producing, with endless fertility, objects of love." In this way he seeks to evade the conclusion that the finite end of creation, as we know it in the present order, could involve merely a temporary personality of God. The subject is decidedly alive to-day. It is fully handled by Mr C. C. J. Webb in his Gifford Lectures on *God as Personality* (Allen & Unwin). Mr Webb discusses rationality and morality as elements of personality, dismisses the attempt to rest satisfied with a Finite God ("I see no more, if also no less, difficulty

in allowing that the Absolute may be the object of personal religious devotion than in allowing that the Absolute may be the object of metaphysical speculation”), and begins a restatement of the idea of a Mediator as being “of permanent value to our understanding of the nature of our spiritual world.” The elaboration of this view will come in the second course of the lectures. Meantime, the extreme interest of Mr Webb’s theory lies in the fact that he has recourse to a Mediator-doctrine, in order to harmonise the idea of creation and generation, and also to suggest a twofold personality in the divine nature. The book is a weighty interpretation of the synthesis, posited by the religious experience, of personality and absoluteness in God. It is also more readable than some of Mr Webb’s previous publications.

JAMES MOFFATT.

REVIEWS.

Folk-Lore in the Old Testament. By Sir James George Frazer.—
3 vols.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1918.

THE unwearied energy of Sir James Frazer has made all students of the religion of Israel his debtors by these three massive volumes on *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament*. The author's interest in Old Testament studies has long been known. For ordinary readers he has edited an admirable selection from its varied literature. His mastery of Hebrew has enabled him to exercise an independent choice among renderings of the text and hypotheses of critical inquiry. In various essays he has already opened up new paths of investigation,¹ and the present work carries his methods into fresh and unfamiliar fields. Its sub-title, "Studies in Comparative Religion, Legend, and Law," warns us not to expect a treatise exhaustive and complete. Here is no technical survey embracing the whole development of Israel's life and institutions from the "folk-lore" point of view. The author follows the incidents and personalities from the Creation to Solomon, selecting various themes for illustration without any systematic arrangement, save that a group of essays in the last volume on topics suggested by the Law-codes stands apart from the treatment of patriarch or king.

The definition of Folk-Lore in the preface includes "the whole body of a people's traditionary beliefs and customs, so far as these appear to be due to the collective action of the multitude and cannot be traced to the individual influence of great men." This includes not only the whole mass of the institutions of the lower culture, but advanced religions like those of Greece, or of India before Buddhism, as well as the pre-Mosaic practices of Israel. The distinguished translator and annotator of Pausanias is of course perfectly at home in the intricacies of Hellenic mythology; for ancient India he has safe guidance in Professor Macdonell, the Sacred Books of the East, and the scholars of Bühler's *Grundriss*; while nothing seems too remote in the literature of voyages, travels, and missionary labours, or the anthropological publications of the British Empire, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Russia, and the United States, to supply a comparison or support an inference. No one may quarrel with the author's choice of his own subjects. Yet, in view of his immense range of knowledge, the student may be pardoned for wishing that some of the discussions, like those on Jacob's mandrakes or the mutilation of children's fingers (which has

¹ See especially his contribution to the volume of *Anthropological Essays presented to Edward Burnet Tylor*, 1907, dealing with eight items now treated at greater length.

nothing to do with boring a slave's ear), might have been curtailed to make room for illustration of higher themes like that of the origin of arts and crafts (Gen. iv.) or the beginnings of ideas of revelation, the sources of law, and the psychology of primitive prophecy. Standing out among all the dissertations is the great chapter (ii. 94-371) on Jacob's marriages, itself a treatise on social evolution from the practice of "group marriage" down to later rules regulating the marriage of cousins, and the "levirate" and the "sororate," marriage with a deceased husband's brother or a deceased wife's sister. This contains some of the author's most original work. It expounds an important theory of the most fundamental of human relations, worked out with infinite patience on the basis of evidence from India, Africa, America, the islands of the Pacific, and Australia; but it has, of course, no bearing on Biblical theology, and must be left to experts in this special field. It is, however, refreshing to escape from the perpetual motive of fear of the ghost (on which the author promises a further work) into a region of economic influences and personal affections and jealousies. Occasionally the investigation runs up against an ultimate fact which the author's ingenuity cannot explain, such as the preference of the Australian Kariera for marriage with a cousin through a mother's brother instead of through a father's sister; while opposite rules may be traced forbidding or sanctioning the marriage of the children of two brothers or two sisters. Into the conditions which have produced such variations neither the historian nor the psychologist can penetrate; and the student must content himself with the author's caution in the frequent use of the words "conjecture," "probably," and "perhaps."

It may under these circumstances be suggested that more allowance should be made for two sources of action which are often imperfectly recognised in anthropological inquiry. Its tendency constantly leads the investigator to ask the question "why?" and to answer it in terms of purpose and intention. A custom, a habit, a practice, a rule, is assumed to have a specific object, to have been established for a definite end. This is the method of rationalism; and it takes insufficient account of emotional impulse under stress of new conditions and unexpected events, or of the speed with which the demand for repetition of behaviour may create a definite and permanent usage. For instance, in the discussion of "cuttings for the dead" (iii. 270-303), which is illustrated by evidence, ancient and modern, from both hemispheres, we are led up through a long series of instances in which mourning is expressed by cutting off the hair and gashing the face or wounding the body to the suggestion that the object of the survivors is to prevent their recognition and consequent visitation and annoyance by the ghost of the departed. But it does not follow that the reason now alleged by the modern Nicobarese, for instance, originally prompted such mutilations. Strong emotion needs to express itself vigorously. The inward pain of bereavement may have led originally to efforts to counter it by the infliction of pain upon the body; and the yearning to do something to demonstrate affection by the surrender of a cherished possession (such as the hair, with its associations of strength and value—compare the Samson story) must not be left out of account. When the chief mourner at Lord Palmerston's funeral dropped some valuable rings upon the coffin as it was lowered into the grave, he was only yielding to a primeval instinct in a modern sophisticated society

instead of shaving his head or drawing blood from his cheeks. Sir James Frazer is, of course, not unaware of this class of motives. But he makes hardly any use of them. Yet in his last chapter, apropos of church-bells, to which he is led by the bells on the high priest's robe, he remarks (iii. 454) that "we cannot understand the ideas of the people unless we allow for the deep colour which they take from feeling and emotion"; and he adds that "a study of the emotional basis of folk-lore has hardly yet been attempted; inquirers have confined their attention almost exclusively to its logical and rational, or as some might put it, its illogical and irrational elements." Perhaps in his forthcoming work the leader of English anthropologists will lay the foundations of this wider and more intimate investigation.

In dealing with the stories of the Creation, Sir James Frazer passes over the first chapter of Genesis with scant notice. Yet the derivation of the heavens and the earth out of primeval chaos is not without many interesting folk-lore parallels; the efficacy of the divine utterance rises out of the magic power of the word; and the origin of the week and the sacred number seven are open to illustration from various sources. The hint that God is conceived as androgynous is hardly consistent with the subsequent admission that the authors of the Priestly Code conceived God in an abstract form. The "Jehovist" story (as it is regularly called) supplies plenty of material for comparison; and on philological grounds, together with a satirical reference to a modern writer's remarks on the colour of the soil of Palestine, it is decided that the colour of the clay from which Adam was made was red. The ghost of folk-lore was sufficiently vigorous in the middle of the last century to prompt the exhibition in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre of some of this original red earth, where Harriet Martineau was privileged to see it. The subsequent citation of stories of an evolutionary type is really irrelevant, and appears to have been cunningly introduced to lead up to a parallel between Plato and the Arunta, with the implied suggestion that the fairest products of Hellenic wisdom rested upon an undergrowth of savagery. (Compare the similar hint in iii. 422 concerning Plato's sanction of the judicial prosecution of animals or lifeless objects causing human death, apropos of Exod. xxi. 28, or the likeness discovered between the Curetes clashing spear and shield around the infant Zeus and the Tagalogs of the Philippines, where a new-made father assembles his friends, armed with sword, shield, and spear, around the house, to slash furiously in the air and drive away the dangerous spirit threatening mother and child, iii. 472, 474.)

The analysis of the narrative of the Fall culminates in the proposal to reconstruct the original narrative out of two motives, the intention of Deity to confer immortality on man being perverted through a lying communication by the serpent, while the serpent secured immortality by casting his skin.¹ An ingenious assortment of stories supports these two propositions, about which the most interesting thing is that they should be presented at the outset of an elaborate work founded on the Old Testament and dedicated in sonorous and dignified Latinity "*Sanctæ Trinitatis apud Cantabrigienses Collegio.*"

The story of the Great Flood (i. 104-360) is examined in the light

¹ This suggestion had been already made in the volume presented to Professor Ridgeway (1913), p. 413.

of traditions from every continent save Africa, where "no single clear case has been recorded." In summing up the question of their possible connection, Sir James Frazer is opposed to the theory of the derivation of Greek or Indian legends from a Mesopotamian original. With minute knowledge of the different forms of the tale in Greece, and personal acquaintance with their several localities, he can reduce them to what Sir E. B. Tylor happily called "myths of observation." But the Indian narrative which first appears in the *Brāhmaṇa of a Hundred Paths* cannot be dismissed so easily. It must be studied in a larger historical context. Babylonian acquaintance with India can be traced back to the ninth century, when an Indian elephant is figured on an obelisk of Shalmanassar, well within the period allotted by Sir James Frazer's authorities for the composition of the *Brāhmaṇa*. Nebuchadrezzar employed Indian cedar in his palace at Birs Nimrud. The Buddhist texts which follow introduce into Hindu cosmography the picture of the central mountain and the regents of the four quarters of the world, which is generally recognised as of Asiatic origin. It is almost impossible to deny a connection between the judgment of Solomon and the Indian tale which our author only quotes from a late Jain version of the fourteenth century (ii. 571), though the older Buddhist form presents a much closer parallel. In view of the transmission of Indian stories to the Mediterranean by the beginning of the fifth century B.C., the probability of a similar origin for the example of Solomon's wisdom is greatly strengthened. The legend of Karna in the *Mahābhārata* which supplies a parallel to those of Sargon and Moses (ii. 451) falls into line with the indications of connection between the nativities of the Buddha and of Apollo, implying a yet wider circulation of folk-stories.¹ Further, the cosmology of primitive Buddhism exhibits for the first time the doctrine of world-ages closed by fire and water. This, too, there is good reason to ascribe to Babylonian influence. It is a curious circumstance that in both the Far East and the West instances of this dual method of destruction unexpectedly appear. It turns up in Sumatra (i. 218), among the Arawaks of British Guiana (i. 265) and the Indians of British Columbia (i. 319), associated with representations of divine punishment for human wickedness. In these cases there is no clue to the age of the stories. Brahman influences may have easily reached Sumatra. To what are the American versions due? Mexican culture shows some surprising analogies with Asiatic beliefs. Humboldt laid stress on the parallel of its doctrine of Four World-ages with that of India. Sir E. B. Tylor pointed first to the curious correspondence of a Mexican game called *patolli* with a kind of Hindu backgammon named *pachisi*, and then to the coincidences between four scenes of the journey of the soul after death in the so-called Vatican Codex from

¹ In discussing the story of Moses in the bulrush ark it is observed that as the father of Moses married his aunt (Exod. vi. 20), and unions of this kind are condemned as incestuous in Lev. xviii. 12, the mother of Moses may have had a more particular reason for thus treating her child than Pharaoh's command to throw all male Hebrew infants into the river. The early narrative in Exod. ii. does not name Moses' parents. They appear for the first time in a secondary stratum of the Priestly Code. What authority the writer followed we do not know. The father of Moses, Amram, is represented as a grandson of Levi. In Exod. ii. his mother is described as a "daughter of Levi," i.e. a woman of the tribe. The would-be genealogist, taking the term literally, united Amram in the second generation to Jochebed in the first. But to employ this relationship to convey an imputation is to confuse the data of documents that are centuries apart.

Mexico and scrolls from Japanese Buddhist temples. Each displayed (1) the soul's passage through the river of Death; (2) its dangerous transit between two mountains threatening to clash together and crush it; (3) its ascent of a mountain set with sharp knives cutting its hands and feet; (4) the perils of fierce blasts driving the blades through the air against its lacerated form. Here it would seem impossible to deny a connection. Similarly, the story of the man and woman who escaped from the Flood in a little bark, landed upon a mountain, and then had a great many children, just as Noah and Manu became the progenitors of a new race, may have owed its origin to the Asiatic tale. In another Mexican version the hero Tezpi and his wife and family entered a great vessel with animals and seeds sufficient to restock the world. When the waters abated the man sent forth a vulture; the bird fed on the floating corpses and did not return. It is the counterpart of the Biblical raven, though the reason why the bird did not come back to the ark is left to the reader's imagination. The Babylonian story, however, according to the version adopted by Sir James Frazer (with citation of different renderings), succinctly remarks: "The raven flew away, she beheld the abatement of the waters, *she ate*, she waded, she croaked, but she did not return." Did the detail survive in Christian tradition outside the Bible, or was it an artist's realistic supplement to the silence of Genesis which led the designer of the mosaics in the vestibule of St Mark's at Venice to depict the raven pecking at one of a number of corpses in the subsiding waves?

In the treatment of the patriarchs and Moses, Sir James Fraser follows the usual results of the documentary analysis of the Hexateuch. He accepts the historical reality of the three progenitors of the tribes of Israel, and deals with many of the Biblical stories as founded on actual occurrences. There is a good deal of embroidery in his reproduction of the ancient narratives. How does he know that there were deciduous trees in Eden, or that the Fall took place on an autumn day, so that the presence of the Deity was recognised by the "rustling of fallen leaves"? An undignified story is made more undignified by such exposition as this: "Apparently he (Yahweh) feared that when the tower reached the sky, men would swarm up it and beard him in his den, a thing not to be thought of. So he resolved to nip the great project in the bud" (i. 363). In Jacob's relations with his father-in-law we are bidden to see the attempt of two rogues to cheat each other, and their virtuous indignation at each other's rascality is "a delicate stroke of satire in the manner of Molière" (ii. 342). When Jacob "had drained the old man as dry as a squeezed lemon" (ii. 398), and is overtaken on his flight with his wives and flocks by the indignant Laban, in the expostulation which followed his father-in-law proved "as inferior in the gift of the gab as he was in the refinements of cunning. A man would need a very long spoon to sup with Jacob, and so Laban found to his cost." From these modern familiarities the reader will turn with satisfaction to such passages as those expressive of admiration for the "fine literary instinct" and the "fine moral instinct" which have pruned away many grotesque incidents of legend and myth (ii. 394), to the many successful descriptions of the scenery of Palestine when the author does not speak from the memories which inform corresponding pictures of the hills and glens of Greece, or to the vivid account of the visit of Saul to the witch of Endor. In spite of the curious parallels adduced from various tribes of East Africa, we find it difficult

to believe that Jacob's assumption of goatskin coverings on his neck and wrists in personating Esau really meant originally a new birth by which he became Isaac's heir (ii. 39), for no evidence is adduced that any such ideas can be found among Arab or other Semitic tribes. Nor does the suggestion that the mysterious adversary with whom Jacob wrestled at the ford of the Jabbok was the "jinnee" of the stream appear convincing (ii. 412), though Menelaus did catch the sea-god Proteus, and Peleus secured Thetis to wife, and Herakles wrestled with the river-god Achelous for the possession of Deianeira. Doubtless below the canonical literature of Israel there were many local beliefs and usages surviving from the lower culture, but Sir James Frazer offers no Semitic parallel to the conception of spirits of the streams and glens. Visitors to Ravenna may indeed recall the appearance of the river-god Jordan as a witness to the baptism of Christ in the Arian Baptistry, but this is plainly a symbol derived from classical mythology. Jacob's anxiety to learn the stranger's name passes unnoticed, perhaps because the control gained by such knowledge over the person of its bearer is too familiar a theme in magic and folk-tale to need illustration.

Sir James Frazer accepts Moses as the liberator of Israel from Egyptian bondage, and the real founder of its higher religion. The briefest of his chapters supplies a parable from the Celebes to the story of the waters of Meribah. It is not necessary to go so far. The myth-making instinct was still alive in the last century. When Garibaldi made his famous march over the Apennines after the siege of Rome in 1849, his men drooped in the heat upon the barren heights. In the danger of their exhaustion the hero fired a cannon against a cliff, and a stream of fresh water burst forth to the relief of the fainting troops. Following the Israelites into Palestine, the author sketches the connection of sacred trees, the oaks of three species (described by Sir Joseph Hooker) and the terebinths, with local sanctuaries. Determined to provide them, like the streams, with living occupants, he suggests that the three men whom Saul was to meet on their way up to Bethel (1 Sam. x. 3) may have encountered him at the oak where Deborah, Rebekah's nurse, was said to have been buried, and may have originally been the tree-spirit, "perhaps in triple form," prepared to bless the king at his inauguration (iii. 57)! How far modern Arab notions can be safely assumed as the common stock of ancient Palestinian belief must be sometimes doubtful. The current custom of hanging bits of rag on the branches of trees by the tombs of Moslem saints has many parallels elsewhere; but the author recognises that its motive is not always clear, and he offers no illustration from antiquity. After explaining that the groves on the hills were the survivals when the lower forests had been destroyed for agriculture, Sir James Frazer suggests that the Baals were the gods of the woodland. It was, however, claimed by their worshippers that they were the givers, not of the products of the wild, but of the corn and wine and oil from the field and the vineyard and the olive, under cultivation. W. Robertson Smith (whom our author frequently quotes with grateful commemoration) associated them with the fertilising waters which were the sources of all bounties of growth, and this view was still adopted in *The Golden Bough*. A wider view of inscriptional evidence and of other phases of Semitic culture shows that there were Baals of springs and wells, but also of trees and mountains and other objects; and the term cannot, therefore, be limited to any single group.

After a reference to the religious prostitution frequently associated with the "high places," it is somewhat surprising to find the Deuteronomic principle of the One Sanctuary criticised for inadequacy, as a retrogression rather than an advance (iii. 105). A multitude of sacred places seems better fitted to express the conception of an omnipresent Deity. In a vein of unusual sentiment the effect of the destruction of the high places is compared with that of a similar demolition of the village churches of England. "How sadly would our simple rustic folk miss the sight of the familiar grey tower or spire embosomed among trees or peeping over the shoulder of the hill! How often would they miss the sweet sound of Sabbath bells chiming across the fields!" etc., etc. The student who has realised the force of moral indignation in the prophets of the eighth century against the impure idolatries of the local sanctuaries will not be misled by such an analogy. Nor will he find Ezekiel lacking in ethical force because he provides a scheme for the temple-worship of a regenerated nation (iii. 109). His impassioned individualism draws all its strength from the intensity of his demand for personal righteousness, for purity, honesty, justice, and goodwill.

It is difficult in a few pages to give any adequate idea of the wealth of materials which these volumes contain. Some of the discussions stray far beyond the strict limits of the theme; others seem to miss the exact point. What is meant by "leaping on the threshold" (Zeph. i. 9)? The question is not answered precisely by illustrations of the necessity of stepping over it, for why should anyone want to jump upon it? nor is any definitive solution of the sacredness of the threshold reached. The explanation that it was haunted by spirits itself needs an explanation. How did the spirits get there? The custom of immuring human victims in the sides of gateways is well known (cp. Josh. vi. 26; 1 Kings xvi. 34). And there are cases where some of the dead are buried in the doorway. But, as Sir James remarks, this does not account for the superstition in the case of tents as well as houses; and there the matter ends. In treating of the ordeal of the bitter water (Num. v. 11-28), the exhaustive collection of cases of poison ordeal in Africa (iii. 307-405) only remotely bears on the Hebrew law, where the operative force is not poison but water into which the priest has put dust from the sanctuary, with the addition of a written curse. Earth from the sacrificial places was mixed in like manner with the draught for the ordeal among the Mossi of Upper Senegal (iii. 319), an interesting correspondence with Num. v. 17. Mohammedan medical practice for charming away disease or infusing love supplies some illustrations of the application of written words washed into drink or scrawled on food. But the scores of pages on African poisons throw no additional light upon the Pentateuchal usage.—The student will take leave of these volumes often wishing that the writer had chosen other themes for illustration. But he will have received impressive lessons in the range and method of inquiry, in the courtesy with which the labours of predecessors are recognised, and in the lofty conviction that truth, so far as it can be attained, is the best nourishment always and everywhere for the real spirit of religion.

A word of thanks must be added for an index of 86 pages. In another edition, would it not be desirable to add an index of Biblical passages?

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

The Justification of the Good. By Vladimir Solovyof. Translated by Nathalie A. Duddington, M.A.—London: Constable, 1919.—Pp. 475.

VLADIMIR SOLOVYOF died in 1900, at the age of 47. He was an ascetic who lived entirely for philosophy, and probably shortened his life by neglect of his bodily needs. In his lifetime he was regarded as an eccentric, but Russians now revere him as the teacher who best expresses the deepest thoughts of the Russian people.

The present work is an essay in moral philosophy, which presupposes a metaphysical doctrine not expounded in this volume. Readers of the English translation who are not acquainted with the earlier works of Solovyof should read Mrs Duddington's article, "The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyof," in the April 1917 number of this Review. Mrs Duddington has translated the book before us into excellent English. The only slips which betray the foreigner are the spellings "Antioch" (for Antiochus), "Teucres" (Trojan), and "Dominique." We must also protest that "the fettered slave to free" is not what Virgil meant by *parcere subjectis*. The Romans were not Liberationists.

The philosophy of Solovyof has points of resemblance to Gnosticism, to Neoplatonism, and to Jacob Böhme. It is possible, as some critics have done, to interpret the system as a sombre Manicheism, a characteristic product of Russian pessimism. There is, it must be owned, much that rouses the spirit of revolt in a Western mind. He regards three moral instincts as fundamental—shame, pity, and reverence or piety. The first, he says, is based on the sexual passion. It is here that European readers will find it most difficult to follow him. He treats reproduction as something shameful in itself, and thinks that when human beings are more moralised they will abstain from it altogether. He protests that he is not advocating race-suicide; but, as far as we can see, this is the logical outcome of his doctrine on the relations of the sexes. In some incomprehensible manner he seems to think that the birth of a new generation is responsible for the death of the old. Here he becomes quite unintelligible, for he does not attempt to justify so strange an opinion. Even apart from these Gnostic fancies, it is surprising that he draws no distinction between the shame which a conscientious man feels when he has transgressed the moral law, and the very different feeling which causes the civilised man to accept certain *tabus*—that, for example, which keeps certain *postscænia vitæ* out of sight and out of discussion. No principles of ethics are founded on these conventions, which hardly belong to morality at all. Similarly, the resolution of love into pity is surely a great impoverishment of the greatest among the theological virtues.

But these peculiarities of an ascetic, whose life seems hardly to belong to modern Europe, do not affect the greater part of his book, which follows familiar lines in the consideration of ethical principles. Solovyof is a Christian and a devout Churchman: he sees in the Church the potential, and in part the actual, embodiment of the religious instinct and the religious ideal. Yet he insists that "when tradition is put in the place of its object—when, e.g., the traditional conception of Christ is preserved in absolute purity, but the presence of Christ himself and his spirit is not felt—religious life becomes impossible, and all efforts artificially to evoke it only make the fatal loss more clear."

His refutation of hedonism is acute, and reminds us of T. H. Green,

when he denies that pleasure can be accounted for by the desire for pleasurable sensations, and that any summation of pleasures is possible. Self-sufficient hedonism is purely negative, and such freedom can only be a condition of obtaining a higher good and not that good itself. "Happiness is an unrealisable demand, to which the moral demand of the good as duty is in every respect superior."

Without attempting to follow the argument through all its branches, we may call special attention to the chapters about nationality, about legal punishment, about economics, and about war.

Nations prosper and are great only when they do not make themselves their final end. The Roman Empire might have been super-national in a good sense but for the immoral distinctions between Hellenism and barbarism, between Jews and Gentiles (for which, however, the Romans can hardly be held responsible), and between freemen and slaves. Christianity does not abolish nationality, any more than it abolishes personality or the family; it is a union of unions, each of which ceases to be a limit, and becomes the basis of wider harmonious relations. The nations to which posterity admits the largest debt unquestionably cared at the time of their greatness for the objective ideas of beauty and truth. "The men who created the national greatness of England never thought of nationalism as such." The British Empire was built up "by political and religious ideas—ideas of universal significance." In Germany, as in Italy, "the period of the highest development of the spiritual forces of the nation coincided with the period of political weakness and disruption." The ideal is to love other nations as our own; but not to cease to love our own, which retains the priority of a "starting-point."

In discussing the penal question, Solovyof, as we should expect from his nationality, repudiates the right to punish, in the strict sense, altogether. Almost all Russian thinkers have an anarchic sympathy with law-breakers and a sentimental dislike of capital punishment. Solovyof does not go so far in this direction as Tolstoy.

The chapter on the economic question is good. In a living community economic elements are correlated with and determined by moral ends. There is no economic law that men should be greedy and insatiable in the pursuit of gain. The principle that society should be the organised realisation of the good is supreme over economic laws, for these laws are the activities of man, who is a moral being. Economic materialism is the creed of the orthodox economist and of the socialist alike. There is no difference of principle between the bourgeois régime and the socialist revolt against it. "Consistent socialism, which intends finally to limit the life of humanity to its lower interests alone, is not an antithesis to, but the crowning stage of the one-sided bourgeois civilisation." There can be no social harmony on this basis, as recent history has proved clearly. All economic relations must be consciously directed to the common good. As against the unpractical idealism so common in Russia, Solovyof says that "to reject in the name of the absolute moral ideal the necessary social conditions of moral progress means, in the first place, in defiance of logic, to confuse the absolute and eternal value of that which is being realised with the relative value of the realisation as a process in time. Secondly, it means a thoughtless attitude toward the absolute ideal, which, apart from the concrete conditions of its realisation, becomes for man an empty phrase." He is in favour of maintaining private property, mainly

as a natural consequence of the family, to which he attaches an almost mystical importance. There is a real continuity of family life, and we should consider that we owe a debt to our ancestors which it is within our power to pay. They live on in their descendants. How this veneration for the family is to be reconciled with the author's horror of procreation, I am unable to say.

The first act of war—the murder of Abel—was caused by envy and not by hunger; the second, the revenge of Lamech, by pride and ferocity. The organisation of war by the State is the first step towards the establishment of peace. "The greatest of the states founded upon conquest described itself as *pax Romana*." In modern history three general facts have the most important bearing on the question of war: the development of nationality; the corresponding development of international relations of all kinds; and the extension of the unity of culture to the whole of the globe. The development of nationality has obviously not conduced to peace, since the national idea, when taken to be the supreme principle in the life of nations, has led to national pride and hatred or contempt for other peoples. Patriotism has lost its true character, and become idolatrous worship of one's own country. But the sentiment of patriotism needs to be purified, not destroyed. Nations are the living organs of humanity; apart from them we should have the peace of death, which is worse than war. The true unity of mankind must be based on the interaction of states which serve as a complement to each other. Solovyof, like C. H. Pearson and other historical prophets who wrote about the same time, hoped that an internecine war between Christian nations might be averted, but foresaw a gigantic conflict between Europe and the nations of the Far East. It is not certain, even now, that they were wrong; though the competition between the high-wage and the low-wage races may be fought out in the field of economic rivalry. And when Solovyof predicts that the struggle between Ultramontanes and social democrats may take the place of wars between nations, he may well prove to be a true prophet.

Solovyof is perhaps unlikely to take quite the same rank as a thinker in the West that he seems to hold in Russia. His moral philosophy is sound and good, but does not present any very original features; and, as has already been indicated, his view of life contains some ideas which are neither attractive nor altogether intelligible to those who have inherited a different tradition. But the mentality of Russia is so interesting and so important to other nations that we ought to be very grateful to the gifted translator for introducing us to a great writer whom the Russians themselves regard as their best representative in philosophy and ethics. The temporary eclipse of that mighty empire cannot prevent it from again pressing heavily upon its neighbours in the future. The Slav races will have their day; and their literature, already so influential in the field of fiction, will make its own characteristic contribution to the great debates in which civilised humanity is always engaged. The study of this volume may give some indication of the course which Russian idealism is likely to follow. We may guess that it will be unworldly, ascetic, and humane, perhaps forming a kind of bridge between the bustling, restless, European and the contemplative Indian with his lifelong quest of the Great Peace.

W. R. INGE.

THE DEANERY, ST PAUL'S,
LONDON.

God and Personality. Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen in the years 1918 and 1919. First Course. By Clement C. J. Webb, Fellow of St Mary Magdalen College, Oxford.—London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1918.

THIS volume is to be followed by another on Human Personality. It is clear, on the one hand, that the ascription of personality to God has behind it some idea of personality as formed by man in his own self-consciousness, while, on the other hand, Mr Webb points out that the definition of the idea has been largely due to theological discussions. This is his reason for the order of his two courses of lectures; but it is inevitable that the present volume should suffer from the lack of its supplement. We may hope that a few months will remedy the defect.

The greater part of the book is taken up by an historical account of the conception of personality and a criticism of its significance in theology. The historical matter is of great value and interest. A reviewer need do no more than refer the reader to it, though its general result may be indicated by the following passage: "The general history of the word Person with its derivatives in philosophical terminology may be said to have moved on the whole throughout on lines determined for it by the process whose result is summed up in the Boethian definition of *persona* [as *naturæ rationabilis individua substantia*]. Within these lines there has been a continual oscillation, according as the thought, emphasised by the Greek word *ὑπόστασις*, of independent and fundamentally unchangeable individuality, or the thought of social relationship and voluntary activity, suggested by the Latin word *persona*, has been uppermost." But the book is not entirely, or even mainly, historical. It is an essay in philosophical construction to which the historical matter is subsidiary. Its "principal business" is "a discussion of Personality in God; and this is not to be distinguished from a discussion of the place and value of Personality in the universe" (p. 21); and this again is the same problem as "that which is expressed in asking 'Is God the Absolute?' or again: 'What is the relation of Philosophy to Religion?'" (p. 213). As a constructive work it presents certain general features to which attention may be drawn.

In the first place, the book marks the reinstatement of definite theological discussion into philosophical inquiry. Mr Webb is equally at home in Christian theology and in philosophy; and he does not draw the line of distinction between them where it was drawn by tradition. The Scholastic view which has been recognised as orthodox distinguished sharply between doctrines which could be ascertained by reason and others which were matters of revelation. The existence and unity of God belonged to the former class; the doctrine of the Trinity to the latter. Later philosophers who have been interested in theology have usually allowed this distinction to guide their thought, although they may not have assented to, or troubled about, the grounds of the distinction. Yet Mr Webb does not draw the line in the same place or draw the line at all. If Plato, as Professor Burnet says, made theism a philosophical theory, then we may say that Mr Webb brings all the distinctive doctrines of Christianity within the range of philosophy. Of course, he has had a predecessor in Hegel; and the influence of Hegel and his successors may be traced in his work. But he does not reach these doctrines in the same

way as Hegel did; and he has a different method for justifying their introduction into philosophy.

This method is shown in his use of religious experience; and this is the other general feature of his work to which I would draw attention. "Natural theology is," he says, "the result of reflection on a religious experience mediated in every case through a historical religion" (p. 32). This position has two consequences: first, that problems such as those of the being, unity, and infinity of God, which have usually been assigned to natural theology and regarded as within the competence of the "unassisted" reason, depend for their solution on an experience which is always that of some particular religion; and secondly, that doctrines such as that of the Trinity, usually spoken of as "revealed," are equally within the range of philosophical theology, seeing that they arise from reflection on the same kind of religious experience. There will, therefore, be no distinction between natural and revealed theology—provided, of course, the doctrines contained in the sacred writings of any religion are taken simply as the record of or reflection upon a certain type of religious experience, and not as an authoritative standard for right thinking.

How religious experience is to be interpreted and what its valid bearing is upon our views of ultimate reality are important preliminary questions for this method of inquiry. On them Mr Webb has something to say, though he does not profess to discuss them thoroughly. Perhaps he lays too great stress on the formulæ which priests and councils have arrived at as compared with the immediate deliverances of the religious consciousness. In this, no doubt, he offers a needed corrective to the too individualistic preferences of William James and others. Yet the assertion that "in the public theologies and ecclesiastical polities of mankind we have the best expression of the normal religious experience of the peoples among whom they have arisen" (p. 242) may well appear to stand in need of qualification. "Ecclesiastical polities" are affected by so many influences that are alien to religion that they are apt to give a colour to doctrines which does not belong to the experience on which they are founded; and "theologies" may be fitted into an intellectual form due to historical conditions very different from those in which the religion arose. The latter process, for instance, took place when the experience of the early Christians was expressed in terms of Greek metaphysics; and the history of the idea of personality in the creeds, as traced by Mr Webb, is a case in point.

Mr Webb holds that religious experience has a real object; but the plan of his book does not allow of his establishing this position fully. He also looks to the grade of the experience as a ground for accepting one view and rejecting another of the nature of this objective reality. And on this point he has an interesting discussion. He thinks that there are two suitable criteria—"easier to apply than to formulate"—by which we may estimate the rank of a religion. The first of these tests is the success of the religion "in encouraging, and being itself encouraged by, moral and intellectual progress among its votaries." The second is "the greater or less extent to which it exhibits the specific nature of religion" (p. 245). Otherwise put, the criteria might be said to follow from the postulate of the ultimate harmony of all values—religious, moral, and intellectual. All the thinking in the volume either goes upon this postulate or tends to confirm it. Accepting this postulate, as I do, I am yet inclined to differ

from Mr Webb and to say that it is easier to formulate than to apply. We may assign the highest place among religions to Christianity because, more than other religions, it has encouraged the moral and intellectual life. We may assert also that, in the definiteness with which it attributes personality to the object of worship, it exhibits and stresses a factor which belongs to the specific nature of religion. But it is difficult to apply the postulate—or the criteria—to the vindication of particular doctrines. And this for two reasons. The doctrine in question may involve moral or intellectual interests and yet have been worked out without due regard to the claims of ethics or of science. And further, the religious interest does not operate by itself when it passes into the form of dogma, but is influenced by intellectual ideas which may be alien or misleading: as when Greek metaphysics, or Roman law, or primitive science contributed to the expression of Christian doctrine.

This influence should be borne in mind in reading Mr Webb's most interesting discussion of divine personality. "It is," he says, "by the possibility of [personal] relations that we judge of the presence of personality in others" (p. 104); and our ground for asserting the divine personality is, in the end, simply religious experience and its demand for personal relations with the highest object (pp. 70, 73). The Christian doctrine of divine personality is due to the fact that the historical Jesus was worshipped as God (p. 81). Mr Webb will not admit the phrase "personality of God." It is—or was—unorthodox; until quite recent times God was not spoken of "as a person" except by those who wished to deny the doctrine of the Trinity (p. 61). We should speak, therefore, of personality *in* God, but not of the personality *of* God. In this connection Mr Webb gives us what is really a philosophical defence of the Athanasian creed; and his argument is of the highest importance. The theologian could balance himself upon the razor-edge of orthodoxy by oscillating between the associations of the word *ὑπόστασις* and those of the word *persona*; and he did not define personality. Mr Webb does, however, define it, and he proceeds from the Boethian definition. It would seem, therefore, that the three persons of the Trinity are to be regarded as three *individuae substantiae*; and, if so, are we not perilously near the heresy of "dividing the substance"? The discussion, however, is not limited to the relation of *οὐσία* to *ὑπόστασις* and *persona*. More modern conceptions are utilised, and the Logos is said to be the *Appearance* of the ultimate *Reality*. Scriptural analogy might be cited in defence of this description, though it is hard to reconcile it with some points in the Creed. We may ask whether this "appearance" suffers from the "vice of contradiction" which is said to affect all appearances, and how it is related to finite minds and other appearances of the Absolute. These questions might be satisfactorily answered. Yet a real difficulty remains. On this scheme what place is to be assigned to the Third Person of the Trinity, and—still greater difficulty—what place to the First Person? Is God the Father the Absolute or only an "appearance"? The Creed says that the Son is begotten of the Father, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son; but that "the Father is made of none": generation and (by implication) procession are denied of Him. In this respect there is a distinction between the First Person and the other two, though their equality is reaffirmed. The Creed may be content to leave the matter "incomprehensible." In the interests of religion it has said enough—perhaps more than enough. But it

is not enough for the philosopher. As he will not use the phrase "personality of God," it is clear that for Mr Webb God the Father is not the Absolute. Still, I miss any clear account of the religious functions of the First Person of the Trinity, similar to those he gives of the Son and of the Spirit. Is it possible that he has been so much influenced by a certain novelist that the First Person is confused with the Veiled Being?

When we use the phrase "personality in God," what do we mean by "God"? Is the term simply a universal, connoting a common nature (Godhead or divinity) which all three Persons share equally, as different men share humanity, only in more intimate union than these can realise? This is not Mr Webb's view, and would, indeed, be simply tritheism. Or is God one *individua substantia*, consisting of (and exhausted in) three Persons? Perhaps this statement would be accepted by him, though I am not sure. If we do express ourselves in this way we shall have to lay stress on the associations of *persona* and ignore some of the associations of *ὑπόστασις*.

"No conception of God which takes him for less than the ultimate Reality will satisfy the demands of the religious consciousness" (p. 137). This view leads Mr Webb to criticise the current doctrine of a "finite God," and to defend the identification of God with the Absolute. As regards the criticism, it may be said that he has not been happy in the choice of an antagonist. But his own positive contribution merits—as indeed all his views merit—fuller discussion than is possible now. The first question here will be, What is meant by the Absolute? Mr Webb in one place defines it as "the ultimate system of Reality, within which God and his worshipper and everything else that is real must be embraced" (p. 144). If this is his meaning of the term, and God, therefore, means *both* God and his worshipper, then no room is left for the finite freedom which the author elsewhere asserts. Perhaps, however, this definition is intended to refer only to Mr Bradley's view of the Absolute. And he has another explanation in which the alternative phrases "a single ground of all things" and "an all-inclusive unity" are used (p. 216). The sentence suggests that these two phrases are identical in meaning. Yet "the ground" and "the all-inclusive system" are surely not identical. It is possible to hold that God is the "single ground of all things," but that he is not the "all-inclusive unity" or "ultimate system" which contains both himself and everything of which he is the "ground." The term Absolute might thus be restricted to the whole system of which God is the ground. The distinction is not merely one of terminology, as may be seen, for example, in *The Realm of Ends* of Dr Ward—a philosopher to whom Mr Webb does not refer.

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Self and Neighbour: An Ethical Study. By Edward W. Hirst.
London: Macmillan & Co., 1919.

THE saying of Sir William Harcourt that "we are all Socialists now" is still more true to-day, if we take the term to mean the insistence on some philosophy of individual life which is not riveted in self-centredness. Mr Hirst represents an increasing number of thinkers who see the way of approach to ethical problems through the community rather than

through the individual. "Reconstruction" is the watchword of the day; and though the word is often used in an ill-chosen way, yet the development of society demands the closest study, after the upheaval of a war in which civilised nations, as they were esteemed, have offered themselves for examination down to the very roots. Before the court of humanity, present and future, the nations appear as if individuals. As in the nineteenth century, especially the earlier part, social progress was dependent upon, or at least accelerated by theoretical individualism, so now in the twentieth century the philosophical bias has turned towards the community. Mr Hirst takes considerable trouble to criticise representative ethical systems based upon individualism in order to show their inadequacy. He disposes of egoism, universalistic hedonism, perceptive intuitionism, the Kantian ethic, quasi-social intuitionism, in less than fifty pages, and quickly dismisses Herbert Spencer's attempted "conciliation" of egoism and altruism (that is, "that the well-being of each rises and falls with the well-being of all") by regarding it as the "pre-dominance of an enlightened egoism."

These considerations take up Part I. of the book. This portion of Mr Hirst's work thus consists of clearing the ground. The doctrine of the "Good as Private" is the undergrowth of the intellectual and moral garden, and he wants to get us on to the highroad of human ethics. The author tells us he does not claim that this portion of the work is "exhaustive." "On the contrary," he says, "I have tried to make it as brief as possible, partly because it traverses ground which has frequently been worked over, and partly because a longer treatment might overstrain the patience of the reader."

Whilst the destructive criticism of Part I. is concise, it is well supported by references to excellent authorities, and the treatment is throughout provocative to all who maintain the doctrine of the "Good as Private" to come out into the open and justify themselves, or else repent and be converted. Nevertheless, we cannot help thinking that what is wanted most urgently on the critical side is not (even incisive) commentary on the egoism of Hobbes and of Nietzsche, or the utilitarianism of J. S. Mill, or the intuitionism of Shaftesbury or Butler, or the philosophical intuitionism of Kant, or the views of Hume and Adam Smith (with their "quasi-social intuitionism"), or of Herbert Spencer's "conciliation" of egoism and altruism. We should have liked, we confess, an analysis, followed by Mr Hirst's closest enlightening criticism, of the views of the ordinary man of business to-day, of the employer, the workman, the statesman, the professional man, the academic man, the lady of the house, the "domestic assistant," the schoolmaster, and if you will of the public schoolboy, the teacher-in-training, and the minister-of-religion-in-training. What are the explicit, and particularly the implicit, ideas of "the good" in their thinking?

When Mr Hirst proceeds to Part II. of his book, his thesis becomes "Goodness as Community." But if the attitude towards the community is the real basis of the good individual, we should gain enormously in our study of the problem by the investigation into the nature of the conceptions of the good as it presents itself to the different elements of the community. If we agree that Mr Hirst (with the assistance of Dean Hastings Rashdall, Mr Figgis, Professor Sorley, and Professor Sidgwick) sends to the right-about the whole host of the egoists, it is well so far; but if he wishes

to suggest the basis of "reconstruction," it is really society he wishes to reconstruct, though he prefers to define his aim as the reconstruction of ethical doctrine. He wishes to advocate a principle on which ethics might permeate the whole mass of the community, and addresses himself largely to a refutation of certain academic and technical ethical writers. Or, again, he might have appealed to those writers in the past who have substantially held his own views without having based them with the same precision on a philosophical foundation. For Mr Hirst's views, implicitly, might be found in the spirit of Jeremy Taylor on the one hand, and Richard Baxter on the other. "Self and Neighbour" as a title inevitably suggests the ethics of the Good Samaritan, and it is this fundamental conception which is at the basis of Mr Hirst's study. Of course, this spirit has not been without witness throughout history, though, unfortunately, the main lines of its advocacy from the point of view of the community have not been, apparently, separately traced.

For the essential feature of Mr Hirst's book, we venture to say, would be largely missed if the impression were given that he is merely a critical philosopher, out to displace one theory by another. His attitude is not that of indifferentism to the issue. He is a man with a profound ethical and philosophical conviction, and he would wish to convince others. He desires to convince the Comtist that the Positivist "live for others" does not reach to the idea of fraternity. T. H. Green and C. F. D'Arcy are found inadequate in their accounts of the principle of Common Good. Mr Hirst rather accepts Spinoza's view that it is reason which is the basis of Common Good, *i.e.* the will is rational and includes the communal *in its nature*. "Community," says Mr Hirst, "will not be attained simply by making 'good' inward, but by a true socialisation of the inward principle."

Mr Hirst is suggestive in his social psychology. Thus he maintains that the psychological basis of love, defined as community of man with man, is to be found in the parental instinct. We realise that a man may be rightly termed the father of his community. The term "love" implies a union of wills. "The 'ego' and 'alter' are not treated as opposed, but are merged." Thus, again, "in a true marriage, the husband and wife become 'protective' the one to the other. . . . The relationship is almost transmuted into a simulated relationship of parent and child—each is 'child' to the other; so that the 'boy' and 'girl' character of each of the partners to the other constitutes the poetry of a long and affectionate union, of which the child-features survive sometimes to old age." So Mr Hirst regards the created world as the revelation of God's "protective" activity, as Father, the universal Father. The sentiment of parental love is thus the fundamental element of all love.

To no one philosopher, on the constructive side of his book, does Mr Hirst seem to be really nearer, and to owe more, than to Professor Josiah Royce. "Royce," says Mr Hirst, "identifies the soul of society [the "beloved Community"] with the Divine Being." Mr Hirst states his difference from Royce. "We are willing to acknowledge that the idea of a 'beloved Community' is a moral conception. But in itself Charity (in the Pauline sense) cannot 'save' or provide its own energy, or supply its own inspiration. Charity must be allied with Faith in Him on whom the Community depends. Such faith 'worketh by love.' The Kingdom of Heaven is therefore not so much 'the community of God's beloved' as the community of those that love God, and is indeed a Church." Yet

Mr Hirst says elsewhere (p. 239), "The love of man for man cannot be sundered from the love of God for man."

But Mr Hirst leaves mother earth, with which Professor Royce is always in touch, and in his unchecked winged flights to the heights of speculation some will think he only finds what he seeks. He finds the "absolute impartiality and ethical perfection of love. . . . In this Unity in Trinity we have that perfect model of love which it is the task of all human life and every human institution to imitate. And it is interesting to note that the idea of a Divine Trinity has been a matter of definite belief to multitudes of intelligent people." Yet, if the doctrine of the Trinity sheds such transcendent light on the problem of the Community, why is it that the doctrine of "Goodness as Community" has not been a distinguished feature of the views of Trinitarians, and are we to assume that non-Trinitarians only have fallen back on the isolating influences of the doctrine of "Good as Private"?

The last chapter, on "The Principle of Community Applied," deals all too briefly with the application of the principle of fraternity to personal, social, industrial, national, and international life. It is here that we should have liked a much more detailed treatment. It is when the writer lets himself go on such applied subjects that we really feel we are getting on with the matter. It is not common for technical philosophers to write with such convinced fervour as this:

"We come to the supremely important practical question as to the means by which love may be begotten in the hearts of men. If we declare these means to be Education, that term must be understood in its largest sense. Chief among the forces that socialise the nature of man is the education that comes from the cultivation of the religious life. For, as we have said, it is pre-eminently in religion that man realises the hand that binds him to his fellow. For, however interconnected by various ties of secular interest human lives may be, not until man realises by an active faith that God is the universal Father—not until then does he also realise with vividness and power that his neighbour is his brother."

This is the last paragraph of Mr Hirst's book. But it is precisely here that, instead of ending, we should like to have Mr Hirst beginning. With his insight into ethical problems, with his love of his fellow-men, with his evident faith in education, this is just what we want to know: How to relate education to the idea of goodness as community? If Mr Hirst is right that it is through religion that the fitting education necessarily comes, what has he to say to the idea of the exclusion of the teaching of religion from the day-schools of Great Britain?

This book shows in its author qualities of clear-headedness and warm-heartedness. Unfortunately, in our opinion, the writer attempts too much criticism, in which he does not allow himself adequate scope for full treatment, and too little exposition as to the practical applications of his views, for which readers would have been particularly grateful.

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Roads to Freedom. By Bertrand Russell.—London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1918.—Pp. 215.

READERS of the *Principles of Social Reconstruction* will welcome this further contribution to fundamental problems of politics and economics. The book consists of two parts. In the first Mr Russell gives a brief but illuminating survey of the doctrines of Socialism mainly as taught by Marx, of Anarchism as represented by Bakunin and Kropotkin, and of Syndicalism and Guild Socialism. In the second part he expounds his own views on Work and Pay, Law and Government, International Relations, Science and Art under Socialism. The historical portion is somewhat slight, and gives merely the broad and contrasted outlines of the doctrines referred to. He is chiefly concerned to bring out the defects of State Socialism, but his criticisms apply rather as against certain Marxians than as against either Marx himself or his strict followers. Mr Russell draws attention to certain ambiguities in Marx's attitude to the State, but it seems clear that neither he nor Engels can be described as State Socialists. This is evident from the Communist Manifesto, and from the following passage which I quote from Engels' *Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*: "The society which will organise production on a basis of free and equal association of producers will put the whole machinery of the State into its proper place, the museum of antiquities where it will lie side by side with the spinning-wheel and the bronze axe." Their view can be summed up in the following three statements:—

1. The State is the result of the class-struggle, and generally it serves as the instrument of the class which is strongest economically.
2. The workers should aim at seizing political power, but this only with the view of concentrating within their own hands all instruments of production and of bringing about the social revolution.
3. After the social revolution class distinctions will have disappeared, for the simple reason that there will only be one class. Consequently, the State, which represents the domination of one class over others, will lose its *raison d'être* and will disappear likewise.

This attitude to the State is adopted in essentials by many Syndicalists. Lagardelle, *e.g.*, though he often argues against parliamentary or political methods, is yet of the opinion that the working class needs political democracy for the present, though this only in order the better to destroy it. Sorel himself in his earlier writings regarded Syndicalism as a logical outcome of the teaching of Marx, as is evident from his *L'avenir socialiste des Syndicats*. Between this position and the view of Syndicalist Anarchists like Pouget and Griffuelhes, who repudiate political action even as a provisional measure, there are all sorts of gradations. It is interesting to note that some Guild Socialists are prepared to recommend the nationalisation of certain industries, *e.g.* mining and transport, though only as a provisional measure and because they recognise that the workers are not yet ready to assume complete control. Mr Russell does not distinguish clearly between those Socialists who would only use political methods provisionally and the genuine State Socialists who would retain the State after the social revolution. Nor does he deal with the type of Collectivists represented by Mr and Mrs Webb, who are now inclined to assign considerable power to local groups as against the central authority, to democratically organised co-operative societies, to Trade Unions organised on

a national basis, with much devolution of authority to smaller district unions and even workshops.

Turning now to Mr Russell's own views, we note that while in the *Principles of Social Reconstruction* he advocated a kind of mixture of Syndicalism and the Co-operative System, he now declares himself emphatically as a supporter of Guild Socialism, though with a decided flavour of Anarchism. Pure Anarchism, on the other hand, though it should be our ideal, is for the present impracticable. He agrees with the Syndicalists in their negative criticism of State Socialism and in their insistence upon direct control of industry by the producers or workers. On the other hand, the Syndicalists are, in his view, mistaken in trying to abolish the State. The system recommended is Guild Socialism—a compromise between State Socialism and Syndicalism. The fundamental idea is that only by dividing the enormous power now wielded by Industrial Capitalism in the State can the individual be free, and this can be best secured by granting self-government to every important group in all matters that affect that group much more than they affect the rest of the community. The Guild Socialists think that it is above all necessary to divide political from economic power, and they propose, therefore, a double organisation—a parliament representing the producers, consisting of delegates chosen by the Guild, and a parliament representing the consumers, elected on a territorial or local basis. The function of the State will be to deal with all that class of collective actions which affect all members equally and in the same way. Mr Russell accepts this position in the main, but he fears that the evils now connected with State omnipotence will reappear under the Guild System. It is quite likely, *e.g.*, that the dominant personalities in the two parliaments will join hands and so deprive the individual of the liberty which he had hoped to retain by balancing one force against another. Mr Russell's remarks in this connection may perhaps act as a corrective to the rather naïve hopes of some of the Guild Socialists, who seem to imagine that all the evils of bureaucracy and officialdom will disappear with the mere transference of power from the political bodies to the Guilds and the Guild Congress. On the other hand, neither Mr Russell nor the Guild Socialists seem to recognise that no harmonious development is really possible so long as matters are arranged as a mere adjustment of conflicting interests. Nor do they deal adequately with the difficulty arising from the circumstance that the separation of powers on which Guild Socialism rests is confronted with the plain fact of the vital interdependence of all activities of society. How, *e.g.*, can one separate international relations, which belong to the State, from control of economic production, which belongs to the Guilds? The two are intimately connected.

Mr Russell's own delimitation of the sphere of government is far from clear. Government and law, since they involve restrictions on freedom, are, as such, an evil, though, owing to the fact that to allow full liberty to the strong might mean to curtail the liberty of the weak, a necessary evil. It follows, however, that whatever governmental interference there is must be reduced to a minimum. The function of the State is essentially to maintain order—so that the system might not inaccurately be described as one of "anarchy plus the policeman." From various passages in the book before us, as well as from the *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, it is, however, clear that the State also has certain positive functions, and these may be

summed up in the principle that in those matters in which the welfare of the community depends on the attainment of a certain minimum the State has a right to insist that that minimum shall be attained. It may be questioned whether this principle is not as elastic as the principle formulated by the Idealists that State action should be confined to securing the external conditions of the good life and to hindering hindrances to freedom. Both may be interpreted in a way which will meet with the approval of the most ardent of State Socialists. Who is to determine whether certain conditions can be called "external"? Who is to define the minimum? Mr Russell himself in his previous book includes under the positive functions of the State, sanitation, compulsory education, care of children, encouragement of scientific research—though it would seem that these more positive functions are to be exercised by voluntary organisations, the State merely guaranteeing a certain minimum. In the end Mr Russell is compelled to admit that there is no method by which a representative body can guarantee liberty. What is needed, he thinks, is, above all, a diffused respect for liberty, an absence of submissiveness to government, a readiness on the part of minor organisations to offer resistance in case of undue interference. But is not this in effect to abandon the problem?

The discussion of work and wages, though exceedingly interesting, strikes one as somewhat unreal. Mr Russell advocates a "vagabond's wage" to all, whether they work or not, and an additional income graduated according to the number of hours worked and the agreeable or disagreeable nature of the work. In this he departs from Guild Socialism and leans rather to Anarchism, but the departure is justified by him "in the interests of science and art, human relations and the joy of life."

The evils of international relationship arise, in Mr Russell's view, from competitiveness, love of power, and envy. The remedy is to be found in a better economical and political system, including the establishment of a genuine League of Nations, general disarmament, and a disinterested treatment of the subject races. Mere institutions, however, are not sufficient. Above all, we are in need of a better education and a different moral and mental atmosphere.

What is most attractive in the book is the general spirit that pervades it, a spirit of hope for mankind, of belief in the malleability of human nature and the possibility of turning human impulses away from domination and destruction towards freedom, life, and the joy of creation.

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The Principles of Citizenship. By Sir Henry Jones.—London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1919.—Pp. x+177.

WHAT contribution may philosophy be expected to make to the rebuilding of society at the present time? One answer to this question is suggested by Sir Henry Jones' indication, in the preface to his *Principles of Citizenship*, of the purpose the book was intended to fulfil. It was written for use in the classes on civics established under the Y.M.C.A. Army Education Scheme in France, 1918. The philosopher, it may be held,

should convince the ordinary citizen of the need for thought. Another possible answer presents itself as the book is laid down, and we reflect on what it has accomplished and what is beyond its scope. It might be considered the function of philosophy to grapple with the problem which is at the root of the tragedy of human history, the Hamlet-problem of the world. How is thought to control life? Can reason greatly influence human action on a large scale, the behaviour of nations, the process of history? For success in either of these tasks, whether to inspire the will to thought or to make thought effective in life, the philosopher must gain the confidence of the world.

The question, "Why is philosophy distrusted by the world?" is asked in the first chapter. Sir Henry Jones, whilst observing that a complete answer is beyond the scope of the book, suggests—here diverging from Plato—that the blame lies with the philosopher rather than the world. From his argument that the reason for the conflict of national ideals resulting in the war lay in the failure to approach the facts of the moral world in the spirit of natural science, it may be inferred that one cause at least of the public mistrust of philosophy is to be found in this failure. Philosophy has not guided statesmen and nations to the right method of discerning the moral facts and laws, and as the book aims at proving, "the welfare of the State and the well-being of the citizen depend upon moral conditions" (ch. ii.). Sir Henry Jones' lofty defence of the method of ethics which employs intelligence in determining principles of conduct as against all appeals to emotions, intuition, etc., is no doubt prompted by opposition to some recent tendencies to depreciate reason in this sphere. In some expressions, however, he seems to rely more upon experience than is compatible with his general ethical position, as indicated in such statements as, "There is no ulterior why, no anterior cause or explanation of the moral good. . . . To ask why I should be moral is to ask an unanswerable question"; or, "Every moral good is a common good, and every moral law is binding on all rational beings," etc.

It is the application of the ethical principles to the questions of the national ideal and the nature of the State which forms the main interest of the book, both philosophical and practical. "The greatest task ever set mankind ought now to be known as that of seeking the truth in moral matters, and discerning the false good and the true: for the destiny of nations lies in their ideal." The Platonic doctrine that everything must pursue its own conception of the good gives the point of view from which the origin of the world-war is explained. Two irreconcilable conceptions of national good had been allowed to grow to full strength, and their conflict was inevitable. The result is due, at least in part, "to the fact that neither nation has applied itself with true and serious intentions to the scientific study of the ends and conditions of human life." The philosophy of the national ideal implied seems to require for its validity the identification of nation and State, and the analogy between State and individual more strictly conceived even than by Plato. From this analogy as later pursued some curious results would follow, due to the fact that the State in question is that of a modified Neo-Hegelianism, whilst the individual is the person of modern thought with his "finite-infinite" character. If "the ideal is the truth of the real," the principle that the State is a moral personality has to be applied in all its fullness to the actual State, and of this State also the infinitude of personality is a characteristic.

Whilst condemning both nations (England and Germany) for failure scientifically to examine their respective ideals, Sir Henry Jones ascribes a permanent value to the ideal developed through English history if carried further to the inclusion of the free self-development of all nations in accordance with the promise revealed in it during the war, and the final rejection of the baser elements attached to it through the pursuit of material prosperity. The question may be asked whether a national ideal can conceivably be formed in any other way than that in which this ideal has been created. It is the gradual result of the constant expression, in those central moments of history in which the people act as one, of the highest ideal of character in the individuals. Study of its ideal by the nation takes the form of interpretation by men of genius, through which it rises to self-consciousness as the people learn to love its representation in heroic types. To reject tradition, feeling, intuition, etc., from their share in its formation would be to refuse to every nation in history the possession of a well-founded ideal. At the turning-points of history the thinkers may set the ideal in an unusual light and urge to its further purification. Their logic finds a response in the deeper logic of feeling and practice from which the ideal proceeds.

The closer examination of the nature of the State is introduced by a discussion of the question whether the State is a moral being, which, as is pointed out, is raised in an extreme form by the war. The German view of the State as above moral obligations is shown to be self-contradictory since it includes the ascription to the State of a will which is "used to strike at the heart of liberty, the very condition of morality." Such a State is not non-moral but immoral, and it appears to follow that the true State is a moral agent, and therefore a person. That personality is essential to the State itself does not seem to be logically involved in the fact that the forces of a State have been used either for immoral or for moral purposes. It must further be shown that the structure of the State is such as to constitute it a person, and this is recognised by the author. The demonstration, however, which might be expected here of the possibility of an effective organisation of the real will of the whole people in the State is not given, and the principles of State action approved later are in so far lacking in a complete basis. In chapters iii. and iv. the essential correspondence between State and individual is assumed, and the problem of the freedom of the individual, as subject and sovereign, is dealt with on its theoretic side. It is argued on lines familiar in idealistic philosophy that since individuality is comprehensive as well as exclusive, and State and individual interpenetrate, the true State does not in its action curtail the citizen's freedom, for his highest liberty lies in service to the law inspired by universal reason. If this part of the book is not completely satisfying as a philosophical justification of the principles of the "Mutual Service and Mutual Obligations of State and Citizen" (iv.), this is perhaps because present conditions give new strength to doubts whether the logic of the historic nation-State will ever be adequately translated into that of the concrete universal. When Sir Henry Jones is emphasising the moral personality of the State he identifies it with everything which the native-land for which he is willing to die means to the citizen, the spirit of all its history, the object of every affection aroused by home, and the imagination of the vast community past and present with kindred traditions and purposes. But when he passes to the State as an "educational institution" (v.) which,

whether teaching its citizens "the nature of the good," or employing all the means at its disposal for constraining them to develop their capacities to the fullest extent, appears in the guise of a Government with force behind it, he has surely left behind the conception of the "one will in which many wills are united." It is only at a very few crises in national life that men are prepared to regard this entity indifferently as nation, country, social home, or executive authority. The difficulties in the way of treating the State on principles dictated by the concrete universal idea are due to the fact that it is the most dynamic of all existences since its content is primarily persons, not qualities, as indeed Sir Henry Jones seems to agree (*cf.* p. 78). The highly intricate problems with which diplomacy has recently been confronted, in the endeavour to define what constitutes a State, suggest that the unity of a people will always be a matter of degree, and that the community of "blood, language, customs, traditions, and history" (Professor A. C. Bradley, quoted p. 116) required for its perfection will always be rare. It may be agreed that the value of the contribution which a people as such can make to progress will be highest when this unity is most nearly approached; but even where this can be affirmed, the problem of realising the unity of the general will, through the machinery of government, will remain very imperfectly solved. It appears, then, that Sir Henry Jones' principle for determining the limits of State interference—viz. that "a good and wise State cannot have too much liberty, or power, or sovereignty" (iii.)—cannot be easily applied in actual States; and that his doctrine that in pursuance of the true end, or the development of the citizen to his highest possibilities, there is not "any department of man's life, however private, into which its entrance would be an invasion or interference" (v.) might have consequences inimical to liberty. For the State—i.e., here the authority which represents more or less perfectly the will of a transient majority—is to be the judge of the means and their relation to the end.

When, at the conclusion of this book, the reader reflects on the special purpose for which it was written, he will possibly feel that, however provocative of thought it will be to the thinker, a method based on the truth that "thought's the slave of life" for the majority would be of more universal practical value. It is stated in the preface that problems will be given for the learner to solve, but these problems are presented from a definite philosophical standpoint. They do not appear in all their original ruggedness, or before thought has loosened their clutch upon the ordinary mind. The practical citizen at grips with his problem may hardly recognise it in all its bitterness when it is put before him with the sting already drawn by an optimistic philosophy, and may feel, therefore, that his own problem has not been solved. The treatment of the Pacifist (chapter iii.) and of Property (vi.) may be taken as illustrations, though it should be added that the former problem, as that of the conscientious objector, is stated as it were for the simpler stage of thought in the final chapter. Possibly we ought to understand that the book is intended primarily as a guide to the teacher rather than the average student of the army classes. In any case, we may be grateful to Sir Henry Jones for impressing in his lucid style, on all, the duty of hard thinking on the subject of civic organisation, and also for demonstrating that such thinking forces us on to profound problems of philosophy. He is taking perhaps the only possible means of bringing nearer the time when life will be controlled by thought, or when

"statesmanship is too wisely practical to be frustrated and defeated by the nature of things" (p. 89). The influence of thought over the destinies of nations may have very circumscribed limits, but it may certainly be said that these have not yet been reached.

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LONDON.

The Rival Philosophies of Jesus and of Paul: Being an Explanation of the Failures of Organised Christianity and a Vindication of the Teachings of Jesus, which are shown to contain a Religion for All Men and for All Times. By Ignatius Singer.—London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1918.—Pp. 347.

IF you approach a subject without knowing what work has been done at it by others before you, you may achieve considerable freshness of treatment, but it will be at the expense of what is colloquially called "giving yourself away" from time to time. This book is written with a great deal of confidence, in plain, lucid English, though without any of the more delicate nuances of style which a fastidious literary taste might demand. The only approach to a purple passage is at the close of Part I., where a most unfair attack is made on Christian priests and congregations, who are pictured as shutting themselves up in their churches to chant and pray, in complete indifference to the miseries of suffering humanity outside. If what has been done by the Church, or the Churches, for the good of man be eliminated, that which is left for the credit of other benefactors will be little indeed. Will it be claimed for the Howards and Wilberforces and Shaftesburys that they derived no inspiration from the Christ?

The book does not show much sense of reverence, or of consideration for the feelings of those who may happen to differ in opinion from the author. For him theologians are a despicable race, to be mentioned only with scorn. His aim is to disentangle the teaching of Jesus from the accretions superlaid, as he alleges, by Paul; and he claims that the results thus obtained must be as universally and as inevitably accepted as the facts of science. He desires to establish that "Jesus was not the founder of Christianity; that the Christ myth had no existence until many years after his death."¹ It is abundantly clear that in this project the author regards himself as a pioneer. Although he has read a number of "Lives of Jesus," he is unaware of the Jesus-Paul controversy and of the far-extended controversy on the Jesus of history and the Christ of the Church. He frankly confesses that when he began to write the "facts" were unknown to him, and came to light only as he proceeded.² Having dissociated himself, as he tells us, "at an early age from what is conventionally called religion," he has no idea that many of his discoveries are the common property of educated Christians. He thinks it is "the common belief that the Gospels are the oldest documents of the New Testament writings," and takes great pains to prove their posteriority to St Paul's epistles. A footnote to p. 72 informs us that after writing he had learnt

¹ P. 29.

² P. 29.

that others had made the discovery before him. Another footnote, on p. 133, ranks the Apocryphal Gospels (which he calls "the Apocrypha") "as equal with the canonical documents as sources of history." After this it is hardly surprising to find that, having occasion to quote from Blass a passage referring to Codex D, he informs his readers that D is "a manuscript Gospel of Luke in the Cambridge Library." What an inadequate description! On p. 257 he avows his ignorance of what is meant by the appellation "higher critics." And it appears that he has no conception of a critical text of the New Testament. Not only is this evident from his treatment of the text, but on p. 284 there is this truly amazing note, which I must transcribe: "'It is stated in the preface to their Revision that they did not esteem it within their province to construct a continuous and complete Greek text. They adopted, however, a large number of readings which deviated from the text presumed to underlie the Authorised Version' (E. Palmer in his preface to the Greek Testament new edition). I have *italicised* the few words so as to direct attention to the fact, not commonly known to laymen, that there is no continuous and complete Greek text of the N.T. in existence, except what has been constructed by compilers, commentators, translators, or revisers; and that these did not shrink from altering the text whenever they deemed it advisable to do so." He is astray sometimes in his strictures on the translation. Thus, quoting Matt. xx. 26, he prints "minister" in italics, putting after it "(sic!)" in a bracket. Can it be that he forgets the proper meaning of the Latin word *minister*, and is misled by the technical ecclesiastical usage of *διάκονος*? He is quite indignant at the rendering "Gentiles" for *ἔθνη* in the same context, being oblivious of the contrast often drawn between *λαός* and *ἔθνη* (cf. Lk. ii. 32). Of "take no thought for the morrow" he gives the correct interpretation, but accuses the translators of the A.V. of a "blunder—provided it is nothing worse than that," remarking that the phrase "seems to have been specially invented to meet the needs of the case, for nowhere else, and in no other connection, is it used in the English language." This is a rash assertion. Anyone can find it for himself in Chaucer and Shakespeare if he will refer to Skeat's glossarial index to the former and to almost any glossary to the latter.¹ Commentaries also give a reference to Bacon which I am not able at the moment to verify. Chaucer, Shakespeare, Bacon, and the A.V. are, I imagine, pretty good authorities for a phrase, even though it happens to be now obsolete, and so open to misunderstanding.

Our author is ready enough to accuse the evangelists of inconsistencies, but he has not sufficiently thought out his subject to be always consistent with himself. Thus on p. 46 he assures us, "We do not possess, as far as is known, a scrap written by Jesus himself. We do not even know whether he has ever written anything on preservable material"; but by the time p. 61 is reached he is arguing that the Sermon on the Mount and some other passages must have been written down by Jesus himself, "because nobody else could possibly have done so in the terse, forcible, and convincing language save the mind that had thought them out and was familiar with the philosophy that was underlying them all." On p. 48 we are assured that "We do not know for certain in what language Jesus spoke, except that it was not Greek"; but on p. 136 we find, "There is a probability that he had access to Greek learning," and the infancy legend

¹ Under "Thought."

of the flight into Egypt is utilised as possibly enshrining a tradition of a time spent in that country, perhaps in Alexandria. Yet again, p. 231, the opinion is expressed that "Jesus probably spoke in Aramaic." This last, of course, is the generally accepted notion of the day; but, for my own part, I still think that a good case may be made out for Greek as the habitual language of Jesus and his disciples. *E.g.*, in what language was the trial before Pilate conducted? There is no hint of an interpreter, and what language but Greek could be common to all?

From the above criticisms it will be abundantly evident that I find it difficult to take this book very seriously as an interpretation of either Jesus or Paul. The author does not perceive that, if it be true that Paul was the inventor of "Christianity," he must have been one of the greatest men who ever lived, instead of the narrow-minded bigot and pedant who is here depicted. Jesus, it is true, is represented as supremely great, but his greatness consists in a marvellous acquaintance with the unvarying laws of nature, and his teaching is over and over again manipulated till it becomes only an enlightened application of far-seeing common-sense. The kingdom of heaven, of which he spoke, is practically the reign of natural law, and there is hardly an indication that religion, as the author views it, has anything to say about the unseen world and what lies beyond the grave. Yet there is abundant evidence at the present time that the heart of man is not satisfied with a religion which stops short with this earthly life. I do not urge that this fact alone proves the truth of Christianity, but it indicates that no religion can be acceptable which does not penetrate into the unseen.

There are many interesting remarks on the Golden Rule, and on the practical application of the "philosophy" of Jesus, but this is expounded as though he were a Western revolutionist, and without reference to Oriental ways of thought. Yet Jesus was an Eastern! It is explained, in some detail, that if the assassins of Serajevo or the Austrian Emperor had followed the rule of loving one's neighbours as oneself, the Great War would not have broken out. I am not so sure of it, since it seems pretty certain that Germany was bent on fighting, and if one pretext failed another would have been found or invented. It is satisfactory that our entry into the war is vindicated, and is found to be in accordance with the teaching of Jesus. Much is made of the parable of the Good Samaritan, but neither here nor elsewhere have I ever seen the question discussed, What would have happened if the Samaritan, instead of turning up when all was over, had arrived just as the assault was being committed?

If a choice must be made between Jesus and Paul, no one, of whatever school, will hesitate for a moment as to where his allegiance shall be offered; but those who have penetrated most deeply into the mind of the Master have never found the discrepancy, nor will this book convince them. One other question: It is here positively asserted that the synagogues in which Paul preached were those of the Essenes; what proof is there that the Essenes had any synagogues?

The book has no index.

G. E. FRENCH.

WEST CAMEL RECTORY.

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